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This  thesis  proposes  and  explores  a  fundamental  interrelation  between  philosophy, 
education  and  noise.  A  speculative  bridge  is  constructed  between  Alain  Badiou’s 
philosophy and Paulo Freire’s pedagogy, whereby noise is posited as the phenomenological 
(temporal)  appearance  of  Badiou’s  ontological  (atemporal)  notion  of  ‘the  void’.  Such 
temporalisation of  the void drives the key conjecture of  the argument: if, for Baidou, 
philosophy  is  the  opening  of  a  space for the  compossible  thinking of  political,  artistic, 
scienti'c and amorous truths, I propose therefrom that education is the caring of  the 
time produced in praxis by the subjects engaged in the investigations of  such truths. It is 
within  such  pedagogical  temporality,  then,  that  noise  emerges  as  the  (neg)entropic, 
phenomenological trace of  the isentropic, ontological void. Education intervenes amidst 
the noise as a reassuring injunction to  keep going  regardless of  the anxiety which will 
inevitably  assault  the  subjects  throughout  their  uncertain  inquiry.  Given  that  the 
subjective  trajectory  purely  follows  the  consequences  of  an  undecidable  event,  this 
pedagogical  relation  subtracts  itself  from  all  established  laws.  I  claim  that  such  an 
“education in noise” is inherently Freirean insomuch as it constitutes a fundamental site 
of  resistance to the oppression of  constituted power. Noise is immanently subversive 
inasmuch as it enkindles  innen- and  um-subjects that are completely indigestible to the 
status quo of  the state. This indigestibility represents the subtractive face of  noise (on the 
side of  an ontology woven on the void): noise, however, is also immanently relational (on 
the side of  the inter-subjective production of  a new logic).  I conclude that by being 
ontologically subtractive and logically relational an education in noise manages to remain 
both subversive (insofar as it subtracts itself  from all established knowledge)  and critico-
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Preface: The Noise of the Oppressed vis-à-vis Badiou’s Philosophy
Event, truth, subject, education, noise––such are some of the main theoretical threads 
interweaved  throughout  this  thesis.  These  purely  speculative  themes  represent  a 
collection of conceptual artifacts gathered by a thinking which has been ignited, and is 
constantly  refuelled,  by  an  artistic  and  pedagogical  practice.  In  other  words,  what 
follows is a discursive elaboration reHecting on a particular mode of  making and  doing, 
which in my case happens to be that of a composer, performer and teacher. 
Although  I  am by  no  means  the  only  “classically  trained”  musician  with  a 
declared commitment to (what is sometimes regarded as)  the lesser practices of free-
improvisation, experimental noise and so-called “community music”, examples of such 
trespassings in this  'eld  do not abound:  in the  terrain of  music,  like in every other 
(artistic, scienti'c, academic) domain, borders are drawn, specialisations are actualised, 
and deterritorialisation is foreclosed.1
One of my main activities for the past 'fteen years has been to direct an experimental 
music group I founded in 2003, the cardboard citizens new music ensemble (ccnme), members 
of which are all homeless people, asylum seekers and refugees (it is a project that exists 
under  the  organisational  umbrella  of  the  Cardboard  Citizens theatre  company,  main 
practitioner of the Theatre of the Oppressed (TO) techniques in the UK; I have been,  
since  2004,  acting  as  the  Musical  Director  in  most  of  the  company’s  performances. 
Gradually,  a  repertoire  of  music-making  techniques  devised  for  collective  group 
improvisation (warmups, exercises, compositions and the like) developed through years 
1 A preeminent example of a classically trained composer with a masterful grasp of both improvisation 
and community  music  practices  would be Daryl Runswick,  whom I have the privilege of calling my 
teacher.
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of practice. This technical arsenal 'nally individuated in an artistic, pedagogical and 
militant framework which I named the Noise of the Oppressed (NO). 
The choice of such a slightly grandiose name, with its conspicuous pointer to 
Paulo Freire’s  Pedagogy of  the Oppressed (PO) and Augusto Boal’s  Theatre of  the Oppressed 
(TO),  seems  to  pretentiously  place  NO  as  a  descendant  of  one  of  the  greatest 
pedagogico-artistic genealogies of the twentieth century. Even considering the fact that 
NO was indeed conceived, born and developed within the real of TO practice, it would 
seem like an overambitious gesture, and hence one that begs a short explanation. 
The historical link between TO and PO is a well documented fact which today, almost 
three  quarters  of  a  century of  perspective  makes  appear  as  something like  a logical 
development. If Boal explicitly acknowledged his intellectual––or even spiritual––debt to 
Freire, whom he referred to as ‘my father’,2 the connections between TO and PO were 
as structural as they were institutional, right from the start of their joint pioneering work 
at the Movimiento de Cultura Popular3 in the Recife of the early sixties. That the activities of 
TO had been historically encased within Freire’s PO framework is something which 
Boal  was  always  careful  to  point  out,  in  particular  when  clarifying  the  differences 
between  TO  and  ‘the  counterculture’  of  the  time.4 And  that  connection  remained 
unchanged for the rest of the century, even as PO and TO each became in their own 
right the worldwide seismic movements we know of today.  
2 See Augusto Boal, Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics, trans. by Adrian Jackson (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 126.
3 A public body set up by the local government of Recife at the start of the 60s;  Freire was its  'rst  
director.
4 See for example Augusto Boal,  Teatro del Oprimido 1: Teoria y práctica,  trans. by Graciela Schmilchuk 
(México DF:  Nueva Imagen,  1989),  pp.  15,  252 and Augusto  Boal,  Theatre  of  the  Oppressed,  trans.  by 
Charles A. and Maria-Odilia Leal McBride & Emily Fryer (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 96.
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For  my  part,  the  insolence  of  claiming  accession  to  such  an  illustrious  lineage  is 
grounded in something I would call the “the banal contingency of work”. NO naturally 
emerged in the rough and tumble of workshops, rehearsals and performances with the 
Cardboard Citizens, a theatre company which just happens to be the chief practitioner of 
TO  techniques  in  the  UK.5 The  ccnme,  as  the  resident  orchestra  of  the  company, 
developed an aesthetics and a performance ethics which naturally suited the type of TO 
practiced by the Cardboard Citizens.
That said, it is true that by the start of the 00s there existed, with respect to  
musicking within the TO framework, both a lack and a need to address that lack, as Boal 
personally  con'ded in  me during his  last  visit  to  London.  Over  a  long after-dinner 
conversation in February 2008, he confessed that ‘only recently’ he had found himself 
thinking seriously about sound and music and trying to devise ways in which they could 
be naturally integrated into the system. What he heard and saw of our work with the 
ccnme de'nitely  resonated  with  his  latest  concerns  on  the  matter:  ‘we  have  to  keep 
talking’  was  the  departing  message  that  cold  evening,  as  we  warmly  hugged  our 
goodbyes.  Sadly,  such  promising  dialogue  will  always  remain  for  me  un'nished  by 
Boal’s untimely passing the following year. 
Having  said  that,  the  practice  I  developed  within  Cardboard  Citizens did  not 
emerge as an answer to Boal’s questions regarding the con'guration of a be'tting ‘music 
of  the  oppressed’,  neither  is  NO  a  translation  of  TO  techniques  into  the  musical 
world––and it  goes  without saying that  it  never pretended to even approximate  the 
universal beauty and importance of either PO or TO: my work only haphazardly found 
itself  at  a  particular  juncture  which  just  happened  to  be  part  of  a  noble  path  of 
5 Its founder and Artistic Director, Adrian Jackson is not only the English translator of most of Boal’s  
work: Boal considered Jackson as an adoptive son.
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unimagined historical signi'cance.       
This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  this  doctoral  project  falls  into  the  category  of 
practice-based research: what follows is intended to be read as a purely theoretical work. 
However,  the trace of  such practice will  have remained and will  somehow be ever-
present  as  background  noise,  as  a  leftover  radiation  murmuring  throughout  the 
theoretical journey. 
Ultimately, what this in fact describes is nothing more than what Alain Badiou 
refers to as the ‘conditioning’ of philosophy: as it will be duly discussed in the following 
chapters,  for  Badiou,  philosophical  thought  cannot  exist  in  a  state  of  self-enclosure:  
thought needs to open up and let itself be affected––or even violated––from the outside.  
Such fundamental concept of his work (which resonates with the Freirean notion of 
praxis  as  the dialectics  of  reHection  and  action)  is  something  which  makes  his 
philosophical káthedrā feel like home for a project such as mine.
To sum up: in this thesis, Paulo Freire names both a praxis and a heritage, Alain Badiou 
represents  both  an  encounter  with  a  philosophical  system  and  the  decision  to 
incorporate the conceptual tools obtained therein. Noise will have been the result of 
using  those  tools  in  the  construction  of  a  bridge  between  a  Freirean  praxis  and  a 
Badiouian mode of thought. And, like every bridge, the Badiou-Freire bridge needs to 
be itself immanently noisy, if it is to be structurally sound.
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0. Introduction
0.1. Badiou, Freire, Noise
This thesis is interwoven with three thematic threads, delineating something like a trio of 
tonal centres around which the whole argument is structured: (i) there is a  philosophical  
framework, founded in Alain Badiou’s ontological, logical and ethical categories; (ii) there 
is an educational argument, following the critical, emancipatory praxis of  Paulo Freire; (iii) 
there is the subject of  noise, as the connective or relational element, inevitably appearing 
in the gap between (i) and (ii). 
An overarching hypothesis braiding the three strands posits that (1) by deploying 
the main categories of  Badiou’s conceptual system (being, event, truth, subject, the void), 
and (2) as long as these concepts are adequately re-tuned to a theory of  noise which 
posits the latter as the condition of  possibility for the creation of  new knowledge (and, 
hence, of  subject construction), then (3) it will be possible to extract the essence (or, at 
the very least, an essence) of  Paulo Freire’s thought, enabling a modern recon'guration 
of  a Pedagogy of  the Oppressed which, weaved around the notion of  humanisation-as-
subjective process conditioned by language, will, in effect, (4) embody, as pedagogical 
praxis, Badiou’s postulate that ‘the only education is an education by truths’.1
The 'rst theme, composed by motifs drawn mostly from Badiou’s conceptual repertoire, 
will provide the philosophical grounding of  the argument––its fundamental tone, as it 
were.  Indeed,  a  speci'cally  Badiouian  notion  of  being,  event,  truth and  subject will 
1 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 
p. 14; hereinafter HI.
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determine something like the resonant spectrum of  the whole essay, shaping the natural 
frequencies  of  its  theoretical  body  and thus  setting  what  could  be  described  as  the 
eigenconcepts of  its entire speculative 'eld.2 
Being,  truth and  subject name,  for  Badiou,  ‘the  constitutive  triad  of  modern 
philosophy’,3 and  itself  comprises  ‘the  fundamental  core  of  [his]  philosophical 
doctrine’.4 This central nucleus originates in a set of  founding axioms with interweaving 
consequences. ‘Being’, in Badiou’s philosophical topology is a concept which forms a 
Borromean knot with both ‘truth’ and ‘subject’, each holding the sense of  the other two. 
All  in  all,  the  knot  being-truth-subject itself  binds  together  a  complex  neighbourhood 
implicating  other  notions  such  as  event,  void,  multiplicity,  and  the generic.  The  planned 
itinerary of  this research will  require the argument to visit and revisit  this entangled 
topology––I  will  begin  to  unfold  it  here  on  the  understanding  that  its  manifold 
reverberations  will  be  further  reHected  upon at  various  other  points  throughout  the 
journey:
• being is multiple and in'nite and there is no One; the latter is a mere after-effect 
of  a ‘counting-for-one’ operated by thought (with the aid, one must presume, of 
language).  
• this multiple being is weaved around a notion of  inconsistency, or nothingness, 
which Badiou––borrowing from mathematical set-theory––refers to as  the void; 
2 The natural  frequency of a system (sometimes referred to as its  eigenfrequency) is the frequency at 
which it will naturally oscillate without any external intervention from either damping or driving forces. It 
is  referred  to  as  fréquence  propre in  French  and  Eigenfrequenz in  German  (literarily  ‘own  frequency’  in 
English). In linear algebra, an eigenvector is a vector whose direction will remain unchanged after a linear 
transformation. By  eigenconcept, then, I mean concepts for which the direction of the sum-vector of their 
ontological, phenomenological, ethical and epistemological dimensions, will have remained unchanged 
throughout the various transformations, translations,  transductions and––to borrow an important term 
from Ray Brassier––schizductions that the itinerary of the argument will force upon on them.
3 Alain Badiou,  Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. & ed. by Norman Madarasz (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1999), p. 108; hereinafter MP.
4 Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. & trans. by Ray Brassier & Alberto Toscano (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2004) p. xiv; hereinafter TW.
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every situation is structured around this void which always already exceeds the 
count-for-one, haunting the situation.5 
• an  event is  an unpredictable irruption of  the void (something like a miscount, 
random as it is inevitable).
• events only occur in the realms of  art, science, politics and love (hence, events belong 
in history and never in nature).
• a  subject is  induced  following  an  encounter  with  an  event,  by  declaring  its 
occurrence and by investigating its consequences (hence, subjects are not given, 
they are rare, induced, borne out of  a ‘'delity’ to the event) 
• the subject, by naming the event and af'rming its consequences in the situation,  
(locally) processes a new truth (truths are local,  for the situation, but in'nite and 
universal in its implications).
True  to  its  grand  philosophical  narrative,  Badiou’s  foundational  notions  are 
grounded on ontological decisions which establish what it is meant for something to be, 
and  all  at  once  delimiting  that  which  is an  exception,  or  a  supplement  to  such  be-ing. 
Subsequently,  by  demonstrating  how  these  supplements might  eventually come  to  be, 
Badiou prescribes a  logic by which all existing things will differently appear in the world 
and of  the ensuing relations emerging therefrom. Ultimately, this onto-phenomeno-logical 
aggregate will 'nally induce the singular ethical 'eld in which every political, artistic and 
scienti'c praxis, as well as the whole desiring interiority of  the human subject, is to be 
thought. 
And  it  is  precisely  this  ethical  sum-vector  which,  I  contend,  should  be  the 
exclusive, unmitigated concern of  education  and its sine-qua-non determinant. In other 
5 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London & New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 94; 
hereinafter BE.
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words, I hold that choices made regarding ontology and its limits (including its exceptions, 
or cracks), will have determined the resonant mode of  a philosophical discourse, together  
with an educational praxis implicit therein. Hence, the full range of  political, artistic, 
scienti'c and erotic overtones present in the ethical spectrum of  a statement such as ‘the 
only  education  is  an  education  by truths’,  will  only  resonate  within  the  ontological 
vector-'eld that originated it. As it will become clear, however, for Badiou ethics proper 
is  an  injunction hailing,  not  from ontology,  but  from a  rupture,  or  an  exception of 
ontology––i.e. an event.
As the argument modulates to the second theme––education and critical pedagogy––
Badiou’s  conceptual  arsenal  will  be  carried  across  the  border,  deep  into  Freirean 
territory in order to perform there what will have been to all intents and purposes a 
Badiouian recon'guration  of  Freire’s  educational  theory.6 It  is  at  this  stage  that  the 
philosophical toolbox borrowed from Badiou’s attic will have to prove its worth, insofar 
as the conceptual ‘tools and sharpened knives’7 found in it will be expected to withtake 
the translations that the crossing of  such epistemological border requires (in order to 
retain consistency in the new territory)––and this without losing, at one and the same 
time, their original puissance (in order to perform the required recompositional task). 
Simply put, Badiou’s concepts will need to keep their essential functionality within the 
Freirean domain and, simultaneously, Freire’s notions should remain readable under the 
Badiouian instruments. 
This speculative situation only obtains provided that, on the one hand, Freire’s 
6 An operation which, one must duly note, is in full consistency with Freire’s expressed desire that his 
work be constantly reinvented; see: ‘Paulo Freire: “Eu quero ser reinventado”’, Psicologia Atual 3:13 (1980), 
pp. 14-17; quoted in Moacir Gadotti, Paulo Freire: uma biobibliogra6a (São Paulo: Cortez Editora & Instituto 
Paulo Freire, 1996), p. 298.
7 ‘Philosophy is  like the attic  where,  in dif'cult  times,  one accumulates resources,  lines  up tools and 
sharpens knives’ (Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. by Steve Corcoran (London & New York: Verso, 2006), p. 
35).
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thought proves to be philosophically robust enough to accept the conceptual transplant 
and that, on the other hand, there are already present in Badiou’s philosophy at least 
some pedagogical elements compatible with the recipient body. Put differently, should 
the Badiouian/Freirean philosophico-pedagogical framework proposed here prove to be 
consistent, this will have been due to the fact that Badiou foregrounds the fundamentally 
philosophical tone  in  Freire  and,  concurrently,  the  latter  emphasises  the  pedagogical 
overtones in the former, effecting something like a mutually reinforced reverberation, a 
double  resonance which,  arguably,  can only  happen as  long as  there  is  some set  of 
common conceptual harmonics already present in their respective work. 
More  fundamentally,  however,  I  ascertain  that  such  Badiouian/Freirean 
resonance uncovers a deeper correlation, one which underscores the pivotal assumption 
pulsating at the heart of  my pedagogical argument: namely, the material equivalence 
between philosophy and education. By positing this  biconditionality (viz.,  philosophy 
<=> education) I am making explicit an essence of  Freire’s thought, which is as implicit  
in his writing as it is overlooked by his commentators: the fact that Freire considered all  
pedagogical practice as inseparable from a philosophical standpoint is a key aspect of  his 
work and, from my perspective, what makes his name a singularity.
On the whole, and most crucially, it is a position bearing the main conjecture of 
this thesis: namely, that education is none other than the caring of  the praxial8 temporality 
produced by the subjects of  truth: as such, education is the  time produced within the 
place opened up by the philosophical notion of  Truth. And inhering in the validity of 
8 I am importing the term ‘praxial’ from the 'eld of philosophy of music education, where it is commonly  
used; 'rst coined in 1991 by Philip Alperson, it was then extensively applied by David Elliott, who is now 
associated with the term. Obviously deriving from “praxis”, oddly enough, the name of Paulo Freire is  
rarely  mentioned  in  the  'eld  as  a  source.  See  Philip  Alperson,  ‘What  Should  One  Expect  from  a  
Philosophy of Music Education?,  The Journal of Aesthetic Education 25:3  (Autumn, 1991), pp. 215-42 and 
David Elliott & Marissa Silverman, Music Matters: A Philosophy of Music Education, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). see also Constantijn Koopman, ‘Music Education: Aesthetic or “Praxial”?’,  The 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 32:3 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 1-17 and James Vincent Maiello, ‘Towards a Praxial  
Philosophy of Music History Pedagogy’, Journal of Music History Pedagogy 4:1 (2013), pp. 71-108.
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this conjecture is the key translation operating in this thesis: Badiou’s conception of  the  
void  as  noise––a translation which implies  a  temporalisation  of the otherwise atemporal 
void:
(biconditionality): philosophy <=> education
(scission): place of  Truth <–|–> time of  the Subject
(translation): the void ––> noise
This move is authorised, I claim, within both the Freirean and the Badiouian 
philosophical con'gurations: on Freire’s side, we will 'nd that education is a process that 
‘permanently  “bathes  itself ”  in  temporality’,  in  an  always-un'nished  becoming  human 
that––true  to  its  sworn  Bergsonism––temporalises space.9 For  Badiou’s  part,  ‘[t]he 
production of  a truth is the same thing as the subjective production of  a present’:10 in 
other  words,  as  Olivia  Lucca  Fraser  duly  puts  it,  the  whole  subjective  procedure 
amounts  to  a  ‘temporal  unfolding  of  a  truth’,11 and,  hence,  it  implies  a  necessary 
movement  out  of  the  a-temporal  realm of  ontology  into the  (neg)entropic  world  of 
praxis.12
The third discursive strand of  this thesis emerges as a result of  precisely those nonlocal 
resonances, discords and translations that alternatively connect, separate and displace 
the two main themes: namely, noise. If  noise itself  eludes a ‘formal de'nition’, as Cécile 
9 See Paulo Freire, Pedagogia do Oprimido, 63 edn (Rio de Janeiro & São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2017), pp. 114; 
hereinafter PO. The idea of a ‘temporalisation of space’, even if Bergsonian in its  essence, is  directly 
borrowed from Pierre Furter. See Pierre Furter,  Educação e Vida (Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes, 1966), pp. 26-7 
(quoted in PO p. 115).
10 Alain Badiou,  Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London & New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 
569; hereinafter LW.
11 Olivia Lucca Fraser, ‘The Law of The Subject: Alain Badiou, Luitzen Brouwer and The Kripkean 
Analyses of Forcing and The Heyting Calculus’, Cosmos and History 2:1-2 (2006), pp. 94-133 (p. 94).
12 I will use the notation (neg)entropy whenever I need to refer to the dialectical Two of  negentropy|entropy 
itself; i.e. wherever it appears, ‘(neg)entropy’ signi'es: here, in this case, each term always implies the other.
6
Malaspina correctly points out,13 this is due to the fact that its manifold phenomeno-
physical  dimensions––noise  as  distortion,  noise  as  static  (as  parasite),  noise  as  errors 
interfering with communication, noise as unwanted sound (noise as opposed to music), 
noise  as  random Huctuations  in  a  signal,  as  uncertainty,  disorder,  noise  as  random 
variability  between  biological  cells,  as  genetic  variation,  noise  as  anxiety,  turmoil, 
nausea––cause its signifying chain to escape in a spiral of  metonymic displacements and 
metaphorical condensations which is, itself, a producer of  noise. So rather than trying to 
identify the meaning of  noise most suited to the tone of  this thesis,  or to attempt a 
synthesis  of  the  various  descriptions  into  something  like  a  “working  de'nition  of 
noise”––which will always fail to capture its protean and elusive nature––the tactic will  
be to admit the full murmur of  noise into the argument, allowing the latter’s natural 
frequencies to resonate as and when, thereby letting its eigenconcepts 'lter the relevant 
semantic  bands from the proliferating signi'cation that the entire spectrum of  noise 
irradiates. 
It might be useful, at this point, to anticipate some of  the resonators to which 
these  'lters  will  tend to respond,  namely:  (1)  noise  as  the  result  of  the  translation of 
concepts  across  epistemological  boundaries:  this  is  what  Malaspina  refers  to  as 
‘epistemological noise’; once accepted as the condition of  possibility for the creation of  
new knowledge, its relevance to education is almost self-explanatory; (2) noise as the 
inevitable background of  dialogue: as Michel Serres has argued, no dialogue is free from 
noise; insofar as Freire’s pedagogy is founded on a conception of  dialogical praxis, this is 
a crucial notion (and one completely missing in Freirean and post-Freirean literature); (3) 
noise  as  internal  anxiety:  insofar  as  an  education  by  truths  involves  the  subjective 
13 ‘[A] shared formal de'nition of noise is lacking. This lack opens a space for metaphorical reverberation 
within scienti'c discourse, and even more so in the straits between the natural and the human sciences,  
technology and the arts’ (Cécile Malaspina,  An Epistemology of Noise: From Information Entropy to Normative  
Uncertainty (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), p. 7); hereinafter EN.
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breakaway from the security of  knowledge, anxiety emerges as the primal affect of  the 
subject of  education: this is precisely what I refer to as noise-inside (and what Malaspina 
identi'es as the ‘mental state of  noise’),14 the exploration of  this noisy innenwelt will be 
guided, mostly, by a Lacanian cartography of  the subject; (4) noise as a remainder of 
language, as a left-over radiation from the failed attempt of  the symbolic order to fully 
structure the Real: closely related to (2) and (3), this noise is a constant (and necessary)  
reminder of  the incompleteness of  language, foreclosing any attempt to  absolutise it as 
some sort of  human plenitude, signalling that humanisation, as a process indeed made 
possible by language is, however, always already ‘un'nished’––in Freire’s terms––and its 
ultimate  truth should remain ‘unnameable’––in Badiou’s––;  (4)  'nally,  and probably 
most crucially, noise as the translation/temporalisation of  (Badiou’s notion of) the void: 
noise becomes something like the phenomenal appearance––inside-time––of  the void, 
which in its original mathematical purity (as the empty- or null-set of  mathematical set 
theory, marked ∅ and axiomatically posited) remains, always already, outside-time.15 
The  fact  that  noise  persists  in  its  unde'nability,  constantly  escaping  a  'xed 
sense,16 is what makes it the obvious candidate to carry the translated name of  the void 
into the phenomenological and empirical worlds: accepting such translation allows for 
the thinking of  something like a  temporalised void, or rather, a  temporalised thinking of  the 
void: in this sense, noise remains empty of  sense, still a nothingness, still void, albeit now 
thought from an outlook subjected to temporality, entropy and irreversibility.
14 See Malaspina, EN, Part Three: ‘The “Mental State of Noise”’, pp. 165-218.
15 Olivia Lucca Fraser asserts that within the ‘conceptual bestiary of Being and Event’ there is no stranger 
creature than the void’ and that ‘any hope of to extract a clear thought’ that could ground it ‘'nds itself  
assaulted  from  the  outset  by  a  swarm  of  equivocations’  and  therefore,  ‘[a]ttempting  to  reduce  this  
cacophony into a single, essential concept of the void, or temper it into a soothing harmony, is, I think,  
unlikely  to  be  either  useful  or  successful.’  See  Olivia  Lucca  Fraser,  ‘Nothingness  &  Event’  (2009)  
(Unpublished manuscript, <academia.edu> [accss. 20/01/13]).
16 ‘Noise persits’, according to Greg Hainge, ‘because it cannot be recon'gured or recontained […] but 
remains indelibly noise’ (Greg Hainge, Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology of Noise (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013), p. 23).
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0.2. A Hermetic Methodology 
Noise  here  is  related  too  to  the  question  of  methodology,  insofar  as  the  latter  is 
determined  by  a  regime of  translation.  These  translations  will  have  produced  what 
Malaspina terms ‘epistemological noise’. One could thus describe this methodology as 
the setting and trespassing of  boundaries, the combining of  the seemingly separate, the 
splitting of  the  seemingly  inseparable––philosophical  fusions  and 'ssions with a sole 
purpose: the release of  conceptual energy, information, noise. As Michel Serres writes, 
[e]ach level of  information functions as an unconscious for the global level bordering it, 
as a closed or relatively isolated system in relationship to which the noise-information 
couple, when it crosses the edge, is reversed and which the subsequent system decodes or 
deciphers.  In  each  link  of  the  series  the  question  of  language  is  formulated  and 
reformulated by  the  transformation of  the  message,  the  channel,  and the  noise:  by 
translation. In fact, residual background noise is progressively eliminated: what was supposed to 
interfere begins constructing; obstacles combine to organize; noise becomes dialect.17
It is by invoking a Serresean methodology of  translation that the mythical 'gure 
of  the god Hermes performs a theophany. The divine trickster, and thief-child, but also 
the carrier of  messages and information, layer and trespasser of  boundaries, as much 
the inventor of  language as of  noise. As Josue Harari and David Bell explain, the themes 
by which Serres organises his  ‘anti-method’––by which they mean his  conception of 
science, philosophy and myth––can be arranged ‘around one 'gure: that of  Hermes’.18 
17 Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, ed. by Josue V. Harari & David F. Bell (Baltimore & 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 80 (original italics).
18 ‘Hermes is considered to be the god of commerce and of theft. He is the god of music and the patron 
of orators and also the inventor of weights and measures. He is the protector of boundaries and the guide  
of travelers (his statue could be found at crossroads in antiquity). One of his functions as guide is to lead 
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Serres himself  alluringly illustrates this Hermetic methodology in the following text:
[v]isit the environment. Traverse circumstances Hoating like crowns around the instance 
or substance, around the axis of  the act. Make use of  what is cast aside. Describe the 
parasites in signals, the collective or the living: it is always to be found eating right next 
to  you.  Study neighbourhoods,  travel  along country roads  which surround and give 
shape to the countryside. Consider the Huctuations, deviations or inclinations, in the 
estimations  or concepts  of  science.  Atoms are sometimes  cast  aside.  Do not  despise 
conjunctions  or  passages.  Hermes  often  veers  off  as  he  goes  along.  And  detaches 
himself. Observe the mingled Hows and the places of  exchange and you will understand 
time better. Hermes gradually 'nds his language and his messages, sounds and music, 
landscapes and paths, knowledge and wisdom. He leaps sideways, to the places where 
the senses murmur and tremble, the neighbouring turbulence of  bodies––sensation. He 
loves and knows the spot where place deviates from place and leads to the universe,  
where the latter deviates from the law to invaginate into singularity: circumstance.19 
With all this in mind, then, it would seem that I will be driving a Badiouian ontological  
vehicle,  guided  by  a  something  like  a  Serresian  methodology.20 If  the  question 
immediately  begged  here  is  “where  does  this  leave  Freire?”,  I  contend  that  a 
methodology  which  follows  Michel  Serres’  thought––one  which,  in  words  of  Bruno 
Latour,  is  ‘unbounded by the  delineation of  territories’––could well  be considered a 
turbocharged form of  Freireanism.21 Freire and Serres are united less by a pedagogical 
dead souls to Hades. Hermes watches over shepherds, often he is represented carrying a lamb on his 
shoulders’ (Harari, Josue V. & David F. Bell, ‘Introduction: Journal a plusieurs voies’, in Hermes: Literature,  
Science, Philosophy by Michel Serres (op. cit.), pp. ix-xl (pp. xxx-xxxi)).
19 Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. by Margaret Sankey & Peter Cowley 
(London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 287.
20 Despite the fact that the name ‘Serres’ and the word ‘methodology’, side by side, seem to spell out an 
oxymoron.
21 Bruno Latour, ‘The Enlightenment without the Critique: A Word on Michel Serres' Philosophy’, Royal  
Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 21 (1987), pp. 83–97 (p. 97). I am not 'rst in noticing the Freire-Serres 
connection:  see  Humberto  Calloni,  ‘Paulo  Freire  e  Michel  Serres:  Aproximações  na  Perspectiva 
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stance than by a systematic use of  eclecticism––what in Freire was described as  antropofagia 
and in Serres is a radical cross-disciplinarity. Ultimatedly, at it most basal level, both Freire 
and  Serres  share  a  similar  epistemological  strategy,  which  could  be  paradoxically 
described as a methodological use of  non-methodology.  
All in all, Freire approaches the subject of  education wielding a single sharpened tool: 
humanisation. Insofar as everything in his philosophy is a consequence of  this singular 
operator, one could say that Freire’s methodology is, in essence, purely subtractive in the 
strictest Badiouian sense of  the term. 
Translation, transduction, schizduction
The  master-translation  in  this  thesis,  the  quilting  point  or  axis  where  all  other 
translations pass through is:
void —> noise
The wager here is that important conceptual worlds could be discovered by using noise 
as the vehicle for the void. It is in this sense that translation is not just a mere analysis of  
textual  and  contextual  differentials,  nor  a  sterile  game  of  denotation/connotation 
combinatorics. Should the translation void––>noise be left at that, most of  the potential 
usefulness of  it would be wasted. In order for the translation itself  to become a producer  
of  concepts, the latter must be extracted from the former’s conceptual potential: in other 
Interdisciplinar num Diálogo a Múltiplas Vozes’, (unpublished PhD thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio 
Grande do Sul, 2002), Humberto Calloni, ‘Diálogos Interdisciplinares Com Paulo Freire E Michel Serres:  
Contribuições À Educação Ambiental’, Revista Eletrônica do Mestrado em Educação Ambiental 17 (Jul-Dec 2006) 
pp. 127-35 and Alex Guilherme, ‘Michel Serres’ Le Parasite and Martin Buber’s I and Thou: Noise in 
Informal Education Affecting Dialogue Between Communities in ConHict in the Middle East’, Educational  
Philosophy and Theory 47:10 (2015) pp. 1052-1068.
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words, the translation needs to be put to work. A translation is not only a dynamic exercise
—as it  implies,  movements,  accelerations,  collisions:  is  is  also  thermodynamic,  entropic, 
irreversible process: it carries a capacity to produce noise. And it is this noise that I want 
to pay attention to when de-, trans- and re-forming Badiou’s void into noise. It is, once 
again, a question of  methodology––as Serres alluringly illustrates, ‘[t]ranslation is both a 
praxis  and  a  theory;  turbulence  is  a  stable  and unstable  phenomenon where  liquid 
moves  and  stays  in  a  randomly  'xed  form;  the  organism––my  body––is  now  an 
exchanger of  time.’22 
The emerging question, then, is: once the concept of  noise, which begins its signifying 
journey as something like a temporalised, entropic, resonating void––“resonating” in the 
broadest possible sense of  the term, so it includes things like the Lacanian object-voice, 
non-cochlear sound and silence––takes conceptual Hight on its own, what then, does it 
do in the excess of  its metonymical movement?23 
The operation  of  this  conception  of  translation  could be  illustrated with  an 
example: let’s take Badiou’s concept of  the ‘edge of  the void’: translated to the physico-
phenomenal domain, I chose the term the ‘threshold of  Noise’ (‘threshold’ being a term 
used  in  acoustics,  psychoacoustics,  psychophysics,  neuroscience,  neurophysiology, 
statistics, etc).  The idea of  threshold brings with it its sense of  liminality, which allows 
the passage into the subject: here we 'nd, within the articulations of  anxiety, invocation 
and  desire,  a  key  Freudo-Lacanian  concept:  the  idea  of  ‘rim’,  which  can  be  also 
translated  as...  “edge”  (as  indeed  Cormac Gallagher  does  in  his  translations  of  the 
Seminars), carrying, in my view, all the topological implications that Lacan addresses in 
22 Michel  Serres,  The  Parasite (1980),  trans.  Lawrence  R.  Schehr  (Minneapolis,  MN:  University  of 
Minnesota Press, 2007).
23 As  Lacan  af'rms,  ‘desire  is  always  a  metonyme’;  Jacques  Lacan,  Ecrits,  trans.  by  Bruce  Fink  in 
collaboration with Héloïse Fink & Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 175.
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Seminar X (as in the edges of  the möbius strip, klein bottle, cross-cap etc). So, we are 
back (as in a round-trip on a möbius strip) to Badiou’s edge of  the void––though it now 
seems in'nitely enriched by the paradoxical multidimensionality brought back from the 
journey: if  Badiou, an always astute mathematician, had in mind the topological sense of 
the term ‘edge’ when naming his ‘edge of  the void’, it is something that he does not  
make explicit in his ontological account of  it in BE.24 Metamorphosing as the ‘threshold 
of  noise’, which allowed it to enter the subject as a ‘rim phenomenon’, which is just 
another term for a topological rim, the singular power of  Badiou’s edge of  the void, 
once dithered with its own noise (the result of  its metonymic journey), now vibrates in all 
its newly acquired paradoxical topology.   
But, what is more, once the (ontological) void, or rather, its edge, appears as the 
threshold of  noise (effecting ‘a transitory cancellation of  the gap between being and being-
there’), in this new guise, the void manages to permeate the boundaries of  the subject 
and resonate in the  inside. And the proper understanding of  this resonance,  I  claim, 
should  begin  with,  or  at  least  not avoid,  crucial  psychoanalytic  conceptualisations: 
namely, those structures that Lacan termed the object voice and the invocatory drive.
Transduction:
For all that, it would be more accurate to refer instead––to differentiate––translation 
from  transduction,  as  Malaspina  does  in  her  adoption  of  Gilbert  Simondon’s  own 
appropriation  of  the  term.  ‘The  transduction  of  the  concept  of  noise’  Malaspina 
explains  ‘would  imply  not  only  the  transformation  of  one  domain,  for  instance,  of 
information theory, but also the conceptual transduction from one domain to another’.25 
Transduction  is  the  transformation  (or  conversion)  of  one  type of  energy  to 
24 It is, of course, implicit: ‘the void exceeds the always orientated character of natural disposition. It  
ruins the topology of situations’ (BE p. 74).
25 EN p. 94
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another (potential to thermal,  kinetic to electric, chemical to kinetic, and so on); it also 
refers to signal transduction, the process whereby chemical and/or physical signals are 
transmitted at the molecular level inside a cell.26 Transduction will af'rm one of  the key 
aspects of  noise: its protean nature.
The banality of  emergence: from transduction to shizduction:
Ray Brassier, however, provides a timely warning against a too enthusiastic af'rmation 
of  noise as transducer of  life, as expressive of  an in'nite emergence and complexity––all 
concepts which not only sound with the monotone of  nature’s chaotic order, but, much 
worse, are a prime alimentation of  capitalism itself. 
There’s  a temptation to hypostatize capital as  though it were an impersonal,  wholly 
autonomous agent subsisting quite independently of  the myriad of  little human subjects 
who compose it. This strikes me as a mistake. Here I think a sober appreciation of  the 
mechanical  banality  of  the  processes  through which  capital  reproduces  itself  might 
obviate  this  tendency  to  mysti'cation:  this  seemingly  fantastic,  supra-personal 
complexity is not due to some mysterious self-moving cause or superhuman agent but an 
effect generated by the myriads of  micro-processes that compose it: it is neither more 
nor less mysterious in its operations than any other complex, multi-layered emergent 
phenomenon. This kind of  emergence and complexity are banal and ubiquitous.
I think there is an important dis-analogy between noise and capitalism in that 
noise as I understand it is precisely not complex in the way in which capitalism is alleged 
to  be:  the  sort  of  emergent  complexity  exempli'ed  by  self-organizing  systems  is 
26 It is interesting to note that the earliest notion of signal transduction can be traced back to the work of  
Claude  Bernard  in  the  mid  19th  century,  on  what  he  called  ‘internal  secretions’,  later  identi'ed as 
‘hormones’ by British physiologist Hernest Starling in 1905. Bernard was 'rst in coining the term milieu  
intérieur, a concept crucial in the work of not only Simondon (usually appearing as ‘associated milieu’) but 
of  Norbert  Wiener’s  development  of  cybernetics,  negative  feedback  and  self-regulating  systems.  See 
Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (New York: Dover Publications, 1957). 
On the inHuence of Bernard on Wiener, see: Charles G. Gross, ‘Claude Bernard and the constancy of the  
internal environment’, Neuroscientist 4:5 (1998), pp. 380–385.
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relatively uninteresting. The fetishizing of  complexity in the sense of  self-organization, 
along  with  emergence  and  irreducibility,  etc.,  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  neo-vitalist 
tendency to prefer mysti'cation to explanation, so prevalent today. What I consider to 
be interesting about noise is its dis-organizing potency: the incompressibility of  a signal 
interfering with the redundancy in the structure of  the receiver. Not transduction but 
schizduction: noise scrambles the capacity for self-organization.27
A noise interfering with the redundant structure of  the receiver: it is precisely 
this schizductive noise, Hermetic and relational, which 'lters into the subject and out 
again, that best approximates the noise we are following––the noise of  the oppressed. 
0.3. Structure
The text is divided in three parts. 
Part  I,  comprising  the  presentation  of  the  two  main  themes––Badiou  and 
Freire––is  subdivided  into  two  chapters.  The  motifs  presented  in  Chapter  1  are 
subsumed  under  a  single  all-encompassing  argumentative  strategy,  namely  the 
unpacking  of  Badiou’s  singular  pedagogical  statement:  ‘the  only  education  is  an 
education  by truths’. Decodifying this dense statement requires a full understanding of 
what  Badiou exactly means by ‘truth’  (and insofar  as  ‘[e]very truth originates  in an 
event’,28 this latter notion––which is an irruption of  the ‘void’, itself  the ‘proper name of 
being’––needs29, as well, proper elucidation, not to mention an understanding of  what is 
it  meant  to  be  ‘a  subject  to  truth’  and  so  on).  And  this,  in  turn,  requires  an  
understanding what it is to become a ‘subject to truth’, together with the connection 
27 Ray Brassier (interviewed by Bram Ieven), ‘Against an Aesthetics of Noise’, nY # 2 (2009) 
<http://www.ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html>[accss. 17 Jan. 2019].
28 Badiou, HI p.11.
29 See Badiou, BE, ‘Meditation Four––The Void: Proper name of being’, pp. 52-9.
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between truth and ‘event’, and the latter’s relation with a notion of  the void––a notion 
which, crucially, not only is at the centre of  Badiou’s conception of  being, but will have 
become the inaugural translation operating throughout this thesis: void —> noise.  
Chapter 2, expanding on the notion of  critical education and in line with Freire’s 
desire  that  his  ideas  be  constantly  reinvented,  will  attempt  a  recon'guration  of  his 
thought utilising the Badiouian concepts smuggled through the border. The notions of 
truth, event, subject and void will now become operative in a recon'gured notion of  the 
Pedagogy  of  the  Oppressed.  I  will  argue  that  Freire’s  is  less  a  compendium  of 
pedagogical methodologies than a philosophical system in its own right. The backbone 
of  the argument will rest on the following assumption: Freire’s system can be considered 
as a generic 'delity to the event of  humanisation. I will here develop the key conjecture of  
the whole thesis: that education is the praxial-temporal side of  philosophy. 
A Bridge intends to both gather the previous ideas discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
pointing out how noise relates to the two previous themes. It will also anticipate some of  
the issues to be discussed in part II. 
Part II can be considered a developmental section, wherein I will observe in more detail 
the  concept  of  noise,  both  in  its  empirical  exteriority  and  its  subjective  interiority. 
Chapter 4 will discuss notions of  what Malaspina terms ‘empirical noise’––and I will 
here refer to as  noise-outside––brieHy overviewing its  various linguistic,  physical  and 
artistic manifestations. It will include a discussion of  the mathematical formalisation of 
noise performed by Claude Shannon: the position here is that if  we accept the validity 
of  the Badiouian equation mathematics=ontology, then Shannon’s information theory is a 
framework that presents what is, in all but name, a pure ontology of  noise.
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Chapter 5 will direct the argument through yet another border-crossing, into the 
interiority of  the subject: the domain of  what I term noise-inside, akin to Malaspina’s  
‘mental state of  noise’. If  Malaspina’s exploration of  internal noise is conditioned by the 
cognitive psychiatry of  Steven Sands and John Ratey,30 I will here follow psychoanalytic 
routes, mostly those drawn by Lacan. The motivation for embarking in such journey 
inside  the  subject,  however,  seems  to  me  to  be  exactly  the  same:  insofar  as  noise  
trespasses  the  umwelt-innenwelt border,  any  account  of  it  that  does  not  consider  this 
subjective interiority, will be incomplete.
In Part III I will attempt to relate the two main themes in what could be seen as a non-
dialectic recapitulation. I will revisit the two notions which will have proven to be most 
problematic for the Badiouian-Freirean composition attempted throughout this thesis: 
viz., language and humanisation. 
As a conclusive thought, I will propose that the notion of  an “education in noise” 
such  as  the  one  elaborated  throughout  this  thesis,  will  have  redeemed  a  sense  of 
relationality which seems to be inconsistent with Badiou’s subtractive position. If  Badiou 
eschews every relation at the ontological level (except, that is, that of  belonging to a set), I 
claim that by making education and philosophy mutually inclusive, and by temporalising 
the  ontological  void  through  its  translation  into  (phenomeno-  and  epistemo-logical) 
noise,  then  such  non-relational  fault  can  be  repaired––and  this  without  the  need  to 
sacri'ce the necessary subtraction that every pursue of  truth requires. Simply put, I will 
posit that an “education in noise” (my mere translation of  Badiou’s ‘education by truths’) 
is the philosophical term for relation.
30 Malaspina, EN pp. 165-218; see also Steven Sands & John J. Ratey, ‘The Concept of Noise’, Psychiatry 
49:4 (1986), pp. 290–97.
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A reection on form, in the margins
Insofar as this thesis presents two main themes (Badiou, Freire, in part I), a development 
(noise, in part II), and a recapitulation of  the two main themes (part III), a reader with 
some knowledge  in  musical  matters  might  be  lead  to  suspect  the  familiar  tripartite 
presence of  a Sonata form (viz.,  exposition,  development,  recapitulation) emerging herein in 
the text:  
part I part II part III
exposition development recapitulation
theme A  theme B transition, retransition theme A   theme B (=key)
Badiou Freire noise Badiou<—>Freire (relation)
This might be so. However, one could also add that this is simply another case 
wherein contingent  emergencies  happen to coincide  at  the  level  of  formalisation.  A 
mere coincidence evidencing that pattern is no more than a (neg)entropic device––and 
that the Sonata form, just like any other pattern formation, is merely a subjective case of 
Kunstformen der Natur. From this perspective, form becomes simply the random outcome 
of  an urge to reach out, amidst the hazard of  entropy, towards anything carrying the  
promise  of  atemporality.  The  imperative  to  communicate  something  in'nite  and 
universal, within the ever-present void of  sense. Differently put: form is the result of  a 
semantic  pact  between  dialoguing  subjects  who,  amidst  the  impossibly  opaque 
inconsistency of  noise, insist in collaboratively mapping a navigable pass through it. A 
passage which, eventually, hopefully, could lead them both to the encounter of  some 
truth.




1. Badiou: The philosophical framework and its eigenresonances
2. Freire: Philosophy <=> Education
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1. Badiou: The Philosophical Framework and its Eigenresonances
Nothing Is1
1.0. Intro: Being, Truth, Subject
As noted above, if Badiou’s assertion that ‘the only education is an education by truths’ is 
to  be  properly  evaluated,  it  has  to  be  unpacked  within  the  conceptual  'eld  that 
originated  it.  More  fundamentally,  being and  its  relation  to  the  void,  truth and  its 
dependance on an  event, together with the emergence of a  subject of such truth, are all 
concepts requiring proper elucidation if one is to properly understand what exactly does 
Badiou mean by an ‘education by truths’. It is with this in mind that I will now review 
some of the key ontological concepts of the Badiouian system, brieHy underscoring their 
relevance to my overall argument. 
Badiou founds his  whole philosophical  enterprise on the pairing of  truth and 
subject and places at the core of  this pairing the thinking of  being-qua-being: ‘starting from 
an ontology whose paradigm is mathematical’, Badiou explains, ‘I am able to propose a 
new vision of  what a truth is, along with a new vision of  what it is to be the subject of  
such  a  truth.’2 Essentially––and  as  introduced  earlier––Badiou’s  ontological  starting 
decisions prescribe that: 
(1) Being-qua-being is weaved around a notion of  inconsistency which Badiou––borrowing from  
mathematical set-theory––refers to as the void.
Being, for Badiou, is multiple and in'nite and there is no One; the latter is a mere 
1 Sun Ra (New York: ESP-Disk ESP1054, 1966)
2 Badiou, TW p. xiv.
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after-effect of  a counting-as-one operated by thought (with the aid, one must presume, 
of  language).  This  always already there  operation of  the count-as-one––akin to that of 
Lacan’s Symbolic order––will have insured that there is always already something like 
one-ness  presented  to  thought:  ‘the  one  is  not.  It  is  not  a  question,  however,  of 
abandoning the principle Lacan assigned to the symbolic; that there is Oneness’.3
 In a radically subtractive philosophical move, Badiou delegates  all ontological 
thinking  to  mathematics––speci'cally,  to  mathematical  set  theory:  for  Badiou, 
everything that  is is multiple, the One  is not and therefore the thinking of  being-qua-
being must  equal  the  thinking  of  pure,  in'nite  multiplicity––which  is,  precisely,  the 
metier of  set theory (as pioneered by Georg Cantor in the 1870s and later axiomatised 
by Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel in the 1920s). 
An aspect of  this decision, which is of  fundamental importance with respect to 
this thesis, is the foundational place that Badiou––strictly following the consequences of 
the axioms of  set theory––ascribes to the empty set, or the void: for Badiou, uni'ed be-ing 
is the result of  the above mentioned count-for-one. This operation renders consistent by 
counting  and  re-counting  (or  ‘presenting’  and  ‘re-presenting’)  what  is,  in  essence, 
uncountable or un-presentable inconsistency: even if  wrapped with a semblance of  one-
ness, the void remains at the core of  everything that is. 
With  this  account  of  the  void,  Badiou  somehow contributes  his  own  highly 
formalised version to a tradition in thought ascribing a central place to the idea that  
every situation is structured around an inextricable void of  structure, an immanent gap 
between  that  which  can  be  symbolised  and  made  consistent,  and  a  kernel  of 
unsymbolisable inconsistency which not only subsists and persists but that paradoxically 
enables  the  presentation  of  consistency  itself.  Jean-Paul  Sartre’s  nothingness,  Jacques 
Lacan’s excess of  the Real,  Jacques-Alain Miller’s utopic point, Slavoj Žižek’s symptom: what 
3 BE p. 23
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all  these  notions  have  in  common  is  the  positing  of  a  constitutive  void  that  holds 
everything that is possible in a situation together, insofar as it itself  remains impossible 
within it.
From this  perspective,  the  presented consistency of  every situation is  a  mere 
result of  the count-for-one, which wraps this ‘structural impossibility’4 around a 'gure of 
one-ness: the situation thus acquires a semblance of  structure. And, furthermore, the 
count keeps operating by counting the count and re-structuring the already-structured: such meta-
structure, such passage from presentation to re-presentation is what Badiou terms––fully 
aware of  the resonances––the ‘state of  the situation’.  Hence, a situation only knows 
what it counts ‘because the law is the count-as-one, nothing is presented in a situation 
which is not counted: the situation envelops existence with the one’.5 The count-for-one 
wraps  consistent  unities  out  of  the  in'nite  multiple  inconsistency  which  lies  at  the 
bottom of  everything. This void, however, always already exceeding the count-as-one, 
will forever haunt every situation.6 
(2)  The unpredictable, inevitable irruption of  such void in a situation is what Badiou refers to as an  
event (events can only happen in the 6elds of  art, science, politics and love, those realms wherein the  
generic truth procedures mentioned above operate). 
If  Badiou clearly establishes that that which can be thought as being-qua-being is 
none other than the ontological presentation of  set theory, he concurrently allows for the 
unpredictable irruption of  something hailing from the  pure  outside of  such ontological 
situation.  Such  exception  to  the  regime  of  being  is  what  Badiou  calls  an  event:  the 
Heeting, hazardous emergence of  that which, from the established point of  view of  a 
4 Every ideological ‘symbolic 'eld’ Slavoj Žižek writes, ‘contains such a 'ller holding the place of some 
structural  impossibility,  while simultaneously  disavowing this  impossibility’;  Slavoj Žižek,  The Plague of  
Fantasies, (London & New York, Verso, 2008) p. 98.
5 BE p. 52.
6 BE p. 94.
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status quo prescribed by the state of  the situation, counts as nothing––such is, precisely, 
the void of  the situation discussed above. 
Badiou invariably refers to the event as being ‘random’, and probably rightly 
so––however, there is also altogether an element of  inevitability about its occurrence. 
Indeed, if  everything that is, is so because it has been counted as one, it follows that the 
counting-for-one must itself  be counted––and it is right there that a fundamental impasse of 
ontology emerges. And, as it happens, this recursive count-of-the-count––like every self-
referent loop––will always already be in excess of  itself. And crucially, this excess carries 
with  it  an  ontological  'ssure,  wherein  paradox,  reHexivity  and  self-belonging,  albeit 
axiomatically foreclosed from ontology, will inevitably return. And, what is more, as the 
latest work of  Noam Chomsky has shown, recursion is exactly the mechanism rendering 
language and symbolic thought possible––hence the incompleteness of  language, hence 
its inability to fully grasp the Real, hence anxiety. The void, language, anxiety,  noise: all 
these notions are infected with the paradox of  self-belonging, of  which the event is its 
vanishing, random and inevitable manifestation. 
What  the  event  Heetingly  disrobes,  then,  is  the  unseen,  the  unheard,  the 
uncounted, leftover elements that every structured situation always already excretes. It is 
the transient appearance of  the inconsistency which, precisely because it exceeds every 
attempt  to  make  it  consist,  cannot  ever  be  properly  foreclosed––it  is  the  Real  of  a 
situation, its always-returning void: its blind spot, what the situation cannot bear to hear.  
It is the suppuration of  the situation’s symptom, of  what is, in Jacques-Alain Miller’s 
designation, ‘the utopic point [le point utopique] of  the structure, its improper point’.7 And 
indeed, the event is ‘improper’, because its evanescent, phantasmatic appearance evinces 
the impossible, the illegal:  something has, however Heetingly, occupied an  unoccupiable 
7 Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Action of the Structure’, trans. by Christian Kerslake, rev. by Peter 
Hallward<http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/cpa9.6.miller.translation.pdf>[accss. 2 Nov 2012]; 'rst 
published as ‘Action de la structure’, Cahiers pour l’Analyse 9:6 (summer 1968), pp. 93-105 (p. 97).
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place,8 acted out the unseeable, emitted the unhearable. And––the banal fact remains 
true––a most powerful mark of  the unhearable is that, if by any chance it is heard, it can 
never become  unheard again. ‘When something truly New emerges’, Žižek writes, ‘one 
cannot go on as if  it did not happen’.9  
As mentioned above, the generic procedures which condition philosophy are the 
exclusive source of  truths (these themselves being the sole drive of  change). And, for 
Badiou, ‘the existence of  a truth is suspended from the occurrence of  an event’10 and are 
inextricably linked together. What this is  implying is that events themselves can only 
occur within those domains wherein truth procedures are possible: art, science, politics 
and love. These 'elds––which, noticeably, are all liable to be effected by something like 
the agency of some subject––are the only ones able to contain an ‘evental site’ and are 
termed by Badiou ‘historical situations’ (wherefrom yet another Badiouian dichotomy 
emerges: that between ‘nature’ and ‘history’; events can only occur in history, never in 
nature). 
Political  revolutions,  artistic  innovations,  scienti'c  breakthroughs,  amorous 
encounters:  events  in  Badiou  sense  are  cataclysmic  upheavals  with  the  potential  of 
radically transforming the situation in which they happen.11 When the event surges, it 
affects the elements within it and those at its borders, and then the consequences spread 
like wild're throughout the containing situation, forcing its re-formation. Examples in 
8 See Olivia Lucca Fraser, ‘Forcing’, The Badiou Dictionary, pp. 136-40 (p. 136).
9 And this is so, Žižek continues, ‘since the very fact of this innovation changes all the coordinates. After  
Schoenberg,  one  cannot  continue  to  write  musical  pieces  in  the  old  Romantic  tonal  mode;  after 
Kandinsky and Picasso, one cannot paint in the old 'gurative way; after Kafka and Joyce, one cannot 
write in the old realist way. More precisely: of course, one can do it, but if one does it, these old forms are 
no longer the same. They have lost their innocence and now look like a nostalgic fake’ (Slavoj Žižek, 
‘From  Puri'cation  to  Subtraction:  Badiou  and  the  Real’,  Think  Again:  Alain  Badiou  and  the  Future  of  
Philosophy, ed. Peter Hallward (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 165-81 (p. 175)).
10 Badiou, BE p.17
11 This last point is not unimportant: events are located, sited, they happen for a situation which already  
contains a symptomatic ‘evental site’ and hence,  as Peter Hallward explains, ‘an event can always be 
located precisely in a situation […] [w]e might say that every event is speci'c to, but not speci'ed by, its  
site’ (Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 117).
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Badiou’s literature abound, and some are recurring: the French Revolution’s destruction 
of  the  Ancien  Régime,  Einstein’s  General  Relativity  bursting  of  Newtonian  dynamics, 
Schoenberg’s dissolution of  the post-Romantic tonal system, the random encounter of 
would-be lovers that will have changed their lives forever…
All in all, truth and event both name the rare, exceptional emergences of  novelty, 
of  that which in-exist according to the terms of  the situation for which they happen. As 
Andrew Gibson explains, an event ‘is an aleatory fragment, the chance occurrence of  
something that had not existed beforehand, could not be predicted or foreseen and has  
no  prior  name.  The  event  is  the  means  by  which  the  truth  of  newness  enters  the 
world’.12 I would qualify Gibson’s sentence: the event is what triggers a subject by which 
the truth of  newness enters the world. Truth requires the intervention of  a subject.
(3) For Badiou, a subject emerges when, following an unforeseen encounter with an event, they af6rm  
its impossible occurrence and subsequently  (4) delivers a new (artistic, scienti6c, political, amatorial)  
truth into the situation by forcing it to accept the consequences of  the event. 
Although  repeatedly  acknowledging  his  debt  to  both  Descartes  and  Lacan, 
Badiou posits a subject that is neither a given of  the cogito, nor a donation of  language, 
but one that is borne out of  an unforeseen encounter with said event and is subsequently 
induced by the militant work that involves the af'rmation of  its  truth.  A subject, for 
Badiou, does not predate the event, but is ‘induced through a generic procedure, and 
therefore depends upon an event. As a result, the subject is rare’.13 
Being (void, woven out of  nothing), the  event (a surge of  the void, as accidental as it is 
inevitable, random and illegal), and the subject of  truth triggered by such event: within this 
12 Andrew Gibson, ‘Badiou and Beckett: Actual In'nity, Event, Remainder’, Polygraph 17 (2005), pp. 175-
203 (p.184).
13 C p. 305 n. 12.
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thesis, these concepts will inevitably undergo re-tunings and translations as they trespass 
the various boundaries that the argument will encounter––however, the sum-vector of 
their ethical directions, which prescribes a thinking of  the truths produced within artistic, 
scienti'c, political and erotico-desiring 'elds of  practice, will have remained unchanged 
throughout. Insofar as education will be posited here as something like the custodian of 
the temporal stretch produced by the  subjects in their investigation of  these  truths, this 
ethical invariance is a crucial aspect of  my argument. To put it differently: I will posit  
that education, in its most generic sense, is nothing other than the  praxial temporality 
determined by the ethical vectors induced within a philosophical 'eld by its ontological 
(atemporal) axioms. 
1.1. The Truth Procedure: Praxis and the Production of Time
I will now aim to provide the reader with the more general strategic operation of  the 
Badiouian  philosophical  system,  by  commenting  on  three  tactical  aspects  of  its 
functioning engine: 'rstly,  Badiou’s conception that philosophy is  conditioned from the 
outside; secondly, the related idea that philosophy is not a producer of  truths, but rather  
a space for their compossibility and, thirdly, the important distinction between truth and knowledge. 
An overview of  these operators will further the presentation of  a key strategic notion 
threading through all three of  them––namely, subtraction, the concept driving lock, stock 
and barrel the praxial component of  Badiou’s philosophical machine, and one which 
effectively determines every stage of  the trajectory of  a truth procedure.
Conditions
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Philosophy, Badiou claims, needs to open up, and––in a tradition that was inaugurated 
by Plato––allow its thinking to be conditioned from the outside. These conditions are nothing 
less  than those  endeavours  able  to  produce the  universal  truths of  their  time.  As we 
already know, there are four domains of  human activity wherein these praxes, which 
Badiou  terms  generic  truth  procedures,  might  emerge:  science,  art,  politics  and  love.14 
Noticeable in this list is the absence of  philosophy itself: as it happens, philosophy does 
not  produce any truths  of  its  own:  it  is  at  the  service  of  the  generic  truth  procedures, 
facilitating  the  ‘compossibility’  of  the  truths  that  only  the  former  can  produce.15 
Philosophy is empty, or rather: philosophy needs to keep an always-empty place that the 
truths produced outside of  it will have occupied.
Compossibility
For Badiou, then, philosophy offers a ‘mode of  access’ to its contemporaneous truth 
procedures in a ‘temporal arch of  simultaneity’; it thus weaves a conceptual space, ‘in 
which thought accedes to time, to its time, so long as the truth procedures of  this time 
'nd shelter for their compossibility within it’.16 The notion of  ‘compossibility’, which 
Badiou borrows from Leibniz, describes an operation taking place  within a locus that 
philosophy alone opens up and maintains––viz. Truth (singular, with capital T). This space 
is  cleared and made available  to  the  truths  produced  outside of  philosophy,  and this 
happens through a declaration of  the form “there are  truths” (plural, lower case). The 
philosophical place of  Truth, then, becomes an empty pointer, which––in order for the 
compossibility of  truths to run smoothly––must remain itself  void:  ‘[i]t  operates but 
14 According to Badiou, something which Plato himself implied; see Badiou, MP pp. 35-35.
15 See Alain Badiou, Conditions, trans. by Steven Corcoran (London & New York: Continuum, 2008) pp. 
11, 23, 35; hereinafter C. See also MP pp. 34, 37-8, 123, 135.
16 MP p. 38, p. 134.
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presents nothing. Philosophy is not a production of  truth, but an operation from truths, 
an  operation  which  disposes  the  “there  is”  and  epochal  compossibility  of  truths’.17 
Philosophy is the ‘go-between’ of  the generic procedures, ‘the procuress of  truth’18  and, 
as such, ‘readily devotes itself  to the arts, to the sciences, to love, to instances of  politics,  
not in order to think their objective nature, or to standardise their practice, but in order 
to constitute itself  as an experimentation of  a new concept of  truth.’19 
Truth v knowledge
If  Badiou, against the grain of  most post-structural philosophy, emphatically takes the 
position that there are truths (a position which will be fully endorsed throughout this thesis), 
he is also very clear that these truths can never be totalised. Truths, being in'nite, are 
always already un'nished, and can never comprise an encyclopaedic summa, something 
which would fall on the side of  knowledge: as with Plato’s distinction between philosophy 
and sophism, and following Lacan, for Badiou, truth punctures a hole in knowledge and 
is ‘heterogeneous’ to it––in spite of  being its sole source: ‘we shall say that a truth forces 
knowledge’.20 The latter is the domain of  common beliefs and established facts, always 
already resisting the change which invariable follows the disruptive arrival of  a new truth. 
As  Peter  Hallward  writes  in  the  ‘Introduction’  of  his  translation  of  Ethics,  Badiou’s 
philosophy
seeks  to  expose  and  make  sense  of  the  potential  for  radical  innovation  (revolution, 
invention, trans'guration…) in every situation… [dividing] the sphere of  human action 
17 MP p. 124, see also C. p. 11.
18 HI p. 11.
19 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker (London & New York: Verso, 2005), p. xxxii; hereinafter 
M.
20 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London & New York: 
Verso, 2001), p. 70; hereinafter E.
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in  two  overlapping  but  sharply  differentiated  spheres:  (a)  the  ‘ordinary’  realm  of 
established interests and differences, of  approved knowledge… and (b) an exceptional 
realm of  singular innovations or truths.21 
Knowledge,  encyclopedia,  ‘state  of  the  situation’  are  in  Badiou’s  system  all 
interchangeable notions, on the side of  the excess of  the law and representation: as A. J. 
Bartlett explains, 
[t]he  re-presentation  that  the  encyclopedia  performs  as  knowledge  is  thereby 
characterised  by  excess;  the  excess  of  parts  over  elements,  or  representation  over 
presentation, or the rule over the rational. The hole at the heart of  knowledge is what 
the encyclopedia, as pure repetition, exists to conceal.22 
Philosophy as conditioned by ‘truth procedures’ (art, science, politics and love), philosophy 
as a space for the  compossibility of  these truths, the incompatibility of  the latter with 
knowledge:  each  of  these  three  philosophical  principles––which  are  somewhat 
interdependent within Badiou’s system––will inHect my pedagogical argument and 'lter 
from it a reverberant concept of  noise, along the following lines:
 
(1) Accepting the idea that philosophy is empty, that it does not itself  produce any truths, 
and  is  conditioned  from  the  outside  is  a  position  that  not  only  will  have  extreme 
consequences for philosophy itself,23 it is one that, once taken on board, will radically 
determine  the  thinking  of  education  thereof:  to  put  it  very  brieHy,  if  education  is  
equated with philosophy––a move which, once again, every properly Freirean pedagogy 
should perform––this would imply that neither philosophy nor education produce any truths (the 
21 E, ‘Introduction’  p.  viii
22 A. J. Bartlett, ‘Encyclopedia’, Dictionary pp.108-10 (p. 108).
23 As Justin Clemens has correctly pointed out;  see ‘Conditions’,  The Badiou Dictionary,  ed.  by Steven 
Corcoran (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), pp. 67-73 (p. 69).
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stress should remain on the word  produce: as we shall see, truths are certainly a main 
concern of  education). 
By and large, it is here where the pedagogical case of  my thesis comes to fruition: 
education, insofar as it will be posited as the praxial side of  philosophy, acts effectively as 
the minder of  the process undertaken by any  subject of  truth whatsoever. If  philosophy 
opens up a shelter for truths, education is the caretaker, the hands-on janitor of  such 
place and the escort of  its subjects. In short, I posit that education occupies the temporal 
interval opened up in philosophy’s place of  Truth. 
(2) The notion of  compossibility will become pivotal in the next chapter, as it prepares the 
ground for the conceptual separation I will  attempt between “philosophy-as-place-of-
Truth”  and  “education-as-time-of-the-Subject”.  If  ‘[p]hilosophy  is  bound  to  the 
historicity of  its conditions, but seizes the moments of  in'nity that emerge in them’ as 
Jan  Voelker  observes,  and  ‘[i]t  is  thus  subtracted  from time and  creates  a  space  of 
timelessness, in which moments are simultaneously eternal, as they can be regained by 
thought  at  any  point’,24 it  is  precisely  this  act  of  ‘regaining’,  which  imbues  the 
timelessness of  the concept of  Truth with the praxial temporality of  Education. 
Furthermore, we can perceive here a 'rst operative resonance with noise: insofar 
as (i) noise will be considered as the temporalised appearance of  the ontological void 
and (ii) education is posited as the temporal, praxial trajectory of  the subjects of  truths, 
then (iii)  noise becomes the connective thread: from ontology (the void),  through the 
event (the crack of  ontology, the emergence of  the void in a situation), to the subjects’  
work to  ascertain the  truth of  the  event (which produces entropy,  irreversibility  and 
temporality: the void is, at this stage, manifesting itself  Hat out as noise). 
In this respect, however, one might need to be more speci'c: what the event 
24 Jan Voelker, ‘Compossibility’, Dictionary, pp. 66-8 (p. 68
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produces  is  entropy;  what  the  subject’s  work produces  is  entropy  and negentropy,  or 
rather, the dialectic itself between entropy|negentropy: viz., (neg)entropy. It is in this precise 
sense that one can consider the event as an irreversible bifurcation, marking a decision, 
or  nomination  which  forces  a  temporal  beginning  thereupon  to  be  'lled  with  the 
(neg)entropic work of  the subject. 
Moreover, if  ‘time’ for Badiou ‘is intervention itself, thought as the gap between 
two events’25 and furthermore, if ‘the faithful procedure is random [...] and its texture 
the operator of faithful connection, which is itself  also a temporal production’,26 one 
might 'nd therein  an  interesting  and  purely  scienti'c  resonance  in  Ilya  Prigogine’s 
assertion that ‘probability appears through bifurcations [and] Time has only meaning in 
a Probabilistic World.’27 
 
(3) As for the irreconcilability between truth and knowledge, we encounter here another 
clear  reverberation  produced  by  noise––in  this  case,  in  the  resonant  overlapping 
between Badiou’s conception of  knowledge and Claude Shannon’s notion of  information  
entropy. The fact that knowledge for Badiou ‘designates an epistemic state that falls short 
of  truth  precisely  insofar  as  it  harbours  certain  yet-to-be-recognised  anomalies, 
paradoxes,  aporias,  or  other  such  problems’,28 is  something  that  could  easily  be 
translated in “theory of  information” terms as knowledge will never fully be able to rid itself  of  
noise and uncertainty––which is what makes both conceptions sound conspicuously close. 
Indeed,  as  we  shall  see  when  discussing  Malaspina’s  elaborations  on  Shannon’s 
mathematical formalisation of  information, Badiou’s notion of  Truth as a supplement to 
the  always-incomplete  summa  of  knowledge,  can  be  re-thought  in  tandem  with 
25 BE, p. 210.
26 BE, p. 337.
27 Ilya Prigogine, Is Future Given? (Singapore: World Scienti'c, 2003) p. 54.
28 Christopher Norris, ‘Fidelity’, Dictionary, pp. 132-36 (p. 134).
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Malaspina’s  conception  of  ‘epistemic  noise’.  This  is  equal  to  an  uncertainty,  an 
‘information  entropy’  which  can  be said  ‘to  have a  positive  epistemic  value,  if  it  is 
understood to specify the uncertainty in which we are about the unfolding of  a system’ 
and  hence  it  is  ‘no  longer  an  entirely  negative  nor  an  entirely  unspeci'ed  form of 
ignorance’ but, much to the contrary, it ‘is what speci'es complexity and informs on 
what remains to be known.’29 
And, sure enough, both notions––viz. Badiou’s always-empty space for Truth, 
Malaspina’s always-shifting epistemological borders between noise and information––
will  have  strongly  resonated  with  both  Freire’s  conception  of  the  always  already 
‘un'nishedness’  [inconclução] of  the process humanisation  and with the always-divided 
subject of  psychoanalysis.  The common 'delity in all  of  these principles is  never to 
‘knowledge’ and always to ‘what remains to be known’. 
Furthermore, Badiou’s assertion that education ‘has never meant anything but 
this: to arrange the forms of  knowledge in such a way that some truth may come to 
pierce  a  hole  in  them’30 carries  in  and  of  itself  an  uncanny  ring  of  Freire’s  own 
de'nition  of  praxis,  viz.,  ‘reHection  and  action  impacting  on  the  structures  to  be 
transformed’.31
All in all, the incompatibility between truth and knowledge will remain pivotal 
throughout the argumentation of  this thesis––indeed, as Badiou reminds us, ‘everything 
is at stake in the thought of  the truth/knowledge couple.’32 
Subtraction and the trajectory of  a truth procedure
29 EN p. 74
30 HI 9
31 [[R]eIexão e ação incidindo sobre as estruturas a serem transformadas] (PO 167).
32 BE p. 327; the truth procedure is ‘in no way predetermined by knowledge. Its origin is the event, of 
which knowledge knows nothing […]. The multiples encountered by the procedure do not depend upon 
any knowledge. They result from the randomness of the ‘militant’ trajectory starting out from the event-
site.’ BE, p. 337.
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What each of  the three concepts just discussed have in common is the fact that they all  
accomplish  a  subtractive  gesture:33 'rst  of  all,  by  being  conditioned  from the  outside, 
philosophy  subtracts  itself  from  the  production  of  truths;  secondly,  compossibility 
requires that the place of  Truth remain empty, subtracted from any substantiation; and 
'nally, it is the case, almost by de'nition, that every truth is categorically subtracted from 
knowledge.  Indeed,  for  Badiou,  philosophy  itself  is  ‘essentially  subtractive’,  and  this 
‘because its central category is empty [and] at its core is a lack, a hole’.34 
In  fact,  ‘subtraction’  designates  within  Badiou’s  system  a  complex  set  of 
concepts,  the  ‘particular  intricacy’  of  which  must  be  understood,  as  Frank  Ruda 
explains––in a formulation not too distant from the one I used earlier with respect to 
noise––‘as deriving from its reverberation at all levels of  Badiou's thinking’.35 If  it seems 
reasonable that all of  Badiou’s ‘most crucial categories need to be conceived of  in a 
subtractive way’,36 Badiou’s central aim is the radical subtraction of  Truth ‘from the 
labyrinth of  meaning’37 (a distinction that,  as  Ruda points  out,  is  equivalent  to that 
between ‘truth and sense, truth and opinion and, 'rst and foremost, between truth and 
knowledge’).38
Furthermore, subtraction is the alpha and omega of  subjective work, the sine 
qua  non  prescription  present  throughout  the  subject’s  investigation  of  a  truth.  If 
subtraction ‘reverberates  at  all  levels  of  Badiou’s  thinking’,  it  is  in  the  subject-truth 
procedure that it acquires its ethical dimension in full (which, as we shall shortly see, is a 
33 The indispensable reference here is Badiou’s essay ‘On Subtraction’, published as chapter 8 in C (pp.  
113-28),  and chapter 9 in TW (pp. 113-28); c.f.  chapter 2, ‘Philosophy and Truth’,  in Alain Badiou, 
In6nite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed & trans. by Oliver Feltham & Justin Clemens (London 
& New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 58-78.
34 Badiou, C p. 13.
35 Frank Ruda, ‘Subtraction––Undecidable, Indiscernible, Generic, Unnameable’,  The Badiou Dictionary, 
pp. 329-37 (p. 330).
36 Ibid.
37 Badiou, C p. 13.
38 Ruda, ‘Subtraction’ p. 330.
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dimension invariable underscored by the murmur of  noise). As Fraser explains, ‘[t]he 
subject, for Badiou, is essentially a free project that originates in an event, and subtracts 
itself  from both being qua being, as well as the linguistic and epistemic apparatuses that 
govern the situation.’39 The subjective procedure draws what Badiou describes as the 
‘trajectory of  a truth’,40 an itinerary which could be thusly summarised:
- something improbable to the point of  impossible happens––namely, the event; 
- upon haphazardly encountering it (or, rather, its trace: events are, by their own nature, 
Heeting  occurrences,  disappearing  as  soon  as  they  appear),  the  subject  decides  on 
declaring its occurrence (the event will either be ignored or denied by the state of  the 
situation: from the point of  view of  the latter’s established logic, the former is devoid of  
value, undecidable); 
- following the decision to af'rm the event, the subject then commits to the investigation 
of  its  indiscernible consequences in a succession of  random enquiries (such trajectory is 
“indiscernible” and “random” insofar as there is no prior knowledge whatsoever guiding 
the course of  the investigation); 
- next, the subject tirelessly militates in order to force the situation to change its logic, so 
that it accommodates the set of  results of  the enquiries related to the event: the old logic 
collapses and a new  truth is brought into the world (the truth is local and 'nite in its 
subjective presentation, universal and in'nite in its generic implications); 
- thus truth passes into knowledge, both remaining completely incommensurable with 
each other (which implies that the recon'gured knowledge must always reserve a place 
for the unforeseen arrival of  the next truth: such place must be kept empty, unnamed).
39 Fraser, ‘The Law of The Subject’, p. 94)
40 C p. 121.
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Whence, the four subtractive modalities of  a subjective itinerary: the undecidable (the event), 
the indiscernible (the subject’s random path), the generic (the always incomplete production 
of  a truth), the  unnameable  (the ethical imperative:  do not substantialise Truth). Such is the 
trajectory whereby, in Badiou’s own words, ‘philosophy seizes truths “out of  sense”’:
the undecidable, related to the event (a truth is not, it befalls): the indiscernible, related 
to liberty (the path of  a truth is not constrained, but risky); the generic, related to being 
(the being of  a truth is an in'nite set subtracted from every predicate in knowledge); the 
unnameable,  related  to  the  Good  (to  force  the  naming  of  an  unnameable  breeds 
disaster).41
Two crucial aspects emerge here: 'rstly, the fact that this subtractive ‘trajectory of  a 
truth’ is inseparable from a notion of  subjective praxis. Indeed, as Ruda observes, ‘what 
holds for truths holds equally for subtraction: as truths are procedures, so subtraction has 
also to be immanently related to practice’.42 Insofar as (i) education cannot be separated from  
the idea of  praxis––this is one of  the key tenets of  the Freirean doctrine––and considering 
that (ii)   education is nothing but the praxial  side of  philosophy––this is my claim––then (iii) 
education  is,  or  should  be,  completely  isomorphous  with  the  operations  involved  in 
subtraction. 
Secondly,  subtraction requires  an entropic  dimension to supplement  Badiou’s 
otherwise atemporal, isentropic ontology. Constituting a  trajectory,  the truth procedure 
involves the activation of  a temporality of  sorts––in fact, as Fraser appositely points out, 
‘[t]he  subjective  project  is,  itself,  conceived  as  the  temporal  unfolding  of  a  “truth”.  And 
indeed,, such temporality activated by a movement  out of  ontology: ‘[o]riginating in an 
event and unfolding in time, the subject cannot, for Badiou, be adequately understood in 
41 Badiou, MP, 143.
42 Ruda, ‘Subtraction’, p. 330.
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strictly ontological, i.e. set-theoretical, terms, insofar as  neither the event nor time have any  
place in classical set theory’.43 Which might be the reason why, for Jean-Jacques Lecercle, the 
event––being an eruption of  the (non-temporal) void, has ‘no proper duration’. Indeed, 
insofar as 
[t]he event is situated in the situation, it has a site  in it, but it is not  of it, it does not 
belong, it is supplementary to it. It comes and goes in a Hash (it has no proper duration: 
its temporality is the retroactive temporality of  after-the-event; and yet, as we have seen, 
it  interrupts  and  it  founds),  but  it  leaves  traces,  traces  that  allow  an  encounter with 
elements of  the situation, who undergo a process of  conviction, or conversion.44
Therefore, it is precisely here––at the ‘temporal unfolding of  a truth’, which is 
the subject procedure, determined by the stages of  subtraction––the point at which time, 
(neg)entropy and irreversibility start 'ltering through and whereupon the void appears, 
in the emergence of  temporality, as noise. 
Furthermore, and as mentioned above, the work of the subject is time itself, which 
is  to  say,  time  is  produced  as  a  result  of  the  random,  probabilistic,  negentropic 
investigation of  the consequences of  the entropic event. 
In summation, (i) the void surges as an entropic event, (ii) the phenomenological noise of 
which triggers the (neg)entropic work of the subject, (iii) the logical noise of which rumbles 
throughout the investigation and forcing of a new truth, (iv) its reverberation irreversibly 
(entropically) transforms the knowledge of the situation wherein the event happened.
43 Fraser, ‘The Law of The Subject’, p. 9  (my emphasis).
44 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (Basingstoke & NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 
109-10)
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And it  is  here,  'nally,  whereon rests  my claim that,  if  an education is  to  be 
effectively ‘by truths’, then, it must be thought-through from the bias of  some temporality––
which, as Lecercle points out, must be something like a ‘retroactive’ activation of  the 
(temporalised) traces of  the (non-temporal) event. And if  every truth procedure, Badiou 
claims, must proceed from ‘the bias of  the void’, this would mean that education must 
consequently proceed from the combined bias of  the void + temporality––a dyad which can 
be made to reverberate, loudly and clearly, with the signi'er “noise”:
the void + temporality ––> noise
1.2.  Badiou’s Philosophy of Education
A super-dense body, hanging in conceptual space
One is  tempted  to  rehearse  the  following  hypothesis:  if  there  is  anything  that  can 
described  as  “Badiou’s  Philosophy of  Education”,  this  happens to  be  a  super-dense 
body, all of  its virtual volumes tightly packed in two singular, brief  statements: 
(statement 1)  ‘“education” (save in its  oppressive or perverted expressions)  has never 
meant anything but this: to arrange the forms of  knowledge in such a way that some 
truth may come to pierce a hole in them’.45
45 HI p. 9
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(statement 2) ‘the only education is an education by truths’.46 
There are three immediate implications of  taking on board Badiou’s pedagogical 
statements: 
(1)  we accept  that  there  are,  indeed,  such things  as  truths (which implies,  of  course, 
accepting the event and the subject)
(2) we accept that education is consistent with truths.
(3) we accept that education is inconsistent with knowledge.
But  most  importantly,  once  this  Badiouian  framework  is  accepted,  and  once 
decided to follow through its consequences, we immediately encounter a crossroad: on 
what side of  truth does education lie? There are, at bottom, only two possible routes:
(i) education as a truth procedure, i.e. education itself  as a producer of  truths (education, 
then, as a condition of  philosophy)
(ii)  education as a mode, or instance, of  philosophy, i.e. education as a composer, or 
tender of  truths (education, then, conditioned by truths).
Education as an evental site and/or as producer of  truths on one side; education as a 
tender, or minder of  truths on the other: there are not too many clues in the Badiouian 
corpus  regarding  this  decision.  As  of  this  writing,  Badiou  has  simply  left  his 
supermassive pedagogical object hanging in philosophical space, holding itself  in place 
by its own gravity: ‘the only education is an education by truths’––enough said.
The condensed force of  this statement, however, has inescapably attracted the 
46 HI p. 14
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attention of  not a few pedagogues and philosophers of  education. Therefore, before 
taking a 'nal stance on this point, it might be worth making a very brief  bibliographical  
detour, in order to listen to what some of  these Badiouian pedagogues have had to say 
about this issue.
Pedagogy of  the event
The case for ‘a pedagogy of  the event’ is most strongly made by Dennis Atkinson. In a 
series of  publications outlining a program of  ‘pedagogies against the state’47, Atkinson 
outlines  conceptual  variables  for  ‘a  Hexible  teaching-learning space  that  attempts  to 
accommodate unpredictable or unexpected directions in learning.’48  
If  the radical anti-statism of  Atkinson’s project seems to be fully coincidental 
with what  I  am proposing here,  there  is  an  important  difference––as  subtle  as  it  is 
philosophically structural––in that the event, for Atkinson, seems to be possible  within 
education: i.e it is education itself  that becomes the ‘risky situation’ wherein ‘ontological  
boundaries become uncertain or fractured.’49 
Although Badiou is concerned with the event in relation to such major disturbances in 
the 'elds of  science, politics, art and love, I think there is some mileage in taking this  
idea and applying it to more localised micro-events of  learning viewed as local processes 
of  becoming in which learners emerge as subjects. This seems to me to be about the 
production of  new form and new formalisations.50 
Here my position slightly departs from Atkinson’s in that I look at the event as 
47 See Dennis Atkinson, ‘Pedagogy against the state’,  International Journal Of Art & Design Education 27:3, 
(2008), pp. 226-240.
48 Dennis Atkinson, ‘Pedagogy of the Event’,  <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255583005> 
[accss. 23 Jun 2017], p. 3.
49 Ibid. p. 5.
50 Ibid. p. 6.
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not happening within education: as we shall see, the latter––being the temporal-praxial 
side of  philosophy–– takes care of  events happening in its outside.
Education as a truth procedure
Following a similar route than that taken by Atkinson, Tyson Lewis quali'es education 
as  a  truth  procedure  in  its  own  right.  Making  a  footing  on  Badiou’s  account  of 
Althusser’s  subjective  categories––viz.,  science (no  subject,  only  the  object  of  the 
economy),  ideology (subject with no object)  and  politics (subjectivity  without subject)––
Lewis51 then ponders
how can we think the category of  the subjectivity without subject? what is the content of 
this subjectivity beyond the interpellated subject?  It is here that education must be added to  
Badiou's list, for education is a practice (a) whose raw materials make up the subject's 
world,  (b)  whose practice is  a redistribution of  these things (a  work on and through 
perceptual transformation), and (c) whose product is a subjectivity without subject (dis-
identi'cation with  all  assigned roles).  In  this  equation,  education is  an “encounter” 
between  subjects  and  raw  materials  in  such  a  way  as  to  introduce  a  radical 
destabilization  of  the  self  and its  perceptual  'eld–a  new mode of  seeing,  listening, 
speaking and reading as Althusser would say. The result is a subjectivity stripped of  any 
identity allotted to him and her within the community.52  
Lewis seems to be aiming to answer Badiou’s enquires into Althusser’s project, 
namely, the consolidation of  a notion of  ‘Subjectivity without a Subject’.53 His answer to 
51 One can 'nd Badiou’s take on the Althusserian categories of subjectivity in chapter 3 of M: ‘Althusser:  
Subjectivity without a Subject’, pp. 58-67.
52 Tyson Lewis,  The Aesthetics of Education: Theatre, Curiosity,  and Politics in the Work of Jacques Rancière and  
Paulo Freire (New York & London: Continuum, 2012), p. 37 (my emphasis).
53 A project that, according to Badiou, ‘[f]or the time it was quite some project, and it still focuses our  
intellectual  tasks  to  this  day.  This  admirable  effort,  as  yet  unnamed  (to  think  subjectivity  without  a  
subject), is enough to make Louis Althusser worthy of our most rigorous respect’; see M p. 66.
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this  question––that  education,  by producing ‘a  subjectivity  stripped of  any identity’, 
provides a space to understand this notion––is not far from the one I am positing here:  
namely, that education is a generic subject of  subjects.   
Lewis,  however,  comes  even  closer  to  the  Badiou-Freire  bridge  that  I  am 
intending to construct here in a collaborative paper with Daniel Cho54. Identifying not 
dissimilar resonances and tensions between Badiou and Freire––and almost spelling out 
the thrust of  my own pedagogical argument––they assert that  
[p]erhaps, today the two 'gures that stand for revolutionary thought in contemporary 
philosophy and education are Alain Badiou and Paulo Freire: Badiou for his remarkable 
work on the subject as a 'delity to a truth-event, and Freire for his theory of  education  
as a political practice. But, here, the relationship between Badiou and Freire is an exact 
reversal of  Descartes and Rousseau: though Badiou and Freire remain fundamentally  
apart  in  regards  to  their  respective  theories  of  the  subject  (for  Badiou,  subject  is  a 
subject  of  truth,  and  for  Freire,  subject  as  subject  of  dialogic  praxis),  they  remain 
strikingly  similar  in  their  concepts  of  education,  namely,  both  Badiou  and  Freire 
envision education as a revolutionary space.55 
Indeed, if  for Badiou education means ‘to arrange the forms of  knowledge in 
such a way that some truth may come to pierce a hole in them’ and, concurrently, if  for 
Freire––as  Lewis  and Cho put  it–– ‘education  is  a  praxis  for  the  transformation of 
oppressive relations’56, the corollary must be then that Badiou and Freire’s ‘theses on 
education’, are ‘complementary’: Lewis and Cho’s conclusion seems to spell out nothing 
less than one of  the principal hypotheses that I am exploring here. What is more, they 
consider––as indeed I do––the construction of  such bridge as an indispensable strategy 
54 Daniel Cho & Tyson Lewis, ‘Education and Event: Thinking Radical Pedagogy in the Era of 
Standardization’, Studies in Media & Information Literacy Education 5:2 (2005) 
<http://www.utpress.utoronto.ca/journal/ejournals/simile> [accss. 11 Jul 2019].
55 Ibid. pp. 2-3
56 Ibid. pp. 2-3
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in the struggle for the defence of  critical  education,  ‘especially,  during a time when 
standardization is the dominant mode of  education in late capitalism.’57 
Finally,  and  probably  most  interesting,  is  Lewis  and  Cho’s  approach  to 
problematising  Freire’s  seminal  notions  of  dialogue and  curiosity,  which  they  do  by 
introducing none other than Lacan into the conversation––which is precisely the same 
move I intend to do when discussing the idea of  noise-inside in Chapter 6. Exploring 
this same territory, Lewis and Cho argue that dialogue is never free from the distortions 
effected by desire, insofar as it
always  risks  becoming  the  hysterical  dialogue  in  which  the  teacher  holds  a  secret 
relationship to the answer, the missing part of  knowledge, which the student tries to 
uncover.  Or in Lacan’s  terms,  the teacher’s  precious object  that  incurs the student’s  
desire is the agalma. What 'lls the gap separating the teacher and student in relation to 
knowledge so that their dialogue appears to be the exchange of  critical knowledge is the 
same  thing  that  sutures  the  disjunctive  relationship  of  the  Master/slave  and  the 
pedagogy  of  play  so  that  they  appear  to  be  processes  of  learning,  namely,  the 
fundamental pedagogical fantasy.58 
Of  particular  relevance  is  Lewis  and  Cho’s  mention  of  the  agalma,  that 
mysterious  and fascinating  core  hidden deep within  Socrates’  ugly  body  and which 
arouses the ineluctable desire of  an inebriated Alcibiades in the Symposium.59 In Lacan’s 
57 Ibid.  p.  3.  As Sandino Núñez writes,  ‘[t]he political  truth of the next era is  played in education. 
Education is the stage wherein today’s struggle for the political tomorrow of society, is beginning to be  
exposed.’  Sandino  Núnez,  ‘La  educación,  la  nueva  izquierda  demagógica  y  la  lógica  del  mercado’,  
Geopolítica  de  la  Subjetividad,  (27  Jan  2012)  <http://sandinonunez.blogspot.com/2012/01/la-
educacion-la-nueva-izquierda.html> [accss. 28 Jan 2012].
58 Ibid. p. 11.
59 ‘The way I shall take, gentlemen, in my praise of Socrates, is by similitudes. Probably he will think I do 
this for derision; but I choose my similitude for the sake of truth, not of ridicule. For I say he is likest to the  
Silenus-'gures that sit in the statuaries' shops; those, I mean, which our craftsmen make with pipes or  
Hutes in their hands: when their two halves are pulled open, they are found to contain images of gods 
[ἀγάλματα]. And I further suggest that he resembles the satyr Marsyas. Now, as to your likeness, Socrates,  
to these in 'gure, I do not suppose even you yourself will dispute it; but I have next to tell you that you are  
like them in every other respect. You are a Heering fellow, eh? If you will not confess it, I have witnesses at  
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early work,60 the  agalma appears as a confused knot drive-desire-love, and will eventually 
evolve into the notion of  objet petit a. Insofar as I associate here this precise knot––desire, 
objet-a, object voice––with what I term noise-inside, Lewis and Cho seem to be identifying 
this  same symptomatic  area within education––and one which the  latter  cannot  but 
engage  with  (and  one  which  Badiou  also  identi'es  when  mentioning  the  ‘Socratic 
function  of  corruption  of  the  youth’  and  the  seductive  power  of  philosophical 
transmission).61
If  Lewis and Cho are not the only scholars to associate Badiou with Freire, they 
are, to the best of  my knowledge, the only ones who explicitly point to something like 
the operation of  a void at the heart of  the pedagogical relation:
[t]he fantasy that the other has the relationship to the missing part of  knowledge must be 
traversed uncovering the traumatic Real of  knowledge (i.e.  that  it  is  always lacking). 
Here, we see where the act, the traversal of  the fantasy, articulates with the event: rather 
than seeking wholeness in the other, the event structures the truth that at the center of  
the teacher/student relationship is a void, that is to say, the event is the traversal of  the 
fantasy.62 
Considering that if this void appears within the temporality of  education it must  
do so as noise, Lewis and Cho’s notion of  ‘a void at the center of  the teacher/student’ 
relationship’ strongly resonates with the idea of  an education in noise that I am positing 
here. 
There  is  in  all  of  this,  however,  a  subtle  but  crucial  difference  with  the  notion  of 
hand. Are you not a piper?’ Plato, Symposium 215a-b.
60 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VIII, Transference, 1960-1961, trans. by Cormac 
Gallagher <http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/THE-SEMINAR-OF-
JACQUES-LACAN-VIII-Draft-21.pdf> [accss. 11 Jul 2019], pp. 118-88.
61 Alain Badiou, ‘Philosophy as Biography’, The Sympton 9 (fall 2008) 
<http://www.lacan.com/symptom9_articles/badiou19.html> [accss. 8 Apr 2015]
62 Cho & Lewis, ‘Education and Event’, p. 11.
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education that I am developing in this thesis: Lewis and Cho seem to locate the event 
within the space of  education (as indeed does Kent den Heyer)63 whilst I locate the event 
outside of  it.
Which  means  that,  ultimately,  none  of  the  theses  just  discussed––viz.  a 
‘pedagogy of  the event’ (Atkinson), education as a truth procedure (Lewis, Cho, den 
Heyer)––can  be  fully  consistent  with  my  main  assumption:  that  education  and 
philosophy are biconditionally related. And it is precisely this biconditionality, I claim, 
that the Freirean element brings to the Badiouian pedagogical argument.
A (Platonic) education by truths
One cannot move on from a discussion about Badiou and education without mentioning 
the work of  A. J. Bartlett, in my view the utmost Badiouian pedagogue. Although, in 
point of  fact, rather than pedagogue, one should describe Bartlett as something along the 
lines of  a Badiouian thinker of  education, given the clearly negative overtones that the term 
pedagogy acquires in his work––a term he associates with the knowledge and the Law of  
the state. Indeed, the word ‘pedagogy’ is for Bartlett clearly opposed to any conception 
of  a proper education by truths: this must be, without exception, subtracted from the 
knowledge  of  the  state,  which  is  always  ready  to  kill  any  emergence  of  true 
subjectivity––as Bartlett himself  puts it, ‘we must not fail to recall that the pedagogy of  
the  state  precisely  does  remake the  student  in  its  image,  making it  die  in  a  certain 
respect.’64
63 See:  Kent  den Heyer,  ‘Education as  an Af'rmative  Invention:  Alain  Badiou and the Purpose  of 
Teaching and Curriculum’,  Educational Theory 59:4 (2009), pp. 441-63; Kent den Heyer (ed.),  Thinking  
Education Through Alain Badiou (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010);  and Kent Den Heyer & Diane Conrad, 
‘Using  Alain  Badiou’s  Ethic  of  Truths  to  Support  an  ‘Eventful’  Social  Justice  Teacher  Education 
Program’, Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 27:1 (2011), pp. 7-19.
64 A. J. Bartlett, ‘Refuse become subject: The educational ethic of Saint Paul’, Badiou Studies 3:1 (2014), 
pp. 193-216 (p. 197). One must note that Bartlett, as a deep-dyed Badiouian, follows Badiou’s own stance 
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Not  only  does  Bartlett  categorically  assert  (like,  we  saw,  Atkinson  does)  that 
education must  distance itself  the  state:  moreover,  following a (Badiouian)  notion of 
Platonic  education,  for  Bartlett,  the  latter  must  subtract  itself  from  the  sophistry of 
knowledge tout court––if, that is, it is to retain any compatibility with truth. 
What we hope to articulate by exploring the dialogues in this way, that is by deploying 
Badiou’s ‘platonic’ categories back into the Platonic corpus, is the logical and implicative 
link between our primary axiomatic statement: that ‘the only education is an education 
by truths’ and what we might call its consequent yet coincident axiomatic statement that 
‘thought is  nothing other than the desire  to 'nish with the exorbitant excess  of  the  
state.’65
The  pedagogical  argument  developed  in  this  thesis  owes  Bartlett’s  important 
work a double debt: 'rstly, Bartlett is, as far as I can tell, the scholar who most directly  
engages with the consequences of  Badiou’s claim that the only education is an education by  
truths:
[t]here are at least three key assumptions supporting this claim: the existence of  truths;  
the existence of  education; and the link between the two, a link that in fact requires that  
education be thought as something other than an adjunct to any institutional form.66
Secondly, Bartlett seems to identify the same structural pillars (I am tempted to 
call them hermae) on which I am building my own pedagogical argument. For Bartlett, 
on what the latter terms ‘pedagogism’, which in LW is associated with the reactionary subject of science; 
see LW pp. 75, 78. It is also notable the certain disdain with which Badiou already uses the term almost a 
quarter of a century earlier, in Théorie du sujet: ‘[p]edagogy delimits a splace’ (Alain Badiou, Theory Of The  
Subject, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London & New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 39; hereinafter TS), wherein 
‘splace’,  a  portemanteau of  “space of  placement” [espace  de  placement]  is  Badiou’s  larval  term of  later 
concepts such as ‘state of the situation’ and ‘world’; see Bruno Bosteels’ ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in TS 
p. xxxi. For my part, considering that the name  Pedagogy of the Oppressed is synonymous with the Freire 
singularity,  I  will  keep  the  term  pedagogy,  on  the  understanding  that  I  am  using  it  in  its  Freirean 
emancipatory sense, and never in the Badiouain, oppressive, one.
65 A. J. Bartlett, Badiou and Plato: An Education by Truths (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p. 
3.
66 Ibid. p 1.
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‘[e]ducation is constituted by four key components: the epistemological, the pastoral, the 
political, and the psychological. Or: a theory or theories of  knowledge, an ethic of  care, 
a  politics  and  a  psychology  of  the  subject.’67 Indeed,  (1)  Bartlett’s  ‘question  of 
knowledge’ and its ‘transmission’, is akin to the material equivalence I am proposing 
here, viz., philosophy <=> education; (2) his pastoral ethics of  ‘care of  itself  and others’ is 
strongly resonant with my positing of  education as a tending of  the time of  the subject;  (3) 
Bartlett mentions the political aspect of  a ‘collective provision of  education’: it is here 
where the Freirean element of  a  critical education (inextricably linked to a conception of 
cultural revolution), appears most strongly; and 'nally, (4)  the idea of  subjects emerging as 
‘the  relation  between educators  and educated’,  seems to  coincide  precisely  with  the 
concerns  developed  in  my thesis  around notions  of  dialogue,  noise and,  most  clearly, 
around the issue of relation itself. All in all, there is an overall structural coincidence with 
Bartlett in that ‘these component parts betray an ambiguity or better a disjunction––that 
between truth and knowledge.’68
Bartlett’s  thought  presents  the  most  systematic  deployment  of  the  Badiouian 
categories performed by any thinker of  education. His work guides one of  the structural  
decisions operating in my thesis: that education is on the side of  philosophy, and hence, it is not  
itself  a truth procedure.
Having said that,  once forced to be consistent  with both Freire  and Badiou, such a 
decision can altogether be stated as the logical conclusion of  a syllogism:
(1)  a  philosophy  implies  an  education  and  an  education  implies  a  philosophy  (in 
consistency with Freire)
67 A. J. Bartlett, ‘Refuse become subject’, p. 194.
68 Ibid.
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(2) philosophy is subtracted from the production of  truths (in consistency with Badiou:).
(3) ergo, education must be subtracted from the production of  truths.
Preliminary moves
In the Preface to his  Philosophy of  Right, we 'nd not only Hegel’s famous reference to 
philosophy as an ‘Owl of  Minerva’ which Hies ‘too late’, but also a subtle pointer to the 
educative-philosophical mechanism: 
[o]nly one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. For 
such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as the thought of 
the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made 
itself  ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of  the conception that only in the 
maturity of  reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real 
world in its  substance, and shapes it  into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy 
paints its grey in grey, one form of  life has become old, and by means of  grey it cannot  
be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of  Minerva takes its Hight only when the 
shades of  night are gathering.69
In Hegel’s absolute idealism, the ‘intellectual kingdom’ of  philosophy is shaped 
always  with  some delay,  when  ‘reality’  has  already  fully  formed:  no  idea  is  able  to 
rejuvenate  that  which  has  already  matured––it  can  only  paint  ‘its  grey  in  grey’  of 
knowledge, when the world has already set. The tradition that philosophy is empty and 
conditioned  from the  outside  by  events  emerging  in  the  world,  is  not  new.  It  is  a 
philosophical tradition that, according to Badiou, was initiated by Plato70 and has been 
echoed, not only by Hegel, but also by others such as Deleuze and, of  course, by Badiou 
69 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. by S.W Dyde (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001) p. 20.
70 MP pp. 34-35.
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himself. Badiou, however, takes a step further and makes explicitly clear the need of  this 
separation (de-suture) between thought and the human praxes that condition it. Hence, 
the  delineation  of  the  four  generic  truth  procedures  which  condition  philosophical  
thought  from  the  outside:  science,  love,  politics  and  art.  To  repeat:  in  Badiou’s 
con'guration, only within these four realms can events happen (a political revolution, an 
artistic invention, a scienti'c discovery, an amorous encounter); a truth emerges as the 
result of  the militant investigation by a subject who, touched by the impossible event, 
illegally af'rms the consequences of  such impossibility, forcing the situation to accept 
them and thereby to change its logic. New knowledge in the situation will have thus 
been created and established (the subsequent puncturing and re-creation of  which will 
have depended on the appearance of  an-other subject, itself  borne out of  another truth 
procedure af'rming a new evental impossibility…)  
Philosophy, in this conception, is not one of  the subject truth procedures: it does 
not  produce truths,  it  prepares  the  conceptual  space for  their  arrival,  the  ‘intellectual 
kingdom’ wherein it  thinks them together and announces their existence.  Philosophy 
arranges a place for  a  composite  thinking of  the truths of  its  time,  after the event  has 
happened, when the militant work of  the subjects is already taking shape and ‘when the 
shades of  the night are gathering’.
Space of  compossibility/time of  composition 
Education and philosophy seem to both name the tending of  a ‘space of  compossibility’ 
for truths. So what are their different roles? As we shall see in the next chapter, my position 
is that education temporalises  this space of  compossibility: it tends to the subjects of  the 
truth  procedures  and  these,  as  we  already  know,  are  nothing  else  than  the  temporal  
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unfolding of  a truth and––as Badiou himself  asserts––the subjective production of  a present.
Education  assists  both in  the  naming of  a  truth  and in  the  praxial,  temporal 
process that follows the consequences of  that naming: in other words, if  such naming is 
‘the trace of  philosophy’s intervention upon truths’,71 education is the praxial follow-
through of  said philosophical intervention. It is, once again, a production of  time.
This  position,  however,  begs  a  question:  what  about  the  transmission  of  so-called 
technical skills, necessary in any scienti'c, artistic and humanistic education? Is there 
any room in the  generic  context  presented here  for  such speci'city? To answer this 
question, it might be useful to separate those indexed educational places (say,  musical 
education,  mathematical education,  political education,  and  so  on)  from the  subjective, 
time-producing praxes that a proper education by truths should always inhabit (or, to 
put it in early Badiouian terms: to separate the indexed ‘splaces’ from the ‘outplace’).72 
For the sake of  simplicity,  I  will  refer, following Freire,  to such non-subjective,  placed 
education, as training. The opposition then becomes one between Education and training 
(an  opposition  that  mirrors  the  one  between truth  and knowledge,  and  echoes  that  
between philosophy and sophistry). This last point is not a mere rhetorical device: in the 
same way that, according to Badiou, sophistry should not be dismissed but treated as a 
valid  interlocutor  by  philosophy,  education  should  engage  full-on  with  the  issue  of 
training.73 
71 Norman Madarasz, ‘Introduction’, MP 21.
72 See n. 56, above.
73 ‘Just as Plato has the professionals of sophistry, at once bullheaded and bearers of modernity, as his 
interlocutors, so also does the attempt to radicalize the rupture with classical categories of thought today 
de'ne what it is reasonable to call a “Great Sophistry,” linked essentially to Wittgenstein’ (MP p. 97); c.f.  
‘[w]e can, and we should, write new Republics and Symposiums for our contemporaries. Just as Plato 
wrote  the  Gorgias  and  Protagoras  for  the  great  sophists,  we  should  write  the  Nietzsche  and  the 
Wittgenstein. And, for the minor sophists, the Vattimo and the Rorty. Neither more nor less polemical, 
neither more nor less respectful’ (C p. 21). Badiou, of course, eventually wrote his own Wittgenstein; see: 
Alain Badiou, Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy, trans. by Bruno Bosteels (London & New York: Verso, 2011)
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2. Philosophy <=> Education
And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade1
to which, as I suppose, our present argument would con6ne the term “education” whereas an upbringing  
which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of  
reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of  the name “education.” Let  
us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that  
those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case disparage  
education, since it stands 6rst among the 6nest gifts that are given to the best men; and if  ever it errs from  
the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address  
himself  with all his might.2
2.0. Intro: the Educational Argument
The pedagogical theme of  this thesis will proceed in a double movement: (1) I will posit 
that  the  process,  or  trajectory  of  a  truth  procedure discussed  earlier3,  should  become 
something like the philosophical charter for the praxis of  education––in fact, I will argue 
that education is the praxial dimension of  philosophy, tout court; simultaneously (2) an 
immanently Badiouian conceptual space will be utilised to recompose quintessentially 
Freirean  notions  such  as  humanisation,  critical  consciousness and epistemological  curiosity,  a 
humanist cluster of  concepts seemingly very distant from the mathematical formalism of 
1 Paulo  Freire,  Pedagogy  of  the  Oppressed,  trans.  by  Myra  Bergman  Ramos  (New  York  &  London: 
Continuum,  2005),  p.  48;  this  English translation  referenced hereinafter  as  POe.  Unless  clari'ed,  all 
references are from the 63rd edition in Portuguese: Paulo Freire, Pedagogia do Oprimido (op. cit.).
2 Plato, Laws 1.644a-b
3 See chapter 1, section 1.1.
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Badiou’s ontological constellation. 
Such resonance between an anti-humanist subtractive ontology and an explicitly 
humanist, relational logic––which, considering the conceptual distance, if  present will 
have been necessarily nonlocal––is only made possible by the fact that, on the one hand,  
Freire’s  is  less  a  pragmatic  pedagogical  methodology  than  a  rigorous  philosophical 
system in its own right––which is precisely why Badiou’s ontological foundations can be 
re-tuned to be accepted by the Freirean body; simultaneously, on the other hand, Freire’s 
pedagogically-conditioned thought,  by accepting the conceptual  transplant,  indirectly 
and at a distance delivers the unpacking of  Badiou’s singular pedagogical theme: namely, 
that ‘the only education is an education by truths’.
Freire  insisted  throughout  his  public  life  on  the  fact  that  he  saw  himself  less  as  a  
pedagogue than a thinker of  humanisation, understood in its most generic sense: viz., as 
the thinking-through of  every possible consequence of  what does it mean to be human,  
and to  relate  both  with  others  and with  the  world.  The  opening paragraph of  his  
magnum opus, Pedagogía do Oprimido is unequivocal about this: ‘a concern about people, 
as beings in the world and with the world. About both their being and how they come to be 
[em  torno  do  que e  de  como estão  sendo].’4 Earlier,  the  'rst  sentence  of  his  'rst  ever 
publication in English, is yet more unambiguous on this point: ‘[a]ll educational practice 
implies […] an interpretation of  man and the world’.5
Freire’s  is  a  less  a  pedagogical  theory  than  a  con'guration  of  thought––a 
philosophical system, tout court. The fact that it is regarded, at best, as a philosophy of  
education, simply brings out the fact that those two terms, “philosophy” and “education”, 
have been inextricably part of  each other, throughout their common, universal history 
4 PO 40 n1, c.f. POe 43, n1.
5 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom (Harvard: Harvard Educational Review, 2000), p 13; hereinafter 
CAF.
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(it  is  not  only  that  education and philosophy were  borne conjoined in  their  remote 
Western origins––behold the Eleatics, the Pythagoreans, the Academy, the Peripatetics… 
Education in its most generic sense, or to put it differently, the idea of  transmission per se, 
seems to have been more of  a universal  concern than philosophy itself––behold the 
guru-shishya tradition in Hinduism, the Dharma transmission in Zen Buddhism, the 
Zend in Zoroastrianism, the Masorah in Judaism, the Sahabah in Islam, the Apostles in 
Christianity…).
Freire’s relevance today stands on the following claim: it is a gesture that not only 
brings forth the philosophical spirit of  education together with its twin, the educational 
soul of  philosophy: in the same move, it thrusts the education/philosophy pair into a 
dialectics of  praxis whence it emerges with a subjective force which, as I hope to show, 
includes  not  only  a  notorious  political  dimension,  but  also an artistic,  scienti'c  and 
libidinal one as well. This, I maintain, is what makes Freire’s name a singularity (albeit not 
an event: strictly speaking, events never occur within philosophy).
There  is  yet  another  injunction authorising the  philosophical  splice  that  I  intend to 
perform:  Freire  was  adamant  that  his  ideas  be  constantly  recycled,  adapted,  re-
composed––his own voracious eclecticism a testament of  an  ethics  of  un6nishedness he 
applied to his own work. There is also, however, a single caveat: in order to recon'gure 
Freire, one should 'rst identify the central nucleus that moulds the essence of  his thought. 
It is with these Freirean principles in mind, and attempting to respect their spirit, 
that I will delineate the following trio of postulates:
(1)  I  posit  that  the  aforementioned  ‘core’  or  ‘central  nucleus’  of  Freire’s  thought  is 
commensurable with Badiou’s notion of  subjective 6delity (and therefore, consistent with 
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the latter’s conception of  Truth). This, essentially, opens up a space for the thinking of 
truths within  Freire’s  system  (and  hence  rendering  it  philosophical rather  than  anti-
philosophical  or  sophistic).  In  the  particular  case  of  Freire’s  theoretical  con'guration, 
such 'delity is what Badiou refers to as ‘'delity to a 'delity’6, and what I refer to here as 
a generic 'delity: the (ethical, pedagogical) work of  tending 6delity per se, regardless of  the 
particularity of  whatever truths a subject is faithful to.
The begged question is, of  course, what  event is this generic 'delity faithful to 
(what  is  it  af'rming,  what  new connections  does  it  make in  the  situation,  how is  it  
resisted etc.)? The answer being: it is a 'delity directed towards a  subtractive  notion of 
humanisation.  What  this  means  is  that  the  so-called  anthropogenic event is  herein  (i) 
undecidable  (chronologically  unsituated,  residing  in  a  ultrahistorical  arché,  as  Giorgio 
Agamben would have it), (ii) latently able to produce a generic and always incomplete 
subject  of  subjects  (in  Freire’s  terms,  inconcluso),  (iii)  whose indiscernible  (random,  a-legal) 
trajectory––the ultimate Truth of  which remains unnameable (i.e. remains in the realm of 
noise)––and, 'nally (iv) is contingent on language as condition of  conditions.
(2) Articulating an immanent conceptual split within humanisation itself, the operator of 
subjective 'delity within Freire’s system takes, likewise, the name ‘humanisation’. Such 
operator  is  what  connects  the  Freirean notion of  praxis  (viz.  conscientização)  with the 
af'rmation of  humanisation as event.
From a (purely) Badouian perspective, however, one might glimpse a problem 
arising with this split notion of  humanisation: to wit, if  indistinctly equated to the event,  
the operator of  'delity can easily collapse into either ‘dogmatism’ (viz.,  everything is in 
fact dependant on the event) or ‘spontaneism’ (viz.,  only those taking part in the event 
6 E, p. 67.
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are making it so).7 Therefore, in order to avoid such trap––and following the Badiouian 
directive––humanisation-as-operator needs to be clearly separated from humanisation-as-event. 
This potential issue is, in fact, already being taken care of  by Freire. Firstly, there is what  
could  be  described  as  a  (clearly  Hegelian) founding separation, wherein  the  inaugural 
af'rmation of  the anthropogenic event  already contains  its  negation;  in other words, for 
Freire the af'rmation of  humanisation always already implies a split:
humanisation |de-humanisation 
Which, as a consequence,  forces a subject to  act against such negation. We have here, 
then, a strong mutual resonance, facilitated by a common Hegelian chamber present in 
both Badiou and Freire.8 If, for Badiou, what a proper operator of  'delity requires––in 
order for it not to degenerate into a mere statist operation––is a ‘genuine separational 
capacity’ from the event itself,9 surely then, such requirement is met by the Freirean 
notion of humanisation-as-event (the split emergence of  humanisation and its negation) and 
humanisation-as-operator (the  militant  work  of  resistance  against  de-humanisation).  Freire 
himself––almost as if  aware of  Badiou’s concerns––could not be clearer on this matter:
[w]hile the problem of  humanization has always, from an axiological point of  view, 
been humankind’s  central problem, it now takes on the character of  an inescapable 
concern.  Concern  for  humanization  leads  at  once  to  the  recognition  of 
dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality. And as 
an  individual  perceives  the  extent  of  dehumanization,  he  or  she  may  ask  if 
humanization is a viable possibility. Within history in concrete, objective contexts, both 
7 See BE pp. 237-8.
8 If the presence of a Hegelian kernel in (mostly early) Badiou is undeniable, one should not overlook the  
fact that Hegel is also a constant reference in Freire's oeuvre, and not only in his early 1970s writing, but  
also throughout the 80s up until, and including, his later 1990s work.
9 BE, p. 237.
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humanization  and  dehumanization are  possibilities  for  a  person as  an uncompleted 
being conscious of  their incompletion.10 
The separation in Freire, then, is itself  a double step: the anthropogenic event itself, 
(i) separated from its af6rmation (‘concern for humanisation’), which (ii) already contains 
its  negation (‘the recognition of  de-humanisation’). All of  which entails that, 'rstly, the 
subject is always incomplete (self-consciousness of  this incompleteness, moreover, being an 
ethical imperative), and secondly––and most crucially––that the Truth implied in the 
event of  humanisation remains by necessity always unnameable, thus avoiding what would 
be the disastrous substantialisation of  “the human”, which in Freire symptomatically 
appears as a critique of  humanitarianism which is a ferocious as Badiou’s.11  
In  the  process  of  developing  this  postulate  I  will  aim  to  unearth  some 
fundamental connections which link this evental site of  humanisation––particularly with 
regards to its conditioning by language––to an unlikely trio, wherein Freire and Badiou 
will be joined by Noam Chomsky. Indeed, it is hard to avoid a symptomatic reading of 
the  Freirean  dialectical  discourse,  wherein  the  anthropogenic  site  always  appears  as 
something like its inaugural point, or its zero degree:  
qua thinking bodies [enquanto corpos conscientes] in a dialectical relation with an objective 
reality  upon which  they  act,  human beings  are  involved in a  permanent  process  of 
conscientization […]. Its original source is that moment far off  in time that Teilhard de 
Chardin calls “Huminisation,” at which point human beings made themselves capable of 
revealing their active reality, of  knowing it and of  knowing that they know.12
10 POe, p. 43.
11 This anti-humanitarianism is one of the reasons that, I claim, Freire’s alleged humanism cannot be 
fairly assessed without considering it in tandem with his structuralism. In fact, Louis Althusser’s inHuence  
on Freire is as explicit as it is curiously glossed over by most commentators. See, for example,  CAF pp.  
16, 32 and POe pp. 159-60.
12 Paulo Freire,  Ação cultural para a liberdade, 5th edn (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981), Chapter 15, 
‘Algumas notas sobre conscientização’, para 35 (my emphasis). See also ‘An Invitation to Conscientization 
and  Deschooling’,  The  Politics  of  Education:  culture,  power  and  liberation,  trans.  by  Donaldo  Macedo 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 167-173 (p. 172).
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Freire’s reference to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin might not be the best opening 
when attempting a conversation on the origins of  language and symbolic thought with 
the no-nonsense, ultra-empiricist Noam Chomsky (neither it would, for that matter, sit 
well  with the mathematical formalism of  the anti-vitalist Alain Badiou, nor with the 
re'ned, rigorous epistemology of  Cécile  Malaspina).  Though I do not know of  any 
mention of  Teilhard by Chomsky, it would not be a stretch to imagine that the former’s  
progressionist account of  the evolution of  a cosmic sphere of  thought (the  noosphere), 
teleologically directing itself  towards a messianic ‘Omega Point’ of  divine uni'cation 
with Christ, would be promptly rebuffed by the latter as pseudo-scienti'c poppycock.13 
The  fact  remains  withal  that  Freire  does  mention  de  Chardin  on  more  than  one 
occasion:14 and he does so when needing to underline the idea that (a) humanisation 
comprised a  beginning, a moment ‘far off  in time’ wherein the separation from Nature 
and animality began, and that (b) it is an event which will have been indexed by the 
advent  of  language/thought in the early human’s brain.  Considering that  Teilhard’s 
orthogenetic-theological theories on this matter seem, from the point of  view of  modern 
evolutionary-biology, slightly questionable to say the least, the tactic I will employ here is  
to  substitute  the  former’s  not  entirely  indubious  science,  with  Chomsky’s,  Ian 
Tattersall’s, et al. latest 'ndings in evolutionary linguistics, all of  which are grounded in 
hard paleoanthropological evidence. The wager is that the spirit of  Freire’s idea shall,  
not  only  remain  unbetrayed  by  such  conceptual  transplant  but  that,  much  to  the 
contrary, reinvigorated by “proper” science, it will gain a new lease of  life.15 
13 See for example, Peter Medawar’s devastating critique of Tielhard’s  The Phenomenon of Man: Peter B. 
Medawar, ‘Critical Notice’, Mind LXX (1961), pp. 99–106, doi:10.1093/mind/LXX.277. 99.
14 See also, for example, Rex Davis & Paulo Freire, ‘Education for Awareness: a Talk with Paulo Freire’,  
Literacy and Revolution: the Pedagogy of Paulo Freire, ed. by Robert Mackie (New York: Continuum, 1981), pp. 
57-69 (pp. 58-9).
15 One 'nds now that Teilhard has become a key referent to the transhumanist,  cyberlibertarianism  
expounded by the Californian Ideology of Silicon Valley, megaphoned in the pages of  Wired magazine; 
David Livingstone comments that ‘[i]n 1995, Jennifer Cobb Kreisberg declared in Wired, “Teilhard saw 
the Net coming more than half  a century before it  arrived.”’  (David Livingstone,  Transhumanism: The  
History of a Dangerous Idea (USA: Sabilillah Publications, 2015) p.290); see Jennifer Cobb Kreisberg,  ‘A 
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(3) Education––as long as it remains faithful to the operation of  humanisation, i.e. it 
does not decay into mere ‘training’––induces a Subject that, if  borne out, it does so as the 
most  generic  subject  possible.  This,  I  maintain,  is  the  Badiouian-Freirean  Subject  of 
Education. Again, I am here utilising Badiou’s technical terms within a Freirean domain 
of  applicability:  what  I  am  proposing  is  that  a  well-con'gured  Freirean  education 
activates a generic Subject which shares at least one element with each one of  the truth 
procedures.
What this implies is that, as mentioned above, there needs to be the recognition 
of  a double incompleteness: 'rstly, in the generic event of  humanisation itself  (the Truth 
of  which is  unnameable)  and, secondly,  in the (self-conscious)  incompleteness of  the 
humanising subject. In other words, this is a doubly castrated subject. And so it should be: 
such is nothing less than ‘the mark of castration’ that, Badiou writes, ‘separates truth 
from itself and, in the same movement, frees up its power and hypothetical anticipation 
from  the  encyclopaedic  'eld  of  forms  of  knowledge.  This  power  is  the  power  of 
forcing.’16
As we shall  see, this  generic educational subject,  turns out to be not entirely 
anisomorphic with Frank Ruda’s ‘philosophical subject’. In Ruda’s analysis, by taking 
‘the position of the very form of the subject’, the philosophical subject becomes––just as 
our subject of education––‘twice barred’ on account of it being ‘conditioned by the four 
conditions’.17 
Globe,  Clothing  Itself  with  a  Brain’,  Wired  (June  1995)  https://www.wired.com/1995/06/teilhard/ 
[accessed 7 Mar 2018]; see also: Stephen Balkam ‘What will happen when the internet of things becomes  
arti'cially  intelligent?’  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/20/internet-of-things-
arti'cially-intelligent-stephen-hawking-spike-jonze Fri 20 Feb 2015 [accessed 7 Feb 2018].
16 C p. 139
17 Frank Ruda, For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2015), p. 
132. Bearing in mind the material equivalence between philosophy and education which my argument is 
constructed on, this outcome is less unexpected than it is auspicious.
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One could equally say that it is a subject conditioned by what Justin Clemens 
refers to as ‘the condition of conditions’ of Badiou’s philosophy: namely, the (Lacanian) 
letter.18 It is in this structural, abstract sense that I intend to deploy throughout this thesis 
the concept of  language––albeit without completely identifying one with the other: it is, 
rather,  a conception of  language which approaches asymptotically that of  the letter. 
Indeed,  insofar  as  there  is  ‘no  simple  opposition  between  “letters”  and  “void”  in 
Badiou’,19 the  former  clearly  inhabits  an  ontological  realm:  as  an  essentially 
mathematical abstraction, the letter still lingers on the side of the void and of being––still 
a signi'er of  nothing, still outside-time. Language, on the other hand, is always already 
appearing in the relational, temporal world,  riding on the signi'er’s never-ending search 
(desire) for some signi'ed: as such, language is  the trace of  the temporality produced by the  
movement  of  the  letter into  the  physico-phenomenological  (or,  for  Badiou,  onto-logical) 
realm. Wherefore language, as the temporalisation of the signi'er, ignites the inaugural 
murmur of noise, carrying (conditioning) the subjective, (neg)entropic  work involved in 
the trajectory of a truth. 
Overall, my wager is that the arch drawn by this triple-postulate will outline a properly 
recon'gured Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which yields a subject predicated on the following 
properties: it  is  a generic  Subject  of subjects, whose 'delity to the Truth implied in the 
anthropogenic event (humanisation-as-event) is exercised (or rather  disciplined) through the 
operation of humanisation, generically conditioned by language.
The usefulness (or otherwise) of  this hypothetical arch is that it might bring a 
remarkable  corollary:  namely,  that  Badiou’s  philosophical  con'guration  (viz.,  being, 
truth, event, subject and so on) can––and should––be thought together with its immanently 
18 Justin Clemens, ‘Letters as the Condition of Conditions for Alain Badiou’,  Communication & Cognition  
36:1&2 (2003), pp. 73-102.
19 Ibid, p. 94.
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pedagogical implications. Thereupon that ‘half-said’ aspect of  Badiou’s philosophy of 
education, condensed in the ‘education by truths’ diktat, suddenly opens up a hidden 
resonant chamber, at once exposing the full spectrum of  its pedagogical possibilities.   
All  of  this  underscores  what  I have referred to as  the key assumption of  my thesis: 
namely,  that philosophy and education are materially equivalent.  In other words, that a 
philosophy implies an education,20 and an education implies a philosophy––which is to 
say that philosophy and education are biconditionally connected: 
philosophy <–> education <=> education <–> philosophy 
The analysis of  this proposed structure entails the delicate conceptual separation 
of  truth and subject mentioned above. Insofar as a subject, for Badiou, is the ‘'nite part 
of  a truth’,21 these concepts seem to be as intertwined as the physical notions of  time 
and space, with which I am somewhat obscurely linking viz., philosophy as the place for 
Truth, education as the time of  the subjects of  truths. The methodological idea here is to 
perform  something  like  a  conceptual  6ssion,  in  the  hope  that  by  separating  what  is 
seemingly inseparable, some useful theoretical energy will be released: once again, this 
tactic does not appear to be too inconsistent with the noisy epistemology method which I 
am following throughout this thesis.  
philosophy <–> education <=> education <–> philosophy 
20 By ‘an education’ I mean ‘an educational system’, or ‘an educational framework’. From the perspective 
that I am trying to gain here, the term ‘philosophy of education’ seems doubly unhelpful: (1) it conveys the 
sense of education as a sub-discipline, and hence a subset, of philosophy, when what I am positing here is  
an equivalence (2) considering the notion of philosophical conditioning, referring to “philosophies of…” 
within a Badiouian framework is sightly incongruous,.




What is posited in this scheme is that the Subject induced by Education is a praxial 
correlate of  the philosophical  composite thinking of  the truths of  its time: or, differently 
put, that an educational  Subject is the temporal emanation of  the place opened up by the 
philosophical category of  Truth. 
There is a double legitimation for this operation, coming from both the Freirean and the 
Badiouian  sides  of  the  argument.  Freire,  for  his  part,  asserts  that  true  pedagogical 
thought ‘permanently “bathes itself ” in temporality, the risks of  which it does not fear’. 22 
In putting the notion of  temporality at the centre of  education, Freire is not merely  
applying his avowed Bergsonism, but is here following the lead of  his mentor, Pierre 
Furter,  for  whom  the  goal  of  consciousness-raising  education  should  never  be  ‘to 
eliminate the risks of  temporality,  by holding on to guaranteed space,  but  rather to 
temporalise space [temporalisar o espaço]’.23
As for the Badiouian authorisation for performing this conceptual split, I take it  
as given by the implied temporal dimension which emerges as the result of  subjective 
praxis. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of  Badiou’s notion of  ‘subtraction’, the 
fact that ‘[t]he subjective project is, itself, conceived as  the temporal unfolding of  a ‘truth’24 
means that 'delity to an event prescribes a trajectory which drives the subject out of  the 
isentropic atemporality of  mathematical ontology into the entropic world of  physico-
phenomenal  relations.  And,  to  repeat  once  again,  this  is  precisely  the  temporality 
buttressed by education.
22 ‘“[B]anha-se” permanentemente de temporalidade cujos riscos não teme’, PO p.114.
23 Furter, Educação e Vida, pp. 26-7 (quoted in PO p. 115).
24 Fraser, ‘The Law of The Subject’, p. 94  (my emphasis).
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The Double Hazard of Humanisation and Language
 
In  the  exposition  of  the  educational  theme,  a  new  motif  will  gain  in  intensity: 
language––or, more speci'cally,  language as a generic  condition which will  have made 
possible the process of  humanisation.  The latter notion is not only one at the centre of 
Freire’s thought: it functions, I claim, as the operator of  subjective 'delity within his 
philosophico-pedagogical  system.  It  is  at  this  point  where  the  Badiouian  notions  of 
event,  subject  and  truth  need  to  become  operative  within  the  Freirean  framework, 
rendering a praxial meaning to the pure speculative notion of  ‘an education by truths’. 
And  it  is  at  this  point  too––precisely  as  a  consequence  of  the  Badiouian 
injunction––that  a  double  hazard  will  be  encountered:  on  one  side,  the  danger  of 
positing  a  notion  of  subjectivity  too  reliant  on  language––something  which  will  be 
inconsistent  with  Badiou’s  clear  distancing  from  both  analytical  and  post-structural 
reliances on language; on the other side, the danger of  hypothesising a primordial event, 
an  inaugural  singularity,  foundational  of  humanity––something  which,  for  Badiou, 
inevitably leads to the ruin of  thought, a disaster of  ethics and to ‘evil’ tout court.25 
Although I will attempt the crossing of  this dangerous strait in part III of  this 
thesis, one can anticipate some of  the helmsmaning26 that will be required in order that 
our  (Badiouian)  subject  retains  some  consistency  as  they  navigate  though  the 
25 A notoriously sinister example would be National Socialism’s naming of a Volksdeutsche and its recourse 
to an ancestral fatherland, soil, blood, race and so on.
26 ‘The  cybernetic  metaphor  of  the  “helmsman”,  writes  Cécile  Malaspina,  ‘cements  a  classical  link 
between the art of navigation and the art of governing in the contemporary technical paradigm, dating 
back to the Platonic dialogues. Plato’s Alcibiades dialogue is crucial in this regard, not only because of the 
importance  given  to  the  helmsman  as  metaphor  for  the  art  of  governing,  but  also  because  of  the 
injunction it makes against ‘the most sickening’ aspect of poor governance, which is the ignorance of one’s 
own ignorance. (How could we fail to mention here that the etymology of noise leads back to the nautical  
'eld, i.e. nausea, or sea-sickness, completing the metaphorical analogy between noise and uncertainty.)’ EN 
p. 213.
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archipelagos of  (Freirean) education. To ensure a safe passage, it must be posited that (1) 
they are indeed a subject made possible by language (2) language is, by itself, not enough: 
there needs to be some transformative process, triggered by an encounter with an event 
which hails from something outside of  the language available to the subject (3) a truth is 
the forcing of  this outside into language, and 'nally (4) education is purely at the service 
of  such forcing.   
In other words, the wager will be to keep in operation some notion of  language as 
a structural actuator of  the subject, whilst simultaneously holding on to the idea that an 
event is the sine-qua-non condition for the coming about of  said subject–– which means 
that that language upholding the subject is always already incomplete. Indeed, the subject is 
borne out in their following of  an evental trace that, as Badiou writes, ‘simply opens up 
a space of  consequences in which the body of  a truth is composed. As Lacan saw, this 
real point is strictly speaking senseless, and its only relationship to language is to make a hole in  
it’.27 Education  supports  such  piercing  of  sense,  subsequently  aiding  in  the 
transformation of  its logic, so that it accommodates within it the newborn senselessness 
delivered from that hole. 
All of which indicates the fact that education operates at the threshold of noise. And is able 
to do so only if conditioned by the notion of language brieHy mentioned at the start of  
this  introduction:  as  condition  of  conditions,  operating  as  closely  as  possible  to  the 
(Lacanian, Badiouian)  letter28,  albeit keeping a minimal distance from it.  It  is  in the 
passage from letter to language that we 'nd, precisely, the minimal difference between 
the philosophical place of Truth and the educational time of the Subject, in other words, 
the passage from letter to language echoes the schizductive translation passing from the 
(ontological) void to (phenomeno-logical) noise:
27 Badiou, LW p. 386, (my emphasis).




the void  ( )    ––> noise  (η)
letter    —> language
Throughout this chapter I will attempt to show that Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
can  be  recon'gured  as  a  philosophical  system  wherein  humanisation––split  as  logical  
operator and event––connects a subjective procedure of 'delity to said event––in an always 
un'nished process, conditioned by an always incomplete language––to the construction 
of a generic subject of subjects: the Subject of education. 
I will 'rst argue why I claim that Freire’s name spells out a singularity, thought 
not an event. I will explore how Freire, (by following a phenomenological notion of  non-
methodological  method)  conceives  of  an educational  praxis  which is  a  materialisation of 
subjective consciousness and which drives both his conception of  cultural action and 
cultural revolution, through the operation of  humanising dialogue (a dialogue which, as we 
shall see, will always already be mediated by noise).
Next, I will proceed, 'rstly, by pointing out the connection that Freire draws out 
between  his  conception  of  ‘curiosity’––via  its  sister  concept,  conscientização––to  the 
immanent un6nishedness of  the human subject. The challenge here will be to 'lter out any 
phenomenological  residues  from  Freire’s  conception  of  subjectivity  (still  very  much 
dependent of  notions of  consciousness and intentionality) in order to approximate it to 
the rather more structural subject we 'nd in Lacan and Badiou. 
The  key  assumption  of  this  thesis  equates  philosophy  and  education,  hence 
presenting them as a conjoined pair. After unveiling such a pair, I will then attempt the 
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delicate conceptual 'ssion of  splitting it: the result will be the theoretical appearance of  
a (temporal, educational) Subject separated from a (placed, philosophical) Truth. 
I will then observe in detail the Freirean concept of  humanisation itself: most 
importantly,  I  will  show  how,  inasmuch  as it  is  a  system  that  involves  a  faithful 
commitment to the af'rmation of humanisation as an event conditioned by language-
thought  and  to  the  investigation  of  its  consequences,  the  ethics  implied  in  Freire’s 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed can, in effect, be correlated with Badiou’s ethics of truths.
2.1. The Freire Singularity
The Freire “event”?
Once we declare that the Freirean con'guration is a philosophical system, then any talk of 
it  being an event becomes meaningless, inasmuch as there are is no such thing as a 
“philosophical event”. We either have education  as a truth procedure, or education  at the  
service of  the truth procedures. Dennis Atkinson, however, seems to contradict this notion, 
when asserting that ‘[Badiou] provides examples such as the Galileo event in science, the 
Schoenberg event in music and the event of  the French revolution in politics. Perhaps 
we might also think of  the “Freireian event” in pedagogy’.29
This confusion might arise from the fact that Freire’s thought brings about a 
singularity: the introduction of  a generic operator of  connection with an event (which, in 
Freire, takes the name ‘humanisation’), and, as Badiou himself  admits, this operator may 
appear itself  as an event.30 However, if  any revolutionary force is to be extracted from its 
29 Dennis Atkinson, ‘The Event of Learning: Politics and Truth in Art and Art Education’<faeb.com.br> 
[accss. 2 Nov 2015], p. 4.
30 ‘[T]he operator of connection in fact emerges as a second event. If there is indeed a complete hiatus  
between [the event], circulated in the situation by the intervention, and the faithful discernment […] of  
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emancipatory potential, the Freirean pedagogical system should be treated, not as an 
event per se, but as a thought-singularity impelling us to develop the as-yet unexplored 
consequences, in'nite and of  universal value, of  the true event––viz., humanisation.  
The view of  Freire-as-event might be the reason behind the misguided programmatic 
methodologisation  of  his  thought,  the  idea  that  it  is it  which requires  subjective 
interventions, connective operators and the rest of  the subjective militance that a truth 
procedure requires. This could not be farther from Freire's insistance that a liberatory 
education must never degenerate into mere pedagogical methodology. A 'delity to a 
generic  notion  of  humanisation––never  to  any  particular  methodology––is  what 
provides his thought with a purely philosophical tone.
For  Freire,  the  pragmatist  instrumentality  of  methodologies  implies  the 
immanently  neoliberal  and  irremediably  reactionary  concept  of  ‘training’––and  a 
mechanism that  I  am associating  here  with  the  knowledge  of  the  state.  For  Freire, 
training is categorically opposed to education proper: ‘purely pragmatic training, with its 
implicit or openly expressed elitist authoritarianism, is incompatible with the learning 
and practice of  becoming a “subject”’.31 This becoming, which should be taken in its full 
‘Bergsonian sense’,32  emerges as a result of  an un'nishedness, an inconclusiveness that 
the  subject  needs  to  take  on  board  for  the  educational  journey  to  succeed: 
what is connected to it, then we will have to acknowledge that, apart from the event itself, there is another 
supplement to the situation which is the operator of 'delity. And this will be all the more true the more  
real the 'delity is, thus the less close it is to the state, the less institutional’ (BE p. 239).
31 Paulo Freire,  Pedagogia da Autonomia: Saberes Necessários  à Prática Educativa, 55th edn (São Paulo: Paz e 
Terra,  2017);  published in English as  Pedagogy  of  Freedom:  Ethics,  Democracy,  and  Civic  Courage,  trans.  by 
Patrick Clarke,  (Maryland, MD: Rowman & Little'eld,  1998),  p 46 (pagination refers  to  the English 
edition); hereinafter PF.
32 ‘Education is constantly re-made in praxis. In order for it to be, it needs to become. It’s “duration”––in  
the Bergsonian sense of the term––as a process,  resides in the interplay of the opposites permanence-
change (PO p. 101); c.f.:  ‘in order for it  to be, the social structure  needs to become; in other words: 
becoming is the mode that a social structure acquires in order acquire a “duration”, in the Bergsonian  
understanding of the term [estar sendo é o modo que tem a estrutura social de “durar”, na acepção bergsoniana do  
têrmo] (PO p. 245).
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‘[c]onsciousness of  one's inconclusiveness makes that being educable. Un'nishedness in 
the absence of  consciousness about it engenders domestication and cultivation. Animals are 
domesticated;  plants  are  cultivated;  men  and  women  educate  themselves’.33 This 
operation of  education is made impossible under the de-subjectivising mechanistics of 
‘training’ and the substitution of  praxis (implying the dialectics of  reHection and action) 
by  the  instrumentality  and measurability  of  methodology.  It  might  be  useful  at  this 
point, to recall Badiou’s assertion that 
[i]deas, in their process of  becoming within the disparate worlds, should be judged not 
by what determines the circumstances of  their apparent failure in this or that sequence 
of  history, but by the becoming, point by point, through their traversal of  unforeseen 
new worlds, of  their universal demands.34 
The  (false)  dilemma implicit  in  the  “success/failure”  opposition,  comes  as  a 
direct  consequence  of  the  empirical  instrumentality  with  which  the  state  invariably 
yokes education in order to rein in any attempt of  the latter to challenge the hegemonic 
power of  the former. Hence, one way out of  such conundrum is for education to place  
itself  conceptually beyond the particularities of  methodology, and never let go of  its 
‘universal demands’. 
And, precisely, it was “beyond instrumentality” where Freire consistently placed himself.  
It was, nevertheless, a placement he needed to constantly clarify right till the very end––
as he does during his last recorded interview, given in 1996: ‘even if  it should be for me 
a great honour to be understood as a specialist in “literacy”, I have to say “no”’ Freire 
33 Paulo Freire, À sombra desta mangueira (São Paulo: Olho D’água, 1995); published in English as Pedagogy  
of the Heart, trans. by Donaldo Macedo & Alexandre Oliveira (New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 93-4 
(pagination refers to the English edition); hereinafter PH.
34 Alain Badiou, ‘The Lessons of Jacques Rancière: Knowledge and Power after the Storm ’,  Jacques  
Rancière:  History,  Politics,  Aesthetics,  ed.  by Gabriel  Rockhill  & Philip  Watts  (Durham & London:  Duke 
University Press, 2009), p.54.
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gently  reminds  the  International  Literacy  Institute interviewer,  ‘because  my  main 
preoccupation,  since  I  started  working  45  years  ago,  had  to  do  with  the  critical  
understanding of  education’.35 The fact that Freire still felt the need to spell out his anti-
positivism after half  a century of  work that proved it  in actual  facts,  is  yet  another  
symptom that, by then, the subject of  “Freire studies” had become––as Perry Anderson 
puts it in his analysis of  Western Marxism (and Ian Buchanan echoes, regarding that 
other  bloated  'eld:  “Deleuze  studies”)––‘a  prolonged  and  intricate  Discourse  on 
Method’.36
(Anti)method
Freire was categorically unambiguous right from the start: the only “method” allowed 
within  a  liberatory  education  is  one  which  enables  the  re-humanisation  of  both 
educators and educands––tout court. As a consequence, method here is paradoxically 
subtracted from every pre-conceived notion of  instrumental methodology.  For Freire, 
this  non-instrumental  instrumentality  is  a sine  qua non  aspect  of  any  revolutionary 
pedagogy. Indeed, ‘[i]n a humanizing pedagogy the method ceases to be an instrument 
by which the teachers (in this instance, the revolutionary leadership) can manipulate the 
students (in this instance, the oppressed), because it expresses the consciousness of  the 
students  themselves’.37 Inasmuch  as  this  consciousness  is  always  in  a  process  of 
becoming––as a result of  the problematising dialogue between educator and educand––
and method is a manifestation of  consciousness, then the former is none other than a 
35 Paulo  Freire,  ‘A  Conversation  with  Paulo  Freire’,  literacy.org  (30  Dec  2009), 
<https://youtu.be/aFWjnkFypFA>[accss. 19 Jun 2017], 2’05”-2’40”.
36 Perry  Anderson,  Consideration  on  Western  Marxism,  (London:  Verso,  1976),  p.  53;  Ian  Buchanan, 
‘Schizoanalysis and the Pedagogy of the Oppressed’, Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education: For a People-
Yet-to-Come, ed. by Matthew Carlin and Jason Wallin (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014),  pp. 1-14 (p. 3).
37 POe pp. 68-69.
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dynamic materialisation of  the latter’s becoming. Freire is here following the lead of  his 
mentor  and  friend  Alvaro  Vieira  Pinto,  whose  militant  phenomenology  became  a 
foundation  stone  in  Freire’s  conceptual  elaboration  of  conscientização.  In  a  passage 
described by Freire as ‘of  the greatest importance in order to understand problematising 
education’,38 Vieira Pinto explains that ‘method’, in his conception,
is,  in fact,  an external form, materialised in acts which are the manifestation of  the 
fundamental property of  consciousness: its intentionality. The essence of  consciousness 
is  being  with  the  world––a  permanent  and  unavoidable  process.  Therefore, 
consciousness is in essence “a way towards” something other than itself, outside of  itself,  
and which surrounds  it  and apprehends  it  by  means  of  its  ideational  capacity  [sua 
capacidade ideativa]. Consciousness is thus, by de'nition, “method”, in the most general 
sense of  the word.  Such is the root of  method,  and,  equally,  such is the essence of  
consciousness, which only exists qua abstract and methodic faculty.39
It is  only in this generic, intentional (and, it must be added, deeply subversive) 
sense, that one must understand the notion of  “method” within Freire’s system. And 
when  the  tainted  word  appears  in  his  writing,  it  is  indeed  deployed  with  this 
uncontaminated, puri'ed signi'cation. The only method as such is one that allows itself 
38 PO p. 77.
39 Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Ciência e Existência (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1986, 2a ed), quoted in PO p. 77 
(POe p. 69). Vieira Pinto was a seminal inHuence in Freire’s early thought: not only the notion of ‘limit  
situations’ [situações-limites] is a direct borrowing from the former (see PO p. 82); Freire also acknowledges 
Pinto as co-creator of what later became the paramount Freirean concept: conscientização: ‘I am generally 
credited as the author of this strange term, conscientização, on account of it being the central concept of my 
ideas about education. In truth, it was created by a team of professors at the  Instituto Superior de Estudos  
Brasileiros, around 1964. One could cite philosopher Álvaro Pinto and professor Guerreiro amongst them. 
Upon hearing for the 'rst time the word conscientização, I immediately perceived the depth of its meaning. 
This  is  because  I  am absolutely  convinced  that  education,  as  the  practice  of  freedom,  is  an  act  of  
knowledge [é um ato de conhecimento], a critical approximation to reality. Since then, this word has been part 
of my vocabulary’ (Paulo Freire, Conscientização: Teoria e Prática da Libertação, Uma Introdução ao Pensamento de  
Paulo  Freire (São  Paulo:  Cortez  &  Moraes,  1979),  ‘Segunda  Parte:  Alfabetização  e  Conscientizaçao: 
Filoso'a e problemática: Visão do mundo’); for the inHuence of Vieira Pinto on Freire’s thought, see for 
example Jose Ernesto Faveri, Alvaro Vieira Pinto: Contribuiçoes à Educação Libertadora de Paulo Freire (São Paulo: 
Liberars, 2014).
68
to be subject to a process of  permanent becoming––or, to put it differently, method is the  
emergent quality of  any true cultural revolution.
Indeed,  for  Freire,  the  revolutionary  process  of  the  Pedagogy  of  the  Oppressed 
comprises two successive stages: 
(1) a 'rst stage of  ‘cultural action’––namely, ‘problematising education’ which, through a 
consciousness-raising dialogue by which ‘the world of  oppression’ is unveiled and the 
oppressed ‘commit,  through praxis,  to  its  transformation’,40 and  therein the  subjects 
(both educators and educands) are steered in the struggle for liberation––and 
(2) a second stage of  ‘cultural revolution’––namely, a method for the education of  the 
New Man: ‘no longer oppressor, no longer oppressed, but a man liberate-ing [homem 
libertando-se]41 within a new society wherein the oppressing reality has been transformed 
and ‘the pedagogy stops being of  the oppressed and becomes pedagogy of  men and 
women in a permanent process of  liberation’.42
40 PO p. 57
41 PO p. 60. The Portuguese middle voice homen libertando-se, is translated by Myra Bergman Ramos as 
‘man in  the  process  of  liberation’  (POe p.56).  Inasmuch  as  Freire’s  use  of  the  middle  voice  here  is 
anything  but  trivial,  the  lack  of  intransitivity  for  the  verb  ‘to  liberate’  in  English,  makes  its  original  
resonances awkward to render. Throughout  Pedagogia do Oprimido,  libertar-se has a very precise semantic 
diathesis with strong politico-philosophical intentionality: the heading (absent in the English edition) of the 
last section of Chapter 1 reads: ‘no one liberates anyone, no one liberates (by) themselves: men liberate-
themselves in communion [ninguém liberta ninguém, ninguém se liberta sozinho: os homens se libertam em comunhão] 
(PO p. 71). Freire later restates this exact same notion, adding a not insigni'cant quali'cation: granted,  
human beings can neither liberate themselves nor liberate someone else––they can, nevertheless, oppress  
someone  else:  ‘[i]n  truth,  regarding  [the  process  of  oppression],  it  is  legitimate  to  say that  someone 
oppresses someone else; we can no longer af'rm, however, regarding [the revolutionary process],  that 
someone liberates someone else, or that someone liberates (by) himself, but that  men liberate-themselves in  
communion [na  verdade,  enquanto  [no  processo  opressor],  é  lícito  dizer  que  alguém  oprime  alguém,  [no  processo  
revolucionário], já não se pode a6rmar que alguém liberta alguém, ou que alguém se liberta sozinho, mas que os homens se 
libertam em comunhão] (PO p. 179, my italics). Myra Bergman Ramos translates my above italicised 
quote as ‘human beings in communion liberate each other’ (POe, p. 133).
42 PO p. 57.
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 Method fetish and critical education 
Having said all that, it is true that those working closest to Freire––and hence those most 
at risk of  methodising the work––always went out of  their way to make the above points  
clear. Henry Giroux, for example, asserts that Freire’s system, rather than a pedagogical 
method, should be considered ‘as part of  a broader political practice for democratic 
change’;  from  the  Freirean  perspective,  Giroux  adds,  critical  pedagogy  ‘was  never 
viewed as an a priori discourse to be reasserted or a methodology to be implemented, or  
for that matter a slavish attachment to knowledge that can only be quanti'ed’; according 
to Freire, ‘pedagogy could never be reduced to a method’ and so, Giroux concludes, 
‘[a]ny pedagogy that  called itself  Freirean had to acknowledge the centrality of  the 
particular and contingent in shaping historical contexts and political projects’.43 Failing 
to go unnoticed, a chapter in Moacir Gadotti’s Reading Paulo Freire is discordantly titled 
‘The Method Which Took Paulo Freire into Exile’: identifying the incongruity, Gadotti  
promptly clari'es in a footnote that ‘I must add that the development of  the method 
which is presented here is no more than a possibility as, in Paulo Freire's proposal (a 
dialectical  method),  there  is  no  rigid  and  inHexible  sequence  or  methodological 
absolutes’.44 Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard, for their part, write that ‘Paulo Freire’s 
thought and work is revolutionary, but continuously in danger of  being domesticated, as 
many  authors  suggest,  by  the  “progressives”  in  Western  cultures,  into  mere 
methodology’.45 One of  these ‘many authors’ could be Jones Irwin, who, for example, 
observes that 
43 Henry Giroux ‘Prologue: The Fruit of Freire’s Roots’, Paulo Freire's Intellectual Roots: Toward Historicity in  
Praxis, ed. by Robert Lake & Tricia Kress (London & New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. ix-xxi (pp xvii-
xviii).
44 Moacir Gadotti, Reading Paulo Freire: His Life and Work (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1994), p.164 n.1.
45 Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter, ed. by Peter 
McLaren and Peter Leonard (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-7 (p. 3).
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Freire’s philosophy of  education and of  literacy was never intended as a method. The 
fact that it has been so taken is part of  the very system of  education and politics (in  
effect, a positivism) which he criticizes. However, this is not how Freire’s work should be 
deployed and he is unequivocal on this.46 
All of  this is undoubtedly a symptom of  what Stanley Aronowitz aptly calls a 
‘method fetish’, prevalent in the North American educational system.47 Even if  someone 
of  the  calibre  of  Jonathan Kozol  cannot  help  himself  referring  to  Freire’s  ‘brilliant 
methodology’  on  the  cover-comment  of  the  US edition  of  Pedagogy  of  the  Oppressed, 
Freire, as Aronowitz points out, was neither a Brazilian ‘master teacher’, akin to a Latin 
version  of  John  Dewey,  nor  should  his  pedagogy  be  conHated  with  ‘the  traditional 
notion of  teaching’,48 Rather, Aronowitz continues,
it is to the liberation of  the oppressed as historical subjects within the framework of  
revolutionary objectives that Freire’s pedagogy is directed. The “method” is developed 
within a praxis,  meaning here the link between knowledge and power through self-
directed  action.  And  contrary  to  the  narrow,  specialized  methodologically  oriented 
practices  of  most  American  education,  Freire’s  pedagogy  is  grounded  in  a  fully 
developed philosophical anthropology, that is, a theory of  human nature, one might say 
a  secular  liberation  theology,  containing  its  own  categories  that  are  irreducible  to 
virtually any other philosophy.49
Aronowitz’ compelling quote effectively manages to separate, in a single assertive 
blow, the three constitutive pieces of  the Freirean assemblage: education, philosophy and 
46 Jones Irwin, Paulo Freire’s Philosophy of Education: Origins, Developments, Impacts and Legacies  (London & New 
York: Continuum, 2012) p. 45.
47 Stanley Aronowitz, ‘Paulo Freire’s Radical Democratic Humanism’, Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter, ed. 
by Peter McLaren & Peter Leonard (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 8-24 (p. 8). Arguably, a 
‘method fetish’ is prevalent in the educational system of the UK as well.
48 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
49 Ibid. p 12. As for the Freirean notion of ‘praxis’ mentioned by Aronowitz’s, it seems fully concordant 
with Ernani María Fiore’s observation, in his introduction of the original edition of PO (absent in the 
English  translation),  that  ‘true  critical  reHection  originates  and is  dialectised  in  the  interiority  of  the 
constitutive “praxis” of the human world; furthermore, it is itself, also “praxis”’ (PO p. 20).
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praxis. This harks back to Freire himself, when kindly refusing the label “teacher” during 
the interview quoted at the start, explaining that ‘the more I think of  what I did and of 
what I proposed, the more I understand myself  as a thinker and a kind of  epistemologist 
proposing a critical way of  teaching’.50 
And there, effectively, we have it again: the founding triad––thought, education, 
praxis––straight from the horse’s mouth. 
 
Freire’s alpha and omega
If  we rewind a quarter of  a century back from that last public statement, we 'nd Freire’s 
opening line in his 'rst ever important publication in English, Cultural Action for Freedom, 
published in 1970. This inaugural sentence consists of––this is his own view––the stating 
of  a truism: ‘[a]ll  educational  practice implies a theoretical  stance on the educator’s 
part.  This  stance  in  turn  implies––sometimes  more,  sometimes  less  explicitly––an 
interpretation of  man and the world’.51
This  is,  then,  Freire’s  alpha-omega idea:  an  educator  implies,  by  necessity,  a 
philosopher (and vice versa). And the very fact that this is a truism that needs re-stating,  
since ‘experience teaches us not to assume that the obvious is clearly understood’, makes 
such an (immanently pedagogical) statement itself  into a purely philosophical act––one 
which doubtlessly would not be subject to Badiou’s objection.52
In spite of  (because of) all that, it would seem that the truism needs to be spelled 
out  clearly,  yet  again:  Freire’s  is  a less  a  pedagogical  theory than a con'guration of 
thought––a philosophical system, tout court. 
50 ‘A Conversation’ 3’10”-3’47”
51 CAF p. 13.
52 ‘Philosophy  does  not  accept  dominant  names  without  a  critical  examination  irrespective  of  how 
commonly held they are’ (Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), p. 17)s.
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2.2. Freire, For Today: Curiosity, Temporality and Humanisation
‘Eu quero ser reinventado’
One can hardly argue with the fact that much of  the World Wide Web has become an 
online land'll of  loud irrelevant noise: however, buried amongst piles of  virtual waste 
and psychotic redundancy, one can 'nd the beautifully placid YouTube video of  Freire’s 
last  public  interview  mentioned  earlier.53 Conducted  in  1996  during  the  “World 
Conference  on  Literacy”  at  Penn  University,54 the  serene  recording  shows  a 
septuagenarian Freire reHecting on his philosophical and educational journey, sharing 
memories of  a militant lifework extending for more than half  a century: ‘I am now 
almost 75 years old’ observes Freire in his sweet, Pernambucan-infused English––after 
explaining, probably for the umpteenth time, his renowned views on literacy, language, 
power, and the like––,
and sometimes, when I am speaking like now, I am listening to Paulo Freire 40 years  
ago.  Maybe  you  could  ask  me  “but  Paulo,  look,  then  you  think  that  you  did  not 
change?” No, I change a lot, I change every day. But, in changing, I did not change,  
nevertheless, some of  the central nucleus of  my thought’.55 
Freire ceaselessly requested that his ideas be constantly questioned, challenged, 
tested, and if  necessary, reformed, adapted and recomposed: his desire to be ‘reinvented’ 
was  explicit––something  which,  ultimately,  comes  as  the  logical  consequence  of  his 
53 Paulo Freire, ‘A Conversation with Paulo Freire’.
54 Organised by the “International Literacy Institute” and hosted by Penn’s “Center for African Studies”.  
See:  <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Current_Events/Ncal_conf.html> [accessed 19 Jul 2017].
55 ‘A Conversation’, 5’55”.
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inveterate belief  in the ontological ‘un'nishedness’ [inconclusão] of  the human subject.56 
Such structural open-endness in Freire’s thought is something that has been reiterated by 
each and every one of  his  numerous friends  and collaborators:  Peter  MacLaren for 
example, would asseverate that 
there is always something new to be said about Freire’s writings because there is always 
something new to be said about the world and our relationship to it. It is fundamentally 
and necessarily un'nished because the project that animated his work was the struggle 
for human liberation.57 
Antonia Darder, for her part, recalled how ‘Paulo often spoke of  reinventing his 
work, that it wasn’t about us taking exactly what he had done, but for us to understand 
the essence of  what he had done’.58 Hence, the task ‘for those interested in social and 
economic justice and the role played by education’59 is, once again, to reinvent Freire: 
remaking his thought is required if  one is to remain faithful to it. 
However, one might also read in Darder’s account a veiled caveat: in order to 
properly perform such reinvention, it  is  imperative that ‘the essence’  of  his work be 
comprehended. 
I will  thence put forward a 'rst overarching postulate,  one which could be stated as 
follows: if Paulo Freire’s philosophy is to be (re)claimed as a viable educational force to 
be  deployed  in  the  emancipatory  struggles  relevant  to  our  contemporaneity,  if  its 
56 See: ‘Paulo Freire: “Eu quero ser reinventado”’ and Gadotti, Paulo Freire: uma biobibliogra6a, p. 298. As I 
will discuss in more detail later on, Freire’s concept of ‘un'nishnedness  [ inacabamento, inconclução] has deep 
Bergsonian roots: already present in PO (see pp. 101-102), Freire will revisit the idea two decades later in 
his two 'nal works: PH pp. 93-94 and PF pp. 54-55.
57 Peter McLaren, ‘Afterword’, Paulo Freire's Intellectual Roots, pp. 231-36 (p 232).
58 Antonia Darder, ‘ReHections on Paulo Freire & Critical Pedagogy Today’ 
<https://youtu.be/vWymsfBKjlU> (15 Jun 2015), [accss. 31 Jul 2017], 6’05”; see also: Antonia Darder,  
Reinventing Paulo Freire: A Pedagogy of Love (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).
59 McLaren, ‘Afterword’, p. 232.
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reinvention––which,  once  again,  is  an  immanent  aspect  of  the  system,  explicitly 
demanded by Freire himself––is to have any potency today,  then identifying this ‘central 
nucleus’ of  his thought, this dharmic core of  permanence which threads through the 
impermanence of  his oeuvre, is an unavoidable task. My main aim in this chapter is to 
identify such a core and to disentangle its manifold fabric.  
In the process of  developing the above statement, I will be guided by the three 
interlinked postulates mentioned earlier: (1) that the ‘core’ or ‘central nucleus’ of  Freire’s 
thought is commensurable with Badiou’s notion of  subjective 6delity to an event  (2) that the 
operator of  subjective 'delity within Freire’s system takes the name ‘humanisation’ (3) 
that education induces the most generic subject possible.
But  'rst––and  as  indicated  above––in  order  to  properly  perform  this 
recon'guration,  the  unavoidable  prerequisite  is  to  'nd,  within  Freire’s  system,  that 
much-vaunted place wherein the ‘central nucleus’ of  his thought is located. 
Paulo’s curiosity
Some clues to the location of  the Freirean ‘essence’ are hinted at in the interview quoted 
above. They resonate in the opening and closing refrains with which Freire punctuates 
the conversation: namely, the theme of  curiosity. Indeed, the 'lm begins with Freire self-
de'ning his own being-in-the-world: ‘I would say to you that I am a curious being. I  
have been a curious being’.60 And, likewise, towards the end of  the interview, Freire 
closes  the  dialogue  by  bringing  back  the  same  motive  in  the  somewhat  poignant 
observation that ‘I was a curious boy and I am a curious old man. That is, my curiosity  
never stops. Maybe, now I am curious about what it means to die.’ 
Curiosity de'ned Freire the boy, remained the main drive in Freire the man, and 
60 ‘A Conversation’ 0’20”
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keeps determining Freire the elder as he contemplates the path travelled and the end of 
the journey. In the last book published in his lifetime,  Pedagogia da Autonomia of  1996, 
Freire touches ‘once again’
on  the  question  of  the  un'nishedness  of  the  human  person,  the  question  of  our 
insertion into a permanent process  of  searching.  In this  context  I  explore again the 
problem of  ingenuous and critical curiosity and the epistemological status of  curiosity. It 
is also in this sense that I insist once again that education (or “formation” as I sometimes 
call  it)  is  much  more  than  a  question  of  training  a  student  to  be  dexterous  or 
competent.61 
We have in this short paragraph a 'rst glimpse of  the conceptual knot I intend to 
untie here, three of  its most important strands clearly exposed: ‘un'nishedness’––as an 
ontological  condition  of  Nature––,‘training’––as  opposed  to  education––,  and 
‘curiosity’––which appears in three guises: ‘ingenuous’, ‘critical’ and ‘epistemological’.  
Marvel, thaumázō (θαυμάζω), curiositas 
Curiosity and its incidence on something like the emergence of  human subjectivity is  
not, of  course, Freire’s own invention. It is a notion that in the Western tradition can be 
traced back to Plato’s  Theaetetus, where we will 'nd Socrates speaking of  ‘wonder’, or 
‘marvel’ [θαυμάζω] as a condition for philosophical enquiry;62 the idea is then echoed by 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics, though it is here compounded with the issue of  knowledge for  
knowledge’s  sake.63 Such  a  view  is  then  questioned  by  St  Augustine  who,  by  way  of 
61 PF, pp. 21-22.
62 ‘For this feeling of wonder [τὸ θαυμάζειν] shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only 
beginning of philosophy.’ Plato, Theaetus, 155d.
63 ‘It is through wonder [διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν] that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; 
wondering in the 'rst  place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression raising questions 
about the greater matters too […]. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus 
the myth-lover is  in  a  sense a  philosopher,  since myths are  composed of wonders)  [μῦθος  σύγκειται  ἐκ  
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confessing his own ‘vain curiosity’, cannot clearly discern it as a value or a ‘poison’, and 
somehow positing as a hazard.64 Curiosity, unbridled enquiry unchecked by God, now 
poses  a  real  danger:  such  fear  is  undoubtedly  behind  Aquinas’  apprehensive  need, 
almost  a  thousand  years  later,  to  distinguish  between  ‘curiosity’  and  ‘intellectual 
knowledge’ [cognitionem intellectivam non possit esse curiositas].65 
Clearly though, it is Thomas Hobbes’ account which brings back the humanising value 
of  curiosity––a position which very much resembles Freire’s own contemporary usage.66 
Curiosity  for  Hobbes  appears,  as  much  as  it  does  in  Freire,  as  a  symptom  of 
humanisation: it is, for the former, a ‘[d]esire, to know why, and how’  
such as is in no living creature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his 
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other  Animals; in whom the appetite of 
food, and other pleasures of  Sense, by prædominance, take away the care of  knowing 
causes; which is a Lust of  the mind, that by a perseverance of  delight in the continuall  
and indefatigable generation of  Knowledge,  exceedeth the  short  vehemence of  any 
carnall Pleasure.67
The  fact  the  Hobbes  ties  desire  and  curiosity  into  something  like  a  human 
singularity,  renders  his  account strongly  resonant,  not only  with Freire,  but  with the 
whole thread void-noise-anxiety-humanisation-education that I am pursuing here. 
θαυμασίων]; therefore if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they 
pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility.’ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.982b
64 ‘This malady of curiosity is the reason for all those strange sights exhibited in the theater. It is also the 
reason why we proceed to search out the secret powers of nature––those which have nothing to do with 
our destiny––which do not pro't us to know about, and concerning which men desire to know only for 
the sake of knowing’ (Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1955) Ch XXXV, no. 55; see also Ch. XXXVI, no. 58.
65 St. Thomas Aquinas, ‘Of Curiosity’, The Summa Theologica, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Cincinatti, O: Benziger Bros., 1947), 2nd part of the 2nd part, Q 167.
66 For a critical insight of Freire’s notion of curiosity, see Tyson E. Lewis, ‘Teaching with Pensive Images: 
Rethinking Curiosity in Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed’,  The Journal of Aesthetic Education 46:1 
(2012), pp. 27-45, doi:10.5406/jaesteduc.46.1.0027.
67 Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes's Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), p. 44.
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Notable too, is the emphasis that Hobbes puts on the recursive property that 
curiosity  presents:  indeed,  by  being  equal  to  the  ‘love  of  the  knowledge  of  causes, 
[curiosity] draws a man from consideration of  the effect, to seek the cause; and again,  
the cause of  that cause; till of  necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is 
some cause, whereof  there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God.’68 
The desire to know the cause of  something iterates the desire to know ‘the cause of  that  
cause’, inevitably leading the curious subject towards the vertigo of  both paradox and 
in'nity.  In Hobbes’  account,  curiosity  seems  to be  recursive and,  as  such,  a  foster  of 
uncertainty, noise and anxiety. What happens with this vertigo, with this noisy feedback 
of  curiosity  when  the  subject  no  longer  has––like  indeed  Augustine,  Aquinas  and 
Hobbes did––the soothing reassurance of  God as a stopping point?  Such is  the not 
insigni'cant pastoral challenge inherited by an education by truths.69
Freire’s typology of  curiosity
As for Freire, if  the notion of  curiosity appears already fully matured in his last work––
wherein,  as  mentioned  above,  we  'nd it  classi'ed as  either  ‘ingenuous’,  ‘critical’  or 
‘epistemological’––one can sense emerging an interest in curiosity already in the 1985 
“conversational” book with Antonio Faundez,70 Nonetheless, it is in  Cartas A Cristina of 
68 Ibid. p. 80.
69 Surprisingly enough, Hobbes is never directly referenced by Freire: there is evidence though, that the  
English political philosopher was indeed part of the Brazilian’s reading list, at least as early as the late 40s. 
That much can be attested from Ana María Araújo Freire’s ‘Notes’ in  Letters to Cristina, where Hobbes’ 
name appears in a ‘handwritten record of 572 books’ which Freire kept since 1942; Araújo notices ‘that  
he began reading books in Spanish in 1943; in French in 1944; and in English in 1947; that is, if we  
assume that after the books’ purchase, he read them’. Ana María Araújo Freire, ‘Notes to the Tenth 
Letter’,  Letters  to  Cristina, pp.  225-27  (pp.  225-6);  see  also  ‘As  Leituras  do  Jovem  Paulo  Freire’  in 
Biobibliografía, p. 526.
70 Paulo Freire & Antonio Faundez, Por uma pedagogia da pergunta, (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985). Also 
published in Spanish as  Por una Pedagogía de la Pregunta: crítica a una educación basada en respuestas a preguntas  
inexistentes, trans Clara Berenguer (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2013).
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1994 and in À Sombra Desta Mangueira, his penultimate work, published in 1995,71 that the 
concept starts to receive a more thorough philosophical treatment. And  notably,  in  the 
Letters,  we  'rst  'nd  the  notion  of  an  ‘epistemological  curiosity’  appearing  as  a 
fundamental  supplement  to  consciousness,  hinting  a  possible  connection  between 
curiosity and conscientização (and hence implying a rather more critical, or even political 
function of  the notion).
Consciousness is a starting point. It is by becoming conscious of  an object that I can 
account  for  it.  Yielding  to  my  curiosity,  the  object  is  known  by  me.  My  curiosity, 
however, before the world, which is “not-I,” perceives the object without reaching an 
understanding of  its reason for being. This curiosity, if  it undergoes a transformation 
process, becomes what I call epistemological curiosity and may perceive not only an 
object but also the relationships among objects, allowing me to realize their reasons for 
being.72 
And evincing the essential role that curiosity had found within his late thought, 
Freire returns to it in his 'nal work, Pedagogia da Autonomia (1996). Signi'cantly, this time 
it  does  show  up  now  fully  tied  up  with  that  other  classical  Freirean  concept: 
conscientização, which itself  reappears here, as Ana Cruz notes, after a ‘prolonged period’ 
of  not being used.73 
Just  as  conscientização had  been  subjected  in  his  early  1970s  writings  to  a 
comprehensive  analysis  by  means  of  what  Freire  named  an  ‘archeology  of 
71 Freire, À sombra desta mangueira (op. cit.).
72 Paulo Freire, Cartas A Cristina: ReIexões Sobre Minha Vida e Minha Práxis (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1994); 
published in English as Letters to Cristina: ReIections on My Life and Work , trans. by Donaldo Macedo with 
Quilda  Macedo &  Alexandre  Oliveira  (New York  &  London:  Routledge,  1996),  p.  182  (translation  
modi'ed); pagination refers to the English translation (except for my commentary (see p. 266) of Adriano  
S.  Nogueira’s  ‘Preface’  (absent  in  the  English  edition)  and  for  which  I  have  consulted  the  Spanish  
translation:  Cartas A Cristina: ReIexiones sobre mi vida y mi trabajo, trans. by Stella Mastrángelo & Claudio 
Tavares Mastrángelo, 3rd edn (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 2008)).
73 Ana L. Cruz, ‘Paulo Freire’s Concept of Conscientização’, Paulo Freire's Intellectual Roots, pp. 169-182 (p. 
178).
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consciousness’,  so  is  ‘curiosity’  now,  in  the  mid  1990s,  analogously  dissected  in  a 
typology which clearly resonates with the earlier classi'cation. 
 Archeology of  consciousness: true thought, ingenuous thought
What we 'nd in the early Harvard articles that became Cultural Action for Freedom––his 
'rst  important  work  published  in  English––is  the  conceptual  de-composition  of 
conscientização as  ‘semi-intransitive’,  ‘naive-transitive’  and  ‘critical-transitive’ 
consciousness.74 This differentiation emerges, in Freire’s analysis, as a function of  the 
level  of  critical  awareness  that  the  people  have  with  respect  to  an  overdetermined 
historical-cultural reality in which they are more or less submerged. As Freire himself 
explains,  the  ‘archeology  of  consciousness’,  which  is  ‘one  of  the  dimensions  of  the 
conscientização process’ itself,
implies only to invite men and women who are at the naive level of  their consciousness, 
ideologised in a concrete reality in which they cannot express themselves, they cannot 
express the word, they don't know that they can know! To invite them in order to discover 
that it is possible for them to know precisely because men and women can know that  
they are knowing.75
Something like an epistemological invitation (never a coercion, nor an explanation) to 
the people to become aware of  their socio-cultural-historico situation in particular, to 
embrace their ‘un'nished’ nature in general, and, in the process, to identify whatever 
violence is oppressing their ‘ontological vocation’ to ‘be  more’.76 In other words, Freire, 
right from the start in his groundbreaking work of  the 1970s, is taking to heart Frantz 
74 CAF pp. 44-54. See also: The politics of education: culture, power and liberation, trans. by Donaldo Macedo 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 71-81.
75 Paulo Freire & Rex Davis, ‘Education for Awareness’ p. 61
76 See PO pp. 58, 71, 85, 101.
80
Fanon’s belief  that ‘one has to help consciousness’.77 And, in Freire’s system, dialogue is 
the main aide supporting the conscientização process. Indeed, for Freire, inasmuch as it is 
the ‘encounter of  men to “pronounce” the world’, dialogue is ‘a fundamental condition 
for their real humanisation.’78     
Ingenuous curiosity, epistemological curiosity
A  quarter  of  a  century  later,  the  concept  of  ‘curiosity’  appears  linked  with 
conscientisation and is correspondingly de-composed. In a not dissimilar process to that 
with which Freire describes the process of  conscientização, curiosity, which always starts as 
‘spontaneous’, can (and should) progress from ‘ingenuous curiosity’ to ‘epistemological 
curiosity’, through a process of  increased reHection, overseen by education: 
[t]o think correctly, in critical terms, is a requirement imposed by the rhythms of  the 
gnostic circle on our curiosity,  which, as it becomes more methodologically rigorous, 
progresses from ingenuity to what I have called “epistemological curiosity.” Ingenuous 
curiosity, from which there results, without doubt, a certain kind of  knowledge (even 
though not methodologically rigorous) is what characterizes “common sense” knowing. 
It is knowledge extracted from pure experience.79
We can thus see the both notions schematically thus:
consciousness (1970s): semi-intransitive >> naive-transitive >> critical-transitive
curiosity (1990s): spontaneous >> ingenuous >> epistemological
77 Frantz Fanon, Los Condenados de la Tierra (México DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963), p. 282.
78 PO pp. 184-5.
79 PF pp. 35-36.
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However,  unlike  conscientização,  there is  no qualitative difference between such 
levels of  curiosity, inasmuch as ‘the difference and the distance between ingenuity and 
critical thinking, between knowledge resulting from pure experience and that resulting 
from rigorous  methodological  procedure,  do  not  constitute  a  rupture  but  a  sort  of 
further stage in the knowing process’.80 
Curiosity as a symptom of  humanity
Curiosity is one of  the fundamental strands in the Freirean philosophical topology. All of 
these  strands  interweave around the  ‘central  nucleus’  of  Freire’s  thought,  appearing 
alternatively as  conscientização,  critical awareness, un'nishedness, dialogue and cultural 
resistance  (itself  a  double  braid  interlacing  cultural  action  and  cultural  revolution).  
When  put  to  work,  the  Freirean  loom  weaves  a  conceptual  tapestry  wherein 
conscientização is  the  process  whence  the  becoming-subject,  putting  to  full  use  their 
universal  capacity  for  language/thought,  allows  an  awareness  of  their  immanent 
un6nishedness to emerge; the human animal’s  ingenuous curiosity passes into epistemological 
curiosity and thereupon their awareness becomes critical (and, therefore, subjective); this, 
in turn, will have triggered their natural resistance to any oppressive hindrance to the 
ful'lment  of  their  un'nished  potential––what  Freire  describes  as  their  ‘ontological 
vocation to be More’. And, once again, the dialogue prescribed by problematising education 
provides the (temporal) site for this encounter: ‘dialogue is the encounter of  men to be 
more.81
And threading through this whole conceptual plait, we 'nd the ‘human person’. 
It is worth quoting Freire in extenso on this point:
80 Ibid. p. 37
81 PO p. 114
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I like being a human person [gosto de ser  gente] because even though I know that the 
material, social, political, cultural, and ideological conditions in which we 'nd ourselves 
almost always generate divisions that make dif'cult the construction of  our ideals of 
change and transformation, I know also that the obstacles are not eternal. 
In the 1960s, when I reHected on these obstacles I called for “conscientization,” 
not as a panacea but as an attempt at critical awareness of  those obstacles and their 
raison  d’etre.  And,  in  the  face  of  pragmatic,  reactionary,  and  fatalistic  neoliberal 
philosophizing, I still insist, without falling into the trap of  “idealism,” on the absolute 
necessity of  conscientization. In truth, conscientization is a requirement of  our human 
condition. It is one of  the roads we have to follow if  we are to deepen our awareness of  
our world, of  facts, of  events, of  the demands of  human consciousness to develop our 
capacity for  epistemological  curiosity.  Far from being alien to our human condition, 
conscientization is natural to “un'nished” humanity that is aware of  its un'nishedness. 
It is natural because un'nishedness is integral to the phenomenon of  life itself.82
Realstaunen: Bloch’s astonishment and the triggering of  temporality
In this sense, Freire’s curiosity sounds not too dissonant with Ernst Bloch’s notion of 
Realstaunen, an amazement, or astonishment, which nudges the subject out of  their own 
ontological  blind  spot,  and  which  Bloch  strikingly  terms  ‘the  darkness  of  the  lived 
moment’. If  for Bloch the 'rst ‘awakening’ of  the subject happens as a ‘convocation’ in 
the enclosure of  their ‘secret Head’83, and with no possibility of  experiencing the present 
moment, the creative side of  the Blochian cogito is riding on a questioning which points 
to a non-transcendental amazement, an astonishment Hickering within the expanded, 
82 PF p. 55
83 Ernst Bloch,  The Spirit  of Utopia,  trans.  by Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000), p. 247.
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brightened darkness of  hope.84 This amazement, ‘the most authentic of  all emblems’ jolts 
the subject into action, from its immanent darkness, to an urge of  creative shaping and 
is true, in Bloch’s view, of  the ‘greatest things.’ 
Of  the reverberations of  ourselves in all great music, of  the primordial experiences of 
great, dark poetry […]. What is felt, meant here is the same every time: our life, our  
future, the just lived moment and the lighting of  its darkness, its all-containing latency,  
in the most immediate amazement of  all.’85 
Moreover, as Fredric Jameson explains, astonishment carries with it one of  the 
most  important  of  Bloch’s  conceptions:  anticipation,  ‘[f]or  insofar  as  astonishment 
constitutes an implicit or explicit perception of  the future concealed within that which 
exists, it already carries within itself  a story line, the trajectory of  the not-yet-'nished, 
the struggle of  the incomplete to free itself  from the as-yet-formlessness of  the present.’86 
So here begins to loudly resonate, once again, the theme of  temporality. Curiosity and 
amazement have naturally led us back to this place of  time.
Curiosity,  in  Freire’s  philosophical  con'guration, is  a  symptom of  humanity’s 
ontological un'nishedness. Following its trace will lead us to the hard core at the centre 
of  his system, to that nucleic philosophical strand which, albeit intertwined with a multi-
variety of  conceptual 'laments attesting to his notorious eclecticism––itself  a symptom 
of  Freire’s own un'nished philosophical becoming––kept unrufHed, like an unchanged 
philosophical centre, 'rm and undisturbed.
84 Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, p. 201; Amazement, for Bloch, is nothing other than the symptom of hope: 
‘so it seems, indeed it becomes certain, that this precisely is hope, where the darkness brightens. Hope is in 
the darkness  itself,  partakes of its  imperceptibility,  just  as darkness and mystery are always related; it 
threatens to disappear if it looms up too nearly, too abruptly in this darkness. We tremble in hope, in 
amazement’ (ibid.).
85 Ibid. pp. 193-4.
86 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 124.
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Curiosity  is,  once  again,  the  symptom  of  humanity’s  becoming:  a  chronic 
symptom of  an always-un'nished process of  humanisation. And, what’s more, curiosity in 
general, and children’s curiosity in particular––as we shall see in part III––might very 
well have been the spark igniting our species’ foundational event. 
Most importantly, once we have underlined the link between curiosity and astonishment-as-a-
trigger-for-the-perception-of-time in the subject, we can understand how the notion of  curiosity 
finds its place at the core of  one of  Freire’s key ideas: that temporality and education are 
inextricably interrelated. 
Temporality in Freire
Granted,  the  above  curiosity-astonishment-temporality passage  is  drawn  utilising  Bloch’s 
Realstaunen, which brings with it a noticeable dissonance: Bloch’s conception of  time is 
explicitly Husserlian and adamantly anti-Bergsonian. Indeed, in a striking consonance 
with Badiou’s criticisms of  the post-Deleuzian, anarcho-desiring Spinozism (very much 
in vogue during these past decades),87 for Bloch, Bergson’s élan vital has no other function 
than  its  own  duration,  its  empty  search  for  novelty  for  novelty’s  sake:  ‘[e]ven  the 
duration of  a thing, the durée which is imagined as being Huid, is based by Bergson on 
continual difference’; the radically new, in Bergson, ‘is  not elucidated by its path, its 
explosions, its dialectic, its images of  hope and genuine products, but in fact repeatedly 
[…] by the contentless  declaration of  an élan vital  in and for  itself.’88 From Bloch’s 
Husserlian perspective, if  a ‘love for the Novum’ is indeed active in Bergson, ‘the process 
87 See for example Alain Badiou, ‘The Hux and the party: in the margins of Anti-Oedipus’ (1976), Polygraph 
15:16 (2004), pp. 75-92 and Polemics, p. 44.
88 Bloch, Ernst,  The Principle of Hope, Volume 1  (1954), trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice & Paul 
Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), p. 201.
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remains empty and produces nothing but process’ a situation which achieves ‘a mere 
frenzy instead of  the Novum, precisely because of  the constantly required change of 
direction, required for its own sake’; a zigzag, not a curve, sheer opposition to uniformity 
which produces  only chaos.  Ultimately,  Bloch’s  damming conclusion is  that  ‘there is 
absolutely no genuine Novum in Bergson; he has in fact only developed his concept 
from sheer excess into capitalistic fashion-novelty and thus stabilized it; elan vital and 
nothing more is and remains itself  a Fixum of  contemplation.’89  
What seems to be emerging from Bloch’s scathing criticism is a fracture between, on one 
side, a Husserlian conception of  time, which, whilst it is explicit in Bloch, is likewise––I 
claim––implicit  in  Badiou and,  on  the  other,  a  vitalist,  Bergsonian  conception  of 
temporality, which is still  somehow present in Deleuze’s  Aion. The point to underline 
here is the following: granted, much has been said about the differences between Badiou 
and Deleuze’s  ontologies––not  the  least  by  Badiou  himself.  Their  radically  differing 
conceptions of  temporality, however, have not been suf'ciently analysed (neither has, for 
that  matter,  the  Husserlian  DNA  in  Badiou).  What  I  am  suggesting  is  that  the 
Husserl/Bergson schism, that Bloch identi'ed in their respective notions of  time, is at 
the root of  the Badiou/Deleuze one. And, after all, Badiou hints in this same direction 
when  he  admits  that  Deleuze’s  ‘canonical  references  (the  Stoics,  Hume,  Nietzsche, 
Bergson…) were the opposite of  my own (Plato, Hegel, Husserl).’90 
All of  which could bring with it a possible inharmonicity to the Freire-Badiou 
bridge, insofar as Freire’s notion of  temporality is Bergsonian through and through. My 
response to this is, of  course, that if  such inharmonicity will have brought an element of 
noise, I will then include it in the structure of  said bridge (as any engineer knows very 
89 Ibid. pp. 201-2
90 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. by Louise Burchill, (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), p.1.
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well, harmonicity can, in fact, be fatal for bridges). 
The fact remains that, pace all of  the above, duration is a notion dear to Freire. His use of 
the  term is  the  main indication that,  for  Freire,  education  is  inseparable  from temporality: 
‘[e]ducation is constantly re-made in praxis. In order for it to be, needs to become. It’s  
“duration”––in the Bergsonian sense of  the term––as a process, resides in the interplay 
of  the  opposites  permanence-change’.91 Crucially,  for  Freire  duration also involves  a 
socio-political dimension.: ‘in order for it to be, the social structure needs to become; in 
other words: becoming is the mode that a social structure acquires in order acquire a 
“duration”, in the Bergsonian understanding of  the term.’92 
As Bergson himself  explains, ‘pure duration’
is the form which the succession of  our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself 
live,  when it  refrains from separating its present state from its former states.  For this  
purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on 
the contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough 
that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point 
along side another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole,  
as happens when we recall the notes of  a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.93
Such is the account of  duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same 
and ever changing, and who had no idea of  space […] in a word, we project time into 
91 Freire, PO p. 101.
92 [estar sendo é o modo que tem a estrutura social de “durar”, na acepção bergsoniana do têrmo ] PO p. 245. C.f.: 
‘“Duration” is a Bergsonian concept synonymous with real time: Bergson opposes it to the arti'cial or 
quantitative time of mathematicians and physicians, applying his concept of “duration” to characterise 
the permanence-change  contradiction  as  a  process  permanently  present  in the  seizing of  reality.  He 
considers duration-as-process the most important aspect of human life.’ Paulo Freire, Educación y cambio, 
(Buenos Aires: Búsqueda-Celadec, 1976) p. 15 n. 7.
93 Henri Bergson, Time And Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. by Frank Lubecki 
Pogson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910) p. 100.
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space, we express duration in terms of  extensity, and succession thus takes the form of  a 
continuous line or a chain, the parts of  which touch without penetrating one another.94 
In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of  qualitative changes, 
which  melt  into  and  permeate  one  another,  without  precise  outlines,  without  any 
tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another,  without any af'liation 
with number: it would be pure heterogeneity.95 
How does Freire operate this becoming? How can the ‘pure heterogeneity’ of  Bergson 
durée become pedagogic, critical, emancipatory? How is one to avoid ‘an élan vital in 
and for itself ’, an empty process producing ‘nothing but process’ required ‘for is own 
sake’? Freire’s answer is to subjectivise pure duration through the praxis of  dialogue. 
Dialogue, true thought and the temporalisation of  space
It  has  become  clear  by  now  that  dialogue––‘the  fundamental  condition  of 
humanisation’––is one of  the main operators in Freire’s con'guration. However––and 
this is a crucial caveat––‘[t]here is no true dialogue if  there is no true thought’. 96 In 
Freire’s conception, true thought is one that ‘perceives reality as a process, as a continual 
becoming  and  not  as  something  static’.97 Moreover,  Freire  adds  that  true  thought 
94 Ibid. p. 101.
95 Ibid. p. 104.  Deleuze for his part, explains that ‘[p]ure duration offers us a succession that is purely 
internal, without exteriority; space, an exteriority without succession (in effect, this is the memory of  the 
past; the recollection of  what has happened in space would already imply a mind that endures). The two 
combine,  and into  this  combination  space  introduces  the  forms of  its  extrinsic  distinctions  or  of  its 
homogeneous and discontinuous “sections,” while duration contributes an internal succession that is both 
heterogeneous “and” continuous’; see Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 37.
96 PO p. 114.
97 Ibid.
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‘permanently “bathes itself ” in temporality, the risks of  which it does not fear’.98 As 
such,  it  stands  in  opposition  to  ‘ingenuous  thought’  [pensar  ingênuo],  which,  on  the 
contrary, collapses under the weight of  ‘historical time’, and as a result its subjective 
temporality is normalised into the static place of  a ‘well  behaved present’.  As Freire 
himself  puts it, ‘[f]or ingenuous thought, the important thing is accommodation to this 
normalised today. For critical thought, it is the permanent transformation of  reality, on 
behalf  of  the permanent humanisation of  men’.99 
Freire  presents  here  a  key  notion:  the  idea  that  the  development  of 
consciousness––from naive to critical––involves embracing ‘the risks of  temporality’. It 
is an idea borrowed from Pierre Furter, whom Freire extensively references throughout 
his early work: for Furter, the goal of  consciousness-raising education should no longer 
be ‘to eliminate the risks of  temporality, by holding on to guaranteed space, but rather to 
temporalise space [temporalisar o espaço]’; in this way, Furter continues, ‘the universe does 
not reveal itself  to me as space, imposing itself  as a massive presence to which I can only 
adapt, but as a 'eld, as a domain which takes its form according to my action’.100 The 
goal of  ingenuous thought, Freire claims,  is precisely to hold on to that ‘guaranteed 
space’, whereby ‘adjusting to it, and negating temporality, it negates itself.’101
Not to fear the ‘risks of  temporality’: there is here a clear summons to something like a 
subjective  courage,  required  to  confront  whatever  temporality  bears:  unpredictability, 
uncertainty,  entropy,  noise.  Exercising  this  courage  requires  the  letting-go  of  a 
98 ‘“[B]anha-se” permanentemente de temporalidade cujos riscos não teme’ PO p.114.
99 PO, p. 115.
100 Furter,  Educação e Vida, pp. 26-7. The importance of Pierre Furter’s inHuence is oddly overlooked 
within Freire studies. And not only with respect to the utopian aspects of Freire’s system: few scholars 
seem to mention that  the (by now seminally  Freirean)  concept  of ‘banking education’,  was,  likewise,  
borrowed from Furter. See Julio Barreiro’s introduction to the Spanish edition of Educação Como Prática da  
Liberdade: Julio Barreiro, ‘Educación y concienciación’, in La Educación como Práctica de la Libertad by Paulo 
Freire, trans. by Lilién Ronzoni (Montevideo: Tierra Nueva, 1969) pp. 7-19 (p. 16).
101 PO, p. 115.
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‘guaranteed space’ of  knowledge, and experimenting with/in the subjective, negentropic 
time of  the truth procedure.
Humanisation ≠ Ereignis
Freire repeatedly made it clear that the object of  his investigation had never been ‘the 
persons’, reduced to ‘anatomical fragments […] but rather the thought-language with 
which men and women refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and 
their  view of  the  world’.102 On that  account,  ringing as  an  overtone of  my  second 
guiding postulate––to wit, that in Freire’s philosophical system the subjective 'delity to a 
generic notion of the anthropogenic event is conditioned by language and operates under 
the  name  of  humanisation––we  can  pick  up  a  tingling  resonance  with  Badiou::  ‘all 
humanity has its root in the identi'cation in thought [en pensée] of  singular situations.’103 
From this emerging perspective, however, Freire’s humanisation does seem to awkwardly 
share its evental starting point less with Badiou than with the Heideggerean  Ereignis. 
However, fundamental (ethical) differences appear in the subsequent trajectories of  the 
concepts.  In  fact,  Freire’s  humanisation draws  a  vector  of  subjectivity  pointing  in  a 
diverging, if  not opposite, direction than Heidegger’s event. The distancing is twofold: 
'rstly,  unlike  Ereignis,  which  is  ‘not  subject  to  human  calculation’,104 Freirean 
humanisation shows no structural resistance to science, allowing––as we shall see–– for a 
conceptual cross pollination with both the biolinguistic programme of  Noam Chomsky 
and the subtractive mathematical ontology of  Badiou. Secondly, the Freirean ‘word’ is 
102 POe, p. 97.
103 Badiou, E p. 16.
104 ‘Yet propriation is not subject to human calculation; it is rather what is sent as the historical destiny of 
mortals’;  see  David  Farrell  Krell  in  Martin  Heidegger,  Basic  Writings,  trans  by  David  Farrell  Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 396. ‘Propriation’ is Farrell Krell’s translation of Eirignis.
90
not inherently failing, originarily escaping ‘as the hint and the onset of  be-ing’,105 within 
a ‘withdrawal’ of  thought which de'nes  Eirignis:106 much to the contrary, in Freire, the 
‘word’,  as  long  as––and  this  is  an  all-important  quali'cation––it  is  a  true  word,  is  an 
af'rmation of  the primordial event of  humanisation. 
In fact, Freire’s ‘true word’ seems much closer to Agamben’s notion of the ‘oath’ than to 
the Heideggerian event. In this respect, Agamben’s hypothesis is that
the enigmatic institution, both juridical and religious, that we designate with the term 
oath  can only be made intelligible if it is situated within a perspective in which it calls 
into question the very nature of man as a speaking being and a political animal. […] 
Ultrahistory,  like  anthropogenesis,  is  not  in  fact  an  event  that  can  be  considered 
completed once and for all; it is always under way, because  Homo sapiens  never stops 
becoming man, has  perhaps  not  yet  'nished entering language and swearing to his 
nature as a speaking being.107
Loudly resonating in Agamben’s lines we can hear not only Freire’s ‘true word’ 
but, crucially, its conditioning of the immanent ‘un'nishedness’ of the humanising subject.
Furthermore––and most important of  all––in Freire, true saying carries the potential of 
sparking  the  subject  into  creative  action:  ‘insofar  as  language  is  impossible  without 
thought, and language and thought are impossible without the world to which they refer, 
105 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. by Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 26. Emad and Maly, for their part translate Eirignis 
as ‘enowning’.
106 For Heidegger, the event is the ‘withdrawal’ of thought, not its advent (See  Basic Writings p. 374). 
Ereignis appears as the ‘owning’ which ‘bestirs in the showing of saying’, and ‘[o]wning conducts what 
comes to presence and withdraws into absence in each case into its own’ (ibid p. 414).
107 Giorgio  Agamben,  The  Sacrament  of  Language:  An  Archaeology  of  the  Oath ,  trans.  by  Adam Kotsko 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,  2011), p. 11. Agamben here borrows the term ‘ultrahistory’  
from Georges Dumézil; see Georges Dumézil, Mythe et épopée 3: Histoires romaines (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 
1981), p. 14.
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the human word is more than mere vocabulary—it is word-and-action’ [palavração].108
Essentially, Freire is here reanimating a crucial idea: the connection of  truth to 
the subjective nature of  the speech act. Palavração is truth as a praxial process: speaking a 
true word is inseparable from a subjective creative action, and it is precisely for this reason 
that  such act becomes itself  a militant-political  and an artistic-experimental  one:  ‘to 
speak the word, in its true sense, is the right to self-expression and to express the world, 
to create and re-create, to decide, to choose. As such, it is not a privilege of  a few with 
which to silence the majority’.109  
We  have  here  already  the  connection  that  Freire  establishes  between  the 
subjective af'rmation of  the true word with  both an aesthetic, creative realm and an 
emancipatory, political one. The Freirean speech act, in its guise as humanisation––i.e. 
conditioned by  the generic condition, producing  a generic subject––also touches on both the 
scienti'c and on the therapeutic/amatorial. 
And with respect to science, once again: if  for Heidegger it is at this precise point 
where  science  and  language  part  ways,110 the  direction  I  will  take––signposted  by 
Chomsky  and  the  latest  paleoanthropological  evidence––is  the  exact  opposite. 
Furthermore,  a  purely  scienti'c  thinking  of this  Freirean  notion  of  humanisation-as-
conditioned-by-language will  open up a singular site where Freire, Badiou and Chomsky 
might be permitted to meet. 
108 CAF, p. 20. in Portuguese, -ação is a suf'x which activates a noun (as in the English ‘-ation’)––and 
commonly used throughout e.g. problematização, alfabetização etc.––; it is also, itself the noun “action”: so a 
more literal, if somewhat unattractive, translation of  palavração would be “wordation”.  Palavração, too, is 
the  name  for  one  of  two  analytic  methods  of  literacy,  or  phonics––not  necessarily  associated  with 
Freire’s––which uses the word as a unit of meaning, distinguishing it from  sentenciação, which uses the 
sentence (a method associated with Jacotot).  What is important to note here is that, though the term 
palavração might as well have had existed prior to Freire’s use of it, he certainly meant to semantically  
deconstruct  it  as  a  compound––something  which  the  English  translation,  ‘word-and-action’,  has,  
fortunately, picked up.
109 Quoted in Julio Barreiro, ‘Educación y concienciación’, p 16.
110 ‘Science in itself does not think’ (Basic Writings p. 373)
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It is imperative at this point, however, before proceeding forward––and so one may do 
justice to Freire’s own desire and vocation––to step back and engage with the intricate 
topology that the conjoined couple philosophy/education present and to frontally tackle 
the complexity emerging from it. The analysis of  such complex conceptual topology will 
require that one move its parts with the utmost care, whilst axiomatically deciding their 
location in the whole.
In other words, experimenting with something like a temporalisation of  space without 
fearing the ‘risks of  temporality’, is precisely what I intend to do next.   
2.3.  Recon3guring  Freire:  the  Place  of  Philosophy  in  Education,  the  Time  of 
Education in Philosophy
Philosophy <=> Education
In essence,  if  we think of  the philosopher/educator relation as an iterated function, 
then,  like  a  pair  of  two-way  mirrors  facing  each  other,  the  two  terms  immediately 
fractalise  into potentially  in'nite  dimensions.  The welcome webpage of  the  Teachers’  
College at Columbia University, bedrock of  American progressive education, is not at all 
ambiguous with respect to the recursive nature of  the philosophy/education couple:
The Philosophy  and  Education program at  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University, 
centers around two closely related convictions:
1.  that  philosophical  reHection  and  inquiry  is  indispensable  for  generating  sound 
educational practice, and
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2. that educational practice is indispensable for bringing philosophical reHection and 
inquiry to life.111
Whilst  the  above  iteration  seems  valid,  at  this  point  we  might  need  to 
accommodate within this emerging assemblage the (equally valid) Deleuzian assertion 
that ‘philosophy is the art of  forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’.112 If  this is so, 
where is, then, the place of  education within that operation? If  we accept––as we do––
the philosophical notion of  Truth, where is, in turn, the place of  Truth within education?
If––as Badiou establishes––philosophy is empty, and, as was made clear above, in 
Freire’s conception education begins from the same foundation stone as philosophy, then 
accepting the fact that philosophy is conditioned from the outside will have inevitable 
effects on the thinking of  education. 
To put  it  differently,  if  philosophy implies  an education (and vice versa),  the 
sharing of  this axis mundi will inevitably force consequences on each other.
If  on the side philosophy, education does not produce truths
Education does not produce truths: this is the 'rst and cardinal corollary of  placing education 
on the side of  philosophy and not on the side of  the subject praxes. As already noted 
above, for Badiou ‘[t]he philosophical category of  Truth is by itself  void. It operates, but 
presents nothing. Philosophy is not a production of  truth, but an operation from truths, 
an operation which disposes the “there is” of  truths and their epochal compossibility’.113 
Philosophy  itself,  desutured  from  the  truth  procedures,  neither  determines  their 
111 See <http://www.tc.columbia.edu/arts-and-humanities/philosophy/>[accss. 20 Jul 2017]. 
Columbia’s Teachers’ College is strongly associated with John Dewey, who taught there for a quarter of a 
century; as of this writing, it counts Maxine Greene amongst its faculty.
112 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. by Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Verso, 1994), p. 2.
113 Ibid. p. 124 (trans modi'ed).
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operation  (there  is  neither  aesthetics,  nor  political  philosophy,  nor  philosophy  of 
science––nor, for that matter, of  education: in this schema there are no “philosophies of”, 
period). Badiou insists on that term (borrowed from Leibniz): ‘compossibility’: 
[t]he  contemporary  complex  of  the  conditions  of  philosophy  includes  […]  post-
Cantorian mathematics, psychoanalysis, contemporary art and politics. Philosophy does 
not coincide with any of  these conditions; nor does it map out the totality to which they 
belong.  What  philosophy  must  do  is  propose  a  conceptual  framework in  which  the 
contemporary compossibility of  these conditions can be grasped.114
This, of  course, immediately begs an urgent question: if  education does not produce 
truths,  what does,  then, education  do? (i.e.:  What does education do as  different from 
philosophy?)  The  answer  requires  one  to  perform  a  risky  operation  of  separation, 
requiring (as with any attempt to separate that which is born conjoined) the utmost care.  
It is here that the surgical disunion of  philosophy and education begins.
The place of  Truth, the time of  the Subject 
My working answer to this question––what does education do that is not philosophy––is 
founded on what I have been referring to as the cardinal conjecture of  this thesis, and it  
involves thinking separately the categories of  Truth and Subject. 
This  splitting operation––performed in the context of  a  philosophical  system 
(viz. Badiou’s) wherein truth and subject are, likewise, born conjoined––is as hazardous 
as the separation of  philosophy and education. The wager is that crucial conceptual 
energy, indispensable to thinking the relation between them (a relation at the heart of 
114 Badiou, BE pp. 3-4.
95
both the Freirean and Badiouian projects), will be released by the split. The philosophical 
'ssion I intend to perform could be described along the following lines: if  philosophy’s  
concern is focused towards the place of  Truth, education’s concern is focused towards the 
time of  the Subject.115 
As noted earlier, there is a double authorisation for performing this split, both from the 
Badiouian and the Freirean sides. 
With respect to the Freire, it seems clear by now that his thinking of  education is 
inconceivable without a concurrent thinking of  some notion of  duration. And this is so to 
such  a  degree  that  education  requires,  'rstly,  the temporalisation  of  space and,  secondly 
something  akin  to  the  courage  to  confront  the  risks  involved  in  the  production  of  
temporality.
And with respect to the Badiouian orthodoxy, this move is not as outrageous as it might  
'rst sound––on the contrary, it is sanctioned from two interlinked postulates: 
(1)  Badiou’s ontology is atemporal and isentropic and the subject procedure is, on the 
other hand––as Fraser reminds us––a ‘temporal unfolding of  a truth’.
A subject’s existence, as Badiou has it, is always temporal, and, beginning with an act of 
intervention that forms an indecomposable dyad with an event, consists in traversing an 
in'nitely complex situation through an inexhaustible process that Badiou calls a 6delity. 
The  business  of  a  'delity  consists  in  performing  a  series  of  enquiries regarding  the 
possible ‘connections’ that may or may not obtain between such and such an element of 
the situation (schematized as a set) and the event to which the subject seeks to remain 
faithful.  A 'delity is  said to be a  truth procedure if  the projected in'nite subset of  the 
115 Which of course brings with it another conceptual hazard: the separation of time and place.
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situation consisting of  all the elements positively connected to the event will have been 
generic.116
For Fraser, ‘in order to adequately think the essence of  a 'delity, we must attend to its  
temporality’,  insofar  as  it  is  (as  Freire  would  have  it)  an  always  already  un'nished 
project, ‘always in excess of  its being’.117 
(2) Badiou’s ontology implicitly hints at this separation of  time and place, insofar as the 
event is clearly localised (i.e. belongs in the situation), but has no temporality (is not of the 
situation). As Jean-Jacques Lecercle explains,
[t]he event is situated in the situation, it has a site  in it, but it is not  of it, it does not 
belong, it is supplementary to it. It comes and goes in a Hash (it has no proper duration: 
its temporality is the retroactive temporality of  after-the-event; and yet, as we have seen, 
it  interrupts  and  it  founds),  but  it  leaves  traces,  traces  that  allow  an  encounter with 
elements of  the situation, who undergo a process of  conviction, or conversion.118
That temporal process, I claim, is what should bear the name  education: ‘[t]he 
Badiou event,’  Lecercle continues, ‘has a speci'c form of  temporality: it  occurs in a 
Hash, and interrupts the time of  the situation; but it also founds another time, the time 
of  the  inquest,  of  the  process  of  truth  and  faithfulness’.  Lecercle,  however,  adds  a 
caveat: ‘[t]his is where it can go wrong, and where Evil comes in (the theory of  Evil can 
be found in L'Ethique)’.119 
And, precisely because this notion of  a time-producing process is the common 
fundamental tone grounding both the Badiouian and the Freirean subjects, is why their 
116 Fraser, ‘The Law of the Subject’, pp. 121-22.
117 Ibid. p. 122.
118 Lecercle, Deleuze and Language, pp. 109-10)
119 Ibid. p. 110
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respective ethics so strongly resonate. 
So––and  to  restate  my  conjecture  in  strictly  Badiouian  terminology––if  philosophy 
organises a ‘space of  compossibility’ for the truths of  its time (in order to articulate the 
empty place of  Truth), education organises a time of  compossibility for the Subjects of  said 
truths  (in  order  to  tend  to  the  ‘evental  time’  created  by  said  subjects).  Indeed,  all  
subjective constitution requires what Badiou calls a ‘discipline of  time’, a discipline on 
which  the  appearance  of  a  new logic––the  creative  construction  of  a  truth  itself–– 
depends upon: 
the  event  is  only  possible  if  special  procedures  conserve  the  evental  nature  of  its 
consequences. This is why its sole foundation lies in a discipline of  time, which controls 
from beginning to end the consequences of  [the event]. I will call this organised control  
of  time 6delity.120 
Education  intervenes  as  a  minder  of  such  discipline––as  we  will  see,  this 
intervention is  in Freire operated through his  conception of  problematising dialogue 
(and is not unlike Jacotot/Rancière’s ‘method of  the will’).121  
 Admittedly, subjectivation is not a learning process, as Peter Hallward correctly 
points out,122 but it could be that education is the guardian of  a subjective process. So: if 
philosophy  is  the  go-between,  the  procuress  (in-thought)  of  the  truth  procedures,123 
education is the minder, the (in-the-Hesh) escort of  the subjects of  said truths.
And  so,  education  thus  cares  for  the  time  produced  through  praxis  by  the 
120 Ibid. p. 211.
121 ‘A person––and a child in particular––may need a master when his own will is not strong enough to 
set him on track and keep him there.  But  that subjection is  purely one of will  over will.  It  becomes 
stulti'cation  when  it  links  an  intelligence  to  another  intelligence’.  Jacques  Rancière,  The  Ignorant  
Schoolmaster:  Five  Lessons  in Intellectual  Emancipation,  trans.  by Kristin Ross (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991)  pp. 12-13.
122 Hallward, Badiou, p. 286
123 Badiou, HI p. 11.
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subjects of  truth: it is for this reason alone that the void (insofar as it is the ontological  
source of  the event which galvanised the subject in the 'rst place) needs to be thought of 
as  temporalised within educational praxis; and, once again, it is this temporalised void what 
appears in the phenomenal world as noise.
Furthermore, and very interestingly for the sake of  my argument, this subjective 
temporality already appears in the early Badiou of  TS: ‘[t]he subject follows throughout 
the fate of  the vanishing term, having the status of  an interval between two signi'ers, 
and which present it one to the other.’124 This following of  the ‘vanishing term’, this 
chasing of  an escaping signi'er within ‘an interval’  (an idea carrying unmistakeable 
temporal connotations), seems to strongly resonate with that subject at the threshold of  noise 
that is posited here as the generic subject of  education.
philosophy <–> education <=> education <–> philosophy 
(Truth) <–|–> (Subject)
place <–|–> time
the void ––> noise
Education names the most generic subject possible
From this (Freirean-Badiouian) perspective, education then becomes the seeing-eye for 
the temporal process undergone by an empty category: that of  the most  generic  Subject  
possible. Neither a subject of  science, nor of  art, nor of  politics, nor of  love, but one that  
shares  at  least  one  element  with  each  one  of  them.  In  other  words,  if  philosophy 
prepares an always empty placeholder for Truth, education, then, prepares an always-
empty timeholder for the Subject. And exactly as with Truth, the Subject of  education 
124 TS p. 134
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remains generic and indiscernible. Education intervenes by following the Subject in the 
trajectory of  its truth: from the nomination of  the event (it sides with the subject with 
regards to its undecidability), all the way to the forcing of  the consequences of  the event 
as Truth (reminding the subject that it needs to remain unnameable).125  
Let us brieHy recap here the 'gures of  the subtractive. As already discussed in 
chapter 1,126 the trajectory of  a truth procedure is described by Badiou as a four-stage 
course:
(1) it starts with an undecidable event: education here wagers alongside the subject 
in their decision to declare, without any (statistic) guarantees whatsoever, that the event  
has indeed happened.127 
(2) the indiscernible, related to the subject’s evaluation of  the event;  the decision to 
declare the event is not guided by any law, it is unsupported by any norm of  evaluation 
and ‘principle of  objectivity.’128 Education can neither provide a Law, nor present itself 
as a proxy for the Law: what it  can do is contain and support the lack of  a Law: it here 
becomes a reassuring (and corrupting) voice, illegally injuncting the subject to “keep 
going”. 
(3) the generic, related to the subject’s collection of  the elements which belong to 
the (potentially in'nite) truth being composed as a consequence of  the event; education, 
unlike training, has no predicate: it is related to this un'nished process, which in the 
Freirean context takes the name ‘humanisation’.
(4) unnameable, related to ethics: truth remains unnameable, and noise must be 
125 See TW p. 110.
126 See p. 33.
127 ‘In order for the process of a truth to begin, something must happen. […] A truth arises in its novelty 
and every truth is a novelty––because a hazardous supplement interrupts repetition’;  being ‘indistinct’, 
the event ‘provides the basis for the undecidable’ (C p. 122).
128 C p. 123.
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allowed  to  be  noise:  education  is  a  reminder  that  any  truth,  even  when  becoming 
information and knowledge, will always have hailed from the noisy side of  epistemology 
(and, therefore, that there is a side of  epistemology, an outside of  its knowledge-de'ned 
border, that needs to always already remain noisy, uncertain, unpredictable).
ethics translation education
event undecidable ––> wager on a wager
subject indiscernible ––> education is illegal
truth generic ––> un-'nishedness
Truth unnameable ––> noisy epistemology
Now, a second corollary of  placing education on the side of  philosophy is, of  course––
considering that education does not  produce truths––that strictly speaking there can be no  
educational subjects per se. Hence the need for this subject of  education to remain empty and 
strictly generic. But a subject it is––one is tempted here to shadow Badiou’s notation, viz.: 
• there are (political, scienti'c, artistic, libidinal) truths (plural, lower case), there is 
a (philosophical category) Truth (singular, upper case).
• there are (political, scienti'c, artistic, libidinal) subjects (plural, lower case), there 
is an (educational category) Subject (singular, upper case).
And so we arrive at the juncture wherein––as already mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter129––our educational  Subject of  subjects, meets with its double: namely, Frank 
Ruda’s––likewise “illegitimate”–– philosophical subject. 
129 See subchapter 2.0,  p. 57.
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For  Ruda,  insofar  as  ‘there  are  no  philosophical  subjects  but  there  is  a 
philosophical act that today has to take the form of  the operation of  forcing’ and, at the 
same time, that we have to accept that there is ‘no forcing without a subject that unfolds 
the consequences of  a truth within a situation’,130 is a situation which brings about an 
unsurmountable impasse: namely, what to do when nothing happens. With no events to 
trigger subjective af'rmation and action, such potential (and necessary) subjects of  truth 
are impotent, left with no answer when confronted with  the historical impasse:  what is  
there to do? Ruda’s important intervention has this precise purpose: to provide an answer 
to  the  fundamental  question  of  how  to  remain  (politically,  artistically,  scienti'cally, 
erotically)  militant  during  non-evental  times (a  mark,  undoubtedly,  of  our  own 
contemporaneity). 
This is the reason why I want to suggest that from time to time, in exceptional times,  
but, maybe, always, there needs to be a philosophical subject—that is a hypothetical subject, 
an anticipated subject which holds the place open for a new political subject (but the same 
goes, as should be clear, for any condition in its absence). The philosophical subject is  
not a subject forcing knowledge into a situation but it produces a forced shift from the 
objective  domain  of  knowledge  into  the  subjective,  or  put  differently:  it  takes  the 
position of  the very form of  the subject (in the conditions).131 
Such subject is neither a meta- nor a super-subject––which would be disastrous: in fact, 
and as brieHy discussed earlier, on account of  them being generic it is a double-barred 
subject: ‘it is once barred as any subject is in the conditions barred and it has to be 
barred twice because it does not appear as a subject in the conditions’. Our generic 
subject is therefore even less “empowered” than the subjects of  the truth procedures, it is 
130 Ruda, For Badiou, p. 132.
131 Ibid.
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‘the subject minus the subject’ taking the position of  the minus sign, of  the bar itself.132
It rather would be  a subject supposed to remember,  repeat,  and work  through the thought of 
loving,  militant,  artistic,  scienti'c  subjects  and  the  impossible  actions  they  already 
performed.  If  philosophy  needs  to  think  the  'delity  to  'delity  and has  to  offer  an 
af'rmative interpretation of  (even saturated) sequences,  philosophy not  to become a 
fully futile intellectual enterprise from time to time has itself  to do the impossible. It has 
to recall the impossible as this is one way to render why we simply should not want to understand  
ourselves as being nothing but animals.  In such a way, philosophy can intervene, it can be 
engaged philosophy.133 
Such intervention ‘necessary but impossible’ is precisely what, I maintain, takes 
the name education. 
All in all, a mere 'ne adjustment of  Ruda’s philosophical subject––in consistency 
with  the  separation  between  Truth  and  Subject  (implied  in  the  philosophy|education  
scission)––would suf'ce in order for it and my educational Subject recognise themselves 
as  the  double  reHection  of  the  same  love-child.  In  short,  the  Subject  of  subjects of 
education I am proposing here appears isomorphic with Ruda’s ‘philosophical subject’. 
Moreover,  it  likewise  appears  conditioned  by  an  appropriately  retuned  notion  of 
Clemens’ ‘condition of  conditions of  philosophy’: namely, the letter.
Letter—>Language
I have repeatedly mentioned that the notion of  language deployed throughout this thesis 
approaches  asymptotically  this  idea  of  the  letter. Hence,  the  concept  itself––and  its 
132 Ibid. p. 185-6, n. 39.
133 Ibid. p. 132.
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relation to language––now merits some some further attention. 
By  “letter”  Lacan  designates  ‘the  material  medium  [support]  that  concrete 
discourse borrows from language. […] The primary reason for this is that language, with 
its structure, exists prior to each subject's entry into it at a certain moment in his mental  
development.’134 The letter is, then, for Lacan the material substratum of  language, ‘the 
essentially localized structure of  the signi'er.’135 As Dylan Evans explains, it is not ‘a 
mere graphic representation of  a sound’, but ‘the material basis of  language itself ’. The 
letter is  something like a stray datum of  the Real,  which is  wherefrom hails  both its 
materiality and its indivisibility: ‘[it] is thus connected with the real, a material substrate 
that underpins the symbolic order. The concept of  materiality implies, for Lacan, both 
the idea of  indivisibility and the idea of  locality’. Indivisible and ‘meaningless in itself ’ 
the letter ‘constantly insists in inscribing itself  in the subject’s life’, 136 persisting in its 
senselessness like minimal, noisy spermata.  
This  persistance  is  the  inevitable  result  of  the  letter being  a  leftover,  a 
background  radiation  of  the  Real,  its  unsymbolisable  excess,  which  becomes  a 
phantasmatic form-lessness insisting to exist alongside that which has been effectively in-
formed. The real, as Bruce Fink explains, ‘is perhaps best understood as that which has not  
yet been symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists symbolization; and it may 
perfectly  well  exist  “alongside”  and  in  spite  of  a  speaker's  considerable  linguistic 
capabilities. […] There is thus always a remainder which persists alongside the symbolic 137. Being 
the  letter  ‘the  material,  non-signifying face  of  the  signi'er,  the  part  that  has  effects 
without  signifying’  it  is,  crucially,  ‘the  substance  that  gets  off  or  enjoys’.  Substance 
134 Lacan, Ecrits, p. 413
135 Ibid. p 418
136 Evans, Dictionary, pp. 102-03.
137 Bruce Fink,  The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), pp. 25 & 27.
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thereby ‘gets the better of  form and teaches it a trick or two.’138 And herein resides, I 
would  add,  not  only  the  link  of  the  letter  to  the  (noisy)  object  voice,  but  the 
paradoxical––and,  as  Fink  himself  crucially  notes,  pedagogical––interpenetration  of 
negentropic form and entropic substance. 
This  rogue,  ‘substance  jouissance’  hails  from the  real,  which  is  precisely  the 
reason of  ‘the impossibility of  mastering the letter.’139 The letter is material, localisable, 
indivisible and, as Clemens points out, it is ‘a lack with delimitable borders.’140 The letter 
is,  therefore,  an  indivisible  meaninglessness,  resembling  the  ‘absolute  inconsistency’  of 
différance141––once again: it is a diaphoric bit. ‘Différance’, Clemens continues, ‘is this “event 
of  matter”  (Agamben)  or  “phantom  of  inconsistency”  (Badiou)  that  un-founds 
systematicity.’142 
I  want  to  consider  language,  then,  as  the  minimal movement  of  the  letter  out  of 
mathematical  ontology:  its  rookie  foray  into  the  (neg)entropic  world  of  onto-logical 
appearing  and  relation,  attempting  to  pluck  the  very  'rst  delicate  shoots  of  sense, 
informing directly from the formless, relating, yes, yet still indiscernible in its murmuring 
noise. A language for subjects unfailingly aware that, when operating at the threshold of  
noise, 
[i]t  is  not  a question of  formulating correct  judgments,  but  rather  of  producing the 
murmur of the indiscernible. 
In this  production of  a murmur of  the  indiscernible,  what  is  decisive  is  the 
inscription, the writing, or, to borrow a category dear to Jean-Claude Milner, the letter. 
Only the letter does not discern, but instead effectuates. 
138 Ibid. p. 119.
139 Clemens, ‘The Letter as Condition of Conditions’, p. 82.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. p. 84.
142 Ibid. p. 88.
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I would add the following: There are several kinds of  letter. There are, in effect, 
the small letters of  the matheme, but there is also the "mystery in letters" of  the poem; 
there is what a politics takes literally [à la lettre]; there are the letters of  lovers. 
The letter is addressed to all. Knowledge discerns things and orders divisions. 
The  letter,  which  supports  the  murmur  of  the  indiscernible,  is  addressed  without 
division. 
Every  subject  can  be  traversed  by  the  letter,  that  is,  every  subject  can  be 
transliterated.  This  would  then  be  my  de'nition  of  an  egalitarian  freedom  within 
thought: A thought is free once it is transliterated by the small letters of  the matheme, 
by the mysterious letters of  the poem, by the way in which politics takes things literally, 
and, 'nally, by the love letter.143
Condition of  conditions
For Clemens, however, the letter seems to inhabit the liminal threshold between being 
and  appearing,  between  the  nomination  of  the  event,  and  the  subjective  labour  of 
forcing knowledge: ‘it is simultaneously an integral moment in a truth process, marking its 
inaugural act of  decision or intervention, and the matter of  the knowledge of  being. The 
disposition of  letters involves a supernumerary act that at once founds the work of  truth 
and the extension of  being beyond its previous limits.’144 
The letter as soon as it passes the threshold being|appearing becomes the 'rst signi'er 
of  language: no longer void, but still empty of  sense. A noisy signi6er.
By positing the movement  letter—>signi6er, then, the attempt is simply to 'ne-
tune Clemens’ account––whereby the letter seems to be slightly over-worked at both 
sides of  the border between truth and knowledge––and attend closely to the threshold 
143 Badiou, HI p. 34.
144 Ibid, p. 92 (emphasis in original).
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itself, thereby placing the letter on the side of  being (and the void), and language on the 
side of  appearing (and noise).
void —> noise
being | appearing
letter —> language (signi'er)  
nomination | epistemological work145 
All of  which is consistent with the  schizductive methodology of  translation I am 
utilising throughout  this  thesis.  It  is  with this  in  mind that  I  can,  de  jure,  posit  with 
Clemens that ‘the letter [language] as act of  nomination is poetry; the letter  [language] 
as act of  knowledge is mathematics; the letter [language] as irreducible Two is love; the 
letter [language] in its universal address is politics’ and that, therefore, ‘all the conditions 
take letters [language] as their material and it is therefore legitimate to claim […] that 
letters are [language is] indeed the condition of  conditions in Badiou’s work.’146 And as 
such, it conditions the subject of  education.
Should  we  accept  it,  this  generic  subject  of  subjects  coincides  with  the  re-
con'gured Freirean subject postulated in the introduction of  this chapter.  One which, 
through the operation of  humanisation, opens out and generically links with all  four 
subject procedures in Badiou’s system.
 
145 The  letter  is  certainly  not an  epistemological  category:  language,  though,  might  be  so.  The  all-
important caveat here is that such epistemology should be nothing but the always un'nished result of the  
noisy epistemological labour of a subject of truth.
146 Ibid,  pp 91-2. This  theme underscores,  of  course,  what Badiou refers  to  as ‘the problem of the 
connection between the different procedures’ (IT, p. 192). And whilst, yes, ‘it is necessary to elaborate a 
general theory of the connections of the knots between different procedures’ (ibid), I am under no illusion 
that merely positing a subject of subjects or a condition of conditions and a philosophy<=>education 
biconditionality will settle the matter. My modest wager is that by surveying the site with these tools, at  
the very least some useful 'ndings might be brought to light.
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But––and to keep this thesis consistent within a Badiouian speech-community––to speak 
of  a subject is to speak of  a truth, and, in turn, to speak of  a truth is to speak of  an  
event. To put it differently, if  the consequences of  an event are to be forced into the 
situation, subjective 'delity to the former must not waver. Which is to say: there needs to 
be an ethics of  truths in place in order for the subjects to create an evental time. 
2.4. Badiou with Freire: an Ethics of Humanisation as Truth 
An ontological vocation
Thus, in this Badiouain/Freirean scheme I am attempting to lay out, philosophy does 
not produce truths, but announces their existence and prepares a conceptual space––
namely, Truth––for their compossibility in thought: if  philosophy is a  shelter  for Truth, 
education  is  the  workshop  of  truths.  Therefore,  education––being  on  the  side  of 
philosophy––does not produce subjects either: rather, it prepares, in expectation of  their 
arrival, a universally accessible temporal stretch (which emerges in the space opened up 
by the  philosophical  category of  Truth),  wherein it  watches-out  for  their  contingent 
appearance  and,  never  loosing  sight  of  a  truth’s  demands  (undecidability, 
indiscernibility, genericity and unameability) attends to the subjects’ becoming-process in 
praxis.  This  temporal  stretch,  rendered  by  the  philosophical  space  of  Truth,  is  the 
generic Subject of  education. For Freire, this Subject’s discipline of  truth, its operator of 
'delity, is humanisation.
However––and this is will have become one of  Freire’s main contributions––the 
Pedagogy of  the Oppressed (which is to say, ‘problematising education’), as a thought-
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praxis which materialises the subjective 'delity to humanisation, does carry a sine qua non 
ethical imperative: if  humanisation is not to be betrayed, problematising education is 
not only a suf'cient condition––it is a  necessary one. And this is because if  the evils of 
violent oppression are to be avoided, humanisation is  not an option. For Freire,  the 
subjective process implies a basal, foundational contradiction between humanisation or 
de-humanisation.  In this respect, it might be worth recalling the opening lines of the 
English version of Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 
[w]hile the problem of  humanization has always, from an axiological point of  view, 
been humankind's central problem, it now takes on the character of  an inescapable 
concern.  Concern  for  humanization  leads  at  once  to  the  recognition  of 
dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality. And as 
an  individual  perceives  the  extent  of  dehumanization,  he  or  she  may  ask  if 
humanization is a viable possibility. Within history, in concrete, objective contexts, both 
humanization  and  dehumanization are  possibilities  for  a  person as  an uncompleted 
being conscious of  their incompletion.147
As mentioned earlier, humanisation, or rather, its possibility––opened up by the 
singular breakthrough of  thought-language––which, being not only species-speci'c, but 
species-de6ning, should be universally opened to all, is, and has been, constantly negated. 
It  is  ‘thwarted  by  injustice,  exploitation,  oppression,  and  the  violence  of  the 
oppressors’.148 And yet, Freire––the unremitting dialectician––adds that humanisation ‘is 
af'rmed by this very negation’149. Humanisation, which names our species’ ‘historical 
and  ontological  vocation  to  Be More’  [sua  vocação  ontológica  e  histórica  de  Ser  Mais],150 
arrives presenting humankind with an inescapable and de'ning contradiction: a choice 
147 POe p. 43. These lines are absent from the Portuguese edition.
148 POe p. 44. Se n 99 above.
149 Ibid.
150 PO p. 72.
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between humanisation as af'rmation and dehumanisation as its negative af'rmation. 
That liminal moment when dehumanisation, in turn, triggers its own negation, will have 
marked the ontological ground of  humanity’s resistance––which is to say: the negation 
of  dehumanisation  will  have  inscribed  the  beginnings  of  politics  (but  also,  and 
simultaneously: of  the af'rmation of  the Two of  love, together with the exploration of 
new forms in art and of  their mathematical  inscription in science).151 This will  have 
been, then, a new af'rmation, ‘by the yearning of  the oppressed for freedom and justice, 
and by their struggle to recover their stolen humanity’.152
Oppressed, not victims
From this approach, there seems to appear yet another impassable obstacle to building a 
conceptual bridge between Badiou and Freire. And it is that the name ‘oppressed’ is 
prone  to  being  stuck  with  victimising,  or  worse,  identitarian  connotations.  Nothing 
would be further away from a Badiouian ethics than this, ‘because the status of  victim,  
of  suffering beast, of  emaciated, dying body, equates man with his animal substructure, 
it reduces him to the level of  living organism pure and simple’.153 In order to further 
illustrate this subject, Badiou relates accounts of  survivors of  torture, of  people treated 
‘like animals destined for the slaughterhouse’, and remind us that those who managed to 
maintain their humanity have done so through ‘an almost incomprehensible resistance 
151 ‘What singularises the political procedure is the fact that it proceeds from the in'nite to the 1. It 
makes  the  1  of  equality  arise  as  the  universal  truth  of  the  collective  by  carrying  out  a  prescriptive 
operation upon the in'nity of the State; […] the amorous procedure, […] proceeds from the 1 to the 
in'nite through the mediation of the two. In this sense – and I leave the reader to meditate upon this – 
politics is love’s numerical inverse. In other words: love begins where politics ends.’ (Badiou, M p.151); in  
this regard Clemens remarks that ‘[t]he nominal supplement of an event is integral to any and all of the 
truth processes, necessary to name the essential contingency of the existing situation and to open new 
possibilities for being.’ ‘Letter as Condition of Conditions’, p. 91.
152 POe p. 44.
153 Badiou, E p. 11.
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on the part of  that which, in them, does not coincide with the identity of  victim’.154
However,  attaching victimary connotations to  Freire’s  ‘oppressed’  would be a 
misconception of  his use of  the term. In truth, the Brazilian’s disgust towards any sort of  
humanitarianism was, in fact, as strong as Badiou’s:
[t]he pedagogy of  the oppressed, by seeking the restoration of  intersubjectivity, presents 
itself  as a pedagogy of  Humanity. Only such pedagogy, animated by an authentically 
humanist––though not humanitarian [humanitarista]––generosity, can achieve that goal. 
Conversely,  a pedagogy based in the egoistic interests  of  the oppressors––an egoism 
disguised as the false generosity of  paternalism––and which makes of  the oppressed the 
objects of  its humanitarianism, maintains and embodies the oppression itself. It is an 
instrument of  dehumanization.155
Freire signals a way out of victimising his conception of ‘oppressed’ through a 
triple  movement. Firstly,  he  presents  ‘the  oppressed’  not  as  an  identity,  but  as  a 
consequence of  the human being abandoning (or being forced to abandon) what is their  
ontological  and historical vocation: that of  being more than what Nature presents as the 
sole possibilities––what Freire calls ‘limit situations’ [situações-limites]. Human beings are 
separated  from  Nature  by  a  unique  urge  to  overcome  such  situations  through  the 
positing  of  new possibilities:  what  he  refers  to  as  ‘unprecedented  feasibility’  [inédito  
viável].156 As noted above,  only humanisation is an ‘ontological vocation’:  its  obverse, 
dehumanisation––which is nonetheless a very real possibility––is not. 
Dehumanization, which de'nes not only those whose humanity has been robbed, but 
also––though in a different manner––those who have stolen it,  is  a distortion of  the 
vocation of  becoming  more. It is a distortion made possible by history, but it is not a 
154 Ibid (original italics).
155 PO p. 56
156 PO p. 53. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos as ‘untested feasibility’ (POe p. 102).
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historical vocation. […] The struggle for humanization, for freedom of  labour, for de-
alienation [desalienação], for the af'rmation of  men and women as persons, as “beings 
for-themselves”  [seres  para  si]  would  have  no  meaning.  This  struggle  is  possible  only 
because dehumanization, albeit a concrete fact of  history, is neverthless not a given destiny 
but the result of  an unjust “order” that engenders the violence of  the oppressors which, 
in turn, the generates the being less of  the oppressed.157
Dehumanisation, albeit having a historical appearance, has no being per se: it 
appears  as  a  distortion,  or  corruption  of  humanisation.  As  such,  when  oppression 
happens (and it does of  course happen) it does more so as a ‘historical reality’ than as an 
‘ontological viability’. Dehumanisation, which is the shared corruption of  humanity of 
both  oppressed  and  oppressors,  is  a  distortion  of  true  becoming  and  hence, 
‘oppressed’––inasmuch as it is a category empty of  ontological substance––can never 
constitute an identity. Furthermore, dehumanisation––just like humanisation––is not a 
feature immanent to Nature, but a historical result of  the dehumanising/humanising 
contradiction  triggered  by  the  separation from  Nature  and  the  contingent,  arbitrary 
struggle for power that ensues. Dehumanisation does not produce an oppressed subject, 
but a ‘false subject’ [o falso sujeito].158
Secondly––and of  the utmost importance if  the term oppressed is to be cleansed 
of  victimising connotations––is the fact that, granted, dehumanisation does not establish 
a new vocation––it does, nevertheless, constitute a seed of  resistance to its violence: 
[t]he oppressor’s  violence  (which dehumanises  them as  much as  those oppressed by 
them) does not inaugurate another vocation––that of  “being less” [a do ser menos]. As a 
distortion of  their vocation to “being more”, “being less” will, sooner or later, drive the 
157 PO p. 40
158 PO p. 48.  One is tempted to further qualify the opposition: humanisation is on the side of  politics, 
dehumanisation is on the side of economics.
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oppressed into a struggle against those who have made them less.159 
Finally, in a third move away from victimisation, Freire makes direct use of  the 
foundational concept of  humanisation: both oppressed and oppressors have been denied 
their ‘ontological vocation’ by the evils of  dehumanisation: the inevitable struggle which 
ensues and which, let’s not forget, is inaugurated by the oppressed,160  becomes the only 
possible  way  back,  for  both  oppressed  and  oppressors,  to  the  redeeming  way  of 
humanisation:   
[t]his struggle only makes sense if  the oppressed, while endeavouring to recover their 
humanity––which is a way of  creating it––do not […] turn themselves,  in fact,  into 
“oppressors of  the oppressors”, but rather into restorers of  the humanity of  both.161
No room here, then, for identitarian victimisation: clearly for Freire the power to 
restore humanity resides on the weak and it is the ‘humanistic and historical task of  the 
oppressed’  to  liberate  themselves  together  with  the  oppressors.162 It  is  a  stance  that 
strongly resonates with a notion of  politics which relates its truth to the Rancièrian ‘part 
of  no part’, and the Badiouian ‘void’ of  a situation: ‘[o]nly the power that is borne out 
of  the weakness of  the oppressed will be strong enough to liberate both’.163 
True words, dangerous thinking
159 PO p. 41.
160 ‘Who, other than the oppressed, would be better prepared to understand the terrible signi'cance [o  
signi6cado terrível] of an oppressive society?’ (PO 42-3).
161 PO p. 41.
162 PO p. 41.
163 Ibid.  Badiou,  for  his  part,  writes  in  Metapolitics that  ‘[a]s  far  as  the  notion  of  domination  is 
concerned––or the counting of parts of a whole as substructure of the unequal––this I named not long 
ago, in my own jargon, ‘the state of the situation’ and Rancière names ‘the police’ (playing on the Greek  
word  πόλις).  That  it  is  necessary––in  order  to  think  change––to  think  the  correlation  between  the 
counting and non-counted, the State and insecurity (what I call the ‘on the edge of the void’), between the  
all and nothing, is  indeed my conviction. Everything hinges on the nominal summoning,  through an 
event, of a sort of central void at the surface of a situation stati'ed by a counting’ (M p. 116).
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For Freire, the problematising dialogue emerging within a Pedagogy of  the Oppressed 
needs  to  keep  its  disciplined  focus  in  the  evental  nature  of  humanising  thought-
language. If  it is genuine thought, which is to say, if  the word is true,164 then, inasmuch as it is 
a thought-language that resists the dehumanising violence exercised by the state––and 
its excrescent knowledge, disseminated by ‘banking education’––it is (it should be) an 
immanently subversive thinking. True thinking is, just like its Subject, incommensurable 
with the state: ‘[t]he thing is that genuine thinking is dangerous. The strange humanism 
of  this “banking” conception is no more than an attempt to turn the human being into  
its opposite––the automaton, in itself  the negation of  the ontological vocation to Be 
More’.165 
Freire posits a ‘problematising education’ that would stand against a ‘banking’ 
model  which,  by  uncritically  assisting  domination,  inhibits  creativity  and,  by 
domesticating  instead  of  forming,  ‘negates  people  their  ontological  and  historical 
vocation to human-ise’ [nega os homens na sua vocação ontológica e histórica de humanizar-se].166 
It  is  a  conception of  education as searching,  as movement,  as  constant becoming––
though Freire is very clear on this point: education’s  moto perpetuo needs to keep a 'rm 
ethical focus: 
this searching movement is only justi'ed inasmuch as it is directed towards being more,  
towards  peoples’  humanisation.  [Which is]  their  historical  vocation,  contradicted by 
dehumanisation which, not being a vocation, is a mere feasibility, veri'ed by history. 
And, qua feasibility, it should appear to people as a challenge and not as an impediment 
to searching.167  
164 A Freirean notion which, as we already saw, is not dissimilar, to Agamben’s ‘oath’.
165 PO p. 85.
166 PO p. 101.
167 PO p. 104.
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Humanisation as Good, dehumanisation as Evil
The fact that dehumanisation is a ‘distortion’ of  the human being’s ontological vocation 
of  ‘being-more’, is what lends Freire’s subjective process its Havour of  Badiouian ethics. 
In  Freire,  dehumanisation  has  no  being  in  itself  other  than  as  a  corruption,  or  a  
deviation, of  the people’s ‘vocation to become subjects’ [a sua vocação de ser sujeito].168 The 
starting  point  in  Freire  is  humanisation;  dehumanisation––standing-in  as  a  'gure  of 
Evil––is a distortion of  humanisation––standing-in as the 'gure of  Good. If  we accept 
this, then the parallels with Badiou’s ethics become almost explicit: ‘If  Evil is […], it 
must then be that it arises as the (possible) effect of  the Good it Itself. That is to say: it is only 
because there are truths, and only to the extent that there are subjects of  these truths  
that there is Evil […] if  it exists, is an unruly effect of  the power of  truth’.169 
In Badiou’s ethical substructure, Evil has no being per se: it emerges as no more 
(no less)  than a deviation from the subjective 'delity  to a truth.  And this  subjective 
'delity, or more precisely, the disciplined operation of  this 'delity, is what stands in for the 
Good: ‘[t]he ethic of  truths––as the principal of  consistency of  'delity to a 'delity, or 
the maxim ‘Keep going!’––is what tries to ward off  the Evil that every singular truth 
makes possible’.170 
For Badiou, then, an ‘ethics of  truths’ equals a ‘'delity to a 'delity’:  he thus 
performs a separation which produces two succeeding 'delities,  one included in  the 
other. And, as it happens, it is precisely on the 'rst term of  this double 'delity that the  
model of  education I am positing here operates. Indeed, from this Badiouian/Freirean 
perspective, education guards the (generic) 'delity of  a (succeeding, subjective, localised) 
'delity to a particular truth,  which is entirely emergent from a local educational situation and 
168 PO p. 227.
169 E p. 61 (original italics).
170 E p. 67; c.f. p. 53
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which has humanisation as  its  unique operator.  Thus a temporal  space wherein ‘an 
education  by  truths’  becomes  activated,  is  opened.  Education  hence  becomes  the 
exercising of  a discipline of  truths itself, the Jacototian will, or––what I contend is the 
same thing––the Freirean praxis.      
Education’s  concern  is  to  safeguard  the  6delity  to  a  6delity––any  6delity  as  long  as  it  is  in  the  
investigation of  some truth. In other words, education is the caring of  generic 6delity.
Education is a wager on a wager, not a matter of  knowledge
As we saw in chapter 1, every situation implies some law prescribing that which belongs 
to it and discriminating that which doesn’t––this is what Badiou refers to as the count-
as-one. This oneness is what underscores ‘Leibniz’s thesis [that] “What is not a being is 
not a  being”’ the ontological rule ‘which literally governs the immanence of  a situation 
and its horizon of  verity.’171 For Badiou, this ‘thesis of  the law’ is perfectly veridical, which 
does not mean it  is  necessarily  true:  truth is  always a matter for the  subject,  who is 
unconcerned by the veridicality prescribed by the count-as-one (which is no more than 
the ontological formalisation of  the Law). It is precisely in this sense that education,  
insofar as it supports the violation of  the count-as-one, is illegal. 
Every truth is  post-evental.  In particular,  there is  no “structural” or  objective truth.  
Concerning structural statements admissible in the situation, we shall never say that they 
are  true  but  only  that  they  are  veridical,  they  are  related  not  to  truth,  but  to 
knowledge.172
Insofar as  its  exclusive concern is  the generic  Subject  to a  truth,  Education is 
171 Badiou, BE p. 53.
172 Badiou, MP 107 (translation modi'ed).
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incommensurable with knowledge and, hence,  with the state tout court.  In Badiou’s 
wonderful account, Archimedes’ murder by a Roman soldier, is a perfect example of  this 
incommensurability,
[b]ecause it shows that between the right of  the state and creative thought, [...] there is 
no common measure, no real discussion. In the end, power is violence, while the only 
constraints creative thought recognizes are its own immanent rules. When it comes to 
the  law  of  his  thought,  Archimedes  remains  outside  of  the  action  of  power.  The 
temporality  proper  to  the  demonstration  cannot  integrate  the  urgent  summons  of 
military victors. That is why violence is eventually wrought, testifying that there is no 
common measure and no common chronology between the power of  one side and the 
truths of  the other. Truths as creation.173
Education thus  operates  on the  evental  time created by a generic  'delity––it 
exercises  the  discipline  of  a  ‘'delity  to  a  'delity’  to  a  truth.  In  a properly  Freirean 
education, the event to be connected to this  generic 'delity is  the passage from the 
human  animal to the human  subject––and such 'delity operates through the continual, 
dialectical, dialogical process of  ‘humanisation’. By the same token, education, being a 
matter of  'delity, becomes immanently militant,174 insofar as 
[a] 'delity is not a matter of  knowledge. It is not the work of  an expert: it is the work of  
a militant. […] The operator of  faithful connection designates another mode of  discernment: 
one which, outside knowledge but within the effect of  an interventional nomination, 
explores connections to the supernumerary name of  the event.175
The  Freirean  Subject,  guided  (graced)  by  ‘another  mode  of  discernment’, 
173 Alain Badiou & Slavoj, Žižek, Philosophy In The Present, trans. by Peter Thomas & Alberto Toscano, ed. 
by Peter Engelmann, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 3.
174 ‘But ‘militant’ is a category without borders, a subjective determination without identity, or without  
concept’ (M p. 142).
175 BE p. 329.
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recognises  if  a  particular,  local  educational  situation  (any educational  situation 
whatsoever)  is or  is not connected to the primordial event of  humanisation. They will, 
accordingly, ‘perform the minimal gesture of  'delity’ and either af'rm it (as humanising) 
or denounce it (as de-humanising) in subjective militance to our species’ ‘ontological 
vocation’:  and  this  they  do,  unfailingly,  every  time  they  encounter  an  educational 
situation (whereby the conversion of  Badiouan ‘faithful enquiries’ to Freirean educator-
educand ‘dialogical praxis’).  
In sum, education needs only to accept the following axiom: a Subject, if  human-
ising, will have wagered on an event. Once this “axiom of  humanisation” is accepted as the 
exclusive  operator,  all  that  education  has  to  do  is  keep reassuring  the  Subject  that,  
despite the  fact  that  every odd is  stacked against  their  wager––and warding off  the 
inevitable anxiety that the transgression of  the Law keeps causing them––they need to 
‘keep going’, that they need to never give up on their desire.176
Education itself  is a wager on a wager, insofar as education wagers on the Subject’s  
wager, siding with them, reaf'rming their af'rmation of  the event. It keeps reassuring, 
even  though  it  cannot,  by  any  means,  ever  guarantee  (humanisation  does  not, 
necessarily,  make a subject).
2.5. Esplanade I: Epistemology, Gnosiology, Ontology
In order to discuss humanisation as an event, we must 'rst clarify or untangle Freire’s  
use of  the concept of  epistemology from gnosiology: the fact that Freire consistently uses 
the latter term (and therefore seemingly implying that his concern is focused on the 
176 ‘I propose then that, from an analytic point of view, the only thing of which one can be guilty is of  
having given ground relative to one's desire.’ Jacques Lacan,  The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII, The  
Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1997), p. 319.
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problem  of  “knowledge”  in  its  broadest  sense,  rather  than  that  of  “scienti'c 
knowledge”) is a fact that seems to be missed by many commentators.177 
An educational 'eld conceptually presented as a gnosiological situation allows 
Freire  to  sow  in  such  generic  ground  (cleansed  of  every  particularity  of  discipline, 
method  or  any  other  state-determined  prescription):  'rstly,  a  humanising  ontology, 
whereby being is equated with being-cognisant and, secondly, an ethics of  subjective 
becoming,  whereby the  world  is  placed as  the  mediating object  to  be  cognised and 
problematised through a critical dialogue between educator and educand. It is through 
this  dialogical  process  that  the  world (including,  of  course,  the  educational  situation 
itself) is problematised, and the contradiction between those who ‘know’ and actively 
transfer  knowledge,  and  those  who  ‘ignore’  and  passively  receive  it,  becomes 
dialecticised.  Conscientização is  hence  activated  through  such  problematisation  of  the 
world,  which  becomes  the  place  to  be  transformed.  Thus  emerges  the  opposition 
between  ‘problematising  education’  and  its  pedagogical  negation:  the  dominant, 
oppressive, anti-dialogical ‘banking education’. If  the latter equates education with ‘an 
act  of  depositing,  in  which  the  students  are  the  depositories  and  the  teacher  is  the 
depositor’,178 the former is a logical (ethical) decision once the starting premises (viz. [1] 
being as knowing––en-route to becoming subject; [2] the world as mediating object of 
critical enquiry––always in the process of  being transformed) are accepted.   
In  this  sense,  liberating,  “problematising”  education,  can  no  longer  be  an  act  of  
depositing,  narrating,  transferring  or  transmitting  “knowledge”  and  values  to  the 
177 Both in his early and late work: see chapters I, part B and Chapter III, part B of his 1973 Extensión o  
Comunicación?––written in 1969––titled respectively ‘Extension as gnosiological misinterpretation’ (pp. 24-
40)  and ‘Education  as  a  gnosiological  situation’,  (p.  85-109),  and cf.  his  comment  on  À sombra  desta  
mangueira of  1995  that  ‘[w]ithout  the  curiosity  that  makes  us  beings  in  permanent  availability  for 
questioning […] there  would be no gnoseological  activity,  a concrete expression  of our possibility  of  
knowing’ (p. 94). Paulo Freire, Extensión o Comunicación? La concientización en el medio rural (México D.F.: Siglo 
XXI,  1984),  published  in  English  as  part  of  Education  for  Critical  Consciousness (London  & New York: 
Continuum, 2005), referenced chapters on the English edition: pp. 90-101 and pp. 130-146.
178 PO p. 80.
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educands––mere patients––as in the manner of  “banking” education. On the contrary, 
it  is  a  cognisant  act  [um  ato  cognoscente].  As  a  gnosiological  situation,  wherein  the 
cognisable object, in lieu of  being the terminus of  the subject’s cognisant act, is rather 
the  mediator  between  cognisant  subjects––educator  on  one  side,  educand  on  the 
other––problematising education requires, as a matter of  course, the overcoming of  the 
contradiction educator-educand.179    
The contradiction between problematising and banking education can be seen as 
a praxial (ontic) mirror of  the more fundamental (ontological) contradiction between 
humanisation and dehumanisation.  
Freirean ontology = epistemology?
If  some commentators seem to point to a certain misidenti'cation on the part of  Freire 
between ontology and epistemology180, once we have accepted the thesis that Freire’s 
ontology  is  rooted in  the  humanisation event,  then the  distinction itself  is  rendered 
meaningless.  The  danger  is  not  so  much  a  confusion  between  ontology  and 
epistemology, but, as Morrow and Torres observe, that humanisation might render a 
subjective 'gure tainted with an essentialist telos. The point of  departure of  Freire’s 
pedagogy is an ontology of  praxis as a distinctive human quality.
Freire’s  social  ontology  overtly  operates  within  the  framework  of  a  humanist  and 
existentialist  Marxian  framework  based  on  the  subject-object  distinction.  As  a 
consequence, Freire’s humanism potentially runs the risk of  an essentialist conception of 
179 PO p. 94.
180 Paul Taylor notes Freire’s indistinction between ‘epistemology and ontology, knowing and being’,  
commenting that, for Freire, ‘the Cartesian cogito ergo sum becomes “I know therefore I am”, and he aligns 
himself  with  a  classical  Piagetian  psychology  which  views  cognitive  development  as  a  personal 
development.’ Paul Taylor, The Texts of Paulo Freire, (Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
1993), pp. 56-7
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the  subject  (he  does  refer  to  “man”)  and  a  theory  of  praxis  that  suffers  from the 
limitations of  an individualistic philosophy of  consciousness and the model of  praxis as 
“work.”.181 
Freire 'nds a way out of  this essentialism, according to Morrow and Torres, 
through  the  'gure  of  dialogue;  indeed,  dialogical  praxis  takes  this  ontology  to  a 
‘communicative direction that avoids most of  the problems associated with essentialist 
forms  of  humanism (and related  gender  bias)’  neither  deterministic  nor  teleological  
human essentialism ‘to be realised.’182 
However, as Serres reminds us, there is no dialogue devoid of  noise: the former ‘is a sort 
of  game played by two interlocutors considered as united against the phenomena of  
interference  and  confusion,  or  against  individuals  with  some  stake  in  interrupting 
communication.’ 
These  interlocutors  are  in  no way  opposed,  as  in the  traditional  conception of  the 
dialectic game; on the contrary, they are on the same side, tied together by a mutual 
interest: they battle together against noise. The cacographer and the epigraphist, the 
cacophonous speaker and the auditor, exchange their reciprocal roles in dialogue, where 
the source becomes reception, and the reception source (according to a given rhythm). 
They exchange roles suf'ciently often for us to view them as struggling together against 
a common enemy.  To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him . A 
successful  communication  is  the  exclusion  of  the  third  man.  The  most  profound 
dialectical  problem  is  not  the  problem of  the  Other,  who  is  only  a  variety––or  a 
variation––of  the Same, it is the problem of  the third man. We might call this third man 
the demon, the prosopopeia of  noise.183
181 Raymond  A.  Morrow & Carlos  Alberto  Torres,  Reading  Freire  and  Habermas:  Critical  Pedagogy  and  
Transformative Social Change (New York & London: Teachers College Press, 2002), p.34.
182 Ibid.
183 Hermes, p. 67
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As Harari  and Bell  explain,  what  Serres  is  proposing  then,  is  that  ‘[c]orrect 
transmission  seems  to  require  two  contradictory  conditions.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
necessitates  the  presence of  noise,  since  the  meaning of  a  message takes  shape  only 
against  a  background  noise.  On  the  other  hand,  it  requires  the  total  exclusion  of 
precisely what it needs to include, namely, background noise.’184 
And it is this noise that we are ready to cross through now.  
184 ‘Introduction’, Hermes, pp. xxv-xxvi
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3. Bridge: Apparitions, Translations, Transductions, Schizductions
3.0. Crossing Over1
How to traverse noise? Let us remind ourselves of the main principles of Serres’ hermetic 
methodology:
Visit the environment. Traverse circumstances Hoating like crowns around the instance 
or substance, around the axis of  the act. Make use of  what is cast aside. Describe the 
parasites in signals, the collective or the living: it is always to be found eating right next 
to  you.  Study neighbourhoods,  travel  along country roads  which surround and give 
shape to the countryside. Consider the Huctuations, deviations or inclinations, in the 
estimations  or concepts  of  science.  Atoms are sometimes  cast  aside.  Do not  despise 
conjunctions  or  passages.  Hermes  often  veers  off  as  he  goes  along.  And  detaches 
himself. Observe the mingled Hows and the places of  exchange and you will understand 
time better. Hermes gradually 'nds his language and his messages, sounds and music, 
landscapes and paths, knowledge and wisdom. He leaps sideways, to the places where 
the senses murmur and tremble, the neighbouring turbulence of  bodies––sensation. He 
loves and knows the spot where place deviates from place and leads to the universe,  
where the latter deviates from the law to invaginate into singularity: circumstance.2
This  environment we are  about  to visit,  this  ‘circumstance’  that  needs to  be 
traversed  is,  precisely,  noise.  Serres’  methodology  instructs  we  do  so  by  way  of 
1 ‘During  meiosis,  an  event  known  as  chromosomal  crossing  over  sometimes  occurs  as  a  part  of  
recombination.  In  this  process,  a  region  of  on  chromosome  is  exchanged  for  a  region  of  another 
chromosome,  thereby  producing  unique  chromosomal  combinations  that  further  divide  into  haploid 
daughter cells.’  ‘Crossing Over’,  Encyclopædia Britannica <https://www.britannica.com/science/crossing-
over>[accss. 13 Sept. 2019].
2 Serres, The Five Senses, p. 287.
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conjunctions, deviations and sideways leaps into haphazard neighbourhoods. We are 
there to attend to any local parasites3 busy at their hermetic work: their folding of the 
outside into the inside, producing what initially appear as unlawful invaginations, but 
which eventually will have become the singularity of language, message and form.
Noise as environment, noise as subject
The  opening  statement  of  this  thesis  anticipated  the  exposition  of  three  thematic 
threads:  two main  themes––Badiou  (as  a  philosophical  framework)  and  Freire  (as  a 
pedagogical argument)––and  noise as the resultant bridge, or gap, developing between 
them (i.e. noise as environment, as alluded to above).  
How (where, when), then, does noise relate and separate those main themes as 
expounded so far? How (where, when) does it resonate within Badiou, Freire and the 
motif  of  education? Moreover, considering that––in 'delity to the methodology I chose 
to follow––noise was postulated as the  passe-partout environment of  the whole journey: 
what  happens  to  noise  when it  itself  passes  into  subject?  What  emerges,  thereon,  as 
environment? 
In  order  to  answer  the  above  questions,  it  might  be  useful  at  this  point  to  rewind, 
playback and attend to any eigenresonances that noise might have been triggering in its 
passage through the main themes (viz., Badiou, Freire, noise itself).
(1) Badiou: the philosophical framework 
There was here an implied a decision on the notions of  being, truth, event, subject, the void; 
3  Apart from its bio-sociological meaning (as in English), the word  parasite in French also refers to the 
static noise in a signal.
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such a decision determined what ‘an education  by truths’ really means (requiring an 
understanding of  the notions of  subject and event). As for being and the void, we established 
that every ontological situation is structured around its void, its constitutive lack, or un-
occupiable point.
It was within that framework that I introduced the operation of  an inaugural 
translation: the void will be translated as noise (written, the void ––> noise, or more formally, 
 ––> ). Following that––and still in consistency with the Serresean methodology––I 
extracted from the translation something like a noisy corollary (what I refer to as the 
translation’s work): noise thenceforward becomes a temporalised void ( ).
(i) inaugural translation: (  ––> )
(ii) corollary (translation’s work): (  ––[temporality]––> )
All of  which indexes the passage from being (ontology) to appearing (phenomenology).
(2) Freire: the pedagogical argument 
The notion  of  education  up  to  this  point  remained  purely  subsumed to  the  above 
(Badiouian) notions. I thus proceeded to supplement it within the Freirean argument. I 
applied here a key assumption of  this thesis––namely, that philosophy and education are 
biconditionally  related  (what  I  have  been formulating  as:  philosophy<=>education). 
This material equivalence laid the ground for a conceptual scission which begot a place 
of  Truth and  a  time  of  the  Subject:  education,  conjectured  as  the  carer  of  such 
temporality  then  relates  to  noise  in  a  double  braid:  'rstly  (and  evidently)  time  is 
unthinkable without entropy, irreversibility, noise; secondly, Freirean education subjectivises  
time through  the  praxis  of  dialogue––which  is  itself  unthinkable  without  (a)  the 
125
background of  noise immanent in any exchange of  information (noise-outside) and (b) 
the libidinal anxiety produced by the onset of  the dialogical relation (noise-inside).
Education, then, resonates with noise in three related registers:
(iii) as the time of  the (un'nished) subject, (time is entropy, irreversibility, noise)
(iv) as 'delity to (the incompleteness of) language (noise as both excess and lack) 
(v) as duration subjectivised through dialogue (noise as anxiety, or, noise-inside)
All of  which is integrable, utilising Badiou’s philosophical tools, in an ensuing translation: 
(vi) education by truths—>education in noise
(3) noise
And 'nally, noise as the remainder of  a methodology of  translation wherein it is itself  one of 
the  terms  of  said  translation:  (a)  noise  is  a  translation  of  the  void  and  (b)  every 
translation produces noise––ergo, (c) the translation of  the void into noise produces its 
own noise:
(a) the void ( ) (translation) noise ( )
(b) every translation produces a remainder noise ( )
(c) the void ––[translation––>(remainder noise: )]––>noise 
We are therefore left  with seven formulas wherein noise relates with the three main 
themes, as either translation, temporalisation, remainder or excess:
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- philosophy:
(i)  translation  
(ii)  temporality
- education:
(iii) time of  the subject –>  
(iv) excess of  language –>
(v) dialogue, anxiety   –>
(vi) education by truths translation education in noise
- noise:
(vii)  translation  
In formula (vii) we have a graphic example of  the recursive, self-dithering properties of  
the signi'er noise. These properties (recursion, iteration, reHexivity, paradox) point to 
that  onto-phenomenological  hinge  between  the  void  (on  the  ontological  side)  and 
language-thought (on the physico-phenomenological side): what I am positing is that it is 
in this hinge between the ontological and the phenomenological––between the abstract 
and the empirical–– wherein noise itself  originates. 
Noise is a noise-producing methodology: it thus becomes simultaneously both subject 
and environment.  It  is  in such paradoxical  kilter  that noise separates and relates the 
subjects of  this enquiry.
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Noise as shown impossibility
It is this recursive, self-dithering property that allows noise to in'ltrate every possible 
communication,  dialogue and relation.  And this  pan-in'ltration of  noise is  no more 
than the  phenomenal expression of  the  ontological fact  that every situation is  structured 
around its own void. 
All of  which points to the limits to language referred to earlier. Such a breaking-
point in the signifying chain of  language, the apparition of  which is none other than 
metaphor,  ultimately  reHects  on  the  impossibility  of  signifying  the  Real.  This 
impossibility, being an immanent limit lying within the blind spot of  subjective dialogue, 
can  only  be  shown.  And,  insofar  as  this “shown  impossibility”  is  the  phenomenal 
appearance of  the void, it coincides, precisely, with the conception of  noise that I am 
intending. The crucial aspect here is that, once accepted, this is  a conception which 
perhaps,  as  Slavoj  Žižek  points  out,  ‘opens  up  a  new approach  to  phenomenology, 
rede'ned  as  the  description  of  the  ways  in  which  the  breakdown  (failure)  of 
symbolization, which cannot be signi'ed, shows itself.’4 
This idea of  noise as a showing of  the impossibility to signify the Real, which, as Žižek 
notes, is intrinsically phenomenological (and  performative), then draws a possible bridge 
between  Freire’s  phenomenologically  heavy  enterprise,  very  much  reliant  in 
consciousness,  and  Badiou’s  subtractive  ethics  that  ‘relates  to  the  particularity  of  a 
situation only from the bias of  its void.’5  
Furthermore,  this  conception  of  noise  permits  the  passage  of  concepts  from 
mathematical ontology, via the Lacanian Real and the remainder of  language, all the 
4 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 279.
5 Badiou, E p. 73
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way to Malaspina’s epistemological uncertainty and Shannon’s information theory. We 
'nd here noise at its most Serresian––I will hence denominate it  hermetic noise: a noise 
allowing for a 'ltering through, a passage (or translation, or transduction, or, better still,  
schizduction)  from  ontology,  through  phenomenology  to  epistemology,  all  the  while 
keeping a 'delity to the exception of  the event of  which noise is itself  both the reminder 
and remainder.
3.1. The Void (Becomes) Noise:  ––> η
I  return  now  to  Fraser’s  passage  quoted  earlier,  regarding  the  fact  that,  'rstly,  the 
subjective process is a ‘temporal unfolding of  a truth’6 and, secondly, that time has no 
place  in Badiou’s  ontology.  As it  happens Fraser’s  analyses  on Badiou’s  void and its 
relation to subjectivity are of  particular pertinence to my whole argument. Indeed, the 
soundness  or  otherwise  of  the  translation  void–>noise depends  on  accepting  a 
temporalisation of  the immanently atemporal and isentropic void of  set theory. Fraser’s 
insights seem to justify such a move in that they support the following reasoning: (i) the 
void is atemporal, isentropic (ii) noise is temporal, entropic (iii) the subject-process is a 
‘temporal unfolding of  a truth’––therefore (iv) the transduction from the void to noise 
(should we accept it) implies a temporalisation of  the void.
ontological being phenomenal appearing
atemporal temporal
isentropic (neg)entropic
Truth subject process (truths)
the void ––> noise
6 Fraser, ‘The Law of the Subject’, p. 94.
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This is underlining one of  the key operational assumptions at work in my thesis: 
that  the  passage  from  ontology,  viz.,  the  presentation  of  being,  into  the  world  of 
appearing––which is something like a Badiouian phenomenology (let’s agree, for now, on that 
word)––requires that ontology be supplemented with some notion of  temporality. Once 
again, such is the sole rationale behind the fundamental translation at the core of  my 
argument, viz., the void––>noise. Differently put, insofar as the subject develops in time, it 
‘cannot be understood in strictly ontological terms’: therefore, we need to move out of 
the atemporality of  mathematics in order to properly conceptualise the trajectory of  a 
truth (hence the translation  void––>noise, hence the separation of  the  temporality of  the  
Subject from  a  locality  of  Truth and  hence,  'nally,  the  conceptual  scission  between 
philosophy and education).
If  a subject is to remain faithful to an event, the truth-procedure must not lose its 
bias on the void at any stage throughout the trajectory. Should we agree on that, then 
the void must somehow subsist,  in some form or other, outside of  ontology and still  
remain operative within the phenomenological world of  appearing and relations: my 
claim is that if  this is the case, then  its manifestation must surely be something in the order of  
noise. 
There will be a four-way consequence of  this translation: (i) noise becomes evental and (ii)  
the event becomes noisy; (iii) noise becomes subjective and (iv) the subject becomes noisy 
(i) making noise evental: 
Considering that for Badiou (a) the event is an unpredicted, chance appearance of  the 
void, and that, as posited here (b) noise is the phenomenal rendering of  the void, these 
two statements taken together would imply that an event can be also thought as an occurrence of  
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noise within a situation. By making noise evental in this sense, it becomes a subtractive, 
punctual,  singular  spike,  exceptional  and rare,  rather than ever-present.  Noise in this 
sense,  is  the  Heeting  (phenomenal)  appearance  of  the  (ontological)  void.  What  this 
translation brings is a subtractive idea of  noise as a vertical, subjective cut rather than as 
the  horizontal  exuberance  of  chaos  and  nature,  with  which  is  more  commonly 
associated in most philosophical discourses.  
(ii) making the event noisy:
An  event  is  irreversible––or  more  precisely: an  event  is  a  rare  manifestation  of  pure  
irreversibility. It is this characteristic which potentially will have related Badiou’s notion of 
event  with  a  thermodynamic  conception of  noise.  This  perspective  brings  with it  a 
whole new point of  view from which to re-think Badiou’s (patently undeveloped) notions 
of  chance and randomness, both loosely associated with the occurrence of  the event and 
with the subjective trajectory induced therein. A thermodynamic perspective including 
notions such as (neg)entropy, irreversibility, the arrow of  time, provides the thinking of 
the trajectory of  a truth and of  its subtractive modalities with a whole new meaning. 
(iii) making noise subjective:
But most importantly, for noise to become properly evental, it needs to be pointed at, 
engaged with. The harnessing of  the truth-producing potential in noise, requires the 
intervention of  a subject. It is in this precise sense that I maintain that noise is, indeed, 
subjective.
(iv) making the subject noisy:
Granted, in its empirical manifestation, noise is everywhere: from cosmic background 
radiation  to  quantum  decoherence;  however,  the  noise  that  I  am  attempting  to 
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conceptually separate from nature’s undifferentiated plane, will always already require 
the reverberant space of  some subject. And, once again, the tending of  this space––which 
means nursing the subject’s uncertainty and anxiety brought about by their constant 
exposure to noise––is the task of  education.
All of  which allows for the following assertions: 
•  temporality appears as soon as the subjects initiate their truth-building itinerary 
•  the process of  truth is also inseparable from a notion of  praxis, work.
•  time  and  work  are  both  thermodynamic  notions  inextricably  linked  to 
(neg)entropy.
•  where there is (neg)entropy, there is noise.
From  which  emerges  the  work  of  the  subject and  their  production  of  time:  this  is  the 
educational  time  of  the  Subject,  emanating  from the  philosophical  place  of  Truth. 
Which is why an ‘education by truths’ can be translated as an education in noise.
 Noise  then,  insofar as it  operates  as  a  translation of  the  void––which is  that 
which Heetingly manifests itself  as an event––thereby becomes a notion inseparable from 
subjectivity and immanently related to the concept of  truth. 
Furthermore, the void becomes the ever-present, background noise constantly 
in'ltrating and both permeating the subjective inside (in the form of  anxiety) and the 
phenomenal outside (in the form of  epistemo-logical noise). 
This  background  noise  however,  may  be  diversely  indexed  according to  the 
different stages of the time-producing (neg)entropic truth process: (i) there is 'rstly the 
hazardous, entropic upsurge of the immanent void of a situation: the event per se, which 
(ii) phenomenologically appearing as noise , triggers the subject into its (neg)entropic, 
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time-producing work which itself  (iii)  is  an emitter of  logical noise   as  it  randomly 
investigates the consequences of the event, the truth of which eventually (iv) is forced 
into the situation as new knowledge, whereby (v) a new situation is con'gured, spiralling 
out the narrative of History:
On this note a crucial clari'cation might be 'tting: the intention of  this thesis is not to  
elaborate an apologia of  noise––in other words, noise itself  is not the event: noise is perfectly 
neutral, indifferent. And so is anxiety, which as an affect has no ethical value in itself 
(neither  language,  nor,  for  that  matter,  the  human).  Just  as  the  void  is  ontologically 
included in every situation,  noise is  an ever-present,  phantasmatic  background hum: 
there still needs to be an event, and there still needs to be a subject transformed by such 
event. 
In other words, (1) something anomalous needs to happen disturbing the bell-
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curve of  the  normal  statistical  distribution of  randomness,  a  ‘voltage  spike’,  a  non-
normal vibration breaking the  mean7 (2)  there  needs  to  be a subjective intervention 
pointing out such an anomalous spike and declaring that its occurrence, its causes and 
its consequences are worth pursuing. 
Between ontos and phenomena
One  might  therefore  think  of  noise  as  a  thermodynamic,  (neg)entropic,  void;  a 
temporalised void  able  carry  us  right  across  the  border  from  the  meta-mechanical, 
isentropic  regime of  ontology,  all  the  way  to  the  mechanical  and  thermodynamical 
regime determined by temporal phenomena. 
The void, of  course,  still needs to remain empty: hence, it cannot contain time––
time cannot belong to the void, insofar as only nothing belongs to it. However, the void/
noise, being universally inclusive, is necessarily a part of  time (if, that is, we can accept 
that time is itself  a situation; strictly speaking, time belongs on the side of  the event and 
the subject and, as we have already established, Badiou’s ontology does not seem to be 
able to think temporality, insofar as time is always an emergent result of  the subject’s 
enquiries, a post-evental, praxial production of  a present. Time, from this perspective 
then, is  a  nonontological  situation––which  is  precisely  why every  temporal  situation 
cannot be founded on the void, but on noise).8
However, even if  the translation, ( ––> ) is  accepted, and insofar as we are in the 
realm of appearing, we will still be required to look at the inscriptions of the void in the 
world, and perform our translation(s) therein. If the void is universally included, that 
7 Malaspina, EN, p. 99.
8 C.f. Hallward: ‘It is clearly impossible for any material or nonontological situation to be founded upon 
the literal (or mathematical) void Ø as such’ (Badiou, p. 119).
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means that it will hazardously emerge (as a result of the lacking metastructuring of the 
recounting of every state) in every situation––or, if speaking of a regime of appearing, in 
every world. 
As we have seen, according to Badiou events will happen in the situation-worlds 
of  art, science, politics and love. Let us re'ne the above statement: the void will have 
appeared in every situation-world: it so happens that only when the void of  the world-situations  
de6ned by art, science, politics and love emerges, it becomes an emergence with the capacity to 
acquire the  intensity of  an event, and hence ignite the work of  some subjects and the 
consequent production of  a truth.
If  the  void  is  universally  included,  and  ‘thus  distributed  everywhere’,9 the 
translation void–> noise would imply that the latter, too, is universal––which is something 
that makes empirical sense (one only needs to invoke the cosmic background radiation, 
or the universal affect of  anxiety, for example).10 This is clearly the position taken by 
Greg Hainge: 
[d]o ideas and concepts not also [just as matter does] move and vibrate, resonate with 
and  impact  upon each  other,  vibrate  in  and  beyond  the  time  into  which  they  are 
released?  Everything,  then,  is  expressive,  not  only  embodying  a  form but  for  ever 
forming an embodiment.  Or, rather, for this will be our contention, everything is in 
noise, and noise is in everything.11
The  temptation  here  would  be,  however,  to  follow  through  with  Hainge’s 
9 BE p. 57.
10  On the other hand, it is worth noting that noise cannot contain everything (which would make it appear as a 
Whole, and the latter, as Badiou repeatedly asserts, ‘has no being’ (LW p 110). This matter, however, can 
only be resolved axiomatically: ‘[i]n the end, the question of the Whole, which is logical or onto-logical in  
essence, enjoys no physical or phenomenological evidence. It calls for an argument, the very one that  
mathematicians discovered at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which we have reformulated  
here’ (LW 111); Badiou is here referring to the paradoxical impasse of self-belonging: if a Whole exists,  
then––being whole–– it must contain itself, thereupon bringing about its own inconsistency (illustrated by 
Russell’s paradox). Such inconsistency is what the ZF axiomatisation of set theory intended to address. 
11 Hainge, Noise Matters, p. 2.
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absolute ontologisation of  noise: if  Badiou’s gambit is mathematics = ontology, Hainge’s is 
noise = ontology (in other words: noise = being, tout court). For this to happen, the transitive 
noise  = mathematics should hold (something not entirely impossible to argue,  if  one is 
ready to switch formal groundings and pass from set theory to information theory). 
Now, if  Badiou’s void is ‘the proper name of  being’––and should our translation 
void—>noise stand––this would imply that we can equally assert something like ‘noise is 
the proper name of  being’: this would surprisingly prove,  in Badiouian terms, Hainge’s 
thesis––which is clearly stated in (incompatible) Deleuzian terms.12 
This conclusion however, is evidently incorrect: the translation void—>noise has already 
moved us  out  of  ontology,  or  at  the  very least,  it  has  relocated us  to  the  threshold  
between  being  and  appearing.  Hainge’s  formula  is  not  ontological,  but 
phenomenological––something which makes complete sense if  we take into account that 
the  Spinozist/Deleuzian  DNA  of  Hainge’s  noise-studies  will  always  already  have 
collapsed  the  realm  of  appearing  with  that  of  being,  producing  a  Hat  ontology 
indistinguishable from a phenomenology. This should not be read as a mere Badiouian 
incrimination: far from it, it is a fact which is explicitly acknowledged by Hainge himself: 
‘[i]n effect, what I want to suggest here, then, is that there need not be a split between 
the operation of  noise as a philosophical concept and its manifestations in expression, 
that it is not necessary to separate out the ontological from the phenomenological.’13
However,  a  more  fundamental  difference  between  this  Spinozist/Deleuzian 
conception of  noise (a conception which, as we shall see, is much closer to a certain 
discourse on  chaos than to noise proper), and the subtractive, Freirean/Badiouian one 
12 ‘Noise straddles both the actual and the virtual, the realms of concept and matter, multiplicity and 
singularity; it is the by-product of the event taking place in the becoming situated across these poles, the  
very  precondition  of  expressivity  that  is  born  only  as  an  unintended  yet  inexorable  consequence  of 
expression itself’ (ibid, p. 23).
13 Ibid. p. 22
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which I am attempting here,   will have to do with the operation of  a subject (something 
completely absent in Hainge and, for that matter, in almost all Deleuzian approaches to 
noise). 
It is not only that noise is subjective: moreover, when thought of  as something like the void 
inside, noise is that which  begets subjectivity. What is meant by this is the following: the 
human  singularity  (what  some  would  call  ‘self-consciousness’),  from  a  Badiouian 
perspective, is nothing else but the capacity (one could add, the burden) to internalise the 
void; such internalisation is what translates as noise-inside. Hence, it is  a capacity to 
incorporate a trajectory that crosses over from being (wherein the ontological void is 
wrapped  by  language/thought)  to  appearing  (wherein  the  void  emerges 
phenomenologically as noise, anxiety). And it is  only within the hazard of  this noisy 
itinerary that a subject––which is to say,  a truth––might emerge. On this issue, Badiou is 
unequivocal: 
[i]n  particular,  man is  the  animal  that  appears  in  a  very  great  number  of  worlds. 
Empirically, we could even say it is nothing but this: the being which, among all those 
whose being we acknowledge, appears most multiply. The human animal is the being of 
the thousand logics. Since it is capable of entering into the composition of a subject of 
truth, the human animal can even contribute to the appearance of a (generic) being for 
such  and  such a  world.  That  is,  it  is  capable  of  including  itself  in  the  move  from 
appearance (the plurality of worlds, logical construction) back towards being (the pure 
multiple, universality), and it can do this with regard to a virtually unlimited number of 
worlds. 
This  notwithstanding,  the  human  animal  cannot  hope  for  a  worldly 
proliferation as exhaustive as that of  its principal competitor: the void. Since the void is 
the  only  immediate  being,  it  follows  that  it  'gures  in  any  world  whatsoever.  In  its 
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absence, no operation can have a starting point in being, that is to say, no operation can 
operate. Without the void there is no world, if  by ‘world’ we understand the closed place 
of  an operation. Conversely, where something operates [où ça opère]—that is, where there 
is world—the void can be attested.14
 This  striking passage resounds with some crucial  notions at  the  core  of  my 
argument: we have here the human animal as a being traversed by the in'nite, noisy 
recursion of  a ‘thousand logics’, entangled in a self-reHective, paradoxical ‘move from 
appearance  [and]  back  towards  being’.  Most  crucially,  when  Badiou  writes  that 
‘[u]ltimately, man is the animal that desires the worldly ubiquity of  the void’15,  he is 
pointing at exactly the same the knot that I am engaging here: language/thought/desire as 
the emergent result of  the void/noise.  It is  such emergence, doubly indexing ‘a logical 
power [and] the voided animal’,16 which sets an evental site for the potential appearance 
of  the subject.
The double register of  noise
Harking back to the question posed at the opening of  this bridge-chapter: how is one to 
attend to noise when it passes from background to subject? How can such a protean 
'gure acquire an identity at all? It is here that bringing noise back into the regime of 
ontology might be useful.
And here, the thing to remember is that within set theory the void operates as a 
marker  of  identity.  And  it  does  so only  through  the  operation  of  the  axiom  of 
extensionality, which establishes that ‘[t]wo sets are equal if and only if they have the 




same members’.17 What  this  crucially  implies  is  that  there  is  nothing guaranteeing the 
identity of any multiplicity whatsoever––as Fraser explains,
‘[w]hat  [the  axiom of  extensionality]  says,  after  all,  is  that  the  ‘act’  of  assembling 
elements into a set has, in itself, no qualities whatsoever, that it contributes nothing to 
the identity of the set so formed. Once we know all of the elements of a set, we know all  
there is to know about the set in question. There is no ‘substance’, no ontic ‘thickness’,  
to the operation of the count itself.18 
In short, as Badiou himself  puts it, ‘the nothing is the operation of  the count.’19 Key for 
Fraser  however,  is  that  the  axiom of  extensionality  ‘strips  unity  of  substance  while 
grounding identity in the void’, and, most important of  all, that the pivot is in the word  
between––the  hermetic  word  par  excellence:  ‘between presentation  as  structure  and 
presentation  as  structured-presentation,  between the  one  as  result  and  the  one  as 
operation, between presented consistency and inconsistency.’20 
For  Fraser,  Badiou’s  void  implies  a  double  register  ‘[n]aming  both  the 
inconsistent being of  the in-itself, and the contradictory eruptions of  the for-itself ’; it is,  
thus, through the void that ‘Being and Event communicate.’21 
The  void  is  devoid  of  any  relationality,  as  Hallward  correctly  asserts––except  that, 
Fraser argues, it is through the void that something like an inaugural communication 
appears. But the void carries nothing: it cannot carry information––and yet, Fraser is also 
correct: there must be some channel, some relation wherefrom the evental for-itself and 
the  ontological  in-itself  will  have  exchanged  (or  transduced,  or  schizduced)  some 
17 see Paul J. Cohen & Reuben Hersh, ‘Non-Cantorian Set Theory’, Scienti6c American 217:6 (Dec. 1967), 
pp. 104-117 (p. 114); ‘in other words’, Peter Hallward explains, ‘a set’s identity is determined entirely by 
its elements’ (Badiou, p. 338).
18 Olivia Lucca Fraser, ‘Void’, Badiou Dictionary, pp. 377-80 (p. 378).
19 BE p. 55.
20 Ibid. p. 379 (my emphasis).
21 Ibid. p. 380.
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information  (here,  one  cannot  contradict  science:  information  has,  quite  literarily, 
nowhere to hide).22 In order to traverse this impasse, Fraser’s thesis might need to be 
gently tweaked: Being and Event (inside and outside, physics and mathematics, cosmos 
and history) do indeed communicate: just not through the void, but through noise.  
Between the abstract and the empirical
And so, as speculated earlier, it is indeed here, at the boundaries between being and 
appearing,  where  we  can  attend  to  the  'rst  tinkling  of  noise,  as  the  void  oscillates  
between domains of  different materiality. It is a noise that coincides, as Douglas Kahn 
puts  it,  with  ‘that  constant  grating  sound  generated  by  the  movement  between  the 
abstract and empirical.’23 The reference here is, once again, Serres: 
‘[m]athematical form is both a Universal in itself  and a Universal for us: and therefore 
the 6rst effort to make communication in a dialogue successful is isomorphic to the effort to render a form  
independent of  its empirical realizations. […] At the extreme limits of  empiricism, meaning is 
totally  plunged  into  noise,  the  space  of  communication  is  granular,  dialogue  is 
condemned  to  cacophony:  the  transmission  of  communication  is  chronic 
transformation. Thus, the empirical is strictly essential and accidental noise.24
The  void  is  ontologically  secured––decided,  axiomatised.  Perfectly  contained  within 
mathematics and mathematics alone, it allows us there to think inconsistency consistently. 
Noise, for its part, speculated as something like the movement of  this isentropic, static  
22 The fact that information cannot be lost has been established by what is known as the no-hiding theorem; 
see Samuel L. Braunstein, & Arun K. Pati, ‘Quantum Information Cannot Be Completely Hidden in 
Correlations:  Implications for the Black-Hole  Information Paradox’,  Physical  Review Letters 98:8 (2007) 
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.080502.
23 Douglas Khan, Noise, Water Meat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 25.
24 Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, ed. by Josue V. Harari & David F. Bell (Baltimore & 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 69-70.
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void out of  the pure ontological situation into the entropic, phenomenal world, might, 
on  the  other  hand,  allow  us  to  make  sense  of  both  senselessness and  nonsense in  a 
subtractive manner.
However, for that subtractive sense to emerge, our noise will have to be separated 
from the variously coloured noises of  empirical science,  as much as from the virtual 
white noise of  vulgar Deleuzianism. It must remain in a doubly subtractive register: the 
mathematisable  noise  of information  entropy  together  with  its  (non-cognitive,  non-
psychologisable) subjective counterpart inside the subject: anxiety.
And, to repeat once again: it is this double register of  a subject-constructing noise––
information, language on one side, anxiety, subjectivisation on the other––that requires 







It is as black as Malevich’s Square
The cold furnace in which we stare
A high pitch on a future scale
It is a starless winternight’s tale
It suits you well1
4.0. Intro: Which Noise?
As noted in the Introduction, there are abundant de'nitions and manifold uses of  the 
word  “noise”,  each  dependant  on  the  particular  'eld,  or  community  of  practice, 
wherein  it  appears––information  theory,  statistical  thermodynamics,  quantum 
mechanics,  signal  processing,  probability  theory,  statistics,  bio-genetics,  cognitive 
psychology,  economics,  acoustics,  psychoacoustics,  music  theory,   and  so  on––each 
de'ning  what  Sean  Carroll  refers  to  as  a  ‘domain  of  applicability’.2 This  is  not 
necessarily  a  bad  thing:  in  fact,  as  Malaspina  notes,  this  lack  of  ‘a  shared  formal 
de'nition of  noise’ could be taken as an opportunity, insofar as it ‘opens a space for 
metaphorical reverberation within scienti'c discourse, and even more so in the straits 
between the natural and the human sciences, technology and the arts.’3 Furthermore, 
Malaspina points to something rather symptomatic in the protean spiral of  signi'cation 
that noise produces: 
1 Einstürzende Neubauten, ‘Sabrina’, Silence is Sexy (Potomak, 957052, 2011)
2 Sean Carroll, The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning and the Universe Itself (London: Oneworld, 2017), 
p. 96. The notion is almost identical to Léon Rosenfeld’s ‘domain of validity’; the term was subsequently 
borrowed  by  Ilya  Prigogine;  see  Ilya  Prigogine  (in  collaboration  with  Isabelle  Stengers),  The  End  of  
Certainty: Time, Chaos and the New Laws of  Nature (New York: The Free Press, 1997), p. 29. 
3 EN p. 7.
143
[h]ow  can  we  understand  this  transfer  of  the  idea  of  noise  from  mechanics  to 
information, and from its antithetical relation with work in classical mechanics to self-
regulating systems with noise, bearing in mind also that the general notion of noise is 
derived from an aesthetic and moral connotation of acoustic events?4 
In other words, how can we identify a particular noise without muting its protean nature? 
Or, to put it in terms relevant to my argument: with which (if  any) of  all of  these noises 
will the Noise of  the Oppressed resonate? 
As stated in the introduction, it is a question of  neither extracting from the total  
sum of  these de'nitions something like an appropriate “template” from where to 'ne-
tune a suitable usage, nor to “synthesise” a pragmatic, applicable notion of  noise. Such 
approaches would undoubtedly dampen its hermetic potential as a pan-boundary trespasser, 
as  the interrupter,  in'ltrator of  borders.  A Hermetic noise able to carry us through 
borders that are not only epistemological (as  Malaspina has it),  but also ontological,  
phenomenological, physical, biological, psychological…
An unavoidable exercise, then, will be to call up the whole spectrum of  the accepted, 
standard de'nitions of  noise, and then to identify which conceptual bands of  it will have 
resonated  with  those  'lters  within  my argument  which  I’ve  been  referring  to  as  its  
eigenconcepts (the void, event, truth, subject, language, humanisation...).
Semasiologies
To reiterate: noise is a noisy word. This is not meant in the sense that “noise” is a self-
referential, or autonymic word (it is neither). What is meant is that the signi'er “noise” 
seems to add noise to its own 'eld of  signi'cations. It self-dithers, so to speak, and by so 
4 EN p. 94.
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doing it refracts a multiplicity of  literal denotations and an uncountable virtuality of 
'gurative  ones.  Its  meaning  seems to  Hicker,  unorderly,  to  and fro  along its  axis  of 
metonymic  displacements,  as  it  oscillates  up  and  down,  randomly  substituting  its 
metaphoric condensations. 
The signi'er “noise” produces––appropriately so––a noisy 'eld of  signi'cations. 
Its meaning, which might also be chaotic (noise and chaos are not the same thing, as we 
shall see) will have shown close dependancy with a subject of  enunciation.
But that’s not all. When pursuing the meanings of  noise to its limits, one might 
'nd oneself, like in a Mobius strip, traveling at the opposite side. When José Díaz Nafría 
writes that ‘[t]his means that through  metonymies and  metaphors the term has gradually 
adapted itself, as far as possible, to various and collective uses and interests’, he seems to 
be almost exactly, word for word, agreeing with what I have just stated above about 
noise:  remarkably,  however, the term he is describing here is  not noise but that one 
commonly considered its precise opposite:  information. This apparent paradox, already 
unsurpassably reviewed by Malaspina, is precisely what the Shannon event addresses.5 
So then, to repeat: which noise is this noise I am referring to? Who, or what, are 
its subjects? The question being not “who speaks?” But rather: “who, or what, is making 
noise?” As it happens, noise seems to be, in and of  itself, a sound trope for the Subject.  
But then again: which subject?
Subjects (ritornello)
To recap: a subject is neither a substance nor a given; a subject is induced by a chance 
5 José Díaz Nafría, ‘What is Information? A multidimensional concern’, tripleC 8:1 (2010), pp. 77-108 (p. 
78).  Furthermore,  as  Díaz  Nafría  adds,  ‘the  very  concept  of  “information”  puts  forward  deep  and 
challenging questions. Just one binary digit may tell us if the universe is about to collapse, thus being very  
informative, and all millions of terabits on the web (measured in a Shannon’s sense) may also be generated 
by the whim of electrons in a rheostat, therefore being uninformative’ (ibid).
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encounter with an event; events will have happened in art, politics, science and love; 
events  are  unpredictable,  illegal,  a-logical,  unprovable  for  the  situation wherein they 
happen; a subject af'rms the event and forces a new logic into the situation (a truth);  
there are (artistic, political, scienti'c) truths; there is a philosophical space allowing for 
their  composite  thinking  (Truth)––such  is  the  subject,  according  to  the  Badiouian 
orthodoxy we started from. Following from this, and hopefully still consistent with its 
starting  axioms,  I  recon'gured  this  same  subject  by  making  operative  a  notion  of 
education  as  'delity  to  the  generic  event of  humanisation, under  the  generic  condition of 
language:  I  hence  speculated  that  there  is  an  educational  time buttressing  the  subjects 
throughout their truth-processes (the Subject of  education) and posited––aware of  the 
hazard––that humanisation is, likewise, the operator of  6delity within education. In other 
words: the subject, if  induced, will have af'rmed the event of  humanisation, conditioned 
by language-thought, under the watchful eye of  education. 
Now, in order that the consistency of  this con'guration obtains, the case must be made 
that this is a conception of  language which will have had nothing to do whatsoever with 
either (1)  communication and its horizontal relativity in the plurality  voices; or with (2) an 
attempt  occupy  the  place  of  Truth  with  the  dogmatic  vertical  absolutism  of  the 
authoritative  Word. Not yielding to either side of  this false opposition, this is a notion, 
rather, of  language as lack, as trauma: it is therefore opposed to both the schizophrenic 
democracy of  voices and the psychopathic tyranny of  the Word. I am following here––
as I  so often do––Sandino Núñez:  language,  if  articulated from this  ‘zero degree of 
enunciation’6 becomes
a structure that permits, in a single fold, both sense and its critique, permits knowledge 
6 Sandino Núñez,  La Vieja Hembra Engañadora; Ensayos Resistentes Sobre el Languaje y el Sujeto  (Montevideo: 
HUM, 2015) p. 120. Núñez is of course adopting Barthes’ term here.
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and summons it to appear before the Other, permits belief and suspicion… it is the 
name that we give to a structure of overcoming [una estructura de superación], and has a lot 
to do with what we call consciousness as its own transcendental illusion, that I-language that 
denotes,  as  Benveniste  used  to  indicate,  not  a  simple  interchangeable  situational 
pronoun, but a subject of enunciation endowed with a certain position of transcendence and 
sovereignty in relation to the communicative circumstances, the expressive resources, 
the rhetorical or argumentative tools, the situational and pragmatic contexts.7
Núñez, in a passage of  'nely distilled Badiouianism, concludes his meditation 
with a staunch and elegant defence of  both language and the subject:
there  is  no  subject-substance  that  we  can  consider  as  the  source  and  the  origin  of  
interpretation and thought. But that does not make the subject dissolve in the mere  
order  of  the  imaginary––the  subject  is  not  something  simply  “added  by  the 
imagination”: the subject is necessary for language.8 
In other words, we have subjects that, if  induced, are the cause-effect of  language. 
Also here present, loud and clear, is the Freudo-Lacanian trope of  a subconscious being 
structured by (like) language: 
the  mechanisms  described by  Freud as  those  of  the  primary  process,  by  which  the 
unconscious  is  governed,  correspond  exactly  to  the  functions  [that  the  school  of 
linguistics of  Saussure and Jakobson]  believes determine the most radical axes of  the 
effects of  language, namely metaphor and metonymy—in other words, the effects of  the 
substitution and combination of  signi'ers in the synchronic and diachronic dimensions, 
7 Ibid; Benveniste, referenced here by Núñez, wrote that ‘[l]anguage is possible only because each speaker 
sets himself  up as a subject by referring to himself  as I in his discourse. Because of  this, I posits another 
person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to “me,” becomes my echo to whom I say you  
and who says you to me. This polarity of  persons is the fundamental condition in language, of  which the 
process  of  communication,  in  which  we  share,  is  only  a  mere  pragmatic  consequence’;  see  Émile 
Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek, (Coral Gables, FL: University of 
Miami Press, 1971) p. 225.
8 Ibid p. 120.
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respectively, in which they appear in discourse.9
Which  takes  us  back  to  the  opening  paragraph:  noise  itself  keeps  Hickering 
throughout its signifying 'eld, from metaphor to metonymy, displaced here, condensed 
there––noise produces a noise-producing semantic 'eld. As Serres 'rst discovered, noise, 
by being immanently protean, is in excess of  its own proteanism. 
Proteus––the god of  the sea, a minor and marginal god, nonetheless a god of  the 'rst 
water,  a  god  whose  name stands  at  the  beginning––is  the  shepherd  who tends  the 
oceanic  Hocks  in  the  prairies  of  Poseidon.  […]  In  these  places  of  truth,  Proteus 
undergoes metamorphoses: he is animal, he can be element, water, or 're. He’s inert,  
he’s alive. He's under the beam of  the beacon, he’s under the veil. He knows. He’s a 
prophet, he possesses the gift of  prophecy, but refuses to answer questions. He contains  
all information, admits no information. He’s the possible, he’s chaos, he’s cloud, he’s 
background noise.  He hides  his  answers under the endlessness  of  information.  […] 
Physics  is  Proteus  chained.  Background noise  is  this  Proteus  badly  bound.  The sea 
breaking free. Behold a myth, barely a myth, which grants us an epistemology that is  
globally accurate, locally rich and detailed. It doesn't grant it in a language all rigor-
worn, but through a channel full of  noise, murmuring, and images.10
In Serres’ wonderfully evocative description, we have a peerless image of  noise 
at  its  most  mercurial,  polymorphous,  'ckle  and unstable––however,  and to repeat  a 
question posed earlier: what happens to this protean nature when it itself  passes from 
9 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’, Ecrits, pp. 671-702 (p. 676-
77). Russell Grigg commenting on the above passage, explains that: ‘[t]his theory of metaphor and, to a 
lesser extent, of metonymy does a lot of work for Lacan. Condensation, one of Freud’s primary process  
mechanisms, he says, is a type of metaphor, as displacement is of metonymy. The subject is a metaphor;  
the  father  of  the  Oedipus  complex  is  a  metaphor;  the  symptom  is  a  metaphor;  and  love,  too,  is  a 
metaphor’; see Russell Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University Of New York 
Press, 2008) p. 151. C.f. Chomsky’s language as a ‘mirror of  the mind’; see Noam Chomsky, ReIections on  
Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) p. 4.
10 Michel Serres Genesis, trans. by Geneviève James and James Nielson (Ann Arbor, MI: The University  
Of Michigan Press, 1995) p. 14.
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background noise to foregrounded subject?  This is altogether a rather more elusive matter, as it 
pertains precisely to the inconsistency of the threshold between information and noise. 
Serres, of  course, is perfectly aware of  this begged question: ‘[w]hat the narrative of 
Proteus does not tell is the relationship between chaos and form. Who is Proteus when 
he is no longer water and not yet a panther or a boar?’.11 
The issue to be addressed, then, rather than the one posed by the question which noise, is: 
at  which moment in  this  dynamic  signifying  system  of  substitution/combination, 
condensation/displacement, metaphor/metonymy is the word “noise” to be 'ltered (it 
can never be captured) and attended (it cannot be observed) in order to be echoed (it cannot 
be deployed) as a consistent concept (it can never be a coherent concept) without collapsing 
the potency of  its Huctuation. And, not less importantly, which signi'cation(s) is (are) to 
be ignored, discarded. 
And, 'nally, once (if) noise resonates as a concept: how, or when, or where does it  
pass into information, form, music? (does it ever)? Is language, as the thought-operation 
described above, instrumental in this passage? (and, therefore––as implied in chapter 
2––is so education?). 
These questions, all of  which point to the “order out chaos” trope are, in Serres’  
view, left unanswered by simply invoking the 'gure of  Proteus. And undoubtedly one of 
the noisiest hinges wherein the passage from chaos to form is at its most symptomatic, is  
that one separating, or connecting, music and noise.
On this point a short clari'cation might be in order. As mentioned in the Preface, this 
whole research project has been conditioned by a musical practice: however, my purpose 
throughout this work has been to attend to noise neither in its mere opposition to music 
11 Ibid.
149
(though that might have been indeed the initial trigger),12 nor to simply reduce noise to 
the  aural  domain.  Somehow building on  Malaspina’s  “epistemological  gesture”,  my 
intention is to subsume the music|noise border (which is purely contingent and only one 
of  many borders), into an enquiry that posits noise as something like a generic connector-
interrupter: noise as a notion that allows to think passages not only between epistemological 
'elds––as  Malaspina  masterfully  does––but  passages  also  6ltering  through various 
ontological, phenomenological and pedagogical realms of  thought––something which 
Malaspina purposely avoids.13   
Having  said  all  that,  and  considering  that  the  knot  language-noise-music is  as 
impossible to untie as it is fundamental to my argument, a short detour onto the music  
esplanade might be in place.
A sounding cogito
Probably since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, much has been written about music being 
somehow isomorphic, or even homeomorphic, with the temporal Hux of  a subjective 
inner state––as a sort of  nonverbal “sounding cogito”, so to speak. An utmost modern 
example  of  this  position  we  'nd  in  Suzanne  Langer’s  philosophy  of  music,  its 
Whitehead-inHuenced  processism  and  original,  innovative  vitalism––anticipating 
Deleuze’s––mostly misconceived as some sort of  quirky version of  resemblance theory 
within analytic quarters, and curiously unesteemed within the Sound Studies creed. In a 
12 Yet another aspect in which my project resonates with Malaspina’s: ‘although noise music and noise  
art are what opened my mental shutters to the prospect of thinking about noise, this book is about neither,  
leaving this avenue open for future projects’ (EN p. 11).
13 Indeed,  Malaspina’s ‘is  predominantly  an epistemological  enquiry,  rather than an ontological  one 
[furthermore] the problem of epistemological noise, as posed here, is ultimately co-extensive neither with 
a  phenomenology of  noise,  (because  the question posed here  starts  from Shannon’s  counter-intuitive 
relation  between  information  and  noise),  nor  with  its  cultural  history,  (insofar  as  it  focuses  on  the 
conceptual implications of thinking about noise).’ Ibid.
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passage beaming with Bergsonian overtones, Langer writes that 
the elements of  music are moving forms of  sound [which do so in] a realm of  pure 
duration [neither of  which are] an actual phenomenon […]. [It is a duration] completely 
incommensurable with the progress of  common affairs. Musical duration is an image of 
what might be termed “lived” or “experienced” time––the passage of  life that we feel as 
expectations become “now,” and “now” turns into unalterable fact.14
In  other  words,  as  Trevor  Wishart  explains,  ‘in  its  articulation  of  the  time 
continuum of  concrete experience, [music] corresponds directly with the continuum of 
our experiencing, the continuous Hux of  our response-state.’15 
If  Langer’s  inHuence  on  Wishart  is  openly  admitted  by  the  latter,  the  obvious 
complementary  referent  here  is  Deleuze.  Indeed,  one  cannot  but  describe  Langer’s 
philosophy of  music––with its focus on Hux and the embodiment of  temporality––as 
proto-Deleuzian.16 
The retroactive connection between Langer and Deleuze becomes evident, for 
example, when reading the following passage from the latter’s book on Bacon: 
‘[c]ertainly music traverses our bodies in profound ways, putting an ear in the stomach, 
in the lungs, and so on. It knows all about waves and nervousness. But it involves our  
body, and bodies in general, in another element. It strips bodies of  their inertia, of  the  
materiality of  their presence: it disembodies bodies.’17 
14 Suzanne Langer, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953) p. 109.
15 Trevor Wishart On Sonic Art (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996) p. 17.
16 Langer’s philosophy of music is still to 'nd its deserved status as a proper tributary to that pond of  
neodeleuzianism  which  is  contemporary  Sound  Studies.  Edward  Campbell  provides  a  rare  counter-
example, when noticing that ‘[i]f Langer pre-dates Deleuze in telling us that time becomes palpable in  
music, Deleuze goes further to state that not “time” but a multiplicity of “times”, all kinds of mixed times, 
become palpable in music.’ Edward Campbell,  Music After Deleuze (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) p. 130. 
One cannot help noticing that, Campbell’s brief note notwithstanding, this ‘pre-dating’ of Deleuze by 
Langer is as yet scantily acknowledged by the Deleuzian vulgate; a relatively recent interest in Whitehead  
within the community might change all this.
17 Gilles Deleuze,  Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (London & New York: 
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Deleuze is here comparing the affective differences between painting and music, 
wherein––historically at least––music seemed to always gain the upper hand:
[i]n a sense, music begins where painting ends, and this is what is  meant when one 
speaks of  the superiority of  music. […] When music sets up its sonorous system and its 
polyvalent organ, the ear, it addresses itself  to something very different than the material 
reality of  bodies. It gives a disembodied and dematerialized body to the most spiritual of 
entities.18
If  the meditations on Bacon provided Deleuze with the optimal philosophical 
ground for him to discourse on the divergent aspects of  the visual and the sonorous, we 
can nonetheless sense the same notion emerging in the earlier A Thousand Plateaus, where 
he ascertained with Guattari that 
[t]here is surely no question here of  declaring a given art supreme on the basis of  a 
formal  hierarchy  of  absolute  criteria.  Our problem is  more  modest:  comparing  the 
powers  or  coef'cients  of  deterritorialization  of  sonorous  and  visual  components.  It 
seems that when sound deterritorializes, it becomes more and more re'ned; it becomes 
specialized and autonomous. Color clings more, not necessarily to the object,  but to 
territoriality. When it deterritorializes, it tends to dissolve, to let itself  be steered by other 
components.19
For Deleuze and Guattari, the power of  sound is owed to ‘a machinic phylum 
that operates in sound and makes it a cutting edge of  deterritorialization.’20 “Sound”––
which in this context, I would argue, is a term perfectly interchangeable with “noise”––
carries, by way of  its own materiality, a power to deterritorialise and to articulate the 
Continuum, 2003), p. 54.
18 Ibid. pp. 54-5.
19 Gilles  Deleuze  &  Felix  Guattari, A  Thousand  Plateaus:  Capitalism  and  Schizophrenia,  trans.  by  Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p 347.
20 Ibid. p 348.
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true temporality of  Aeon, ‘it is a question of  a freeing of  time, Aeon, a nonpulsed time for 
a Hoating music’21. It is, however, a power and a deterritorialisation that, for Deleuze and 
Guattari,  ‘does not happen without great  ambiguity’,  bringing with it  the hazard of 
hypnosis,  and of  the fascistic appropriation of  the ritual power of  sound:
sound invades us,  impels us,  drags us, transpierces us. It takes leave of  the earth, as 
much in order to drop us into a black hole as to open us up to a cosmos. It makes us 
want to die. Since its force of  deterritorialization is the strongest, it also effects the most 
massive of  reterritorializations,  the most numbing,  the most  redundant.  Ecstasy and 
hypnosis. Colors do not move a people. Flags can do nothing without trumpets. Lasers 
are modulated on sound. The refrain is sonorous par excellence, but it can as easily  
develop its  force into a sickly sweet ditty  as  into the purest  motif,  or  Vinteuil's  little 
phrase. And sometimes the two combine: Beethoven used as a “signature tune.” The 
potential fascism of  music.22
Which  is  why,  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  ‘music  is  plugged  into  a  machinic 
phylum in'nitely more powerful than that of  painting: a line of  selective pressure.’23 
Deleuze and Langer’s  proto-sound-studies are,  of  course,  only one side of  the coin: 
music  phenomena  have  also  variously  been  depicted  as  something  like  a  grammar 
without semantics. If  this is a view mostly expounded by analytic schools of  thought, 
strongly grounded on empirical data provided by music cognition, cognitive musicology 
and the like (of  which Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff ’s inHuential  Generative theory of  
tonal music is the prime exponent),24 one of  the main proponents of  this view––though 
21 Ibid. p 267.
22 Ibid. p. 348.
23 Ibid.
24 See Fred Lerdahl & Ray Jackendoff, A generative theory of tonal music (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 
and Fred Lerdahl & Ray Jackendoff, ‘The capacity for music: What is it, and what’s special about it?’,  
Cognition 100 (2006), pp. 33–72.
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coming from a completely different angle than that taken by anglo-american music-
theory scientism––is Jacques Attali. 
Noise, music & language
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Jacques Attali’s Noise: The Political Economy of  
Music has had, specially in the years after its English translation in 1983 (it had its 12th 
reprint  in  2014),  an  inHuence  and  repercussion  of  seismic  proportions  within 
contemporary music scholarship––seismic, that is, in relation to what could have been 
hardly the papillionic Hutterings of  a brief  monograph committed by an economist with 
absolutely no previous business in musicological matters.25 
I will return to Attali’s serendipitous book in the next section: for now, I would 
like to brieHy comment on Attali’s not entirely prudent diatribe on the relation between 
music and language––this being just one of  many divergences between his conception of 
noise and the one expounded here. Having said that, Attali does begin his reHections on 
language in terms somewhat acceptable to the conception of  noise I am elaborating 
here; indeed, one cannot but agree with the fact that
[a]ll  music can be de'ned as noise given form according to a code (in other words, 
according to rules of  arrangement and laws of  succession, in a limited space, a space of  
sounds) that is theoretically knowable by the listener. Listening to music is to receive a  
message.26
However,  the tirade that  follows seems way off  various marks:  for a start,  to 
Attali’s assertion that ‘music cannot be equated with a language’ insofar as ‘quite unlike 
the words of  a language––which refer to a signi'ed––music, though it has a precise 
25 Jacques  Attali,  Noise:  The  Political  Economy  of  Music,  trans.  by  Brian  Massumi  (Minneapolis,  MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1985).
26 Attali, Noise p. 25
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operationality, never has a stable reference to a code of  the linguistic type’,27 a Lacanian 
interlocutor could perfectly rebut something like “it is  not  the case that words always, 
necessarily refer to a signi'ed (hence: S/s)”. Secondly, when Attali writes that music ‘is 
not  “a  myth  coded  in  sounds  instead  of  words,”  but  rather  a  “language  without 
meaning”’ and that music has ‘neither meaning nor 'nality’28 one might be perfectly 
entitled to ask: what does Attali mean by language? (what does he mean by meaning?). That 
said, Attali is here pointing the 'nger at Lévi-Strauss––who is worth quoting at length 
on this point: 
[m]ythology and music have in common the fact that they summon the listener to a 
concrete form of union, with the difference, however, that myth offers him a pattern 
coded in images instead of sounds. In both cases, however, it is the listener who puts one 
or several potential meanings into the pattern, with the result that the real unity of the 
myth or the musical work is achieved by two participants, in and through a kind of 
celebration. The listener, as such, is not the creator of the music, either through a lack of 
natural ability or through the incidental fact that he is listening to someone else's music,  
but a place exists inside him for the music: he is, then, like the reverse, hollowed-out,  
image of a creator, whose empty spaces are 'lled by the music. The phenomenon is 
inexplicable, unless we admit that the non-composer has at his disposal and multiplicity 
of  meanings,  all  at  the ready and otherwise  unused,  which are attracted as if  by  a 
magnet to attach themselves to the sounds. Thus, the union of the sound proposed by 
the composer, and of the meaning present in a latent state in the listener, is constituted 
in  a  pseudo-language.  When  they  encounter  the  music,  meanings  drifting  half-
submerged come to the surface and 't together according to lines of force analogous 
with those determining the patterning of the sounds. Hence a sort of intellectual and 




since each represents one of the two 'sexes' of the music, whose carnal union is realized 
[p 655] and solemnized in the performance. Only then do sound then sense meet up 
with each other to create a unique entity comparable to language, since in this case too 
there is a coming together of two halves, one consisting of a superabundance of sound 
(in relation to what the listener could have produced on his own) and the other of a 
superabundance  of  meaning (since the  composer  had no need of  it  to  compose his 
work).
In both cases, the supplementary sound and the supplementary meaning are in 
excess of  the needs peculiar to language, which uses sounds other than musical ones (so 
much so that it has been said that an ear for language and an ear for music are in  
inverse proportion to each other),  and which is never able  to give expression to the 
ineffable emotions and meanings that music arouses in its devotees. We can say, then,  
that musical communication and linguistic communication both suppose the union of 
sound and meaning; but it is also true to add that the sounds and meaning exploited in 
musical  communication  are  precisely  those  that  are  not  used  in  linguistic 
communication. In this respect, the two types of  communication are in a relationship of 
supplementarity.29 
The 'rst thing to notice in this fascinating text, is how much closer than expected 
seems Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism to Langer’s vitalist trope that music articulates a sort of 
temporal  cogito,  with  the  listening  subject  as  ‘the  reverse,  hollowed-out  image  […] 
whose empty spaces are 'lled by the music’. Lévi-Strauss, however, introduces a notion 
of  ‘pseudo-language’––and here the importance of  the pre'x should not be passed over, 
as Attali  might have done. Because,  even if  Attali’s  gripe is (rightly) directed against 
some Lerdahl-Jackendof'an, cognitivist approach to music as a mere grammar-without-
semantics, music-as-communication, music-as-an-evolutionary device and so on, he is 
29 Claude Lévi-Strauss,  The Naked Man: Mythologies  Volume 4,  trans.  by John and Doreen Weightman 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981) pp. 654-55.
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somehow missing something deeper in Lévi-Strauss’ text: 'rstly, there is the pointer to 
myth, ritual and desire which is implied in the union of  composer and listener (‘a kind 
of  celebration’, an ‘emotional coupling’ in  ‘the coming together’ of  the ‘two ‘sexes’ of 
the music’), and which brings the knot language-noise-ritual-music remarkably closer to 
Attali’s  unabashed Girardianism and, secondly,  the possibility that even if,  yes,  Lévi-
Strauss does oftentimes use the word ‘communication’, he speci'cally distinguishes the 
‘supplementarity’  between  musical  and  linguistic  communication:  clearly,  for  Lévi-
Strauss, they are not the same thing, as Attali seems to imply.   
Furthermore,  when Attali  moves  on from Lévi-Strauss  to Saussure,  here too, 
there is much more potential for an elaboration of  a concept of  noise which, without 
contradicting  his  (i.e.  Attali’s)  own  basic  tenets,  could  bring  about  noise’s  properly 
subjective (properly political) potential. Attali asserts that
when  Saussure  wants  to  't  music  into  the  double  structure  of  language,  by 
distinguishing within it a signi'er and a signi'ed, he superimposes a semantic system on 
sounds:  “We  do  not  see  what  prevents  a  given  idea  from being  associated  with  a 
succession of  sounds”; Derrida implicitly does the same thing when he writes that “there 
is no music before language.” […] The musical message has no meaning, even if  one 
arti'cially assigns a (necessarily rudimentary) signi'cation to certain sounds, a move that 
is almost always associated with a hierarchical discourse.30 
Even if  we can wholeheartedly agree with Attali that ‘the origin of  music should 
not be sought in linguistic communication’ and that,  indeed, ‘there is  no convincing 
theory of  music as language’ and even that ‘the attempts that have been made in that 
direction are no more than camouHages for the lamest kind of  naturalism or the most 
30 Atttali, Noise, p. 25; furthermore, by misquoting Derrida, Attali does not help his anti-linguistic cause: 
Derrida does not ‘write’ that ‘there is no music before language’: Derrida is here paraphrasing Rousseau’s 
argument against the (pseudo) Pythagoreanism of Rameau.  See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 195.
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mundane  kind  of  pedantry’,31 what  we  are  missing  here  is  that  the  (cognitivist) 
conception of  language that Attali is attacking is not the only possible one. If  it is true  
that ‘[t]he musical message has no meaning, even if  one arti'cially assigns a (necessarily 
rudimentary) signi'cation to certain sounds’32 exactly the same can be said of  language as 
such: all there is is what Núñez calls a ‘semantic pact’, a pretence that there is some 
meaning somewhere at the end of  the signifying chain.33 And, just like the subject, it is a 
pretence which is necessary for the functioning of  language, necessary for the subject 
(for critique, for politics, for Truth).
As already hinted above, it is  precisely in the gap between signi'ed and signi'er, 
from that immanent, errant misalignment of  meaning, and which is constitutive of  both 
language and the subject, that a properly generic conception of  noise might 'nd its  
philosophical place and its pedagogical time. Noise is the signal emitted by the division 
of  the subject. Or better: noise is a remnant background radiation leftover from such 
division.   
The unconscious is structured like music
Tempting as it is to extract from all of  the above a somewhat unbridled transitivity––
viz.,  (one) the unconscious is  structured like language,  (two) music is  like a language 
without semantics, (ergo) the unconscious is structured like music––it will suf'ce for now 
to  point  out  something  like  an  overlap,  or  an  intersection  unconscious-language-music. 
However, in this  brief  detour about the relationship between music and language (a 
relationship  we  will  have  to  return  to  later),  we  notice  that  the  word  “music”  has 
surreptitiously sneaked in, and that “noise” has, once again, slipped out of  sight.   
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora, p. 19-22
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However, we can always rely on Serres to bring noise back within hearing range,  
and this without loosing its language-related (subject-related) resonances:
[w]hen languages know how to talk about themselves, they only create a further circle. 
Any metalanguage closes the loop of  another course, slightly shifted, to be sure, but of 
the same form as those 'rst little rhythmic poems. Metaphysics comes from the same 
whirlwind as music. ReHection, at whatever level, is a loop, sameness and difference, in 
the  whirling  whole  of  the  organization of  languages  by  themselves.  The more  one 
knows how to talk about languages, the better languages know how to talk. As long, of  
course, as they continue to hear the noise.34 
Never allowing noise to fade out: not a trivial exercise, considering that the 'rst 
step,  as  mentioned  in  the  opening  paragraph  of  this  chapter,  is  to  identify  the  
appropriate (useful)  signifying band within the disordered semantic vibrations of  the 
word “noise”,  in order to 'lter from it a spectrum which would be suitably coloured for  
the task ahead. 
But even before that, let us take a step closer and try to listen to the resonant carpet of  
signi'cations, 'gurations, suggestions and symbolisations that the etymological narrative 
of  the word noise emits.  
4.1.  Etymologies
The intention here is not to appeal to some higher etymological authority that will arise 
to dictate the terms of  the subsequent conceptual elaboration––one should always keep 
in  mind  Pierre  Vidal-Naquet’s  warning  that  ‘no  etymology  can  be  singled  out  as 
34 Serres, Genesis p. 70 (translation modi'ed).
159
infallible (thank God)’,35 Instead, the function of  the following etymological observations 
might  be  taken  like  that  of  a  free-form  prelude:  to  simply  allow  the  etymological 
resonances of  the signi'er ‘noise’ (bruit  in French,  ruido,  in Spanish,  rumore in Italian, 
Geräusch in German, θόρυβος (thórivos) in Modern Greek) set the tone for whatever is to 
follow.    
Noise, nausea, noxious
For  the  Old  French  noise,  from which  the  same  Middle  English  word  derives,  two 
etymological versions exist. A 'rst one, more interesting than convincing, derives it from 
the Latin  nausea, which descended from the Ancient Greek, ναυτία (navtia), ναῦς (navs, 
from the Proto-Indo-European  *néh₂us, “ship”), from which all of  navire (French),  nave 
(Spanish and Italian), also ναύτης (navtis: sailor, nauta in Latin, “nautical”) derive. All of 
which arrive today with the same denotation: “seasickness”,  “disgust”,  “illness”,  and 
relating to certain nautical, or maritime origin. 
This etymological narrative is one that provides Serres with a lexical vessel in 
which  to  navigate  these  deep speculative  waters:  reminiscent  of  Leibniz’  meditative 
seaside walker,36 Serres’ suggestive prose evokes the white noise (or more precisely, the 
pink noise) of  the ocean surf:
[t]his word noise crosses the seas. Across the Channel or the Saint Laurence seaway, 
behold how the noise divides itself. In Old French it used to mean: noise, uproar and 
35 ‘When an etymology seems bad or fantastic, no appeal to higher grounds can confer authority on it’;  
see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, ‘Foreword’ in  The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece by Marcel Detienne (New 
York: Zone Books, 1996) pp. 7-33 (p. 27).
36 ‘Every soul knows in'nity—knows everything—but knows it in a confused way. It is like what happens 
when I walk along the seashore: in hearing the roar of the sea, I hear—though without distinguishing 
them—the individual little noises of the waves out of which that total noise is made up. Similarly, our big  
confused perceptions are the outcome of the in'nity of tiny impressions that the whole universe makes on 
us.’  G.  W.  Leibniz,  Principles  of  Nature  and  Grace  Based  on  Reason,  trans.  by  Jonathan  Bennett, 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1714a.pdf [accss. 24 Apr 2018] p. 6.
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wrangling; English borrowed the sound from us; we keep only the fury. In French we use 
it so seldom that you could say, apparently, that our language had been cleansed of  this  
“noise.” […] There, precisely, is the origin. Noise and nausea, noise and the nautical,  
noise and navy belong to the same family. We mustn't be surprised. We never hear what  
we call background noise so well as we do at the seaside.37
Greg Hainge, for his part, dedicates a whole chapter of  his important work, Noise  
Matters to analyse the articulations (or lacks thereof) of  noise in the psychotic episodes 
recounted by Roquentin in Sartre’s La Nausée.38
Pace  Serres  and Hainge,  this  is  not  the  only  etymological  interpretation.  A  second 
version connects “noise” to the Latin noxius: “harmful” or “guilty”, and noxa (“damage”, 
“hurt”, “injury”), that is, noxious, injurious, “offensive”, (in Spanish nocivo means literarily 
“harmful”,  “poisonous”);  noxa in  turn comes  from the Greek  νέκυς  (nekys)  “corpse”, 
“dead person”,  or,  in  plural,  νεκύεσσι:  the  “spirits  of  dead bodies” (akin to  νεκρός 
[nekrós] from where the pre'x necro- derives). 
So  then,  regardless  of  which  account  of  this  etymological  double  helix  we 
accept, both strands end up denoting ideas of  sickness, unwellness, damage, and even 
death. Here, one encounters the 'rst of  many multi-directional signposts, the possibility 
of  exploring various diverging roads. One one side, the sense that George Canguilhem 
gives to the pathological, in its opposition to the normal (the junction taken by Malaspina): 
(1) normal is that which is such that it ought to be; (2) normal, in the most usual sense of 
37 Serres, Genesis, pp. 12-13
38 See Noise Matters, chapter 2, ‘Noisea’ (pp. 67-83); Hainge’s work, together with that of Christoph Cox, 
both present consistent  attempts  to think ontologies of noise (even though Cox, unlike Hainge––who 
engages  with  the  concept  of  noise  head on––speaks  more  generally  of  a  ‘sonic ontology’).  Hainge’s 
ontology, however, is imbued with a Deleuzian relationality which renders it essentially divergent from 
the Badiouian subtractiveness I am trying to draw out here; likewise, Cox’s ontology is permeated with 
the vitalism of Huxes, Hows, effects, intensities, haecceities and the like (see for example: Christoph Cox,  
‘Sound Art and the Sonic Unconscious’,  Organised Sound 14:1 (2009), pp. 19–26 and ‘Sonic Philosophy’, 
Artpulse 16:4 (2013) artpulsemagazine.com  [accss. 28 Jan 2016]).
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the word, is that which is met with in the majority of cases of a determined kind, or that 
which constitutes either the average or standard of a measurable characteristic’.39
On the other side, the sense of  contagion with which René Girard invests the notion of 
mimetic  violence.  These  Girardian  overtones  Attali  will  incorporate  in  his  own 
conception of  noise. Indeed, in Girard’s notion of  violence we 'nd the agency of  all of  
the  above  elements,  and  a  sense  of  pathological  contagion:  a  viral  violence  which, 
fuelled by vengeance, becomes ‘an interminable, in'nitely repetitive process. Every time 
it turns up in some part of  the community, it threatens to involve the whole social body’. 
Violence spreads like a disease, and death is its inevitable outcome: 
[d]eath is nothing more than the worst form of  violence that can befall a man. It is no 
less reasonable, therefore, to lump together all the possible causes of  death, pathological 
and otherwise, than it is to create a separate category for only one of  them: sickness.40 
Somewhat lacking in Girard’s account, however, are the many emancipatory-
political  possibilities  that  this  infectious  aspect  of  noise  implies.  If  Attali  is  widely 
credited to have extensively addressed this issue, it is Malaspina, however, who seems to 
have more accurately pinpointed it:  
[w]hen noise is thought in epidemiological terms and presented as parasitic upon the 
conscious processes of perception of its host or, importantly, host population, then what 
we are potentially dealing with is a bio-politics of noise in the Foucauldian sense. The 
critical  problem  is  thus  not  to  determine  noise  ‘in  itself’  or  even  ‘for  us’,  but 
emancipation: because it concerns the power of judgement and the power of control 
over its pre-cognitive ground.41 
39 Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans by Carolyn R. Fawcett and Robert S. Cohen 
(New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 125
40 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) pp. 34-35.
41 EN p. 167
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In any case, if  Attali’s conception of  noise––i.e. as an encoded form of  ritual 
murder––proceeds from this Girardian notion of  violence, the fact remains that noise, 
considered on its own (non-codi'ed) materiality,  can be harmful to the body: acoustic 
science has determined the Sound Pressure Level (SPL) at which sound becomes painful 
and damaging, what is called the threshold of  pain (values varying between 120 dbSPL 
and 140 dbSPL). Sound of  course is now used as a burglar deterrent; a more sinister  
development of  this aspect is the known fact that loud music has been used by CIA, MI6 
and Mossad for so-called “no-touch” interrogation techniques (or, to put it plainly, for 
music-torture),42 and there has been increasing research on what is described in military 
lingo as USW:  Sonic and ultrasonic weapons (sonic grenades, mines or bullets) which use 
extremely high powered sound waves to maim or even kill enemy combatants. US police 
forces have already used Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD), or “sound cannons” on 
various occasions, more recently during the Dakota Access Pipeline protests.43 
All of  this, of  course, is the noise of  the state, in its most distilled, brutal form; as 
such, it appears as close as it can to a subject-constructing noise,  showing (like any other 
simulacrum) a terrible morphological semblance with it,  inasmuch as it  identi'es the 
evental possibilities inherent in noise. Nonetheless, by utilising noise in this way, the state 
42 See for example: Justin Caba, ‘Torture Methods With Sound: How Pure Noise Can Be Used To Break 
You Psychologically’ (2015) <https://www.medicaldaily.com/torture-methods-sound-how-pure-noise-
can-be-used-break-you-psychologically-318638> [accss. 30 Apr 2018], Gwen Ackerman, ‘Israel refuses to 
ban loud music torture’ (12 Jan 1998) <https://www.questia.com/article/1G1-60847881/israel-refuses-
to-ban-eloud-music-torture> [accss. 30 Apr 2018], ‘Iraq: Torture not isolated: independent investigations 
vital’, Amnesty International, (30 Apr 2004) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20071013143507/http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engmde140172004>[accss. 30 Apr 2018], Suzanne Cusick, ‘Music as Torture/Music as Weapon’, Trans: 
Revista Transcultural de Música 10 (2006)<https://www.sibetrans.com/trans/articulo/152/music-as-torture-
music-as-weapon>[accss. 13 Mar 2019].
43 Matthew  Weaver,  ‘G20  protesters  blasted  by  sonic  cannon’,  The  Guardian (25  Sep  2009), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2009/sep/25/sonic-cannon-g20-pittsburgh>[accss.  24 
May 2018]; ‘Watch: Shots reportedly 'red, 141 arrested at Dakota Access Pipeline protests’,  The Seattle  
Times (28  Oct  2016)<https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/live-updates-from-the-
dakota-access-pipeline-protests-oct-27>[accss. 24 May 2018]. John Hamilton, for his part, sees a deeper, 
anthropological connection between music and torture: see John T. Hamilton, ‘Torture as an Instrument 
of Music’, Thresholds of Listening: Sound, Technics, Space, ed. by S. van Maas (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 201), pp. 143–52.
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substantiates  this  potential––in  archetypical  fascistic  manner––obliterating  any 
possibility of  either event or subject ever happening.44 
Bruit, rumore, θόρυβος (thorivos)
The Modern French bruit itself  brings an interesting semantic baggage. The Old French 
past participle of  bruire, has a clear origin in the vulgar Latin brugitus, a variation on the 
Latin  rugitus (rugido,  “roar”), which comes from the Ancient Greek ἐρεύγομαι (ereúgomai, 
“belch”),  akin  to  ὀρῠμαγδός  (orumagdós,  “noise”),  and  also  related  to  ὠρῡγή  (ōrūgḗ, 
“roaring”, “noise”, “howl”). All of  these words, including the German Geräusch (which is 
derived from the Proto-Germanic  rūskōną)  share  the  same Proto-Indo-European root 
*h₁rewg- (or *rAwə-, to “shout”, to “roar”); note also that from this same root comes the 
Latin  rūmor (“common talk”), which derived in  rumore, i.e. the modern Italian term for 
“noise” in the technical sense, rather than the English (or Spanish) sense of  “rumour” or 
“gossip”. The Spanish ruido (also the term used within the technical framework) comes 
from the same root.
The Modern Greek θόρυβος (thorivos),  remained unchanged from its  Ancient 
origin: akin to θροέω (throeō), or more likely, to τύρβη (tirbē ), it will lead to the Latin turba 
(“mob”, “crowd”, “uproar”, “tumult”, “disorder”, related to the Germanic “storm”); 
these all share the Proto-Indo-European root  *(s)twer- and  *(s)tur- (to “swirl”, “twirl”, 
“rotate”, “move around”). 
We can  sense  in  these  sets  of  connotations  a  common element:  that  of  the 
crowd,  the  mob,  even  the  theatrical  audience.  Serres,  once  again,  eloquently  brings 
home this point: not only from the perspective of  the nauseous subject, a version of  
44 And, let’s not forget, the invention of the noble Apollonian lyre was achieved via the evisceration of an  
innocent tortoise, performed with the most cruel cynicism by Hermes himself.
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Roquentin,  or  even  worse,  of  Pentheus  who,  dismembered  by  the  Bacchic  mob, 
becomes a subject in and through the sparagmos [σπαραγμός] at Mt. Cithaeron:
[a] crowd, a swarm, an army, a herd, a battalion, the pitched multiplicity, howling and 
motley  with shouts,  rushes  toward us,  rushes  toward me,  toward me alone,  me the 
victim, bowed down, safe, tomorrow, before the altars.
The  noises  of  space,  the  colors  of  the  world  are  coming  toward  me.  I  am 
plunged here and now in colors and noises to the point of dizziness. Here and now 
means that a Hux of noises and colors is coming at me. I am a semiconductor, I admit it, 
I am the demon, I pull  among the multiplicity of directions the direction that,  from 
some upstream, comes at me.
This crowd comes at me, it threatens to knock me down, to trample me, to 
throw me under it. Then and only then am I a subject. I am thrown under the multiple.  
Prostrate beneath the waves of noise, I am a castaway of perception. I am swallowed up 
in space, drowned in its murmuring, the multiple always overHows me. I am a subject 
only when I am on the verge of fainting, dying.
In other words: the crowd comes at me, the mob knocks me down, dismembers me, cuts 
me up, I am going to see the open heavens.
Knowledge is born of this danger of death.45
Apart from the notion, also elaborated by Deleuze, about knowledge arising as a 
violence,  we  have  here  the  'rst  of  many  encounters  with  that  seemingly  obvious 
association between noise and the Dionysian; interestingly though, as Girard observes, 
Dionysius’ guise as the mob is what directly relates him to the auditory realm:
[u]nder  the  name  of  Bromios—the  Noisemaker,  the  Earthshaker—Dionysus  presides 
over disasters that have nothing to do with the thunderstorms and earthquakes beloved 
of  nineteenth-century scholars but that in fact always involve a mob impelled by sheer 
45 Serres, Genesis p. 66.
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panic to the performance of  extraordinary acts.46 
It  is  here, one might say, that the direct connection between noise and ritual  
violence––which  Attali  fails  to  evince  even  though  it  is  the  support  of  his  whole 
argument––must reside. 
However, even if  Girard reaches ‘the inescapable conclusion that Dionysus is the  
god of  decisive mob action’,47 from this it does not immediately follow that such action is 
solely destructive. Indeed, the connection between noise and the Dionysian is,  as we 
shall see, not so clear-cut as it might super'cially appear: not only in that the binary  
Apollonian-Dionysian as a function of  order/disorder does not always obtain, but in 
that Dionysius himself  is a bringer of  order: 
it should be easy to see why such a god is called for and why he is revered. He claims 
legitimacy not from his ability to disturb the peace but from his ability to restore the  
peace he has himself  disturbed—thereby justifying, a posteriori, having disturbed it in 
the  'rst  place.  Divine  intervention  is  transformed  into  legitimate  anger  against  a 
blasphemous hubris, which, until the crucial display of  unanimity, seemed to implicate 
the god himself.48
All in all, it seems that noise, in the 'gure of  the frenzied violence of  the mob––
the Latin  turba––manages  both to produce  and dissolve difference, to create  and destroy 
relation, to bring forth the one and multiplicity.
The Latin language creates a diversion. The turba of Lucretius, a stormy mass of diverse 
elements in disorder, given over to shocks, to impacts, to the fray, a chaos given over to 
jostling, is a crowd, it is a mob. The physical chaos of circumstances, where the primal 
turbo spirals itself along, is, if I may be so bold, isomorphic with the raging crowd of 
46 Girard, Violence p. 142.
47 Ibid.
48 Girard, Violence p. 142
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bacchantes, all set for the diasparagmos, or the Roman crowd or any crowd. Chaos 
makes the same noise as the social mob. 
Everywhere we go, we have to go back to multiplicities. For the classed or the 
classifying life, we go back to a prebiotic soup, a Huctuating mix. Multiplicities: inert 
ones,  living  ones,  social  ones.  Can we  imagine  a  chaotic  and primal  multiple  with 
respect  to  knowledge,  a  confused  murmur,  a  noise  that  precedes  and  underlies  the 
classi'ed encyclopedia? I would like to hear the clamor of  intellection in its  nascent 
state, the rage to know.49
The Lain  turba is, of  course, the origin of  the word “turbid” and “perturbed”, as an 
opposition to clarity and stillness. Here we can glimpse the 'rst appearance of  a crucial 
element  (for  some,  the crucial  element)  operating  a  negative  de'nition  of  noise: 
information. Malaspina opens her seminal work with precisely this idea: ‘[i]t has become 
commonplace to use the word noise, almost with inverted comas, in a host of  contexts 
unrelated to sound, often in opposition to information.’50 This idea sets the tone for the 
main  imperative  driving  Malaspina’s  whole  argument:  the  avoidance  of  facile, 
commonplace  oppositions  when  dealing  with  the  signi'er  noise––or  rather,  to  listen 
deeply  into  the  (epistemological,  political,  psychological),  origins  of  such  cliched 
polarities.
Despite the ever more apparent complexity of  the relation between information and 
noise, the latter is often taken for granted as the mere opposite of  information, based on 
the intuitive analogy with acoustic noise disrupting communication. What risks being 
overlooked in this simplistic opposition between information and noise is a palimpsest, a 
rich layering of  intuitive  notions of  the still and the perturbed, the clear and the  turbid 
49 Serres, Genesis p. 100
50 Malaspina, EN, p. 1.
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(from Latin turba: crowd), opaque or confused.51
With respect to Dyonisius’ epithet Bromios, such is the name that, in Euripides’ account, 
the  Bacchae  hollered  as  they  begged  their  leader  to  join  them in  their  intoxicated, 
murderous rave.52 Βρόμιος (Bromios), means, as Girard correctly points out, “the noisy, 
roaring,  boisterous  one”  (from  βρέμειν,  to  roar)  which  is  why  βρομεάζεσθαι 
(bromeazesthai),  is  “to rage like a Bacchante”. This branch derives from the PIE root: 
*bʰrem-  (“to  make  noise”),  which  evolved  into  the  Proto-Germanic  *bremaną  (“to 
roar”),  and  the  Gothic   (bramjan),  all  of  which  of  course  leads  to  the 
Spanish  bramar,  cognate with French  bramer,  the Italian  bramire,  and the Old English 
bremman (“to roar, rage”). 
As for the Ancient Greek θόρυβος (thorivos)––which will have become the Modern Greek 
techno-scienti'c term for  Noise––this  is  precisely the word that  Aristophanes,  in his 
grumble against the vulgarity of  the Athenian ‘theatrokratia’, uses when describing the 
noise of  the clapping audience: 
raise loud waves of  applause in his favour this day [θόρυβον χρηστὸν ληναΐτην], so that, 
at this Lenaean feast, the breath of  your favour may swell the sails of  his triumphant  
galley and the poet may withdraw proud of  his success, with head erect and his face 
beaming with delight.53 
Aristophanes’ distaste of  the noise produced by the lumpen ‘waves of  applause’ 
seem to 'nd a distant echo in Serres, for whom 
51 Malaspina, EN p. 2.
52 θίασον, ὦ Βρόμιε Βρόμιε (Euripides, Bacchae 584).
53 θόρυβον χρηστὸν ληναΐτην, /  ἵν᾽ ὁ ποιητὴς ἀπίῃ χαίρων / κατὰ νοῦν πράξας, / φαιδρὸς λάμποντι 
μετώπῳ. (Aristophanes, Knights, 547-50).
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[s]peech  catalyses  and  propagates  the  silent  harmony  from  which  it  can  then  be 
removed. But the collective is quick to bury its harmony, grinding it up in the chaotic  
noise of  applause. The gods are broken into tiny pieces in the palms of  our hands.54 
The (good) noise of speech, its delicate truth, can easily be drowned by the (bad) 
noise of populist ignorance. 
Alarm, harmony, tone
The Ancient Greek ἀραρίσκω (ararískō), “to join”, “to fasten together”, leads to the Latin 
arma (“weapon”)  and  from this  came the  Old  Italian  call  to  arms,  all’arme (“to  the 
weapons” from which the German Lärm––“noise”––derives). But most interestingly, and 
con'rming the somewhat ambiguous and self-contradictory semantic forces contained 
in the 'eld of  signi'cations projected by “noise”, the above branches––i.e. the Hellenic  
ἀραρίσκω  (ararískō)  through  the  Romance/Germanic  alarma,  allarme,  alarme,  alarm, 
Lärme––all stem from the same Proto-Indo-European root,  *h₂er- (again, as in Ancient 
greek, “to 'x”, “to join”, “to put together”); and this root, intriguingly enough, happens 
to be  conjointly  the seed of  the Ancient Greek ἁρμονία (armoníā), issuing a superposed 
semantic 'eld with the exact opposite charge, all its signifying vectors pointing in the 
antipodal direction.  This antonymic semantic space is shared by the etymological line 
projected by the Ancient Greek word τόνος (tónos, “rope”, “cord”), which through the 
Latin tonus and sonus derived the word “tone” and “sound,” and all of  them carrying the 
Proto-Indo-European root *ten-: “to stretch”. 
Regarding the τόνος, its “tension”, or its lack thereof, a fascinating political angle 
opens up when taking a closer look to the texts left by some grumpy critics of  the 5BC 
theatrical avant-garde in Athens: its Phrygian sonorities (slack, effeminate) no more than 
54 Serres, The Five Senses, p. 87.
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the noisy excretion of the sagging aretê brought about by Periclean democracy (itself  the 
cause of  the Peloponnesian War debacle)––as Eric Csapo observes,
[i]deology transferred all the virtues of  Spartan discipline to the Dorian mode. As early 
as Pratinas (probably a late 'fth- century lyric poet) the Doric mode is ‘tense’ (σὐντονος) 
while the Ionian mode is ‘slack’ (ἀνειμένος). The words refer in the 'rst instance to the 
tenseness or laxness of  a string on a musical instrument, but transferred to moral or 
military contexts they came to connote ‘strict discipline’, as opposed to ‘Habbiness and 
dissolution’.  When  Aristotle  compares  two  binarist  tendencies,  on  the  one  hand  to 
classify all political constitutions as varieties of  ‘oligarchy’ or ‘democracy’, on the other 
to view all musical modes as variations on the Dorian and the Phrygian, his own only-
slightly-less-reductive trinary solution, includes a comparison of  oligarchic constitutions 
to the ‘tenser and more masterful modes’ (συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικώτερας), viz. the 
Doric ‘varieties’, and a comparison of  all the democratic constitutions to the ‘slacker 
and softer’ varieties (τὰς δ᾽ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακάς), viz. the Phrygian (Pol. 1290a). To 
make  a  constitution  συντονωτέρας  meant  to  key  it  up  from  democracy  towards 
oligarchy (1304a21).55
Finally,  both the contemporary signi'cations of  the English word “sound” are present 
already in its ancestral Proto-Indo-European roots: *swent- (“healthy”) and *swen- (“to 
55 Eric Csapo, ‘The Politics of the New Music’, Music and the Muses: The Culture of ‘Mousikē’ in the Classical  
Athenian City, ed. by Penelope Murray & Peter Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 207-
248 (pp. 243-44). It  might not be completely fruitless to observe with regards to this that, in the line  
threading through the prevalent narrative of Western music historicity, such “tension of the tone” kept 
giving way (recall its snapping in the post-Wagnerian revolution of the Second Viennese school: we can 
still hear the background noise produced by such crack in what contemporary music theory refers to as 
‘atonality’. Schoenberg, however, was himself too much of an alert thinker to let himself be conned by  
such a lazy descriptor: ‘to call any relation of tones atonal is just as farfetched as it would be to designate a 
relation of colors “aspectral” or “acomplementary”. There is no such antithesis.  […] If one insists on 
looking for names, “polytonal” or “pantonal” could be considered. Yet, before anything else, we should 
determine whether it is not again simply “tonal”’ (Arnold Schoenberg, Theory of Harmony, trans. by Roy E. 
Carter  (Berkeley  &  Los  Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  1978),  p.  432;  for  an  insightful  
commentary, see Richard Norton, Tonality in Western Culture: A Critical and Historical Perspective  (University 
Park & London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1984)).
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make a sound”). The above set of  derived terms (“tone”, “tonic”, “tense”, “sound”, etc), 
seem to  relate  the  acoustic  to  the  hygienic:  something  that  is  healthy  because  it  is  
sounding, something that sounds because it is healthy.
The sublime, the ugly, the abject
 
Also  worth  noticing  is  the  grouping  together  of  elements  that  only  later  would  be 
(extensionally) included in the set labeled the sublime: fear, pain, danger, awe, the ugly (see 
Aristotle’s representation of  the ugly as producer of  pain, see Augustine’s ugly as non-
existent, see, of  course, Burke’s separation of  the beautiful from the sublime, the horror 
produced by darkness, uncertainty and confusion––i.e. by noise––his introduction of  the 
notion of  pleasure in horror and pain:  
[w]hatever is 'tted in any sort to excite the ideas of  pain and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a 
manner analogous to terror, is a source of  the sublime; that is, it is productive of  the  
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of  feeling.56 
Moreover (and somehow not surprisingly), for Burke, the sublime can be effected 
by the auditory too:
[t]he  eye  is  not  the  only  organ  of  sensation  by  which  a  sublime  passion  may  be 
produced. Sounds have a great power in these as in most other passions. I do not mean 
words, because words do not affect simply by their sounds, but by means altogether 
different.  Excessive loudness  alone is  suf'cient to overpower the soul,  to suspend its  
action, and to 'll it with terror. The noise of  vast cataracts, raging storms, thunder, or 
56 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (New York: 
P.F. Collier & Son Company, 1909–14), part I, n.7, ‘Of the Sublime’ 
<https://www.bartleby.com/24/2> (2001) [accss. 30 Mar 2018].
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artillery, awakes a great and awful sensation in the mind, though we can observe no 
nicety or arti'ce in those sorts of  music. The shouting of  multitudes has a similar effect;  
and, by the sole strength of  the sound, so amazes and confounds the imagination, that, 
in this  staggering and hurry  of  the  mind,  the  best-established tempers  can scarcely 
forbear being borne down, and joining in the common cry, and common resolution of 
the crowd.57
Noticeable here, once again, is the presence of  those ancient signi'ers: the pink 
noise of  massive waters, the angry mob, the weapon (‘the noise of  vast cataracts […] the 
shouting of  multitudes […] artillery…’).
The  sublime intersects  with  that  other  set  including  notions  related  to  the  Freudian 
‘uncanny’ (das Unheimliche),58  Clément Rosset’s ‘terrifying object’59 and Julia Kristeva’s 
‘abject’ (l'abjection). Most striking is Kristeva’s association of the abject to something like a 
subjective distress, alarm, or anxiety produced by the dissolution of boundaries, form and 
established knowledge: ‘[i]t is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection 
but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. 
The  in-between,  the  ambiguous,  the  composite.’60 We have  in  Kristeva’s  account  a 
crucial signifying knot: one tying noise (viz., as ‘what disturbs identity, system, order’),  
with its hermetic quality (‘what does not respect borders’), which provides for its protean 
liminality (‘the in-between, the ambiguous’).
And, once again,  every one of  these 'gures are what I have been describing as the  
57 Ibid, part II n.18, ‘Sound and Loudness’.
58 See Sigmund Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’,  The Penguin Freud Library,  Vol.  14: Art  And Literature:  Jensen's  
‘Gradiva’,  Leonardo  Da  Vinci  And  Other  Works,  trans.  by  James  Strachey,  ed.  by  Albert  Jackson 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) pp. 335-76.
59 See Clément Rosset, L’objet Singulier (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2014), pp. 37-42.
60 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), p. 4.
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symptoms of  the void, a noisy leftover that 'lters through in the interstices of  language,  
appearing in  the cracks  of  the  Symbolic’s  insuf'cient attempt to  structure  the Real. 
These  ‘terrifying  objects’  are  themselves  phantasmatic  emergences  of  language  and 
thought. 
All these apparitions are, therefore, in a deep sense, logical. They are as aberrant 
as they are inevitable, as Poincaré knew very well when observing that ‘logic sometimes 
makes monsters.’61 Such logical aberrations appear, not so much in opposition to thought, 
but  as a result of  the thought process itself, producing even here, at its most abstract level, 
mathematical pathologies––thought-monstrosities which are indistinguishable, as Benoit 
Mandelbrot notices, from mathematical noise.62
Rhythm
As for the widespread etymology relating the notion of  noise with that of  rhythm (not 
dissimilar to nausea in its relation to the nautical How of  waves and tides),63 it might be 
worth  quoting  Émile  Benveniste’s  exhaustive  account  (which,  it  must  be  said, 
immediately puts Deleuzian notions of  rhythm––inevitably attached to the concept of 
Iow–– into perspective): 
[a]n identical answer is given by all dictionaries: ῥυθμός is an abstract noun from ῥεῖν ‘to 
61 Henri Poincaré, ‘La Logique et L'intuition dans la Science Mathématique et dans L'enseignement’,  
L’Enseignement mathematique 1  (1899), pp. 157-62 (pp. 158-9); also in  Œuvres XI (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 
1955-1956)  pp. 129-34, cited in Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 3 
(New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 973.
62 Fascinatingly enough, Mandelbrot relates this mathematical noise with none other than Cantor’s Set,  
so  dear  to  Badiou;  the  paradoxical  properties  of  Cantor’s  continuum––uncountability,  self-similarity, 
fractal dimensionality––which I to refer to as “the noise of the continuum”, Mandelbrot alluringly names 
‘Cantor dust’; see Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 
1983), especially chapter 8, ‘Fractal Events and Cantor Dust’,  pp. 74-83.
63 The  Wiktionary entry for ‘rhythm’, for example, reads: ‘ῥῠθμός (rhuthmós), or Ionic ῥῠσμός (rhusmós), 




How,’  the sense of  the word,  according to Boisacq,  having been borrowed from the 
regular movements of the waves of the sea. […] And what, really, could be more simple 
and satisfying? Man has learned the principles of things from nature, and the movement 
of  the waves  has given rise in his  mind to the idea of  rhythm,  and that  primordial 
discovery is inscribed in the term itself. […] But the semantic connection that has been 
established  between  “rhythm”  and  “to  How”  by  the  intermediary  of  the  “regular 
movement of the waves” turns out to be impossible as soon as it is examined. It suf'ces  
to observe that […] the sea does not “How.” Ῥεῖν is never said of the sea, and moreover, 
is never used for the movement of the waves.64 
Etymological vector sum
What we have here,  then, are  two overlapping semantic con'gurations,  each with a 
multiplicity of  opposing signifying charges: from the spatial notions of  disorder, harm, 
injury  we  arrive  to  the  temporal-aural  notions  of  murmur,  scream,  roar;  from the 
individual harm, injury, sickness to the collective tumult, crowd, mob; in the opposite 
direction indexed by the pair τόνος-ἁρμονία, we have the uniting, the joining together of 
the multiple into the one, its tensing, and its strict disciplining and prescription, and 
eventually a call to arms should such order be threatened, a call to arms justi'ed by the  
appeal to strength and healthiness.
If  noise, as everything else, is itself  divided it itself  seems to always-already appear as the 
negative  side  of  such  split.  In  the  laying  out  of  what  Malaspina  describes  as  a 
‘palimpsest  of  concepts,  notions and  ideas,  noise always appears to occupy the negative 
place of  a dichotomy, be it  in that of  order and disorder,  of  physical  work and the 
64 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, p. 281.
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dispersion of  energy in the state of  entropy, or of  the norm and the abnormal.’65 
In other words, noise is at best associated with the absence of order, of work or of the 
norm––be it the statistical, moral or aesthetic norm––and at worst, noise is identi'ed as 
a threat to the norm and subversive of work and order: a perturbation, a loss of energy 
available for work, a parasite.66
Considering  that  Malaspina  is  here  taking  a  critical  stance  towards 
commonplace  denotations  of  noise,  the  allusion  to  ‘a  parasite’  might  sound  like  a 
sideways  critique  of  Serres  (whose  absence  is  screaming  throughout  the  pages  of 
Malaspina’s  otherwise  exhaustive  tome)––if  this  is  so  (something  that  I  cannot 
substantiate)  it  would  imply  a  loud  (and  indeed,  welcomed)  dissonance  with  my 
Serresian approach. On the other hand, the problematising of the vulgar notion of noise 
as that which is ‘subversive of work’ is entirely consonant with the position I am taking  
here: namely, that the subjective truth procedure, supported by education, is a producer 
of noise as it concurrently engages in work. Pedagogical subjectivity is work, in the true 
thermodynamical sense of the term.67 
4.2. Extensionalities
The opening question, though, remains unanswered:  Which noise? My intention in the 
following paragraphs is to set the sign “noise” to what Núñez would call its ‘referential 
mode’: that is, to bring out, not its ‘authenticity’ as a valid pointer to a signi'ed thing, but 
its  ‘referential  character’––in  other  words,  to  deploy  (the  sign,  thing,  word)  as  ‘a 
65 EN p. 3.
66 EN p. 3.
67 And quite literarily so: at least joules/degree per bit of acquired information, as established 
by the Landauer limit.
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signifying knot within a complex structure of  signi'cations and social practices’.68 
Just  as an illustration:  when Ben Jonson,  writing in  1621, makes  his  Cockrel 
clown explain that ‘[t]he King has his Noise of  Gypsies, as well as of  Beardwards and 
other  Minstrels’,69 is  this  not  a  symptomatic  sign  that––at  least  in  this  particular 
historico-cultural-political setting (viz., Jacobean court theatre practices)––the signi'ers 
“noise” and “music”,  or (much more interestingly),  “music-maker” and “noise-maker”, 
seem to  overlap  their  signi'cations?  At  the  very  least,  one  has  to  accept  that  these 
‘signi'cations  and  social  practices’  managed  to  co-exist,  either  dialectically  or 
disjunctively, side by side. 
From the aural to the spectral
In its most vulgar use, the word remains con'ned to its archaic auditory realm: noise 
merely means ‘unwanted sound’. And it is within this aural usage where noise is at its  
maximal subjective dependancy, inasmuch as the utterance “this or that is noise”, must 
be complemented with the question “who speaks?” for a properly contextual (pragmatic) 
space of  meaning to be established (unwanted  sound: who wants what, when? etc). As 
such, and from a Badiouian perspective, we are deep inside anti-philosophical territory.70 
Moving diagonally onto the other end of  the semantic space, we 'nd ourselves in 
the opposite corner, determined by the unequivocal Word of  Science. Here “noise” has 
a  very  precise,  unambiguous  de'nition,  even  if  commuting  to  and  from  manifold 
specialisations:  signal  processing,  statistics,  statistical  thermodynamics,  quantum 
68 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora. p. 17.
69 Ben Jonson, ‘A Masque of the Metamorphos’d Gypsies’,  Works in Six Volumes: Volume 5 (London: J. 
Walthoe, 1716) pp. 374-417 (p 403).
70 Badiou writes in Saint Paul that ‘[f]or an antiphilosopher, the enunciative position is obviously part of 
the statement's protocol. No discourse can lay claim to truth if it does not contain an explicit answer to the 
question: Who speaks?’ SP p. 17.
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statistical mechanics, probability, acoustics, economics, communication theory, and its 
formalised counterpart,  information theory.  In all  of  these contexts,  noise essentially 
indicates the presence of  Huctuating, unknown (unwanted?) data, randomly modifying some 
observed,  known (wanted?)  signal, this  latter  de'ned as  a  function supposed  to  convey 
information about the behaviour and properties of  some phenomenon. 
The  ‘Glossary  of  Telecommunication  Terms’,  issued  by  the  US  Federal 
Standard (the Federal Standard 1037C), informs us that noise is one or all of  've things:  
1. An undesired disturbance within the frequency band of  interest; the summation of 
unwanted or disturbing energy introduced into a communications system from man-
made and natural sources. 2. A disturbance that affects a signal and that may distort the 
information carried by the signal. 3. Random variations of  one or more characteristics 
of  any entity such as voltage, current, or data. 4. A random signal of  known statistical 
properties of  amplitude, distribution, and spectral density. 5.  Loosely,  any disturbance 
tending to interfere with the normal operation of  a device or system.71
From the point of  view of  science then, noise, all the while keeping its connotations of 
undesirability, is a  spectral phenomenon (it might be not without interest to note that, 
somewhere along the line, a substitution of  a visual connotation for its original, aural 
one, has taken place).72 
Within the family of  scienti'c 'elds listed above, one might 'nd noise de'ned as 
a  stochastic  process,  and  oftentimes  related  related  to  notions  such  as  Markov  chains, 
Brownian  motion and  random  walks.  The  Cambridge  Dictionary  of  Statistics,  for  example, 
de'nes “noise” as ‘[a] stochastic process of  irregular Huctuations’.73 A stochastic process 
71 ‘Noise’, Federal Standard 1037C https://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/fs-1037c.htm [accss. 9 May 
2018].
72 Spectrum is Latin for “apparition”, “image”; it is a descendant of the Proto-Indo-European spéḱyeti 
(“to keep looking at”), which is also an ancestor of the Ancient Greek σκέπτομαι (sképtomai: “to examine”). 
One wonders if this passage from the aural to the visual is not saying something about science itself.
73 ‘Noise’,  The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics (Fourth ed.), ed. by Brian S. Everitt & Anders Skrondal 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 301.
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is, very simply put, a collection of  random variables.74 A Markov chain is an example of 
one, its particularity being that it is a sequence of  events wherein the probability of  each 
event  depends  solely  on  the  state  of  the  previous  one––in  other  words,  ‘their 
characteristic feature is the existence of  well-de'ned transition probabilities independent of  
the previous history of  the system.’75 As for random variables, these are the outcomes of  a 
random (i.e. unordered, unpatterned, unpredictable) phenomenon. The domain of  the 
random variable  is  usually  neither  in'nite  nor  uncountable––the toss  of  a  coin,  for 
example, has two possible outcomes: what is uncertain is the physics that makes one or  
the  other  happen  (become  actual)––the  domain  itself  has  a  cardinality  of  two 
possibilities: heads or tails. 
From all  this,  we  can  start  mapping  some  conditions  for  the  outline  of  an 
ontology: Noise, in the sense that I am trying to refer to here, belongs to the uncertainty 
itself, not to the outcome (which belongs to the domain of  truth).
Attali’s borrowings
As mentioned above, Attali’s conception of  noise imports a plethora of  connotations 
from information theory:76 noise will ‘attack’ the existing codes of  a (economic-political-
cultural) network: noise is an inevitable ‘mutation’ (ie an error) in the transmission of  a 
message within the channel used by a dominant code, and which virally takes over the 
channel-network,  itself  becoming  dominant  and  so  on––Attali’s  writing  in  Noise is 
74 More formally, a stochastic process is a series of random variables, {}, where  t assumes values in a 
certain range T. In most cases is an observation at time t and T is a time range. If T = {0, 1, 2, …} the 
process is a discrete time stochastic process and if T is a subset of the nonnegative real numbers it is a  
continuous time stochastic process. The set of possible values for the process, T, is known as its state 
space. See ‘Stochastic process’, The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics p. 415; see also David R. Cox & H. D. 
Miller, Theory  of  Stochastic  Processes (London:  Chapman  and  Hall/CRC  Press,  1977)  and  The  Oxford  
Dictionary of Statistical Terms, ed. by Yadolah Dodge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
75 llya  Prigogine & Isabelle  Stengers,  Order  Out  of  Chaos:  Man's  New Dialogue  With  Nature (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1984), p. 236 (original italics).
76 See Attali,  Noise, pp. 26-27.
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permeated with the lingo of  information theory:
[a] network can be destroyed by noises that attack and transform it, if  the codes in place 
are unable to normalize and repress them. Although the new order is not contained in 
the structure of  the old, it is nonetheless not a product of  chance. It is created by the  
substitution  of  new differences  for  the  old  differences.  Noise  is  the  source  of  these 
mutations in the structuring codes. For despite the death it contains, noise carries order 
within itself; it carries new information.77
It would be a not too inaccurate observation to say that Attali’s is a noise that  
runs on a combination of  information theory and Girard’s anthropology of  mimetic 
violence (a third propellant would be historical  materialism––albeit  in a soft,   “third 
way” version).  
Discernible  in  Attali’s  quote  above  some  useful  undertones  appear:  noise  as 
subversion of  the status quo, the resistance of  the latter, the eventual substitution of  its 
codes (one would say “logics”), the idea of  noise carrying a new order, etc. Nevertheless, 
we also notice a crucial lack: Attali’s noise might have borrowed plenty of  its descriptive 
terms from information theory (code, message, network)––what it did not do is explore 
any line of  inquiry involving  a Subject (which,  as noted earlier,  might  have still  been 
consistent with Shannon’s mathematical formalisations). This lack is not surprising, not 
only in that one would struggle to 'nd any subject within the mimesis-desire-violence-
ritual-sacred con'guration that Girardianism bears (a scapegoat is never a subject), but 
in that, after all, Attali is much less a philosopher than he is an economist (not to say a  
banker).
Economy’s pseudo-noise
77 Ibid p. 33.
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Noise is certainly talked about within the domain of  economics. Itself  being a (pseudo) 
scienti'c  contraption,  economics  borrows  its  conception  from  the  above  (properly) 
scienti'c  formulations.  However,  and  appropriately  so,  noise  here  acquires  a 
bootstrapped, circular de'nition: economic noise is “inaccurate data”, as opposed to the 
supposedly “accurate data” feeding back into the markets and in effect determining its  
(mis)functioning: the circularity is embedded in the term ‘accuracy’, which here simply 
masks  the  fact  that  economically  “accurate”  predictions  overdetermine  an  outcome, 
which then retrospectively proves or disproves the truth value of  such predictions). And 
this is not entirely surprising: this self-transcendence is what makes economics, as Jean-
Pierre Dupuy has shown, one of  many modern substitutions for the sacred (albeit a 
clumsy, de'cient one).78 Along similar lines, Malaspina asserts that ‘'nance provides a 
setting  that  demonstrates,  like  few  others,  how  valuable  it  can  be  to  look  at  the 
metaphorical  latitude involved, when the idea of  noise is converted from a scienti'c 
concept to a schema of  thought’;  such paradigm, Malaspina adds, allows for ‘a new 
esotericism’  to  emerge  which  defers  ‘critical  analysis  of  the  internal  dynamics  of  the 
'nancial  sector  to  the  presumed  expertise  of  those  in  charge’.79 In  the  end,  for 
Malaspina,
the obliqueness and viscosity of 'nancial information becomes a form of efferent noise, 
meaning a self-generated uncertainty, adding itself to the basic contingency of pricing 
on the trading Hoor [...]. Although the mirage created by this vanishing act of exposure 
to debt is not what is usually meant by noise in 'nance, synthetic CDOs [collateralized 
debt obligations], together with the shadow banking system they generate, nevertheless 
add a dimension of uncertainty that is  not essentially distinguishable from noise and 
78 See Jean-Pierre Dupuy,  The Mark of  the Sacred,  trans.  by M. B. Debevoise (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 6-13.
79 EN p. 119.
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which predictive models must strive to take into account.80
The noises of  nature
As we have already noticed, Science has nudged the referential 'eld of  noise from the 
aural to the visual (and something promptly picked up by the visual arts, as Hainge has 
clearly shown).81 Science has  coloured noise: there is white noise, pink noise, blue noise, 
violet  noise,  black  noise;  there  is  brown  noise  too,  though  this  is  not  a  chromatic 
reference but a reference to the Brownian motion mentioned above.82  
 White noise, according to the Cambridge Dictionary of  Statistics, is a ‘[t]erm often 
used in time series to refer to an error term that has expectation zero and constant 
variance at all  time-points and is uncorrelated over time’:83 that is,  void expectation, 
eternal variance, in'nite un-correlation. Within the auditory domain, white noise refers 
to an acoustic random signal, containing all audible frequencies at equal intensities: in 
this sense, white noise may be referred to as the all-encompassing set of  all  possible 
frequencies. A purely theoretical construction, it resembles the universal set forbidden by 
Axiomatic Set Theory: therefore, if  we are to admit the notion that  white noise contains  
itself,  we have already emerging here an ontological  'gure for the event,  in Badiou’s 
sense.84 Besides,  as  we shall  shortly see,  white noise provides us with an appropriate 
80 EN p. 127.
81 See Noise Matters, chapter 7, ‘On Noise and Photography. Forest, Fuzz, Ruff’, pp. 209-39.
82 See the Federal Standard 1037C: ‘white noise’ <https://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/fs-1037c.htm> 
‘pink noise’ <http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-027/_4019.htm> ‘blue noise’ 
<http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-005/_0685.htm> ‘black noise’ 
<http://glossary.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-005/_0649.htm> ‘noisy white noise’ 
<http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-024/_3570.htm> ‘noisy black noise’ 
<http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-024/_3569.htm>; see also: Duncan Geere, 'White, pink, blue 
and violet: The colours of noise’, Wired (7 Apr 2011) <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/colours-of-noise  >   
[accss. 9 May 2018].
83 The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics p. 458.
84 ‘An event […] is the multiple composed of: on the one hand, elements of the site; and on the other 
hand, itself (the event)’ (BE p. 506).
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'gure for the Bergsonian/Deleuzian virtual. 
White noise, then, is the (in'nite) set of  the virtual aural. If  there are inescapable 
differences between the Deleuzian conceptions of  noise dominant in sound studies and 
the Badiouian notion I intend to develop, the use of  the word “virtual” is here entirely 
justi'ed as, in actual fact, we cannot hear white noise. Not only in that our hearing 
bandwidth is not in'nite (it is bounded at around 20 Hz in the low end to about 20kHz 
at the higher limit) but in that hearing is logarithmic: we cannot perceive the constant 
power spectral density of  white noise: it gets 'ltered by our hearing mechanism and 
becomes, in our subjective listening, pink noise, which has a power spectral density that 
is inversely proportional to its frequency. White noise is the idea of  a signal containing all 
possible frequencies at equal intensity: pink noise is a sound in which each octave has equal 
intensity.   
As for brown noise, this is the signal produced by Brownian motion, also known 
as “random walk”. Observed by Scottish botanist Robert Brown in 1827, it refers to the 
random movement of  suspended particles colliding with the moving particles  of  the 
Huid  they  are  suspended in  (Brown was  examining under  the  microscope  grains  of 
pollen from ragged-robin Howers suspended in water). However––one should give credit 
where  credit  is  due––these  naturally  occurring  noisy  phenomena  had  already  been 
noted twenty-two centuries earlier by Lucretius. Indeed, in verses 113–140 from Book II 
of  De rerum natura, Lucretius calls out attention 
to these motes which seem to confuse one another in the rays of  the sun; because such 
disorders signify that there secretly exist tendencies to motion also in the principles of  
matter, though latent and unapparent to our senses. For you will see there, among those 
atoms is the sun-beam, many, struck with imperceptible forces, change their course, and 
turn back, being repelled sometimes this way, and sometimes that, everywhere, and in 
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all directions. And doubtless this errant-motion in all these atoms proceeds from the 
primary  elements  of  matter;  for  the  'rst  primordial-atoms  of  things  are  moved  of 
themselves; and then those bodies which are of  light texture, and are, as it were, nearest 
to the nature of  the primary elements, being urged by secret impulses of  those elements, 
are put  into motion,  and these latter themselves,  moreover,  agitate  others  which are 
somewhat larger. Thus motion ascends from the 'rst principles, and spreads forth by 
degrees, so as to be apparent to our senses, and so that those atoms are moved before us, 
which  we can see in the  light  of  the  sun;  though it  is  not  clearly  evident  by  what 
impulses they are thus moved.85 
Science  has  identi'ed  Nature’s  noises,  and  has  promptly  proceeded  to  establish  a 
taxonomy:  there  is  popping,  random occurring  events  of  similar  magnitude  (popcorn 
being the obvious example),  snapping, where the system violently changes state when it 
reaches a critical threshold (as in the sudden snapping of  a piece of  wood), and crackling, 
where there is a combination of  the popping and snapping of  small and large events 
('re, crumpling paper, earthquakes).
And,  'nally,  one  must  not  forget  the  quintessential  noise  of  Nature,  what 
Malaspina describes as the archetypical noise of  the ‘unfolding universe’: namely, the 
Cosmic  Microwave  Background,  accidentally––randomly,  noisily––discovered  by 
physicists  Arno  Penzias  and  Robert  Wilson  in  1964.  This  remnant  electromagnetic 
radiation, a relic from the early stages of  the universe, faintly 'lls all space perpetually 
performing a somewhat noisy rendition of  the Pythagorean Music of  the Spheres.
Noise or music (reprise)
85 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. by John Selby Watson, (London: George Bell & Sons, 1880) p. 
59.
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Noise, however––as already alluded to above––still inhabits most comfortably what has 
been its original semantic territory ever since its linguistic birth (at least in the Romance 
lineage bruit, ruido, rumore): viz. the realm of  sound. 
Noise is vulgarly de'ned today as ‘unwanted sound’––as it has been for some 
time now. The Scottish acoustician Alexander Wood,86 writing in the early 1940s,  is 
already pointing towards some interestingly speculative places––if  undeveloped during 
those (pre “listening cultures”, pre “acoustic ecology”) times–– that the thinking of  noise 
might open up:  
[n]oise is a term which used to be applied very much in the sense of  unmusical […]. It  
was reserved for sounds that were unpleasant, rough and lacking de'nite pitch. It has 
now [1944] been de'ned by international agreement as “sound which is undesired by 
the recipient”. This is a distressingly subjective de'nition, but, after all, we are dealing 
with a subjective term. The sound of  the siren is not a noise if  it is blowing the “all  
clear”, and a Bach Fugue on the piano next door, however faultlessly performed,  is a 
noise if  we are trying to settle ourselves to sleep.87
In  an  early  environmental  concern,  Wood  replays  some  resonances  on  the 
relationship between noise and ill health, at the same time foretelling Murray Schafer’s 
sonic-environmentalist concerns of  three decades later 
[t]he measurement of  noise is  the 'rst  step towards its control,  and this step is now 
being  taken.  There  is  perhaps  insuf'cient  evidence  available  to  enable  us  to  assess 
accurately the effects  of  noise on the health of  the people.  Two facts,  however,  are  
already clear: (1) that noise is in some degree detrimental to health, (2) that much of  the 
noise to which we are ordinarily exposed is unnecessary.88
86 Alexander  Wood  (1879-1950)  was  a  student  of  Lord  Kelvin  at  the  University  of  Glasgow;  a 
conscientious objector during World War I, he remained a militant paci'st throughout his life.




Denouncing the invasion of  the ‘noise of  technology’ rubbing its way into urban 
and rural life, and blaming a newfound ‘appetite for noise’, stemming from the modern 
‘sensibility  of  man’  (and  pointing  the  'nger  to  both  the  Futurists’  erotico-fascistic 
obsession with the machine––to Russolo in particular––and to John Cage) Schafer will 
write in 1977 that ‘[t]oday, as the machines whirl in the hearts of  our cities day and 
night, destroying, erecting, destroying, the signi'cant battleground of  the modern world 
has become the neighbourhood Blitzkrieg’.89
The perceived picture of  noise in relation to sound and music has evolved and gone 
through various mutations, from the disruptions of  the early twentieth-century avant-
gardes up to the early twenty-'rst-century digital postconceptualisations. Most highly 
illustrative  of  this  historical  journey,  Paul  Hegarty’s  entry  on  “noise”  in  the  Grove  
Dictionary of  Music and Musicians––that biblia sacra of  the Western musical establishment––
is worth quoting in extenso: 
[t]raditionally,  noise  has  been  thought  of  as  the  outside  of  music  and meaning.  In 
systems theory, noise is  disruption of  the signal or message; in biological terms, it is  
associated with pain, in legal terms it is associated with disturbance. Noise is also that 
which has hitherto been excluded from being proper music, so can include radical new 
directions in musical form (Wagner, Coltrane) as well as noises deemed unmusical. The 
term noise implies a judgement about the type of  sound, performance, or piece, not an 
inherent quality of  it. This means that the idea of  noise has always been historicized 
within music philosophy. 
After  mentioning  the  oft-quoted  examples  of  Luigi  Russolo  and  John  Cage, 
Hegarty observes the mandatory invocation to Attali, who, in his view,  
89 R. Murray Schafer,  The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World (Rochester, VT: 
Destiny Books, 1994) p. 185. As Hainge notes, this book ‘might be considered the ur-work of the anti-
noise lobby’ (Noise Matters, p. 41).
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developed a Nietzschean argument wherein the history of  music could be seen as the 
progressive domestication of  noise, through familiarity, secularization of  music, or legal 
controls (copyright, noise abatement, travel restrictions). More recently, Attali is often 
questioned,  but  it  was  his  book,  Bruits,  that  cleared  the  way  for  a  contextualised 
understanding of  noise and its relation to social and musical order, and established the 
idea that noise could work as a near-synonym for being avant-garde. 
Hegarty  then  goes  through  his  historicist  account,  wherein  noise  'nd  itself  
incorporated into composition running through the names of  Erik Satie, Charles Ives, 
Edgard Varèse, Pauline Oliveros, Pierre Schaeffer, Delia Derbyshire, and Stockhausen, 
without forgetting a mention to Jimi Hendrix’s Woodstock rendition of  The Star-spangled  
Banner in 1969. Other obligatory names thrown in together include representatives of 
the  New York  Downtown  scene:  Fluxus,  Sonic  Youth,  Yoko  Ono,  through  that  of 
Masami Akita, aka Merzbow––arguably the preeminent example of  the Japanoise scene
—up  to  the  recent  digital  explicitations  of  the  “Harsh  Noise  Wall” movement. 
Con'rming  the  relatively  recent  turn  to  genre'cation,  Hegarty  concludes  his  entry 
stating that ‘[a]fter a brief  period where noise was the essence of  “noise music,” the 
early-twenty-'rst  century  has  seen  a  return  to  a  paradigm  (in  performance  and 
recording) of  musicalization of  noise’.90
However,  the subtractive framework presented here––whereby noise originates  in an 
ontological  void––prescribes  that  noise  can  never  ever  be  substantiated.  From  this 
perspective, then, there is no such thing as “noise music”. In other words, noise can 
never be a genre91 and, insofar as the former hails from the inevitable upsurge of  a 
90 Paul Hegarty, ‘Noise’, Grove Music Online (2016) 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-
9781561592630-e-1002292545 [accss. 2 May 2018].
91 As  Brassier  has  eloquently  argued,  ‘[i]n  this  regard,  the  “noise”  genre  is  undoubtedly  a  cultural 
commodity, albeit of a particularly rare'ed sort. But so is its theorization’; see Ray Brassier, ‘Genre is 
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(musical) void, there has always been some noise in every music. 
A case in point which immediately problematises this (widespread) suturing of 
noise  with  twentieth-century  modernisms  is  what  has  been  termed  within  classical  
scholarship as the New Music of  Athens. Evidence only recently researched92 speaks of  a 
wave of  radically innovative experimental performers, composers and tragedians who 
emerged in mid-'fth century BC in Attica.  The activities of  this avant-garde (which 
counted Euripides amongst  its  supporters,  as  Aristophanes’  brutal  parodies attest  to) 
appeared around the time of  the democratic reforms of  Pericles at the start of  the 460s 
and lasted up to the beginning of  the  fourth century.  Modern scholarship seems to 
unanimously  agree  that  this  Athenian  movida of  experimental  music-theatre––which 
shows  all  the  symptoms  of  a  full-on  Badiouian  artistic  event––was,  indeed,  an 
experimental avant-garde of  noise-makers. Stephen Halliwell, for instance, writes about 
‘a trend of  avant-garde musical experimentation’ happening in Plato’s own lifetime and 
‘often called the “New Music” by modern historians’.93 Armand D’Angour echoes that 
‘[i]n the case of  ancient music, the terms “revolution” and “New Music” are regularly 
and  unapologetically  applied  by  modern  scholars  to  developments  in  the  late  'fth 
century BC.’94 The centre of  the movement was Athens, but the wave also spread to 
other cities which happened to be under the inHuence of  democratic ideology.95 The 
members of  this  camarilla, ‘ruf'ans’ as Martin West jestingly calls them, were mainly 
‘composers  of  dithyrambs  or  citharodes’96––their  names  (in)famously  exposed  in  a 
comedic  fragment  by  Pherecrates  (quoted  in  the  Pseudo-Plutatchan  De  Musica): 
Obsolete’,  Noise  and Capitalism,  ed. by Antony Iles et. al.,  (Donostia-San Sebastián: Arteleku Audiolab, 
2009) pp. 61-71 (p. 69).
92 Mainly Pseudo-Plutarch (De Musica 29) and Aristophanes. 
93 Stephen Halliwell, ‘Plato’,  The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, ed. by Theodore Gracyk & 
Andrew Kania (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 307-316 (p. 307). 
94 Armand D’Angour, ‘The New Music––so what’s new?’, Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient Greece, ed. 
by Simon Goldhill & Robin Osborne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 264-83 (p. 267).
95 See Csapo, ‘The Politics of the New Music’, p. 230.
96 Martin Litch'eld West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 357.
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Melannipides, Phrynis, Cinesias, Philoxenus and Thimoteus, along with their tragedian 
accomplices  such  as  Agathon  and  Euripides,  and  the  histrionic  showmanship  of  
performers like the aulete Pronomus. Like every other avant-garde worthy of the name, it 
was  properly  provocative,  scandalous  and dangerous.  According  to  Eric  Csapo ‘the 
critics cried “insurrection!” and “buggery’ with a vehemence likely to dumbfound any 
who examines the actual remains of New Music.’97
One must insist, then, on this point: that with regards to its border with music, noise can 
be neither substantialised in a singular genre, nor ascribed to any particular historical  
sequence (as Hegarty and most sound studies scholars seem be inclined to do). As the 
'fth century BC musical  revolution in  Athens testi'es,  there have been eruptions  of 
noise throughout the whole historical narrative of  Western music.98 
Noise happened (and happens) all the time: it retroactively becomes a musical 
event  if  and  when  encountered  by  musical  subjects  that,  rather  than  denying  or 
obscuring it, will have faithfully af'rmed it as a new musical truth. Such af'rmation 
(which amounts to an explicit articulation, by the musical subject, of  the noise itself) is 
precisely what  a musical education in noise supports (which amounts to an explicit  dialogic  
response to the noise articulated by the subject).
4.3. The Matheme of Noise
The Shannon event and Malaspina’s enquiries
The 'eld  of  Information  Theory will  deserve  some closer  attention,  if  only  for  the 
97 Csapo, ‘The Politics of the New Music’, p. 207. For further reading on this fascinating subject, see also  
Isobel  Henderson,  ‘Ancient  and  Oriental  Music’,  Ancient  Greek  Music,  ed.  by  Egon  Wellesz  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 336–403.
98 Whether it has been something happening exclusively within Western music history, is another matter.
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reason that it  has a strong case to being the framework wherein noise gets  its  most 
formal,  mathematised treatment,  and therefore––a Badiouian reader might think––it 
should provide fertile grounds for sowing a proper ontology of  noise.99
Information theory, the science studying the transmission, encoding, decoding, 
processing, extraction, and utilisation of  communication, sprang towards the end of  the 
1940’s as a result of  the work done by mathematician and electronic engineer Claude 
Shannon.100 Its founding moment was the publication of  two papers in 1948 in the July 
and October issues of  the Bell Systems Technical Journal, titled ‘A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication’.101 
Shannon’s intervention has arguably acquired the intensity of  an event, in the proper 
Badiouian sense of  the term––something which Malaspina makes very clear right at the 
start  of  her  seminal  treatise:  ‘[t]he  conceptualization  of  noise  takes  a  new  turn  in 
relation to Claude Shannon’s de'nition of  information as “information entropy”––this 
much is certain.’102 And, in this respect, Malaspina is not alone––indeed, the evental 
aspect of  Shannon’s invention is something universally acknowledged in the scienti'c 
community, as neuroscientist James Stone remarks:
Shannon’s theory underpins our understanding of how signals and noise are related, 
and why there are de'nite limits to the rate at which information can be communicated 
within  any  system,  whether  man-made  or  biological.  It  represents  one  of  the  few 
99 Not to mention the fact that Attali’s own conception of noise will have drawn most of its vocabulary––
though, as we shall see, not all of the potential consequences––from it.
100 Claude Elwood Shannon (April 30, 1916 Petoskey, MI – February 24, 2001, Metford MA,) was also 
co-inventor of Pulse-code Modulation (PCM), a method for digitally representing analog signals: PCM is 
the technique used to encode audio data to be stored in CDs.
101 See Claude E. Shannon, ‘The Mathematical Theory of Communication’, The Mathematical Theory Of  
Communication, by Claude E. Shannon & Warren Weaver  (Urbana, IL: The University Of Illinois Press, 
1964), pp. 29-125.
102 EN p. 17
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examples of a single theory creating an entirely new 'eld of research. In this regard, 
Shannon’s theory ranks alongside those of Darwin–Wallace, Newton, and Einstein.103
Shannon’s  formalisation  presents  something  like  an  informational  situation which,  as 
already mentioned, is ontologised, in a quasi-Badiouian manner. And qua situation, it 'nds 
itself  here subtracted from any predicates and particularities––hence the irrelevance of 
semantic signi'ers. As Warren Weaver explains in the introduction to the book-edition 
of  Shannon’s  paper,  ‘information must  not  be  confused with meaning.  […] It  is  this, 
undoubtedly,  that  Shannon  means  when  he  says  that  “the  semantic  aspects  of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering aspects”’.104 
It is this ‘ontologisation’ of  the informational situation that which marks the Shannon 
singularity as an event. And it is arguably Malaspina’s work which––in true Badiouian 
spirit, one must say––best extracts the full philosophical consequences from said event:105
Shannon’s  conceptual  audacity  was  to  treat  information  as  a  raw  fact,  in  all  its 
ontological  and epistemological  nudity.  Devoid  of  Boltzmann’s  reference  to  physical 
reality, but also of  Wiener’s utilitarian injunctions regarding organization or purpose, 
Shannon’s “entropic ideas” help us to rethink information as a pure event of  which we 
know nothing but the improbability of  its occurrence. What information philosopher 
103 James V Stone,  Information Theory: A Tutorial Introduction (s.l.: Sebtel Press, 2015), p.2. Soon after the 
publication of the papers, in 1953, Francis Bello blazoned in the pages of Fortune magazine in that ‘[g]reat 
scienti'c  theories,  like  great  symphonies  and  great  novels,  are  among  man's  proudest––and  rarest 
creations. What sets the scienti'c theory apart from, and, in a sense above, the other creations is that it  
may profoundly and rapidly after man's view of the world [...] Within the last 've years a new theory has  
appeared that seems to bear some of the same hallmarks of greatness.’ Francis Bello, ‘The Information 
Theory’,  Fortune 48:6,  pp.  136-58;  quoted  in  Jeremy Campbell,  Grammatical  Man:  Information,  Entropy,  
Language, and Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 19.
104 Warren  Weaver,  ‘Recent  Contributions  to  the  Mathematical  Theory  of  Communication’, The 
Mathematical  Theory  Of  Communication,  by  Claude  E.  Shannon  &  Warren  Weaver  (Urbana,  IL:  The 
University Of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 1-28 (p. 8)
105 Malaspina would probably correct my use of the term philosophical to epistemological.
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Luciano Floridi has called the most profound epistemic upheaval since the invention of 
the Gutenberg Press, must therefore be considered not only in light of  the profound 
impact  of  new  communication  technologies  […]  but  also  in  light  of  its  truly 
philosophical audacity.106
In Shannon’s inaugural papers, we 'nd a 'rst attempt to mathematically capture and 
formalise those elusive concepts and de'nitions that we have been relating to noise in 
order  to  somehow  measure its  protean  nature.107 In  Shannon’s  framework  though, 
Proteus-noise takes the form of  (what some would regard as) its opposite: viz., information.
Before  Shannon’s  paper,  information  had  been  viewed  as  a  kind  of  poorly  de'ned 
miasmic Huid. But after Shannon’s paper, it became apparent that information is a well-
de'ned and, above all, measurable quantity. Shannon’s paper describes a subtle theory 
which tells us something fundamental about the way the universe works.108
Shannon’s translation
Shannon’s tremendous achievement is nothing else than an elegant and rigorous piece 
of  conceptual translation109 of  an earlier body of  work: viz., Ludwig Boltzmann’s statistical 
formalisation of  molecular entropy. During the last quarter of  the nineteenth century, 
Boltzmann’s work on kinetic theory of  gases, together with that of  Josiah Willard Gibbs 
and James Clerk Maxwell––building upon the earlier 'ndings of  Rudolf  Clausius, which 
had  layed  the  foundations  for  establishing  the  second  law  of  thermodynamics––
106 EN p. 105.
107 ‘Essentially’,  Jeremy Campbell writes,  ‘the papers consisted of a set of theorems dealing with the 
problem of sending messages from one place to another quickly, economically and ef'ciently’ (Grammatical  
Man, p. 17).
108 Stone, Information Theory, p. 2.
109 I mean  translation with the full Serresian inHection that I am using throughout this essay, viz., as a 
producer of noise and, hence, of potentially new sense.
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eventually led to the creation of  the 'eld known as statistical mechanics, a scienti'c 
event  marking  the  epistemological  rupture  that  shifted  physics  from  dynamical  to 
thermodynamical paradigms.110 
As  suggested  above,  Shannon’s  invention  consisted  in  a  translation  of 
Boltzmann’s  et  al.  statistical  mechanical  concepts  and  formulae  into  informational 
terms: in short, it comprised a perfect example of  an epistemological trespass. As Malaspina 
notes,  ‘Ludwig  Boltzmann’s  great  innovation  during  the  nineteenth  century  was  to 
devise  the  statistical  formulation  of  molecular  entropy,  which  became  the  basis  for 
Shannon’s formalized concepts of  both information and noise.’111 And it  is  precisely 
because of this translation, or, rather, because of the nature of the borders crossed, that 
a particular kind of epistemological noise is here produced: one that jitters the respective 
meanings of information and noise themselves. In Malaspina’s reading, this semantic 
jittering happens because ‘despite the high degree of formalization, the intuitive idea of  
disorder continues to colour our idea of entropy and, consequently, both Shannon’s 
concepts of information and noise.’112 
And,  at  the  centre  of  Shannon’s  translation,  is  the  notion  of  entropy,  as 
Malaspina  plainly  points  out:  ‘[t]he  conceptual  operator  upon  which  the  idea  of 
information uncertainty hinges, is entropy’.113 
Entropy as a condition for thought
110 And an evental break which, as Serres notes, was a fundamental condition in Freud’s development of 
his idea of the unconscious.  ‘Freud,  however,  aligns himself  with these [thermodynamic] 'ndings:  he 
manifestly adopts as an initial model a topology like that of Maxwell and Listing, in which lines of force 
are  already  called  complexes,  and  an  energy  theory  based  on  thermodynamics  and  linked  to  two 
fundamental  principles:  the  conservation of energy and the tendency toward death.  Freudian time is 
irreversible (Hermes, p. 72).
111 EN p. 4.
112 Ibid.
113 EN p. 27.
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Entropy is the  hermetic signi6er par excellence. First coined by Clausius in 1885, when 
trying to de'ne a quantity which could measure the ‘equivalence of  transformations’, he 
proposed, ‘to call this quantity, after the Greek word τροπὴ, Transformation, the Entropy 
of the body’.114 
As Arthur Eddington explains, entropy is no more (no less) than ‘a criterion to 
distinguish past and future time’, which means then that it is an idea inseparable from a 
notion of  temporality.115 Eddington––who was 'rst to coin the ‘time’s arrow’ metaphor––
ties entropy, not only to a notion of irreversible temporality, but, fascinatingly enough,  
to that of  consciousness.116 What is more,  insofar as it  is  ‘the practical  measure of  the 
random element which can increase in the universe but can never decrease’,117 entropy is 
a notion which, in turn, links temporality with randomness. 
What  we have then is  entropy  (noise),  temporality,  chance and consciousness 
(subjectivity)––this  is  not,  however,  the  full  picture.  It  has  been  established  that  the 
transition  from low to high  entropy  (as  established  by the  second law),  can  also be 
productive  of  emergent  complexities––in  other  words,  the  passage  from  order  to 
disorder may be,  through its  own imbalance and nonequilibrium, productive of  new 
order. This position is doggedly maintained by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, for 
example.  Speci'cally,  for  Prigogine  irreversibility  is  not  the  mere  introduction  of 
increasing ignorance into the laws of  physics, as is commonly asserted. In other words, 
entropy is not only the result of  approximations forced onto physicists by the second law.
114 Rudolf Clausius,  The Mechanical Theory Of Heat,  trans.  by Walter L. Browne (London: Macmillan, 
1879), p. 107. Earlier, in a paper published in 1865, Clausius had written that ‘[t]he word entropy is  
deliberately formed as similar as possible to the word energy, for the two magnitudes which are to be  
named by these words are so closely related to one another in their physical meanings, that a certain  
similarity in their designation seems to me to be convenient. Rudolf Clausius, ‘Ueber verschiedene für die 
Anwendung bequeme Formen der Hauptgleichungen der mechanischen Wärmetheorie (Vorgetragen in 
der naturforsch. Gesellschaft zu Zürich den 24 April 1865)’, Annalen der Physik und Chemie. 125:7, pp. 353–
400 (p. 390).
115 Arthur S. Eddington, The Nature Of The Physical World (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 72. 
116 Ibid. pp. 68-75.
117 Ibid. p. 74.
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The main reason to discard the banalization of irreversibility is that we can no longer 
associate the arrow of time only with an increase in disorder. Recent developments in 
nonequilibrium  physics  and  chemistry  point  in  the  opposite  direction.  They  show 
unambiguously that the arrow of time is a source of order.118
It is here, then, that the core of  my arguments resides: the temporalisation of  the void as 
noise, the connection between the randomness of  the truth-procedure with a subjective 
production of  time in the assembling of  a new truth, all of  which is buttressed by what I  
call an education  in noise: all of  these concepts happen to be hermetically braided in 
and through entropy. 
And,  after  all,  if  Eddington’s  word  is  anything  to  go  by,  the  immanent 
uncertainty,  irreversibility and potential  that entropy brings  with it,  is  precisely what 
provides any thought conditioned by it with a sound foundation.
The law that entropy always increases⎯the second law of thermodynamics⎯holds, I 
think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature […] if your theory is found to be 
against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it 
but to collapse in deepest humiliation.119 
Nonetheless––and this point is crucial––entropy has to be considered as both an 
index of  disorder and a bearer of  new order. To put it in Žižekian Hegelese: entropy is 
split, immanently carrying its own negation. This dialectic––which, one might note in 
passing, does not contradict the second law––is precisely what I signify by the notation 
(neg)entropy. 




Technically speaking, entropy refers to the amount of  disorder (or randomness)  in a 
thermodynamic system (in the case of  statistical thermodynamics, the systems show a 
relatively large amount of  freedom: say, the movement of  air molecules in a container). 
When  Shannon  performs  his  translation,  ‘[t]he  resulting  formalism,’  Malaspina 
observes,  ‘is  not  just  metaphorically,  but  formally  analogous  with  the  statistical 
expression of  physical entropy.’120
In information theory, entropy is related to the lack of  information about the state 
of  the system (or, correspondingly, how much information we need to add in order to 
know the exact state of  the system). Very simply put: the occurrence of  a low-probability 
(i.e.  more  uncertain)  event  carries  more  information than a  higher  probability  (i.e.  less 
uncertain) event. The average amount of  information carried by each of  these events, 
expressed  as  the  value  of  a  random  variable  (i.e.  when  considering  all  possible 
outcomes), is equal to the amount of  information entropy. 
But how does Shannon connect entropy and information? Through the notion 
of  surprise. Take as an example the toss of  an unfair coin: say that we already know that 
there is a 90% probability of  landing heads. In which case, we would be more surprised 
if  the (less probable) outcome of  tails lands. Shannon will have measured the amount of 
surprise as the inverse of  the probability of  an outcome (or, more speci'cally, as the 
logarithm of  the inverse of  the probability). Shannon’s entropy would be, not necessarily 
the measure of  surprise of  a single outcome, but the average surprise throughout an entire  
set  of  outcomes.  Shannon’s entropy is  therefore the average surprise of  the probability 
distribution of  the random variable de'ned by those possible outcomes. 
120 EN p. 27.
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Uncertainty, freedom of  choice
But how does noise relate to  information and entropy? Shannon begins  his  seminal 
paper by reHecting on an immanent uncertainty ingrained in any communication:
[t]he fundamental problem of  communication is that of  reproducing at one point either 
exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages 
have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain 
physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of  communication are irrelevant 
to the engineering problem. The signi'cant aspect  is  that  the actual message is  one 
selected from a set of  possible messages. The system must be designed to operate for each 
possible selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown at 
the time of  design.121 
As  Malaspina  notes,  ‘Shannon’s  audacity  consists  quite  simply  in  correlating 
both information and noise with uncertainty’,122 or, to put it schematically:
information <—[uncertainty]—> noise
And adding her own Hegelian twist, Malaspina later on remarks that ‘we can now think 
of  information as a subtler difference than that between organization and chaos or sense 
and non-sense, a difference that takes place within the conceptual space of  entropy , within the space  
of  uncertainty’123 (a  remark  somewhat  suggestive  of  the  (neg)entropic  split  alluded  to 
above).
121 Shannon, ‘The Mathematical Theory of Communication’, p. 31.
122 EN p. 15.
123 EN p. 50 (my emphasis).
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It is important to note that noise is here not (yet) related to semantic sense, viz., as lack  
of  meaning, or none-sense. In fact the notion of  meaning per se makes no sense within 
the informational situation: 
[t]he concept of  information applies not to the individual messages (as the concept of 
meaning would), but rather to the situation as a whole, the unit information indicating 
that in this situation one has an amount of  freedom of  choice, in selecting a message,  
which it is convenient-to regard as a standard or unit amount.124 
This line of  argumentation rings with some intriguing resonances, inasmuch as 
information  as  de'ned  here––even  within  this  extremely  formalised  mathematical 
formulation––seems to be tinkling with subjective overtones, in that it appears to point 
towards some (probabilistic) notion of  freedom of  choice: 
[t]o be sure, this word information in communication theory relates not so much to what 
you  do say, as to what you  could say. […] That is, information is a measure of  one's 
freedom  of  choice  when  one  selects  a  message.  If  one  is  confronted  with  a  very 
elementary situation where he has to choose one of  two alternative messages, then it is 
arbitrarily said that the information, associated with this situation, is unity.125
This is a crucial aspect, as Malaspina is quick to notice: if  entropy is a measure 
of  the uncertainty of  all possible outcomes, in other words, ‘if  all probabilities […] are 
equal then the greatest possible “freedom of  choice” corresponds to the greatest possible 
uncertainty regarding the actual state of  either system or message, with respect to all its 
possible states.’126
124 Weaver, ‘Recent Contributions’,  p. 14.
125 Ibid, p 8-9.
126 EN p. 27-8
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It is here then, that for Malaspina, ‘[e]ntropy and noise indeed become identi'able.’127 
However––and most crucially––this  does  not imply the identi'cation of  noise with a 
statistically predictable quantity (more akin to a modern notion of  chaos):
it  would  be  wrong  to  overstate  the  statistical  determination  of  noise  and  call  it 
predictable,  because ultimately  entropy and noise  remain a  measure  of  ‘freedom of 
choice’, characteristic of an undetermined state of the system or message.128 
And it  is  precisely here,  as well,  that we 'nd a key (philosophical)  difference 
between chaos and noise: insofar as the latter involves the notion of  freedom of  choice, it 
allows––unlike the former––for some idea of  subjectivity to emerge. And this idea hinges 
on the distinction between statistics and probability. 
The quantity of information in Shannon’s  sense is analogous to the probability with 
which the observer of a physical system can predict what Max Planck called the micro-
complexions of a given system, and the probabilities of 'nding the system in any of these 
complexions.129 
In the end, as Díaz Nafría observes,  it  all  resides on the issue of  deciding,  or 
doing––in other words, what is there to do when encountering information and noise? 
(How does one decide it is one or the other?).
The very concept of “information” puts forward deep and challenging questions. Just 
one  binary  digit  may  tell  us  if  the  universe  is  about  to  collapse,  thus  being  very 
127 EN p. 28.
128 EN p. 28
129 Ibid. As for the concept of micro-state, and its relation to disorder and equilibrium, as Henri Atlan  
explains,  ‘[m]aximal  disorder  obtains  when the system reaches  its  state  of  equilibrium.  In  fact,  such 
disorder  is  mere  statistical  homogeneity  and concerns  the  placement  of  the  submicroscopic  particles 
(molecules,  atoms, elementary particles)  which constitute matter,  in every one of its possible energetic 
states (its “microstatess”)’; see Henri Atlan,  Entre le cristal et la fumée: Essai sur l’organisation du vivant  (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1979) p 28.
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informative, and all millions of terabits on the web (measured in a Shannon’s sense) may 
also  be  generated  by  the  whim  of  electrons  in  a  rheostat,  therefore  being 
uninformative.130 
The conclusion being, as Malaspina puts it, that ‘nothing distinguishes outwardly 
“information entropy” from what we would ordinarily call noise.’131 
Noise as spurious information
Shannon’s system, however, should be seen as a formal tool built,  not to extract the 
subjective (philosophical, political) consequences of  this uncertainty, but, much to the 
contrary, to aid in the resolution of  such uncertainty (in other words, to lower the probability 
of  decoding error). In order to achieve this, the system needs, 'rst of  all, to identify the  
appearance  of  noise–or  rather,  to  index  its  locus––within  the  informational  loop: 
Shannon accordingly begins by formalising a communicative mechanism comprised of 
've essential parts:
1.  An  information  source which  produces  a  message  or  sequence  of  messages  to  be 
communicated to the receiving terminal  […].  2.  A  transmitter which operates  on the 
message in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel […]. 
3. The  channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to 
receiver. 4. The  receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of  that done by the 
transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal. 5. The destination is the person 
(or thing) for whom the message is intended.132
As is apparent then, the message is the actual connecting stuff linking the source with 
130 Díaz Nafría, ‘What is Information?’ p. 77.
131 EN p. 24.
132 Shannon, ‘The Mathematical Theory of Communication’ p. 2.
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the receiver and Howing through the info-communicative machine: one could think of  it 
as the material of  information, its unit of  measurement being the bit.133 As for the signal, 
this is de'ned as a function of  which its variation in time, space, temperature, or any other 
independent variable able to convey information, represents the information conveyed by 
such variables.134 A signal is, more generally then, the representation of  a disturbance, of 
a transfer of  energy, of  an oscillation, or a vibration.135 
It  is  within  this,  or  rather,  because  of this source-transmitter-message-channel-signal-
receiver-destination assemblage, then, that noise makes its appearance:
As Weaver explains:
in the process of  being transmitted, it is unfortunately characteristic that certain things 
are  added to the signal  which were  not  intended by the  information source.  These 
133 Shannon writes that a message, could be ‘a sequence of letters (as in the telegraph),  or ‘a single 
function of time’ (as in radio or telephony),  ‘a function of time and other variables’  (black-and-white  
television),  ‘two  or  more  functions  of  time’  (three-dimensional  sound),  ‘several  functions  of  several 
variables’ (color television), and ‘various combinations’ of the above (Ibid, p.2).
134 ‘A signal is a function that conveys information about the behaviour of a system or attributes of some  
phenomenon’. Roland Priemer,  Introductory Signal Processing  (Singapore, New Jersey and London: World 
Scienti'c, 1991) p. 1. For Shannon (writing in the late 1940s) the signal in telephony, for example, would 
consist of ‘changing sound pressure’, in telegraphy ‘a sequence of dots, dashes and spaces’ and so on (Ibid. 
p. 2)
135 ‘In most cases, these signals originate as sensory data from the real world: seismic vibrations, visual 
images, sound waves, etc.’ Steven W. Smith, The Scientist and Engineer's Guide to Digital Signal Processing (San 
Diego, CA: California Technical Publishing, 1999) p. 1.
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unwanted additions may be distortions of  sound (in telephony, for example) or static (in 
radio), or distortions in shape or shading of  picture (television), or errors in transmission 
(telegraphy or facsimile), etc. All of  these changes in the transmitted signal are called 
noise.136
Furthermore,  Weaver  goes  on  to  equate  noise  with  the  ‘spurious  portion’  of 
information: 
It  is  generally  true  that  when  there  is  noise,  the  received  signal  exhibits  greater 
information- or better, the received signal is selected out of a more varied set than is the 
transmitted signal. This is a situation which beautifully illustrates the semantic trap into 
which one can fall  if  he does not remember that “information” is used here with a 
special  meaning that measures freedom of choice and hence  uncertainty as  to  what  
choice has been made. It is therefore possible for the word information to have either 
good or bad connotations. Uncertainty which arises by virtue of freedom of choice on 
the part  of  the  sender  is  desirable  uncertainty.  Uncertainty  which arises  because of 
errors or because of the inHuence of noise is undesirable uncertainty. 
It is thus clear where the joker is in saying that the received signal has more 
information.  Some  of  this  information  is  spurious  and  undesirable  and  has  been 
introduced via the noise. To get the useful information in the received signal we must 
subtract out this spurious portion.137
Shannon’s concern is ‘in particular the effect of  noise in the channel, and the 
savings possible due to the statistical structure of  the original message and due to the 
nature of  the 'nal destination of  the information’.138 
136 Weaver, ‘Recent Contributions’,  p. 7-8.
137 Ibid. p. 19.
138 Shannon, ‘ The Mathematical Theory of Communication’ p. 1.
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All in all Shannon’s efforts are an expression of  technology’s desire (which, one could add, is 
itself  an expression of  the state’s desire as a whole) to neuter noise, to ceaseless focus on 
the Sisyphean effort of  in'nitely increasing the signal-to-noise ratio, not only in every 
communicative situation, but in every possible situation.
Noise vis-à-vis signal
Such desire 'nds a most formal expression in Shannon’s noisy-channel coding theorem, which 
states the following: given a noisy channel with channel capacity C and information 
transmitted at rate R, then if  R < C, there exist codes that allow the probability of  error  
(of  noise) at the receiver to be made arbitrarily small. This means that, theoretically, it is 
possible to transmit information nearly without error at any rate below a limiting rate, C 
(in the converse situation, wherein R > C, an arbitrarily small probability of  error is not  
achievable).  This  theorem became a  foundation  pillar  for  Coding  theory––yet  another 
subset  of  communication  theory––a  'eld  which  groups  together  the  technologies 
developed  to  exploit  channel  capacity,  and  allow  for  work  within  bounds  of  the 
immanent signal-to-noise limits of  a system. 
Shannon’s system then, considers mostly ‘the entropy of  the message relative to the 
signal’139:  the consequences of  this,  as  Malaspina observes,  are  not trivial,  insofar as 
‘what remains in the dark, if  we consider only the problem of  noise in the channel of 
communication, is thus the part that the accidental may play in the decision to select 
and designate something, in principle anything, as information’.140  
139 Weaver, ‘Recent Contributions’,  p. 19-20.
140 EN p. 98.
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Weaver’s conclusive remarks on this issue, even though not abandoning a clearly 
scientistic and positivist viewpoint, are worth quoting in extenso: 
[o]ne  can  imagine,  as  an  addition  to  the  diagram,  another  box  labeled  “Semantic 
Receiver”  interposed  between  the  engineering  receiver  (which  changes  signals  to 
messages) and the destination. This semantic receiver subjects the message to a second 
decoding,  the  demand  on  this  one  being  that  it  must  match  the  statistical  semantic 
characteristics  of  the  message  to  the  statistical  semantic  capacities  of  the  totality  of 
receivers,  or of  that  subset of  receivers  which constitute  the audience one wishes to 
affect.
Similarly one can imagine another box in the diagram which, inserted between 
the information source and the transmitter, would be labeled “semantic noise,” the box 
previously labeled as simply “noise” now being labeled “engineering noise.” From this 
source is imposed into the signal the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are 
not  intended  by  the  source  but  which  inescapably  affect  the  destination.  And  the 
problem of semantic decoding must take this  semantic noise into account.  It  is  also 
possible  to  think  of  an adjustment  of  original  message  so  that  the  sum of  message 
meaning  plus  semantic  noise  is  equal  to  the  desired  total  message  meaning  at  the 
destination.141
Weaver’s ‘semantic noise’ seems to hint at the other crucial concept at work in 
my thesis: that of  the incompleteness of  language, residing at the origin of  what I am terming 
noise-inside.
Bit as relation
Shannon’s paper, incidentally, presents the 'rst ever appearance of  the word ‘bit’. 142 In 
141 Weaver, ‘Recent Contributions’,  p. 26.
142 Even though Shannon (who was renowned for his humbleness) credits it as ‘a word suggested by [the  
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one of  her many insights, Malaspina identi'es that in a “bit”, ‘what is thereby quanti'ed 
is not a signal or message, but  a changing relation between the actual and the possible, 
within a given frame of  constraints’.143  Insofar as the notion of relation will become 
fundamental to my conclusive argument, this beautiful idea has immense anticipatory 
potency for my educational argument. 
Furthermore, what Malaspina seems to be not unnoticing here, is the fact that a 
bit,  in  Shannon’s  sense  (viz.,  as  a  measurement  of  the  amount  of  information  in  a 
message) is not identical to a binary digit (viz., as the outcome [0,1] of a binary variable)––
a common confusion which, as Stone points  out, is  the source of  a serious category 
error: 
[d]espite the fact that the word bit is derived from binary digit, there is a subtle, but vital, 
difference between them. A binary digit is the value of a binary variable, where this value 
can be either a 0 or a 1, but a binary digit is not information per se. In contrast, a bit is a 
de'nite amount of information. Bits and binary digits are different types of entity, and to 
confuse one with the other is known as a category error.144 
As  Malaspina  correctly  hints,  this  distinction  points  to  notions  concerning 
freedom of  choice and subjectivity. The difference between receiving a message carrying 
new information, or one that simply con'rms something already known. To illustrate 
this: take a subject faced with an option to turn left/right in a junction; each choice can 
be represented by a binary digit, say: right = 0, left = 1; if  the subject already knows that  
they will have to turn left, the binary digit 1 will have provided them with zero bits of  
mathematician] J. W. Tukey’ (The Mathematical Theory of Communication, p. 32). See: John Wilder Tukey, 
‘Sequential  conversion of continuous data to digital  data’,  Bell  Laboratories  Memorandum (1 Sept.  1947), 
reprinted in: Henry S. Tropp, Annals of the History of Computing 6:2 (1984), pp. 152-5.
143 EN p. 40 (my emphasis); as we shall see in part III, the proper development of the consequences of  
this beautiful idea, is critical to the consistency of the Educational theory proposed here.
144 Stone, Information Theory, p. 10. Following David Mackay, Stone suggests that the unit of information 
be named ‘the Shannon’ (ibid. p. 10); see also David J.C. MacKay, Information Theory, Inference, and Learning  
Algorithms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 33. 
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information. Moreover, if  they know that there is, say, 70% chance that they will turn 
left, then the binary digit 1 will have provided them with less than 1 bit of  information––
in fact, it is providing the subject half  a bit of  information. 
When  thought  in  the  context  of  a  subjective  truth-procedure  within  Badiou’s 
framework, wherein the subject enquiries are de'ned by binary options of  the form “is  
this element (x) positively connected to the event?”, Shannon’s informational tools might help 
opening  up  novel  ways  of  formalising  the  random  trajectory  drawn  by  a  truth 
procedure. 
Considering  that  such  trajectory  concerns,  as  I  claim  here,  the  domain  of 
education, the consequences of  these new formalisations might not be unimportant.
4.4. The Nil-dimensionality of Noise
Order, disorder: information, noise
Once  again,  the  paradox  identi'ed  by  Malaspina  is  that  ‘nothing  distinguishes 
outwardly “information entropy” from what we would ordinarily call noise’.145 Precisely 
this same paradox emerges with the notions of  order and disorder––in order to illustrate 
this  semantic  puzzle,  one  has  but  to  recall  Gregory  Bateson’s  ‘Metalogue’  with  his 
daughter:
Daughter: Daddy, do you and I mean the same thing by “tidy?”
Father: I doubt it, my dear––I doubt it.
145 EN p. 24.
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Daughter: But, Daddy, isn’t that a funny thing––that everybody means the same thing 
when they  say  “muddled”  but  everybody  means  something  different  by  “tidy”.  But 
“tidy” is the opposite of  “muddled,” isn’t it?146 
Commenting on this  delightful  passage,  Henri  Atlan observes  that what  is  at 
stake here is a matter of  signi'cation at the level of  the receiver. Bateson’s daughter’s 
questions illustrate a not unfamiliar situation: the encounter with someone else’s working 
space (desk, 'ling cabinets, shelves etc.), all of  which appear to the outsider as a ‘muddle’ 
of  papers,  books  and  unidenti'able  stationary––an  uncodi'able  mess  of  stuff  to 
everyone’s but the proprietor’s eyes. Why would the task of  trying to impose a new order 
on this disorder would be almost futile?  Because, as Atlan explains, 
[w]hat we are dealing here is documents in terms of their relation to their user. The  
apparent disorder was hiding an order determined by a speci'c knowledge of each one 
of the documents and their possible utilitarian signi'cation. But why did this order have 
the appearance of disorder? Because for the second observer, who desires to “put some 
order”, the documents no longer have the same signi'cation. […] What we see here is 
that the opposition between order and apparent order proceeds from the fact that the 
documents be considered either in their individual and speci'c signi'cation, or globally 
with an altogether different individual signi'cation (determined, for example, on shape, 
colour,  or  any  other  ordering  principle  decided  from the  outside  and  without  the 
knowledge of the user), or even with no signi'cation at all.147
And it is indeed this same paradox that Malaspina identi'es in ‘Shannon’s de'nition of 
146 Gregory Bateson, ‘Metalogue: Why Do Things Get in a Muddle?’, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago 
& London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972) pp. 3-8 (p. 4).
147 Atlan, Entre le cristal et la fumée, p 27.
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information’ and which therefore ‘appears dangerously close to that of  noise.’148  So, 
once again,  we have here the  case of  noise’s  self-dithering behaviour,  which could be 
formalised ontologically as a (banned) self-belonging set––and which is, let us not forget, 
the formalisation of  a Badiouian event itself. Indeed, for Malaspina, this self-reHexivity 
between Shannon’s information and noise
is  paradoxical  in  the  sense  that  it  is  free  of  cultural  pre-conceptions  and therefore 
offends  such  pre-conceptions,  transgressing  their  doxa:  in  this  sense  the  conceptual 
innovation inherent in Shannon’s concept of  “information entropy” indeed acts as a 
form of  conceptual noise, when it is exported from its technological application to other 
domains.149 
Shannon’s de'nition of  entropic noise is a concept that itself  emits ‘conceptual 
noise’,  and  this  without  it  being  necessarily  self-contradicting; it  is  in  this  sense  that 
Shannon’s entropy––as de'nition  and as subject of  a de'nition––is purely ‘evental’ in 
Badiou’s sense of  the term. 
Indeed,  as  Malaspina  argues,  Shannon’s  entropy  does  contradict  ‘the  doxa 
according to which one ought to obtain from information simultaneously both novelty and 
a reduction in uncertainty’,  frustrating the ‘paradoxical  need’ to  equate novelty and 
certainty, thereby enabling us ‘to think about contingency as belonging to the conditions 
of  possibility of  all processes of  information, including but not only of  those processes 
we  associate  with  signi'cation  in  the  semantic  communication  between  sapient 
beings.’150
148 EN p. 23
149 EN p. 24
150 EN p. 24
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In this respect, one could not agree more with Malaspina’s imperative of  exploring the 
site demarcated by the relationship between noise, information, knowledge, subjectivity 
and  truth.  The  fact  that  Malaspina  utilises  slightly  different  conceptual  tools  and 
philosophical vehicles to survey it, is a mere contingency, and the only the reason why 
some  of  our  respective  ‘discursive  interpretations’  (which  are  sensitive  to  initial 
conditions),  will  have  inevitably  drifted  apart,  even  when  strong  common attractors 
remain.
Return to ontology?
The void as noise provides a vehicle out of  the realm of  ontology. Insofar as this is done by  
temporalising the void, this movement brings with it (neg)entropy and irreversibility: it  
would seem, then, that once out of  ontology,  there is no going back. 
Having said that, would it  be possible to think of  noise in purely ontological  
terms? Can we think of  noise de-sutured from the physico-phenomenological condition? This is 
precisely what Shannon’s intervention is designed to do. 
Information theory allows for the thinking of  noise unburdened by its physical body. 
This  is  almost  graphically  evinced  in  the  way  that  Shannon  tweaks  Boltzmann’s 
formulae for statistical mechanics, which measures the entropy of  a physical system, in 
order to obtain his own formula for information entropy:
Boltzmann:
: physical system––number of  possible states as a physical entity 
(  is the probability of  the momentum and position of  particles at any given moment) 
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Shannon:
: information––number of  possible states as a message
(  is the probability––(0,1) of  signs)
As we can see comparing the formulae, Shannon’s information entropy (H)  is 
almost identical to Boltzmann’s statistical entropy (S): the former only lacks the latter’s 
constant K. As Malaspina notes,
Shannon uses a mathematical expression that is almost identical to Boltzmann’s. What 
is signi'cant, however, is that he leaves out the term K. K is the physical constant that 
expresses the calori'c value of Hows of energy, understood as displacements of thermal 
charges,  wherever  a  disparity  exists  between  energy  levels,  for  instance  in electrical 
currents or in Hows of matter. This algorithm, K, is what anchors Boltzmann’s formula 
in physical reality.151
Now, as alluded to above, it is the use of  the notion of  entropy what makes Shannon’s  
con'guration  metaphorical: it is what renders it a proper noise-producing translation––
indeed,  as  Malaspina  puts  it,  entropy  is ‘an  indispensable  metaphor  into  this 
ontologically  arbitrary  concept  of  information’.152 However,  for  Malaspina,  this 
metaphorical aspect is operated by omitting the Boltzmann constant.  The omission of 
this term––which, one might say, is  the mark of  a suture to  physis–is  what unmoors 
Shannon’s concepts from the weight of  an empirical body, and therefore, ‘by leaving out 
the reference to this physical aspect’, 
Shannon  transforms  Boltzmann’s  mathematical  expression  of  entropy  into  an 
151 EN p. 29.
152 EN p. 27
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ontologically arbitrary measure of probability.  Shannon thereby unmoors probability 
from Boltzmann’s empirical measure of calori'c conversion of energy and work related 
to thermal displacements in a physical system’.153 
So,  for  Malaspina,  even  though  it  is  still  true  that  Shannon  does  apply  his 
concept to empirical realms such as electronic signal transmission and the like, 
his concept of  “information entropy” and hence also of  noise is now devoid of  any 
ontological reference: it  could inform us about the probability of  occurrence of  any 
phenomenon involving large  numbers,  be  it  the How of  signals,  Hows of  people,  of 
goods or unicorns – in short it is ontologically arbitrary.154
Or, in Badiou’s terms,  ontological, tout court. Noise hence becomes the abstract 
interior of  a black box, a negativity of  absolute lightness, complying with what Bateson 
calls  ‘the  negative  character  of  cybernetic  explanation’,  wherein  ‘“information”  is 
quanti'ed in negative terms.’
An event or object such as the letter K in a given position in the text of a message might 
have been any other of the limited set of twenty-six letters in the English language. The 
actual  letter  excludes  (i.e.,  eliminates  by  restraint)  twenty-'ve  alternatives.  In 
comparison with an English letter, a Chinese ideograph would have excluded several 
thousand  alternatives.  We  say,  therefore,  that  the  Chinese  ideograph  carries  more 
information than the letter. The quantity of information is conventionally expressed as 
the log to base 2 of the improbability of the actual event  or object.[…] Probability, 
being  a  ratio  between  quantities  which  have  similar  dimensions,  is  itself  of  zero 
dimensions.  That  is,  the  central  explanatory  quantity,  information,  is  of  zero 
153 EN p. 31.
154 Ibid.
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dimensions.  Quantities  of  real  dimensions  (mass,  length,  time)  and  their  derivatives 
(force, energy, etc.) have no place in cybernetic explanation.155
Once accepted, the nil-dimensionality of  noise is what guarantees its passepartout 
capability, its pan-6ltering through any border, membrane and category one can think of: 
inside|outside, objective|subjective, afferent|efferent,156 I|it, immanent|transcendent, emic|etic, voice|
language, logos|melos, microstate |macrostate,157  and so on.
As  such,  the  void-as-noise  becomes  thermodynamical,  irreversible,  relational, 
Hermetic.158  
However––and this is  crucial––as far as a subject is concerned, there will  always be 
some work to be done: granted, Shannon’s information, and noise itself, might have been 
unmoored from  physis and hence able to inhabit an ontology of sorts: the  work  of the 
subject, however, will have been always already temporalised, entropic,  heat-producing.  
‘Information has a de'nite lowest cost which can be measured in joules per bit. More 
than  any  other,  this  fact  establishes  the  existence  of  a  fundamental  link  between 
Shannon’s  information  entropy  and  Boltzmann-Gibbs’  thermodynamic  entropy.’159 
Such a link indexes the physical channel wherein education passes, the chord wherein 
the void transduces into noise.  
155 Gregory Bateson,  ‘Cybernetic  Explanation’,  Steps  to  an  Ecology  of  Mind (Chicago & London:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 1972) pp. 405-16 (pp. 408-09).
156 See Malaspina, EN p. 98.
157 Viz.,  kinetic  energy  of  molecules|temperature  of  a  system,  which  marks  the  boundary  between  classical  
thermodynamics|statistical mechanics.
158 One of the most common of the many epithets of Hermes is στροφεύς (stropheus): as Karl Kerenyi 
comments,  στροφεύς is  the “socket” in which the pivot of the door moves,  showing Hermes ‘closely  
related to door hinges, and therefore to the entrance but also to a middle point, to the socket, about which 
revolves the most decisive issue, namely the alternation life-death-life’. Karl Kerényi, Hermes: Guide of Souls, 
(Putnam, CT: Spring Publications, 1976), p. 103.
159 Stone, Information Theory p. 184.
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The subject will always already remain a noisy,  embodied void. And therefore, there is 
indeed,  always  already,  a  minimum  pysico-phenomenological  fee to  pay  for  the  cost  of 
educating this body: precisely joules/degree per bit of acquired information, 
as established by the Landauer limit.
Entropy, negentropy & (neg)entropy
Considering  that  I  have  been  deploying  the  term  negentropy somewhat  liberally 
throughout this thesis, the concept might now require more careful examination. And in 
particular, a closer look will be given to that which I have been notating as (neg)entropy, 
‘the mutual entanglement and correspondence between the two concepts of entropy and 
negative entropy,’ as Kun Wu et al. put it.160
Now, in Wu’s analysis, Shannon’s information entropy formula  can be 
interpreted ‘in multiple senses’, insofar as it can be a measure of  any of  the following:
i. the randomness of the message sent by the source,
ii. the a priori uncertainty of the message generated by the source
iii. the ability of a source to send information
iv. the uncertainty of choosing among multiple messages 
v. the average information quantity (average eliminated uncertainty) carried by each 
message
vi. the average degree to which information sink uncertainty is changed.
160 Kun Wu, Qiong Nan & Tianqi Wu, ‘Philosophical Analysis of the Meaning and Nature of Entropy 
and Negative Entropy Theories’, Complexity 8769060 (2020), doi.org/10.1155/2020/8769060, p 2.
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All  of  which  carries  the  implication  that  H is  a  measure  of  either  (a)  the 
uncertainty at the information source (i.e. the uncertainty generated by the source itself,  
as in i., ii., iii., iv. and v.) or (b) how information changes the uncertainty at the receiving 
end (referred here as  the  ‘the information sink’).  This  means that  H in (a)  eliminates  
uncertainty whilst H in (b) is itself eliminated uncertainty. Should one opt for (b), Wu contends, 
then ‘this kind of information quantity is no longer “entropy” but has the meaning and 
value of “negative entropy” which is opposite to “entropy”’ and therefore eliminates both 
entropy and uncertainty. This is the reason that Shannon’s theory, they conclude, ‘has 
paved the way for related theories using negative entropy to explain the information.’161
If  the 'rst appearance of  the term ‘negentropy’ is credited to Leon Brillouin,162 it was 
Erwin Schrödinger who most famously called on it for scienti'c use, positing it  as a 
metabolic force which, in opposition to entropy, is the sustenance of  life itself: ‘[w]hat an 
organism feeds  upon is  negative  entropy’  he  famously  wrote  in  his  seminal  What  is  
Life?163, published in 1944. Schrödinger further suggested that ‘the awkward expression 
“negative entropy” can be replaced by a better one: entropy, taken with the negative 
sign’ and underlying it as ‘itself  a measure of  order.’164 Four years later, Norbert Wiener, 
as  if  following  Schrödinger’s  recommendation,  explicitly  sign-changed  Shannon’s 
formula in his own pioneering Cybernetics:
[w]e have said that amount of  information, being the negative logarithm of  a quantity 
which we may consider as a probability, is essentially a negative entropy. It is interesting 
to show that, on the average, it has the properties we associate with an entropy.165
161 Ibid. pp. 3-4.
162 See Leon Brillouin, “The Negentropy Principle of Information,” Journal of Applied Physics 24:9 (1953), 
pp. 1152-1163, doi:10.1063/1.1721463
163 Erwin Schrödinger,  What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell & Mind and Matter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967) p. 76, c.f. p. 78.
164 Ibid. p. 79.
165 Norbert Wiener,  Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine  (Cambridge, MA: 
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In this respect there is certainly a continuity between the thinking of  Wiener and that of  
Schrödinger, as Wu clearly points out:
Schrödinger’s  negative  entropy  of  life  is  used  to  calculate  the  ability  to  resist  the 
spontaneous  entropy  increase  in  the  living  body,  while  the  information  quantity  of 
Wiener is used to calculate the amount of  new knowledge brought to the receiver by the 
message. Both have two basic points in common: [1] the system is open and [2] it can 
eliminate its own chaos by the environment. Here, what Wiener’s information quantity 
calculates is exactly what Schrödinger’s negative entropy calculates.166 
And, crucially, it is precisely between this twin notion of  openness and  exchange with the  
environment where (neg)entropy appears as a pivot. Considering that, as Wiener explains, 
‘information is a name for the content of  what is  exchanged with the outer world as we 
adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt upon it’167, then, Wu reasons, insofar as there 
is ‘exchange’ there is an ‘in and out’, which means that ‘there is information not only 
within our subject but also in the external environment.’168
This  “exchange”  implies  that,  crucially,  the  creation  of  negentropy,  whilst 
certainly a producer of  form, is still a producer of  noise. Furthermore, it produces noise 
because it produces form––or, to put it in Badiouian:  if there is  form on the side of  the 
subject, then there is noise on the side of  the state.
All of  which, in turn, points to the (ethical, aesthetic, political, epistemological, erotic) 
slipperiness of, not only the distinction between information and noise, but of  the notion 
of noise-as-always-divided,  an  evasiveness  appearing in  the  ubiquitous  vulgate  question 
The MIT Press, 1961) p. 64.
166 Wu, et al., op. cit. p. 5.
167 Norbert  Wiener,  The Human Use of  Human Beings:  Cybernetics  and Society (London:  Free Association 
Books, 1989), p. 17 (my emphasis).
168 Wu, et al., op. cit. p. 9.
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which,  supposedly,  is  the  ultimate  marker  of  subjectivity:  noise  for  whom?  The  fact 
remains that in addition, Wu continues,
we should also note that the statements “information is the eliminated uncertainty” and 
“information  is  negative  entropy”  are  also  single-faceted  in  the  sense  of  functional 
de'nition.  Because,  in  the  real  world,  the  role  of  information  is  multifaceted  and 
multilayered, it can not only eliminate uncertainty but also increase uncertainty; it can 
play the role of  negative entropy, as well as the role of  entropy.169
Negentropy not only reduces uncertainty: it produces uncertainty: negentropy is, or may  
be, a producer of  noise. Which means that there is entropy and negentropy at either side of 
noise  and there  is  noise  at  either  side  of  (neg)entropy.  Noise  splits  (neg)entropy  and 
(neg)entropy  splits  noise:  this  con'gures  a  non-orientable  manifold,  the  topology  of 
which is dif'cult to visualise in the binary poverty of  a two dimensional diagram:
    noise
entropy <—|—> negentropy (form)
    noise <—|—> noise   noise <—|—> noise 
negentropy <—|—> entropy  etc…       negentropy <—|—> entropy etc…
All  of  the above might  explain the reason why a notion such as  ‘entropy’  is  always 
already pregnant with its own negation, as in Malaspina’s earlier Hegelianism: there is a 
split within, not only entropy, but within the space of  uncertainty itself, wherein noise torsions 
into information.170 And one cannot but agree that that is, indeed, a ‘revolutionary’ way 
of  thinking about information, 
169 Wu, et al., op. cit. p. 9.
170 Malaspina, EN p. 50.
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if  by revolution we mean the radical and unexpected transformation of  a situation, (and 
not  a  sudden  reversal  understood  as  a  return  to  something  pre-existing).  Such  an 
approach, whereby the maximal value of  information is the most revolutionary, implies 
an epistemological attitude to information that could not be further from the idea of 
negentropy, if  the latter is understood as the negation of  alternatives.171
The  crucial  word  is  here,  of  course,  ‘if ’:  (neg)entropy  in  the  sense  applied 
throughout  this  thesis  is  not the  ‘negation  of  alternatives’,  but,  very  much  on  the 
contrary, the opening up of  new ones. Furthermore, through the creation of  (up to that 
point) unknown forms and a-legal norms, (neg)entropy is itself  the production of  fresh 
uncertainty and noise. Such noise is, precisely, the Noise of  the Oppressed.
This  (neg)entropic  dialectic  is  one  which  could  be  associated  with  the  ‘af'rmative 
dialectics’ common in Badiou’s relatively recent work. ‘All creations, all novelties, are in 
some sense the af'rmative part of  a negation’, he asserts adding that ‘the very essence of  
a  novelty  implies  negation,  but  must  af'rm  its  identity  apart  of  the  negativity  of 
negation. […] A creation or a novelty must be de'ned paradoxically as an af'rmative 
part of  negation.’172
And, as it happens, this “af'rmative negation” brings us back to a notion which I 
have been associating all along with the subjective production of  noise: the (neg)entropic 
trajectory  of  the  truth  procedure,  viz.,  subtraction  itself.  Badiou  could  not  be  more 
171 EN, p. 37-8.
172 Alain Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: on Pier Paolo Pasolini’,  Lecture  at the Art Center  
College of Design (Pasadena, 6 Feb. 2007), https://www.lacan.com/badpas.htm [accss. 20th Jul. 2014]. ‘In 
some sense,’ Badiou writes elsewhere, ‘my attempt is to 'nd a dialectical framework where something or  
the future comes before the negative present. […] The question is not whether we need to struggle or 
oppose, but concerns more precisely the relation between negation and af'rmation. […] We have to try 
to  understand  exactly  the  conditions  under  which  we  may  still  have  anything  like  the  possibility  of 
concrete negation. I believe this can only really be realized in the 'eld of primitive af'rmation, through 
something that is primitively af'rmative and not negative.’ Alain Badiou, ‘A'rmative Dialectics:  from 
Logic  to  Anthropology’,  The  International  Journal  of  Badiou  Studies 2.1  (2013),  pp.  1-14, 
https://badioustudiesjournal.org/archive/ [accss. 14 Aug. 2014], p 4.
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explicit: ‘I name subtraction the af'rmative part of  negation.’ And, most importantly, 
the af'rmation itself  exists in the negation, independently of  the implied destruction 
brought on by the latter: ‘clearly, this subtraction is in the horizon of  negation; but it 
exists apart from the purely negative part of  negation. It exists apart from destruction.’ 
In other words, negentropy is always already existing in entropy. Such is the af'rmative 
and subtractive nature of  (neg)entropy: an ek-sistence both in and beyond the negation 
of  entropy.
It is not impossible to add, moreover, that Freire’s prescription about the educational 
subjects becoming conscious of  their own ‘incompletion’, is linked to something like a 
self-awareness  of  (neg)entropy.  And  precisely  this  link  is  the  reason  that  such  self-
consciousness is a sure source of  anxiety. For instance, in Bernard Stiegler’s view, the link 
(neg)entropy-anxiety is ampli'ed by the mirror of  technological progress: ‘just as there is  
no regression of  the living,’ Stiegler writes, ‘but an increase in negentropy through the 
ineluctable  complexi'cation  of  genetic  combinations,  so  also  there  is  only  technical  
progress.’173 Negentropy is here a janusian reminder of  entropy and, as such, a producer 
of  (bio- and techno-logical) form as much as it is of  anxiety: ‘the threat of  entropy makes 
possible the anguish in which the human experiences technical evolution’, due to the 
latter appearing ‘as a process of  differentiation, creation of  order [and] struggle against 
death.’174 To put differently, (in)forming inevitably causes noise-inside.
It is clear in Stiegler’s account that this anxiety is a symptomatic emergence of  
the death drive. If  Shrödinger’s statement that ‘life feeds on negative entropy’ strongly 
resonates  with  psychoanalytic  overtones,  this  is  because,  as  Norman  O.  Brown  has 
pointed out,  ‘in Freud, the emphasis  is  on psychic entropy [is]  elevated to a cosmic 
173 Bernard Stiegler,  Techniques and Time 1:  The Fault  of  Epimetheus (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998) p. 54
174 Ibid p. 69
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principle’175. As mentioned earlier, such thermodynamic notions are the core scienti'c 
conditioning of  Freud’s thought, as Serres was also quick to underline: ‘he manifestly 
adopts as an initial model […] an energy theory based on thermodynamics and linked 
to two fundamental  principles:  the conservation of  energy and the tendency toward 
death.’176 Freudian  time  is,  not  only  ‘irreversible’,  as  Serres  points  out,  but  also 
(neg)entropic through and through.
Anxiety, that human anguish referred to by Stiegler, will nonetheless have become the 
basal  creative  force  driving  the  human  subject.  Indeed,  ‘far  from  signalling  the 
disintegration of  the psyche or testifying to the sovereignty of  physical entropy’, Brassier 
asserts,  ‘the  experience  of  dying  de'es  the  law  of  entropic  explication  governing 
physico-biological extensity and marks the apex of  psychic life as vector of  negentropic 
complexi'cation.’177 
A creative vector which, moreover, will always require the supplement of  courage, 
as implied in Malaspina’s reading of  John Keats’ “negative capability”: ‘essentially the 
courage of  allowing the representative structures of  one’s own “self ” to dissolve.’178  
And such en-couragement is, 'nally, what an education in noise needs to provide. One 
could say that, fundamentally, this is its only function: to bestow on the subject of  truth 
the  courage  to  keep  going,  to  keep  ploughing  through  the  delicate  uncertainty  of 
negentropy, in spite of, against, and probably also with, the brutal certainty of  entropy.
175 Norman O. Brown, Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) p. 
182
176 Serres, Hermes, p. 72
177 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), pp. 194-5.
178 EN p. 182.
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4.5. Esplanade II: Noise XOR Chaos 
Chaos & chaos theory
The conceptual separation between noise and chaos is anything but trivial. And one 
should promptly  stress  the  word  conceptual:  if  inconsistency with science is  never  the 
intention, this is not, by any means, a mathematical essay.179 Hence, a clari'cation is in 
order: throughout my thesis notions such as noise and chaos are treated discursively, that is 
to  say  philosophically––with  the  understanding  that  such  philosophical  discourse  is 
somewhat  conditioned by (or, at the very least,  not inconsistent  with)  the  scienti6c aspect of 
these notions. 
One  might  ask,  however,  if  the  threshold  wherein  a  discourse  stops  being 
scienti'c and turns  philosophical is always clearly identi'able. To put this in Badiouian 
speak:  is  the  line  of  suture––the  border  between  conditioning  and  suturing––always 
clearly identi'able?180 
 
With all that in mind––and before delving on philosophical discourses on chaos––let us 
brieHy recall some (meta)scienti'c propositions and de'nitions which still dwell on the 
scienti'c side of the notion. These propositions outline a relatively modern 'eld which 
marks its scienti'c speci'city by adopting the name “Chaos Theory” (as we shall shortly 
see, mythical and philosophical notion of chaos long predate these modern, scienti'c 
ones).  Within  this  young  'eld,  the  terms  “chaos”  and  “chaos  theory”  acquire  very 
179 There is neither any pretence that I actually possess the technical skill required for such a task.
180 In this respect, Badiou’s identi'cation of ontology with mathematics is a clean, subtractive cut. There  
is  no scienti'c  suture  in Badiou’s  philosophy simply  because  there  is  no  ontology  in  Badiou’s  philosophy––
ontology belongs to mathematics, period. From this, his insistence that his (philosophical) elaborations on 
such (mathematical) discourse on being, be referred to as metaontological.
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speci'c meanings:181  
• Chaos  deals  with  long-term evolution—how something  changes  over  a  long 
time. A chaotic time series looks irregular.
• Chaos happens only in deterministic, nonlinear, dynamical systems. 
• Chaos  is  sustained  and  disorderly-looking  long-term  evolution  that  satis'es 
certain special mathematical criteria. 
• Chaos  theory comprises the principles and mathematical operations underlying 
chaos.
Two important implications derived in the theory are that (i) long-term predictions 
under chaotic conditions are meaningless and (ii) complexity can emerge from simple 
causes. 
Finally––and  seemingly  contradicting  most  vitalist,  chaos-conditioned 
discourses––it is key to underline that ‘chaos is dif6cult to identify in real-world data because 
the available tools generally were developed for idealistic conditions that are dif'cult to 
ful'l in practice.’182 Chaos theory involves mathematical, abstract constructions: it is not 
a natural science.
We will  observe some of  these (modern)  chaos-theoretically related aspects  as we move 
towards the (ancient) philosophical origins of the notion. Let us 'rst take a closer look at 
some of the concepts which are directly and indirectly alluded to in the outline above, 
together with their interrelations.
181 The following table  is  adapted from Garnett  P.  Williams,  Chaos  Theory  Tamed (Washington,  DC: 
Joseph Henry Press, 1997), p 17.
182 Ibid, p. 16 (my emphasis).
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Determinism & causality
Like  noise  itself,  chaos  partakes  of  the  issue  of  determinism.  The  (mathematical, 
philosophical,  epistemological)  complexity  of  this  matter  is  reHected  in  the  non-
transparent relation between determinism itself  and causality: in this respect, it might be 
useful to recall Max Born’s distinction: 
I think one should not identify causality and determinism. The latter refers to rules 
which allow one to predict from the knowledge of  an event A the occurrence of  an event 
B (and vice versa), but without the idea that there is a physical timeless (and spaceless) 
link between all things of  the kind  A and all things of  the kind  B. I prefer to use the 
expression ‘causality’ mainly for this timeless dependence.183 
Most  importantly,  let  us  not  forget  that  a  causal  system  can also be  non-
deterministic as is the case with quantum mechanics. This is precisely the main point of 
contention of  Ilya Prigogine: taking issue with the classical consensus (which includes 
relativity and quantum mechanics), Prigogine’s radical non-causality advocates a fully 
non-reversible conception of  physical laws, in some ways positing a radical realism of 
the arrows of  time; considering that this would, in turn, imply the reality of  entropy––as 
opposed to it being a (philo-idealist) function of  some lack of  information, or ignorance, 
from  the  part  of  the  observer––and  considering  the  janusian,  noise-mediated 
relationship between entropy and negentropy, Prigogine’s de-suturing of  entropy from 
ignorance is of  no little relevance. From this perspective, a position such as Murray Gell-
Mann’s, whereby ‘entropy can be regarded as a measure of  ignorance’,184 is a token of  a 
set of  scienti'c arguments that, in Prigogine’s view, ‘are untenable. They imply that it is  
our  own  ignorance,  or  coarse  graining,  that  leads  to  the  second  law’.  Whereas 
183 Max Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 8.
184 Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 219.
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Prigogine’s  position––strongly  resonating  with  those  taken  by,  say,  Serres,  Atlan  or 
Malaspina––is, as we already saw, that ‘irreversibility leads to both order and disorder’.185 
Determinism & predictability
The already entangled relation between determinism and causality produces an even 
more  complex  matrix  of  interrelations  with  the  introduction  of  the  notion  of 
predictability (a notion, as mentioned earlier, key to Malaspina’s analysis of  noise).186 
Charlotte  Werndl’s  paramount  work  in  this  'eld  has  clearly  shown  that 
‘determinism  and  predictability  are  very  different  notions.  In  particular,  in  recent 
decades chaos theory has highlighted that deterministic systems can be unpredictable in 
various different ways’.187 Explicitly deploying the scienti'c conception of  chaos, Werndl 
explains that ‘chaos theory studies the behavior of  systems that are deterministic but at 
the  same  time  show  complicated  behavior  and  are  random  and  hence  also 
unpredictable.’188 Yet, the peculiarity of  chaotic systems is that ‘they are unpredictable in 
a  way  other  deterministic  systems  are  not’.189 Within  the  chaos  theory  speech-
community,  such  speci'c  notion  of  unpredictability  is  referred  to  as  asymptotic  
unpredictability. For Werndl, however, such a notion of  unpredictability is not unique to 
chaotic  systems  and  therefore  alternatively  proposed  that  ‘approximate  probabilistic  
irrelevance is  the  kind  of  unpredictability  that  is  unique  to  chaos.’  And,  remarkably 
enough, ‘[u]nlike asymptotic unpredictability, approximate probabilistic irrelevance is a 
185 Prigogine, The End of Certainty, pp. 25-6 (my emphasis).
186 see subchapter 4.3, p. 198.
187 Charlotte Werndl, ‘Determinism’ (2016), http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12166 [accss. 
07/01/2021] p. 1; published in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, ed. by Meghan Grif'th, Kevin Timpe 




probabilistic concept of  unpredictability.’190 
According to this concept, any measurement (i.e. knowledge of the initial states that the 
system may currently be in) is irrelevant for practical purposes for predicting outcomes 
suf'ciently far in the future, i.e. makes it neither more nor less likely that the outcome is  
in any region of phase space of interest. This means that not only is it impossible to 
predict with certainty in which region the system will end up in in the suf'ciently distant 
future, but that also for practical purposes knowledge of the currently possible initial  
states  neither  lowers,  nor hightens,  the probability  that  the system will  end up in a  
certain region of phase space in the suf'ciently distant future.191
Now, formally speaking, noise is the behaviour (the output) shown by random––
i.e.  stochastic––systems: full knowledge of  every detail of  the state of  a random system 
still renders any observer unable to predict its state at a future time (a coin toss is an 
example of  a random behaviour: the fact that one knows the outcome of  a result does  
not help in any way to predict the outcome of  the following toss). Chaotic systems, for 
their part, show close dependancy on initial conditions: any disturbance in the initial state will 
exponentially  shoot  up  with  time. Such  sensitivity  to  initial  conditions  does  not, 
technically speaking, entail stochastic behaviour, which is always already random at  all 
times––a difference which marks, in turn, the distinction between chaos and noise.192 
Werndl’s not insigni'cant conclusion is that chaos, from an observer’s (i.e subjective) 
perspective,  does indeed behave stochastically: ‘[t]here are a host of  results’,  Werndl 
190 See:  Charlotte  Werndl,  ‘Are  Deterministic  Descriptions  and  Indeterministic  Descriptions 
Observationally Equivalent?’,  Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40  (2009), pp. 232-42 (my 
emphasis).
191 Werndl, ‘Determinism’, p. 3.
192 For more technical, mathematically involved,  analyses on the distinction between noise and chaos,  
see: Martín Gómez Ravetti et al., ‘Distinguishing Noise from Chaos: Objective versus Subjective Criteria  
Using Horizontal Visibility Graph’  PLoS ONE 9:9 (2014), e108004, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108004 
[22 Apr 2018], Daniel Kaplan and Leon Glass, ‘Direct Test for Determinism in a Time Series’, Physical  
Review Letters 68:4 (1992), pp. 427-30; Temple He & Salman Habib, ‘Chaos and Noise’, arXiv:1211.4667v1 
[nlin.CD] (2012), [accss. 22 Apr 2018]; Osvaldo Anibal Rosso et al, ‘Distinguishing Noise from Chaos’, 
Physical Review Letters 99 (2007), pp. 154102_1-4.
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concludes,  ‘showing that  deterministic  models  are  often  observationally  equivalent  to  stochastic  
models.’193 
 Probability, (dis)order & a ‘conceptual monstrosity’
If  the probabilistic element in chaos comes not without a certain surprise, there was 
never any doubt of  its deterministic behaviour. As Garnett Williams explains ‘a chaotic 
sequence looks haphazard but really is deterministic, meaning that it follows a rule. That 
is, some law, equation, or 'xed procedure determines or speci'es the results.’194 What 
this  implies  is  that  ‘the  two  terms  “random”  and  “deterministic”  aren't  mutually 
exclusive; anything random is also deterministic, and both terms can characterize the 
same sequence of  data.’195  This seemingly incongruous notion is, nevertheless, anything 
but new. 
As noted by Malaspina, it was René Thom’s catastrophe theory that provided in 
the 1960s a ‘deterministic framework’ wherein ‘aligning mathematical rationality with 
the non-linear and resulting in the conceptual monstrosity born from the necessarily 
unpredictable:  deterministic  chaos.’196 And  it  is  precisely  for  this  reason  that,  in 
193 Werndl,  ‘Determinism’,  p.  4  (emphasis  in  original).  As  Werndl  explains  in  more  detail,  ‘a  
deterministic  model  such  as  the  model  of  the  evolution  of  the  daily  amount  of  precipitation  and  a  
stochastic model such as the sequence of coin tosses are said to be observationally equivalent just in case 
the stochastic  model and the deterministic  model relative to the coarse-graining corresponding to the 
possible measurements give the same predictions.  More speci'cally, the predictions obtained from the 
stochastic  model  are  the  probability  distributions  over  the  sequence  of  outcomes.  Concerning  the 
deterministic model, recall that a probability measure is de'ned over all possible states. Consequently, the  
predictions derived from the deterministic model relative to a certain coarse-graining (representing the 
possible  measurements)  are  the  probability  distributions  over  the  sequences  of  observations  of  the 
deterministic system. Hence what is meant by the phrase that the deterministic model and the stochastic  
model  give  the  same  predictions  is  that  the  possible  observed  values  of  the  stochastic  system  and 
deterministic  system  are  the  same,  and  that  the  probability  distributions  over  the  sequences  of  
observations of the deterministic model and the sequences of outcomes of the stochastic model are the  
same’ (ibid.).
194 Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, p. 15.
195 Ibid. p.22
196 EN p. 112
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Malaspina’s view,  it makes no (mathematical) sense ‘to equate even chaos with disorder, 
since  mathematical  chaos,  for  instance  as  treated  it  in  catastrophe  theory  by  René 
Thom, is deterministic––determined and thus orderly in its necessary unfolding, even if 
its  graphic representation is  bafHing and unpredictable’197.  And therefore,  Malaspina 
argues, it would be equally incorrect to equate entropy with disorder—a position which, 
as we shall shortly see, would not 'nd the disapproval of  the venerable Hesiod himself. 
Moreover,  in Malaspina’s  analysis  that  which marks  this  crucial  distinction is 
precisely that key element––probability: to equate entropy with disorder, ‘would be wrong 
also  because  entropy  is  a  concept  belonging  to  the  'eld  of  probability  and  is  thus 
inherently  not  deterministic  and  thus  cannot  be  said  to  contravene  a  deterministic 
order––and  how  can  order  be  anything  other  than  deterministic?’198 But  more 
fundamentally, insofar as the whole deterministic process proceeds from the imperfect 
(i.e. always un'nished, inconclusive) observation of  a thereby incomplete (i.e. castrated) 
observer, there will have existed, always already, an immanent gap between probability 
and determinism: 
the  impossibility  of  an  observer’s  perfect  knowledge  of  initial  conditions  of  a 
deterministic chaotic system, calls for the probabilistic method, which in turn introduces 
the  sliver  of  in-determinacy  at  the  microscopic  level  of  observation into  an overall  
highly  performing  method  of  prediction.  Even  if  mass  phenomena  are  statistically 
mastered and allow for an impressive power of  prediction, this sliver of  indeterminacy 
in turn introduces an irreducible unpredictability  and with it  the  irreversibility of  any 
probabilistic process with increasing entropy. This sliver of  irreducible indeterminacy in 
the probabilistic process thus severs, irreversibly, probability from determinism.199
197 EN p. 200
198 Ibid.
199 EN p. 201
225
I  would  complement  Malaspina’s  insight  by  adding  that  such  ‘sliver  of  irreducible 
indeterminacy’ is precisely what is marked by the bar splitting the subject in Lacan’s  
matheme:  S. Which means that, lo and behold, we are 'nding here traces of  our own 
Subject of  subjects of  education (which, as Ruda has explained, appears in and through the 
subjective  operation  of  the  bar  itself).200 This  might  be  a  not  entirely  surprising 
encounter––nonetheless, the presence of the Subject has here a somewhat anticipant 
quality,  both  heraldic  and  prescriptive:  it  announces  that,  should  something  like 
deterministic noise––an even fouler monstrosity than deterministic chaos––ever appear in 
the epistemological horizon, the philosophico-educational challenge will be to hold on to 
an idea of noise such that indeterminacy (as a 'gure of the void) will always already be 
built-in in it.  A prescription which, ultimately, amounts to the following af'rmation: 
Noise will be noise as long as it remains indigestible to the knowledge and to the power of any form of  
state whatsoever.
Chaos unbound
If, as some would have it, chaos is strictly speaking a theory (and a young one at that, only 
developed in the 1970s) and if, simultaneously––and as already noted––it is presently 
‘extremely dif'cult to identify [it] in real-world data’: to what signi'ed(s), then, might the 
single word “chaos”––i.e. chaos minus the quali'er “theory”––refer to? It would seem 
that in the same way as “noise” becomes a noisy metaphor when unmoored from any 
technical speci'city, the term “chaos”, when not referring to its speci'c scienti'c 'eld,  
200 ‘Philosophical forcing works by taking the very position of the barring, that is to say of the mark of 
castration. It is not the position of the bar—as the bar is not one—but in a very precise sense the position  
of the very operation of the barring, that is to say the very condition for the emergence of a new truth (the  
split between event and the consequences that it produces).  The barred barred subject thus takes the  
position of the anticipated subject by insisting on the impossible possibility of the place of (any future) 
barring.’ Ruda, For Badiou p. 185, n. 38.
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becomes itself  a self-referential chaotic signi6er. 
And so,  to  repeat  once again:  what  are  we referring to  when we invoke the 
signi'er “chaos” outside of  the speci'c 'eld of  “chaos theory”? A vulgate answer seems 
easy enough: it undoubtedly has come to suggest, today, a notion coarsely associated 
with disorder, confusion, amorphousness, unpredictability. It has become the negative of 
the word “cosmos” (κόσμος, a term of  alleged Pythagorean origin), it itself  being the 
opposite notion pointing towards some sort of  universal order. 
Cosmos and/or chaos: despite appearances, this pair of  opposites was not in any 
way born together as a disjunction201. Indeed, if  the Presocratic parenthood of  the term 
κόσμος is unclear (Pythagoras? Archytas? Philolaus? Parmenides?), χάος has itself  a well-
documented birth certi'cate. 
And, remarkably so, we do not 'nd anything in there that speaks to us of  disorder. 
Cosmogonies 1: Χάος
The  appearance  of  the  word  “chaos”  (χάος)  is  'rst  attested  in  Hesiod’s  Theogony 
(composed circa 700 BCE), a work predating the pre-Socratic philosophers for almost a 
century.202 As such, it interpellates the reader with a prototypical interrogation: is it to be 
read  as  a  religious  text  or  a  poetic  metaphor?  Is  it  an  epic  narrative  with  serious 
historical pretence? Is it a philosophical meditation, or even a work of (proto)scienti'c 
inquiry?  Clearly though, each one of those categories are rendered meaningless by the 
actual con-text of the Theogony itself, insofar as its reading will always already involve an act of  
201 Joyce’s fusing gesture, picked up by Deleuze and Guattari, notwithstanding: ‘[t]he world has become 
chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos.’ Deleuze 
& Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 6.
202 See Hesiod, Theogony, 116, 123, 700, 740 & 814.
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translation. ‘Hesiod lived in an age innocent of philosophy’ Norman O. Brown reminds 
us,  and ‘[w]e must therefore translate his  speculations into our own idiom, which is 
primarily philosophical.’203  But even if  we settle on reading/translating the  Theogony 
(and, hence, the notion of chaos therein) as a philosophical text, this might not completely 
clear the air. We need to also bear in mind that, as Francis Cornford points out, the 
passages from religion, through myth, to philosophy remain somehow always unbroken:
there  is  a  real  continuity between the  earliest  rational  speculation and the religious 
representation that lay behind it;  and this  is  no matter of super'cial analogies.  […] 
Religion  expresses  itself  in  poetical  symbols  and  in  terms  of  mythical  personalities; 
philosophy prefers the language of dry abstraction, and speaks of substance, cause, matter, 
and so forth. But the outward difference only disguises an inward and substantial af'nity 
between these two successive products of the same consciousness. The modes of thought 
that attain to clear de'nition and explicit statement in philosophy were already implicit 
in the unreasoned intuitions of mythology.204
This is an idea which we 'nd most strongly developed in Serres, for whom such 
continuity  not  only  exists  between philosophy and science  (a  mere  bifurcation),  but 
between the  ‘supposedly  antithetical  languages’  of  science and  myth.205 Serres,  whose 
encyclopaedic  non-methodology  covers  ‘the  three  great  modes  of  knowledge: 
philosophic, scienti'c and mythic’206, is himself unequivocal on this point: ‘it is not, it has 
never been the case that science is on one side and myth on the other. In a given myth, 
millennial tradition, or barbarous thought, the proportion of relevant science is probably 
as great as the proportion of mythology that envelops any given science’.207 And in the 
203 Hesiod, Theogony, trans. with an introduction by Norman O. Brown (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1953), 
p. 15
204 Francis M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study of the Origins of Western Speculation  (New York, 
NY: Harper & Bros Publishers: 1957), p. v.
205 See Harari, & Bell, ‘Introduction’, p xviii
206 Ibid. p. xv
207 Serres, Hermes, p. xix.
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signi'er chaos we 'nd a living testament of such semantic and epistemological continuity. 
Serres’ commentary, however, refers exclusively to a matter of methodology. Which means 
that, if we are to deploy the term chaos as a purely philosophical term, we are still left 
with the issue of ‘desuturing’ it both from its original poetic jouissance as much as from its 
contemporary scienti'c inscription.
In the name “chaos” we have the case of a migrant signi'er which, starting its journey 
in the Theogony, travelled for nine centuries, from Hesiod through Aristotle to Deleuze & 
Guattari, in a forking path which bifurcated at some point into science, branching off in 
a  new trajectory  signalled  with the  names of  Henri  Poincaré,  Andrey  Kolmogorov, 
Mary Cartwright, Edward Lorenz and Benoit Mandelbrot. Therefore, one might say, 
when engaging with the idea of chaos in a speculative, discursive manner, one could 
never  be  accused  of  committing  any  ‘imposture’  whatsoever––as  border-guards  of 
empirical scientism such as Sokal and Bricmont might be compelled to do. If anything, 
the opposite is quite the case: chaos is 'rst and foremost a poetico-philosophical concept 
which travelled for nine centuries from its original home in poetry and myth until its 
relatively recent adoption by science (and, even in some cases, one might add that the 
trip continued in a further loop from science back to philosophy). 
Such a journey has inevitably left behind a long and winding etymological trace, 
both intriguing and illuminating, and one which might be worth now following. After 
all––and  without  forgetting  Vidal-Naquet’s  earlier  warning208––if  the  etymology  of 
chaos ‘is already pointing towards some route’ as Guilherme Gontijo Flores observes, 
‘perhaps there is a need to reHect some more on this issue.’209 
208 See subchapter 4.1, p. 160 n. 35.
209 Guilherme Gontijo Flores, ‘Caos Hesiódico: Agonia Cosmogônica Do Mistério’,  Revista Eletrônica de  
Estudos Literários, 1:5:5 (2009)
www.portaldepublicacoes.ufes.br/reel/article/download/3543/2811 [accss. 19 Apr. 2018], p. 5.
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A 'rst and foremost observation regarding the primigenial meaning of the term χάος in 
its Hesiodic, pre-4th century BC use, is that ‘it does not contain the idea of confusion or 
disorder’  as  Martin  West  comments  in  his  translation  of  the  Theogony.210 Rather 
differently,  chaos  bespeaks  a  gap,  an  emptiness,  an  opening,  a  yawn,  or  an  open 
mouth––a primordial yawning. ‘In the modern mind’ Cornford explains, 
the word Chaos has come to be associated with a primitive disorder in which, as the  
Ioanian pluralists said, “all things were together”. This is not the sense of the word in 
sixth- and 'fth-century Greek. “Chaos” meant the “yawning gap”, between the 'ery 
heaven and the earth, which could be described as “empty” or as occupied by the air.211
The  entry  for  ‘χάος’  in  Robert  Beekes’  authoritative  Etymological  Dictionary  of  Greek 
informs us that ‘an original meaning “hole, empty space, yawning opening” is quite 
thinkable for χάος.’ It was, therefore, a term ‘since long connected’ with χάσκω, χάσμα, 
χανεῖν etc.’212 One 'nds in these words nothing resembling disorder or confusion: the 
verb χάσκω (cháskō) means “to gape, yawn, open the mouth wide” (it derives from PIE 
root  *ǵʰan-:  “break  open,  to  yawn”)  and  is  itself  root-cognate  of  the  noun  χάσμα 
(chásma): “gaping  hole,  abyss,  chasm”  (and  as  such  is  used  by  Hesiod  in  line  704). 
Likewise, the noun χάνος (chános)  indicates “throat, mouth”, and is directly linked to 
χανεῖν (chaneín): “gaping, open wide, expanded, immeasurable’ and later with ἀχἁνεια 
210 See Hesiod,  Theogony and Works and Days, trans.  by Martin Litch'eld West (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 64.
211 Francis  Macdonald  Cornford,  Principium  Sapientiae:  The  Origins  of  Greek  Philosophical  Thought, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University  Press,  1952),  p.  194.  Kirk  and Raven remark  that  ‘the  common 
modern sense of chaos as disorder […] may be Stoic in origin’ p. 27 (Geoffrey S. Kirk & J. E. Raven, The 
Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1957), p. 27). Considering contemporary, post-Deleuzian takes on the matter, this is not an uninteresting 
observation.
212 Robert S. P. Beekes w/Lucien van Beek, Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2010), 
p. 1614
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(acháneia: “wide hole, immeasurability”213). Χάος, χάζω, χαίνω, χωρίς, χώρα: all of these 
cognates  suggest,  as  Cornford  explains,  notions  related  to  ‘opening,  separation, 
hollow.’214
There is, moreover, an interesting and controversial relation of χάος with χώρα 
(chóra,  “room, space,  interspace” but  also “place,  position,  rank,  location”)  made by 
Aristotle. In a passage of the Physics, concerned about the proper genus of τόπος (tópos: 
“place”), and after associating the latter with a notion of empty space (and the issue of 
how can a body come to occupy it), Aristotle connects χάος with both χώρα and its 
variation, χώρος (chóros: “region, estate, land, country”).215 However, if a potential link of 
chaos with an idea of “unbound”, or the “unlimitedness” of ἄπείρων (apeírōn) is opened 
up by Aristotle’s inquiries, this possibility is promptly dismissed by Kirk & Raven, for 
whom Aristotle’s interpretation may ‘be rejected immediately’ as it is a concept ‘much 
later than the Theogony.’216 Cornford, for his part, seems to agree with their rebuttal: ‘I do 
not think that chaos is ever called ἄπειρον [sic], and if it were, that would mean no more 
than “immense’  as  applied  to  earth  and sea.’  The  only  possible  etymological  route 
leading from chaos to the in'nite is, it seems, cut. All in all, every source seem to suggest 
that ‘in the sixth and 'fth centuries the word  chaos  still  carried its true etymological 
associations with χάσμα “yawn” [and] χασμᾶσθαι “to gape”’.217 
But how does Hesiod actually deploy the notion of χάος in the  Theogony? How does it 
actually  operate  in  his  cosmogonical  epic?  One  will  'nd  that  the  word  makes  've 
appearances  throughout  the  narration,  each  time  with  a  slightly  dissimilar  function 
(albeit every time with the same signi'cation):  there is  a  generic,  or  generative (or even 
213 Ibid, p. 1616.
214 Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, p.194.
215 Aristotle, Physics, IV 1, 208 b30; c.f. Beekes, Etymological Dictionary of Greek pp. 1614 & 1654-5). 
216 Kirk & Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers p. 26.
217 Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, pp. 194-5.
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genetic) chaos at line 116: ‘'rst of all the chasm’ (χάος γένετ᾽ [xáos génet]); there is an ek-
static (or even extimatic) chaos at 123: ‘from, out of the chasm’ (ἐκ χάεος [ek xáeos]); at 700 
happens ‘the prodigious conHagration [that] took possession of the chasm’ (καῦμα δὲ 
θεσπέσιον κάτεχεν χάος [kavma de thespésion kátexen xáos]); then, at 740 there appears a 
‘great chasm’ (χάσμα μέγ᾽ [xásma meg])  and 'nally we have a ‘gloomy chasm’ (χάεος 
ζοφεροῖο [xáos zoferío]) at 814. If the arch from genesis and extimacy, through massive 
nuclear fusion and expansion ending in the big chill of the χάεος ζοφεροῖο seems to 
uncannily resonate with the familiar cosmogenetic narratives of contemporary physics, 
the crucial line is 116: it is there where we 'nd its “purest” meaning, so to speak, one 
that is kept unchanged throughout. 
And  it  is  also  there  where  we  can  hear  the  richest  spectrum  of  overtones, 
symptomatically  ringing  in  the  subtle  differences  in  interpretations  of  Hesiod’s 
primigenial chaos.  
Line 116 reads:  ἦ  τοι  μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ᾽.  It  is  translated as  ‘'rst  came the 
Chasm’ by West, for whom “chasm” is indeed ‘the literary meaning for the Greek name 
Chaos; it does not contain the idea of confusion or disorder.’218 In an earlier translation 
West would comment that Χάος is ‘best translated Chasm. It is a yawning space […] 
dark and gloomy’, adding that ‘Pseudo-Oppian uses the word χάος of a gaping throat’ 
and alluringly compares its paradoxical appearance as the gap  between Heaven and 
Earth which simultaneously  precedes their creation, ‘like the grin before the Cheshire 
Cat).’219 Glenn Most, for his part, translates line 116 as ‘in truth, 'rst of all Chasm came 
to be’,  noting  that  Χάος is ‘[u]sually  translated as  ‘Chaos’;  but  that  suggests  to  us, 
misleadingly, a jumble of disordered matter, whereas Hesiod's term indicates instead a 
218 West, Theogony, p. 64.
219 Hesiod,  Theogony,  ed.  with  prolegomena  &  commentary  by  Martin  Litch'eld  West  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 192-3.
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gap or opening.’220 And even if Geoffrey Kirk and J. E. Raven opt for ‘'rst of all Chaos 
came-to-be’, promptly noting that ‘the primacy of Chaos is remarkable’ they clarify that 
‘the noun is derived from √χα meaning “gape, gap, yawn”, as in χαίνειν, χάσκειν, etc.’ 221 
Most interestingly, and straight to the (uncannily Badiouian)  point, Brown translates 
Χάος as none other than  the proper name of being itself: ‘'rst of all, the Void came into 
being’, noting that ‘[t]he Greek word is Chaos; but this has a misleading connotation in 
English.’222  
Hesiod’s account is already symptomatic of what one could describe as a self-belonging 
split:  a  chasm,  or  gap  (a  yawning,  noise-emitting  mouth),  an  undifferentiated  a-
morphity,  ready  to  be  (in)formed.  It  would  seem  that  the  Hesiodian  mythico-
cosmogonical  chaos  appears  neither  messy,  nor  disordered,  but  still  pregnant  with 
possibilities: an opening, a gap and the possible things issuing from that gap, or frontier, 
or limit; a liminal threshold and the not-yet-things minimally existing in it, or under it: 
in-existing under the limit, a sub-liminal––sublime––inexistance.
Cosmogonies 2: Genesis 1:2
In the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) of the  The Book of Genesis we read that 
‘the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind 
from God swept over the face of the waters.’223 
The adjectival ‘formless and void’ is, of course, a mere rendering into modern 
English of an ancient notion which has traveled long and far. We can place its origin in 
220 Hesiod,  Theogony,  Works  and  Days,  Testimonia,  ed.  & trans  by  Glenn  W.  Most  (Cambridge,  MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), p.13 n. 7.
221 Kirk & Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 25-7.
222 Brown, Theogony, p. 56
223 Gen. 1:2 (NRSV).
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the Biblical Hebrew ֙ה ֹ֙ ה ת ֹ֔ ָוב  (ṯōhū wā-ḇōhū) as found in the Leningrad Codex.224 Interestingly 
enough,  the Hebrew term  ṯōhū wā-ḇōhū  is associated, not with “disorder”, but with a 
notion of “chasm”, or “abyss”. 
Now, if as we saw above, the English word chasm is a loan from Greek χάσμα––
in  turn  a  root-cognate  with  χάος––the  word  “abyss”  itself  comes  from  the  Greek 
ἄβυσσος (abysos),  an  adjective  indicating  something  bottomless,  boundless  and 
unfathomable––impossible to understand, inaccesible to knowledge; as a noun it names a 
bottomless  pit  and  sometimes  the  subterranean  underworld  itself  (related  to  βῠθός 
(bythós): the depth, as in the depth of the sea, or the deep water). Once again, there is 
nothing here which betokens disorderliness––unless, that is, one equates “unkowability” 
with dissorder. 
Most  noticeably,  though,  neither the word “chaos”,  nor  anything resembling 
disorder or muddle, is to be found in the 3rd century BC Septuagint,225 the earliest Koine 
Greek version of the Old Testament. Therein the original Biblical Hebrew ֙ה ֹ֙ ה ת ֹ֔ ָוב  (ṯōhū  
wā-ḇōhū)  is  translated  by  the  Alexandrian  scholars  as  ἀόρατος  καὶ  ἀκατασκεύαστος 
(‘aóratos  kai  akataskévastos’)––literaly:  ‘unseen  and  unformed’.  These  lines,  which  will 
eventually become the “formless and void” that we 'nd today in the modern versions of  
Genesis  1.2,  seem to  signify,  rather  than  anything  resembling  the  (vulgar)  notion  of 
“chaos”, something denoting nothingness, emptiness, formlessness, voidness.226 In other 
224 Dated from around 1008~1009 CE, the  Leningrad Codex is  the oldest complete manuscript of the 
Masoteric Hebrew Bible. The Masoteric Text itself––the authoritative edition of the Old Testament––was 
compiled and edited from various ancient manuscripts by Jewish scholar-scribes between the 7th and 10th 
century CE in Palestine and Babylonia. As for the Book of Genesis, bible scholars seem to agree that it  
was originally assembled around the 5th-4th centuries BCE, with 250 BCE as terminus ad quem.
225 The Septuagint is the earliest extant translation of the Hebrew Bible into Koine Geek. The work was 
commissioned to be included in the Library of Alexandria by Ptolemy II to seventy Jewish scholars––
hence  the  name,  derived  from  the  Latin  versio  septuaginta  interpretum:  “the  translation  of  the  seventy 
interpreters” (originally from the Greek η μετάφρασις τῶν Ἑβδομήκοντα (hē metáphrasis tōn hebdomḗkonta).
226 Most modern European versions of the Old Testament seem to agree on this rendering of Gen. 1.2: 
‘formless and empty’ (NIV), ‘without form and void’ (NKJV), ‘without form or shape’ (NABRE), ‘ inanis et  
vacua’ (VULGATE), ‘desordenada y vacía’ (RVR1995), ‘informe et vide’ (LSG), ‘informe e vuota’ (NR2006), ‘wüst 
und leer’ (LUTH1545); an exception can be found in La Bible du Semeur (BDS) from 1999, in the somewhat 
impetuous ‘chaotique et vide’.
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words, something very similar to the Hesiodic χάος.
The  Book  of  Genesis elaborates,  not  unlike  the  Theogony,  yet  another  “creation  from 
nothing”  cosmogony  wherein  chaos––even if  in  the  former  the  term itself  does  not 
appear  as  such––sounds  more like  an opening,  or  a  void,  rather  than a  disordered 
jumble of  matter.  What these narratives therefore share,  is  the notion of  an abyssal 
opening of nothing, a genealogy beginning in a primeval parthenogenetic void (something 
which  could  account  for  the  pleonasmic  accumulation  of  the  symbolic  imagery 
presented by these creation myths). 
Redundancy,  self-differentiation,  self-contradiction,  paradox––noise:  all 
inevitable  and necessary remainders  of  the  passage from an abyssal  void  of  χάος to 
creation, succession and transmission.
Thus  the  paradoxical  dialectic  between  entropy  and  negentropy,  destruction  and 
creation, af'rmation and negation, wherein the disjunction between the form and the de-
formed can only be related through an  in-forming in potentially in'nite channels of nil-
dimensionality. In-formation, then, as the atom of  relation transducing (schizducing)  a 
seed  of  disturbance,  a  minimal  difference  coded  in  an  in'nitesimal  bit:  διαφορά 
[diaphorā́], Lucretius’ clinamen, Derrida’s différance, Badiou’s inexistance, Floridi’s datum. 
In that respect, one might ask: is there such an impassable gap, then, between 
the poetico-mythical narratives brieHy outlined above and the cosmological descriptions 
of science? In lieu of an answer, one might af'rm: it is only in noise (from noise,  within  
noise) that we may 'nd some of (what could have become) an in'nite number of possible  
connecting  routes,  as  Serres  himself  tirelessly  claimed,  and  as  Malaspina’s  own 
cosmological account––at once scienti'c and poetic––attests to:
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[g]alaxies  form and  even  life  emerges  against  the  predicted  entropic  dissipation  of 
energy. The negentropic capacity of the cosmos to pull itself together at all levels, from 
gravitational order to biological organization, de'es the idea of the cosmos as a closed 
system vowed to entropic death. […] Disorder, quantum uncertainty, entropic diffusion 
of heat are no longer seen as the mere negation of order, but interweave constraints and 
determinism with  the  indelible  singularity  of  evental  conditions.  The  emergence  of 
structure can now be thought via the theory of metastable systems such as Prigogine 
studied them.227 
227 EN pp. 111-2.
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5. Noise Inside
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
     Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d,
     Pipe to the spirit ditties of  no tone1
5.0. Intro: a Lacanian Cartography of the Subject 
Whereat Malaspina, in her journey in search of noise-inside, follows the psychological 
cartography of Steven Sands and John Ratey,  I  will,  in my own exploration, follow 
Lacan. The purpose of the journey, however, seems to me to be exactly the same.2 
There is, at bottom, a shared intuition: noise carries important overtones that 
can only be heard within the depths of  a resonating subject. Once again, the choice of  
itinerary  is  on  the  side  of  an  axiomatic  decision:  Malaspina’s  choice  leans  towards 
psychiatry and cognitive science, whereas mine remains faithful to psychoanalysis.  In 
lieu of  a justi'cation for this option, I will let the following quote of  Alenka Zupančič do 
the talking: 
[a]t the moment when philosophy was just about ready to abandon some of  its  key 
central notions as belonging to its own metaphysical past, from which it was eager to 
escape, along came Lacan, and taught us an invaluable lesson: it is not these notions 
1 John Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’,  The Oxford Book of English Verse, ed. by Arthur Thomas Quiller-
Couch,  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1919), pp. 729-30 (p. 729).
2 Malaspina uses the term ‘mental state of noise’, which she indeed borrows from psychiatrists Steven 
Sands and John Ratey: see EN, part Three, pp. 165-218; see also Sands & Ratey, ‘The Concept of Noise’.
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themselves  that  are  problematic;  what  can  be  problematic  in  some  ways  of  doing 
philosophy  is  the  disavowal  or  effacement  of  the  inherent  contradiction,  even 
antagonism, that these notions imply, and are part of.  That is why, by simply abandoning  
these notions (like subject, truth, the real...), we are abandoning the battle6eld, rather than winning any  
signi6cant  battles. This  conviction  and  insistence  is  also  what  makes  the  so-called 
“Lacanian philosophy” stand out in the general landscape of  postmodern philosophy.3
The fact that Lacan, as Elizabeth Roudinesco points out, ‘turns his back’ on both 
the  ‘lifeless  positivism’  of  scientism  and  the  ‘obscurantism’  of  subject-less 
postmodernisms, makes his thinking so relevant today.4 And, as it is well known, Badiou 
agrees wholeheartedly with this  antipositivism (‘positivism is  more often than not an 
inverted  religion’)  and  the  truth-lacking  obscurantism of  what  he  terms  democratic 
materialism: 
[t]oday,  these  two  pitfalls  are  more  threatening  than  ever!  And  they  form  our 
conjuncture!  The  secret  alliances  between  these  two  supposed  adversaries––narrow 
scientism and superstitious obscurantism––is not, moreover, a recent phenomenon. This 
is why we need Lacan so much.5 
If  the route that we are to follow is signalled at every juncture with signposts that  
read language, subject, truth, humanisation, this is purely on the grounds that, as Roudinesco 
remarks,
[i]f  you obscure what is proper language and psychic subjectivity in the human, the path 
to a fascistic scientism is opened up: you claim to understand man by examining his 
neurons, you treat his suffering without listening to his speech, bombarding him with 
3 Alenka Zupančič (interviewed by Agon Hamza & Frank Ruda), ‘Philosophy or Psychoanalysis? Yes,  
please!’, Crisis & Critique 6:1 (2019), pp. 435-53 (p. 435, my emphasis).
4 Alain Badiou & Élisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan Past and Present: A Dialogue, trans. by Jason E. Smith 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014) pp. 15, 17.
5 Ibid. p. 17.
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medications in a purely mechanical fashion. Where is the subject in this? What happens  
to his singularity? It is held in content, whisked away.6 
When  the  void  is  internalised,  the  murmur  of  the  indiscernible  will  have 
produced the universal affect: anxiety; anxiety is the affect of  noise, of  disorder: and, for  
Badiou, ‘Lacan is a great thinker of  disorder.’7
However, there will be differences with Lacan’s notion of  the subject, speci'cally with 
his overdependence on language. And most crucially, with what can be seen as a lack of 
agency in Lacan’s subject.
By  “subject”  Lacan  means  the  subject  of  the  unconscious—the  subject  split  by  its  
incorporation into the symbolic order and sustained as a gap in the discourse of  that  
collective Other whose desires structure this unconscious. Badiou’s subject, by contrast, 
is  in  a  certain  sense  consciousness  in  its  purest  forms:  decision,  action,  and  'delity. 
Nevertheless, several characteristic traits of  Badiou’s subject can be more or less directly 
attributed to Lacan.8
Ultimately, if  it is true that ‘Badiou’s notion of  the subject does not comply either with  
Lacan’s  structural  emphasis  on  language  and  the  signi'er’  or  with  the  Lacanian 
proscription of  any access to the real, ‘[a]ll the same, […], Badiou can fairly claim to 
have  arrived  at  a  reconstruction  of  philosophy—that  is,  a  reasoned  articulation  of 
subject, truth, and real—that passes through rather than around the challenges posed by 
Lacan’s ambivalent engagement with the Cartesian tradition’.9 And it is the cartography 
6 Ibid. p. 29.
7 Ibid. p. 60.
8 Hallward Badiou p. 12 (my emphasis); I would note in Hallward’s comment not only the distancing of 
Badiou’s subject from the Lacanian one but, precisely through the notion of consciousness, a drawing 
closer to Freire's.  
9 Hallward, Badiou, p. 15.
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drawn from this ‘Lacanian passage’ the one that we will be following when exploring the 
notion of  noise-inside: the map that we will be carrying in our journey to the interiority 
of  the subject will still be the one plotted by Lacan.
5.1. Anxiety at the Borders
I contend that if  there is something like ‘subjective noise’ (which is not to be confused 
with the subject to noise), this is an internalisation of  noise, its passing from the outside to the 
inside. Noise here is the background effect of  the division of  the subject, a murmur of 
the in'nite regress of  the signifying chain that happens when the Symbolic order, in the 
form of  language, intends to grasp the whole of  the Real––and fails. The remainder of  
this founding failed attempt to structure a Whole (a One), is noise––an inaugural Other. 
This big Other as subject is at 'rst a locus: it is the Symbolic order per se ‘the locus in 
which speech is constituted’;10 in this sense, Noise begins in a place of  radical alterity to 
subsequently become a subject and thereby, as Lacan puts it, ‘“embody” the Other for 
another subject’.11 Once again, this passage from place to temporality pertains to the 
concept of  education that I am developing here.
The split itself  is the subject: subjective noise is its effect (in other words, a remainder of  a 
remainder).  As  we shall  see,  this  'gure  of  subjective (or  internal)  noise  is  related to 
Lacan’s  ‘invocatory  drive’––one  of  four  ‘partial  drives’  which  manifest  desire  (itself 
undivided)––and which is speci'ed in the partial ‘object voice’.12  My contention, then, is 
10 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III, The Psychoses 1955-56, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. by Russell Grigg (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 274.
11 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (s.l.: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006), 
p. 136.
12 The other partial  drives being the ‘oral’,  ‘anal’  and ‘scopic’ drives,  manifested respectively by the 
‘breast’, ‘feaces’ and ‘gaze’ objects; see Evans, Dictionary, p. 48
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that once inside the Subject, in order to make sense of  its noise, we will need to examine 
the invocatory drive: the assistance here of  Alain Didier-Weill  (one of  only very few 
thinkers within psychoanalysis who bothered to listen deeply to what the object voice has 
to say, or sing) will be invaluable.
Noise as affect
Noise and its affect on the senses seems to happen at precisely that hinge where the  
outside pivots to the inside, and where the turning up of  a subject is inevitable. The 
subject  (or,  as  we  shall  see,  the  possibility  of  a  subject)  begins  in  those  sensuous 
primordial awakenings and invocations, driving the needs, demands and desires which 
will have determined, always already, the human subject. 
So, what, or where is noise in this subjective inside? If  there is a name for the noise  
inside, then it surely must be anxiety. Noise is the void of  any situation involving the senses: 
we could say noise is an affect (and anxiety is at the heart of  the psychoanalytic theory of 
affects)
The  fact  that  ‘we  are  all  neurotic’  is,  in  Norman O.  Brown’s  view,  the  pons 
asinorum of  psychoanalysis:  ‘Neurosis is  not an occasional  aberration; it  is  not just in 
other people; it is in us, and in us all the time’.13  
Anxiety, as the affect of  universal neurosis, is what relates all of  mankind: ‘the 
doctrine of  the universal neurosis of  mankind is the psychoanalytical analogue of  the 
theological doctrine of  original sin’:14 might it be that noise is the  only relation in the 
sensible?  We  could  indeed  accept  this  by  invoking  something  like  a  commutative 
property, should we take into account that,  as  Quentin Meillassoux reminds us, ‘the 
13 Norman O. Brown,  Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History, 2nd edn (Hanover, NH: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. 6.
14 Ibid.
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sensible only exists as a relation’.15
5.2. The Invocatory Noise
Alain  Didier-Weill  opens  his  Invocations with  a  beautiful  meditation  which  deeply 
resonates  throughout  the  passages  opened  up  by  my  investigation––including,  quite 
astonishingly, the intrinsically Freirean theme of  a ‘vocation to become human’:
[t]he vocation to become human is, in its origin, transmitted to us by a voice that does 
not pass on the word to us without at the same time passing on its music: the music of  
that “maternal sonata” [sonate maternelle] is received by the nursling as a song that, right 
from the start, transmits a double vocation: do you hear the musical continuity of  my 
vowels and the signifying discontinuity of  my consonants? [la discontinuité signi6ante de mes  
consonnes?].16  
The term sonate maternelle Didier-Weill borrows from Pascal Quignard:
The sounds that the child hears are not born instantly at childbirth. Long before they 
can be emitters,  children have been obeying the “maternal sonata”––or at  least  the 
unknowable sonata: preexisting, soprano, muted, warm, enveloping. Genealogically––at 
the limits of  each man’s genealogy––such obedience prolongs the  sexual attacca of  that 
procreating embrace.  […] The corporeal  and cardiac polyrhythm,  then baying and 
respiratory, then hungry and crying, then motoric and babbling [motrice et gazouillante], 
then linguistic, is as much acquired as it seems spontaneous [est autant acquise qu’elle semble  
spontanée]:  its  rhythms  are  more  mimetic  and  its  learning  more  contagious  than 
voluntarily  triggered.  Sound  never  quite  manages  to  emancipate  itself  from  the 
15 Quentin  Meillassoux,  After  Finitude:  An  Essay  on  the  Necessity  of  Contingency (London  &  New  York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2008), p. 2.
16 Alain Didier-Weill, Invocations: Dionysos, Moïse, saint Paul et Freud, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1998), p. 11. 
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movement of  a body that causes and ampli'es it. Music will never completely dissociate 
itself  from a dance that it rhythmically animates. In the same way, neither will ever be 
the  hearing  of  sound  separate  from sexual  intercourse,  nor  from “obedient”  foetal 
training, nor from a 'lial linguistic bond [De la même façon l’audition du sonore ne se sépare  
jamais du coït sexuel, ni de la formation «obédiente» fœtale, ni du lien 6lial linguistique].17 
It is important to note here Quignard’s equation of  listening and obeying: ‘Hearing 
is obeying. The Latin word for listening is obaudire. Obaudire derived in the English form 
obey. An audition, an audientia, is an obaudientia: an obedience [une obéissance].’18  
Could  this  notion  of  ‘obedience’  be  a  Quignard  variation  on  the  theme  of 
‘invocation’? One thing to make clear at this point is that neither invocation in Lacan’s––
or, more precisely in Didier-Weill’s––sense, nor  obedience, in Quignard’s sense, are the 
same as  interpellation in either Althusser’s or Adorno and Horkheimer’s sense. For one, 
unlike  Althusser’s  latter  conception,  invocation is  clearly  operational  at  a  pre-mirror 
stage.
In any case, it is here where we 'nd a 'rst 6ltering through, an inaugural in6ltration of  the 
outside into the inside; the fact that its otherness is retrospective is of  not little importance: 
music/noise will carry this recollective aspect all along:
• penetrating, affecting, which is also perceiving, 
• in6ltrating, breaking into, intruding, 
• pervasive and subversive
The qualities of  the aural are exactly equal to the qualities of  the Hermetic: its 
17 Pascal Quignard, La Haine de la Musique (Paris: Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1996), p 109.
18 Ibid. p. 108.
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intrusion, its always incomplete seal, its de'cient insulation: ‘il se trouve que les oreilles n’ont  
pas de paupières’: ‘it turns out that the ears have no lids.’19 
This is precisely the sense that connects it with the notion of  the (in'nite) subject: 
Badiou’s passing from the human animal to the subject is operated by the possibility of 
the latter to encounter the (idea of) the in'nite: ‘it turns out that the in'nity of  passivity  
(the contrarian invisible reception) is founded in human listening.’20 
‘There is no sealing of  the self  when encountering the sonorous’’21 
We read in the Spanish edition of  Quignard’s work that ‘there is no hermeticism under 
[against,  in  the  face  of,  while  encountering]  the  sonorous’  [no  hay  hermetismo  ante  lo  
sonoro].22 Pierre Jacomet’s translation can be considered, from a common-usage point of 
view, perfectly valid. However, the notion of  the hermetic that I am considering here 
aims  to  remain  faithful  to  (what  I  want  to  believe  is)  a  purer  Hermes-world:  
consequently it conveys precisely the polar opposite sense: everything under the sonorous is  
hermetic.
That  the  sonorous  is  intrinsically  hermetic is  in  essence  the  reason  that  leads 
Jacomet to use the term with an opposite sign (i.e. hermetic as self-enclosed, sealed, 
inaccessible). The original French of  Quignard in this respect is less restrictive:  Il n'y a  
pas d'étanchéité de soi à l'égard du sonore which I, not unclumsily, would render to English as 
‘there is no sealing of  the self  when encountering the sonorous’. 
Hermetic  as  self-enclosed,  hermetic  as  porous:  translating  ‘hermetic’  is  impossible 
19 Quignard, La Haine de la Musique,  p. 105.
20 ‘Il se trouve que l'in6ni de la passivité (la reception contrainte invisible) se fonde dans l'audition humaine’ (ibid. p. 108).
21 ‘Il n'y a pas d'étanchéité de soi à l'égard du sonore’ (ibid. p 110).
22 Pascal Quignard, El Odio A La Música: Diez pequeños tratados, trans. by Pierre Jacomet (Santiago: Andrés 
Bello, 1998), p. 61.
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without a paradoxical self-belonging: this is the result of  the hermetic invocation. We 
'nd ourselves in the whirlpool of  a noise-producing feedback loop which is typical of 
Hermes: the noise of  translation, the noise of  boundary laying and trespassing, of  deceit 
and  self-deceit.  Furthermore,  we  are––most  intriguingly––not  far  from  the  formal 
mathematical  ontologisation  of  Shannon’s  communication  theory:  emitter,  message, 
receiver, with noise as the immanent excess of  the system: a leftover, a Serresian parasite, 
a Derridean differánce, a Lacanian reste, an undivisible remainder which––as Žižek enjoys 
reminding us––is also a reminder.23 
23 See Slavoj Žižek, ‘La Voz y la Diferencia Sexual’, trans. by Nieves Soria,  La Voz, ed. by Guillermo 
Raíces et. al. (Buenos Aires: EOL, 1997) pp. 47-70. This Spanish (authorised) version by Nieves Soria,  
published in La voz, Colección Orientación Lacaniana, Serie Testimonios y Conferencias, Nº 2 , (Buenos Aires: EOL, 
1997), is a translation of a French version by Élisabeth Doisneau which appeared in the Revue de l'École de  
la Cause Freudienne Nº 31, ‘Le dire du sexe’. Raíces mentions in his introduction an original publication in 
English of Žižek’s article which, to date, I have been unable to 'nd (the copy referenced here is a pdf 'le  
uploaded to scribd.com, accessed 23 August 2018).  
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6. Language, Paleoanthropology & Play
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6. Language, Paleoanthropology & Play
‘The philosopher caught in the nets of  language.’ 1
‘As often happens, the invention consisted in turning a paradox into a concept’2
6.0. Intro: Subjects at the Threshold of Noise
The theme of Language has emerged in the two previous chapters, and it is now time to 
attempt  the  crossing  of  the  ‘narrow  strait’3 between  the  double  hazards  mentioned 
earlier, viz.:
• the over-reliance on language as subject-constructing
• the positing of  something like the plenitude of  humanisation 
These two hazards have been encountered: on one side, the danger of  positing a notion 
of  subjectivity  too  reliant  on  language––something  which  will  be  inconsistent  with 
Badiou’s clear distancing from both analytical and post-structural reliances on language; 
on  the  other  side,  the  danger  of  hypothesising  a  primordial  event,  an  inaugural 
singularity, foundational of  humanity––something which, for Badiou, inevitably leads to 
the ruin of  thought, a disaster of  ethics and to ‘evil’ tout court.4 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870’s , ed. & trans. 
by Daniel Breazeale, (New Jersey & London: Humanities Press International, 1990) p. 42.
2 Badiou, BE p. 267.
3 Homer, Odyssey 12.234.
4 A notoriously sinister example would be National Socialism’s naming of a Volksdeutsche and its recourse 
to an ancestral fatherland, soil, blood, race and so on.
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As for the 'rst hazard, far from subscribing to deconstructive, hermeneutic or analytical 
positions––all  tributaries  of  a  linguistic  turn  which  aimed  to  collapse  philosophical 
thought to language––the position I take here is to defend notions such as event, truth 
and subject, albeit without jettisoning language. 
On one hand, as a matter of  principle, I am following Badiou’s assertion that 
there cannot be only ‘bodies and languages’, and adamantly support the idea that there 
must be some exception to the horizontality of  voices and opinions, the name of  which 
is ‘truth’. More generally, I thereby join in the philosophical defence of  concepts such as 
truth and subject, fully endorsing Zupančič’s assertion that ‘by simply abandoning’  those 
notions ‘we are abandoning the battle'eld, rather than winning any signi'cant battles.’5 
However, I concurrently aim to hold the position that we cannot totally dispense 
with language if  we are to keep operative a notion of  truth and subject. Albeit, it is a 
notion of  language as always already incomplete, as never Whole and one that allows, by 
being conscious of  its own incompleteness, a self-puncturing that opens up the possibility 
of  something hailing from outside to take its place within it. In this sense, language is  
both  the  condition of  possibility  of  the  subject,  and  the  subject  is  the  condition  of 
possibility of  language.6 
The symptom of  this capacity of  language to self-puncture most clearly emerges 
in the operation of  metaphor, wherein signi'ed and signi'er keep threatening to endlessly 
displace each other.  Metaphor and metonym will always haunt what Sandino Núñez 
terms the ‘semantic pact’: the inevitable and necessary rei'cation of  sense (or, rather, of 
5 Zupančič, ‘Philosophy or Psychoanalysis? Yes, please!’, p. 435.
6 This is the position taken, most clearly, by Sandino Núñez, and one which, with respect to the problem  
of language and its relation to philosophy and education, I am fully endorsing throughout this thesis. For  
Núñez, ‘to completely renounce language is a loss’,  and his effort to re-situate language as a problem 
central  to  contemporary  philosophy  comes,  not  as  a  desire  to  ‘subordinate  philosophy  to  some 
presupposed science, or theory of language, but in order to put––once again––language into philosophy’ 
(Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora, p. 10).
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the void of  sense) that makes the functioning of  language possible.
The  notion  of  language,  if  it  is  to  function  as  a  generic  condition  of  the 
humanising  operator  in  education,  must  be  able  to  contain  such  paradoxical  self-
belonging and reHexivity, allowing for the possibility of  reaching its own limits and point 
of  breakdown. It is precisely this point which, Núñez argues, allows for critique to happen 
(and without which there is no possibility for the functioning of  anything like politics, 
art, science, love––no capacity for truth, tout court). 
The semantic  pact is  not  established once and for  all:  it  is  condemned to be open, 
damaged or punctured. And this is because metaphor (representation, or signi'cation) 
always  exposes  the  excess  or  the  lack.  And  because metaphor  is,  sooner  or  later,  a 
usurpation,  an illegitimacy or  an inconsistency,  the referential  pact––reality  itself––is 
always vulnerable to the analytical potency of  language. The excess or the lack is a 
breach wherein critique penetrates and proceeds. Because in order for language to be 
language, sense (this or that historical sense,  ideology, metaphor, ontology and whole 
semantic pact of  an epoch or a culture) has to allow itself  to be problematised, revised,  
modi'ed, displaced. In sum, critiqued. Language is that in'nite capacity to problematise 
its own 'nite senses.7     
The subject proposed by Núñez is a subject ‘at the edge of  language’,8 an idea 
which which carries echoes of  the Badiouian subject operating ‘at the edge of  the void’. 
From the perspective taken throughout this thesis, I will refer to this subject, ‘able to 
bear,  support, and operate a critical truth’9 as a subject operating at the threshold of  noise. 
Most importantly, this idea of  critique as made possible by the void, or rather, by its 
manifestation  as  a  noise  always  already  biassing  language and  dialogue, will  have 
provided  with  a  new  meaning  to  the  critical  part  in  the  epithet  Critical  Education––
7 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora, p. 23.
8 Ibid. p. 15
9 Ibid. p. 25
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reinvigorating  an  adjectival  function  which  by  now  has  become  slightly  tired  and 
instrumentalised.10 
Language has no history
As for the second hazard that the pedagogical leg of  the journey has encountered (viz., 
the  positing of  some sort  of  “event  of  events”,  which would in  effect  substantialise 
something like the ultimate truth of  humanity), a safe passage through it requires careful 
navigation.  For Badiou, such sense of  plenitude,  which would complete a truth and 
essentialise  its  body,  is  a  position  implying  that  an  event,  rather  than  situating,  or 
glimpsing  the  void  as  the  inconsistent  nothingness  around  which  every  situation 
structures itself, is the substantialisation of  some transcendental wholeness, made present 
and explicit as it acquires its full de'nitive potential. For Badiou, 
[w]hat allows a genuine event to be at the origin of  a truth––which is the only thing that 
can  be  for  all,  and  can  be  eternally––is  precisely  the  fact  that  it  relates  to  the  
particularity of  a situation only from the bias of  its  void. The void, the multiple-of-
nothing, neither excludes nor constrains anyone. It is the absolute neutrality of  being––
such that the 'delity that originates in an event, although it is an immanent break within 
a singular situation, is none the less universally addressed.11
What can be said, in this respect, about humanisation as event? What can be said about 
the emergence of  language as  condition? In order to explore these questions further, we 
10 Freire  himself,  by  the  end  of  the  80s,  was  publicly  expressing  his  disquiet  towards  the 
instrumentalisation and methodolisation of his work; see for example Paulo Freire & Ira Shor, ‘What is  
the  “Dialogical  Method” of  Teaching?’,  Journal  of  education 169:3  (1987),  pp.  11-31;  for  an insightful 
commentary on the appropriation  of  Freirean concepts,  see  Thomas Archibald & Arthur L.  Wilson, 
‘Rethinking Empowerment: Theories of Power and the Potential for Emancipatory Praxis’, Adult Education  
Research Conference <http://newprairiepress.org/aerc/2011/papers/3> [accss.. 22 Oct. 2013].
11 Badiou, E p. 73.
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might have to venture into the perilous waters of  paleoanthropological science. Let us 
begin by setting foot on a pair of  statements which, albeit not universally agreed upon, 
are undoubtedly, not only scienti'cally sound, but hypotheses worthy of  interest: 
(1)  Paleoanthropological  evidence  has  shown  that  anthropogenesis––and,  therefore, 
language––is an emergence subtracted from biology (i.e. it is not simply a result of  a genetic 
mutation: recent research points to a temporal delay between the appearances of  the 
early modern human’s language-ready physiological apparatus and symbolic thought of 
around 100-120k years).12
(2) Insofar as there is no possibility of  identifying either a speci'c place or exact moment 
for the appearance of  language (as Chomsky often points out, it does not leave fossil  
traces),  it  is  indeed the case that language is an invention which will  have remained 
generic,  abstract  and  lacking  in  any  ‘identi'able  localisation  and  temporality’,  as 
Norman Madarasz has already observed.13 
The effect––or, rather, the  affect––of  the un-identi'able, un-localisable temporality of 
the anthropogenic event has been appealingly depicted by Agamben as a 'eld of  forces 
always  already  shaping  the  human  unconsciousness,  something  like  an  anthropic 
background radiation, emitting its surplus noise throughout and beyond history; ‘it is  
clear’, for Agamben, that
12 ‘[E]vidence suggests that the appearance of symbolic thought, our most accurate proxy for language, 
was a recent evolutionary event. For instance, the 'rst evidence of putatively symbolic artifacts dates back  
to  only  around  100,000  years  ago,  signi'cantly  after  the  appearance  on  the  planet  of  anatomically 
distinctive Homo sapiens around 200,000 years ago’ (Johan J. Bolhuis et al., ‘How Could Language Have 
Evolved?’, PLoS Biol 12:8 (August 2014), pp. 1-6 (p. 3), doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001934).
13 Norman Madarasz, ‘O “sujeito cientí'co” no sistema 'losó'co de A. Badiou: o caso da biolinguística 
chomskyana’, Veritas 61:3, (Sep-Dec. 2016), pp. 466-491 (p 482). Madarasz, following Chomsky, still uses 
the term ‘mutation’––albeit in not a completely biological sense: ‘[n]ão obstante o sentido especí6co deste termo,  
sua generalidade, abstração e falta de localização e temporalidade identi6cáveis, fariam desta “mutação” algo, por de6nição,  
da ordem de um acontecimento na ontologia do sujeito genérico de Alain Badiou.’ (ibid).
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the arché toward which an archaeology seeks to regress cannot be understood in any way 
as a given that can be situated either in a chronology (even in a broad category like  
“prehistoric”) or even beyond it, in an atemporal metahistorical structure (for example, 
as Dumézil ironically suggests, in the neuronal system of  a hominid). It is, rather, a force 
working in history, exactly as the Indo-European language expresses 'rst of  all a system 
of  connections  among  historically  accessible  languages;  just  as  the  child  in 
psychoanalysis expresses a force that continues to act in the psychic life of  the adult; and 
just as the “big bang,” which is supposed to have given rise to the universe, is something  
that never stops transmitting its background radiation to us. Yet unlike the “big bang,” 
which astrophysicists claim to be able to date, even if  only in terms of  millions of  years,  
the  arché  is  not  a  given,  a  substance,  or  an  event  but  a  'eld  of  historical  currents 
stretched between anthropogenesis  and the present,  ultrahistory and history.  And as 
such—that  is,  insofar  as,  like  anthropogenesis,  it  is  something  that  is  necessarily 
presupposed as having happened but that cannot be hypostatized into an event in a 
chronology—it can eventually render historical phenomena intelligible.14
This leftover echo, this force conditioning history is, in and of  itself, the symbolic 
order––language, tout court. And as a  condition of  history, it is somehow, appropriately 
unsutured from it. Which implies that language itself  has no history: it is, hence, eternal. 
This  of  course  is  a  direct  adoption  of  Althusser’s  own  appropriation  of  Freud’s 
proposition that ‘the  unconscious  is  eternal,  i.e.  that it  has no history.’  Considering that 
‘eternal  means,  not  transcendent  to  all  (temporal)  history,  but  omnipresent,  trans-
historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of  history,’ I shall here 
transitively  adapt  Althusser-Freud’s  expression  word  for  word  and  write:  language  is  
eternal,  exactly like ideology (which is eternal exactly like the unconscious).  I 'nd the 
comparison theoretically justi'ed by the fact that the eternity of  ideology (which is that  
14 Giorgio Agamben,  The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath (2008), trans. by Adam Kotsko 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 10-11.
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of  the unconscious) is  not unrelated to the eternity of  language in general15 (i.e. the 
subtractive, generic notion of  language I am deploying here).
Admittedly, we are unable to place the event of  humanisation in any particular point of 
a chronology. As Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Žižek et al. have noted, once the symbolic order 
appears,  it  makes  it  as  if  it  has  always  been  there.  Nonetheless,  one  thing  that 
paleoanthropological  and  biolinguistic  science  seem  to  have  established  is  that 
anthropogenesis does not belong exclusively to biology.
All of  which, passed through a Badouian coarsing, translates as: humanisation is 
not an element of  Nature. Can we therefore assert that it is a Historical site? After all, as 
we  shall  shortly  see,  science  has  marked  the  distinction  between  anatomically  modern 
humans (amh) and behavioral modern humans (bhm): one might be tempted to see this as an 
anthropological endowment to Badiou’s own philosophical (or, rather, ethical) distinction 
between  the  human  animal and  the human  subject.  Evidently,  though,  the  bhm is  not 
necessarily a subject in the Badiouian sense of  the term (as we already know, Badiou’s 
subject is not a given). However, the (ultra)historical appearance of  bhm––its minimal 
difference with amh––con'gures the inaugural site wherein the emergence of  a subject 
becomes possible for the 6rst time.  
Throughout this exploration, then, I seek to 'nd an axial zone where language separates 
the possibility of  a subject, whilst keeping in mind that such a place, whilst necessary, is  
not enough: for a subject to grow in it, some work remains to be done. Language simply 
prepares the ground for the subject by always leaving a noise-producing remainder, a 
15 Louis  Althusser,  On  Ideology,  trans.  by  Ben  Brewster  (London  &  New York:  Verso,  2008),  p  35. 
Althusser’s exact words are: ‘I shall adopt Freud’s expression word for word, and write ideology is eternal,  
exactly like the unconscious. And I add that I 'nd this comparison theoretically justi'ed by the fact that  
the eternity of the unconscious is not unrelated to the eternity of ideology in general.’
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left-over of  the Real, a void of  anxiety––in other words, language conditions an evental site. 
For a subject to emerge, 'rst of  all something  must happen, and then something must 
account for the consequences of  that happening. 
 The point to be made is: humanisation does not guarantee a subject. Neither is anxiety, 
in itself,  enough to secure the trajectory of  the subject: this anxiety, this noise-inside 
which is both cause and effect of  the subjective work, requires the ethical modulation 
provided by an education by truths. What must be kept in mind all along, Ruda reminds 
us, is that ‘the subject is a process, it is not a point’, implying that the subject must never  
be confused with the void-as-unlocalisable-point––or, in the terms I using here,  with 
noise itself:  ‘[t]he void is not  the subject,  the subject  is  not  the void  […]. More precisely: the 
subject is void but it is not  the void. […] To put it in a formula: there is the void and 
there is a process voidening the situation which is the subject.’16
The subject is not noise: it is a process which renders the situation noisy in the investigation 
of  a truth. And education is at the service of  such process. 
Lacan’s cartography of  the subject
From this  perspective,  then,  the  Lacanian  subject  appears  to  be  too  dependant  on 
language. In the sense discussed here, Lacan does not provide room for either truths or 
for the event (hence his clear positioning as an ‘anti-philosopher’):  ‘What Lacan still 
owed to Descartes, a debt whose account must be closed, was the idea that there were 
always some subjects’.17 Much to the contrary, for Badiou the subject is rare. And they 
are so precisely because they are subjects of  truth––and a truth, as we know, depends on 
16 Ruda, For Badiou, pp. 98, 179 n.62 (emphasis in the original).
17 Badiou, BE p. 434.
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the occurrence of  an event, viz., on the subject’s accidental  brush with the Real, which 
ignites their transformation and subsequent militance. This possibility of  the real to grace 
the subject is ‘what distinguishes Badiou’s subjective or activist conception of  the real 
from Lacan’s ultimately more structural or passive conception’.18 
For Lacan, the real will always already remain unreachable to his subject of  the 
unconscious. On the other hand, as Hallward notes, ‘Badiou’s most basic article of  faith’ 
is that ‘truly autonomous subjective action, if  founded only on an event, can indeed 
touch its own real—which is to say, can achieve the impossible’.19 Furthermore, I will 
take here the position that, as Bruno Bosteels argues, a situation can only be changed 
starting from what is, precisely, its impossible point: it is only there and then that the 
subject might be able to exert a ‘torsion on the impossibility of  this impossible’, and 
force into the real of  the situation a new universal law.20  So if  Badiou needs ‘to move 
beyond Lacan’,  Hallward continues,  ‘it  is  mainly  because  the  psychoanalyst  remains 
committed to the structural suf'ciency of  language or the symbolic (however disruptive 
its impact upon the imaginary ego), rather than open to the rare, contingent universality 
of  the event’.21
With  this  is  mind,  I  will  recapitulate  the  safeguards  mentioned  in  chapter  2 
regarding the consistency of  the subject with respect to its passage through the domains 
of  education:
(1) they are a subject made possible by language 
(2) there needs to be an outside of  the language 
18 Hallward, Badiou, p. 15.
19 Ibid.
20 Bruno  Bosteels,  ‘Por  una  falta  de  política:  Tésis  sobre  la  'losofía  de  la  democracia  radical’,  
Acontecimiento 17 (1999) <http://grupoacontecimiento.com.ar> [accss. 5 Apr 2013].
21 Hallward, Badiou, p. 354 n. 48; c.f. Badiou, BE p. 434.
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(3) a truth is the forcing of  this outside into the language 
(4) education is purely at the service of  such forcing.   
And, 'nally, education is able to be at the service of  this forcing because, as Ruda points  
out, it produces (or rather, cares for) a generic subject conditioned by all of  the four  
procedures. If  so, this can only be achieved by what Clemens argues is the condition of  
conditions  of  philosophy:  viz.,  the  letter.  Such  has  to  be  the  notion  of  language  as 
condition of  conditions: one that operates as close as possible to the letter, conditioning 
the educational work of  the most generic subject possible.22 
Granted, language might not be the horizon of  philosophy, as Badiou 'ercely 
argues:23 what  might  be  posited  instead  is  that,  as  a  physico-phenomeno-logical 
appearance  of  the  letter-matheme,  as  schizducer of  the  void  into  noise,  language 
becomes the event horizon of  transmissability per se.
( ) —> (η)
philosophy <=> education
letter —> language 
condition of  conditions —> event-horizon
 
6.1. Humanisation and Science
22 And, moreover––considering we are still  in scienti'c waters––one might point out to an emergent 
resonance: if the letter is essentially mathematical,  could we not 'nd here a link between Chomsky’s  
innate capacity for language and Stanilas Dehaene’s ‘number sense’? See Stanislas Dehaene, The Number  
Sense: How the Mind Crates Mathematics (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
23 ‘[L]anguage is not the absolute horizon of thought’ (IT p. 50).
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Language, or, the site of  a new scientiMc paradigm
My contention is that Badiou, Chomsky and Freire are thinking the same event, but 
composing it discursively in three different philosophical dialects. Badiou describes it from 
the perspective of  his (immanently philosophical) subtractive ontology of  multiplicity; 
Chomsky,  surveys  its  site  from  his  (immanently  empirical)  biolinguistic  outlook;  in 
Freire––as  already  mentioned––taking  the  name  ‘humanisation’,  it  instigates  the 
operation of  his (immanently praxial) construction of  subjectivity. The topos of  the odd 
trio’s meeting is one that Norman Madarasz regards as the possible (evental) site of  a 
new scienti'c paradigm shift, in the Kuhnian sense of  the term. 
Madarasz’s  latest  work––groundbreaking,  in  many  respects––manages  to 
convincingly stage a unique conversation between Badiou and Chomsky: in a move that 
follows through the consequences implied in accepting Chomsky’s ‘faculty of  language’ 
(FL) as innate, universal and immanently human,24 wherein ‘linguistic capacity joins in 
the  production  and  creation  of  identity’,  Madarasz  points  to  the  emergence  of  an 
‘ontological axis’ which ‘singularly encompasses the question of  a coherence between 
[Badiou’s]  subjective  genericity and  [Chomsky’s]  linguistic  generativity,  understood  as 
identity-forming processes’;25 Madarasz concludes that ‘Chomskyan biolinguisitics is a 
scienti'c theory which appertains to a radical model of  speci'c subjectivation, and is 
relative  to  what  Badiou  denominates  the  “scienti'c  condition”  of  philosophy’.26 For 
Chomsky, FL is nothing else than a result of  a genetic mutation: what he terms the 
‘Basic  Property’  refers  to  the  ‘genetic  endowment  that  underlies  the  faculty  of 
24 ‘The faculty of language is a true species property, invariant among human groups, and unique to  
humans  in  its  essential  properties’  (Noam  Chomsky,  ‘The  Galilean  Challenge’,  Inference 3:1  (2017), 
<https://inference-review.com/article/the-galilean-challenge> [accss. 24 Apr 2017], para. 20).
25 Madarasz, ‘O “sujeito cientí'co”’, pp 466, 468.
26 Ibid. p. 468.
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language’.27 In  spite  of  this,  and  pace  Badiou’s  immanently  mathematical,  contra-
biological ontology, Madarasz maintains that ‘the speci'c sense of  this term [genetic 
mutation], its generality, abstraction and lack of  identi'able localisation and temporality, 
would make of  this “mutation”, by de'nition, something of  the order of  an event in 
Alain Badiou’s ontology of  the generic subject’.28 
Madarasz  has  successfully  managed  to  show that  Chomsky  and  Badiou  can 
converse by meeting in a structural common ground, bounded by the generativity of 
language  in  the  former  and  ‘the  generic’  as  its  scienti'c  inscription  in  the  latter.  I  
propose that it is possible to go further and observe that the bracketing of  the void in 
Badiou’s ontology is structurally isomorphic with Chomsky’s labeled bracketing of  the 
surface structures of  language.
So, pace themselves, Chomsky and Badiou might be made to sit  at the same 
philosophical  table.  My intention here is to introduce Freire into the conversation: I 
contend  that  the  latter’s  'delity  to  the  subject-constructing  aspect  of  generic 
humanisation, provides a necessary praxial, inevitably temporal and purely educational 
dimension to Badiou’s ‘subjective genericity’ and Chomsky’s ‘linguistic generativity’.    
Badiou’s void, Chomsky’s feedback-causing ‘recursion’ and Freire’s ‘un'nishedness’ will 
ensure that the murmur of  noise will not be allowed to fade out during the conversation. 
Freire with Chomsky
If, for Heidegger, it is at the crossroads of  language and Eirignis as ‘the historical destiny 
27 Noam Chomsky (interviewed by C. J. Polychroniou), ‘On the Evolution of Language: A Biolinguistic 
Perspective’ (24 Sept. 2016) <https://chomsky.info/on-the-evolution-of-language-a-biolinguistic-
perspective/> [accss. 2 Jul 17].
28 Madarasz, ‘O “sujeito cientí'co”’, p. 482.
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of  mortals’,29 where  science  and  thought  part  ways,30 the  direction  taken  here––
signposted  by  Chomsky  and  the  latest  paleoanthropological  evidence––is  the  exact 
opposite. ‘We have observed’, Chomsky asserts, ‘that the study of the creative aspect of 
language use develops  from the assumption that  linguistic  and mental  processes  are 
virtually identical, language providing the primary means for free expression of thought 
and feeling, as well as for the functioning of the creative imagination.’31 
So,  whereas  Heidegger  forecloses  science  as  the  proper  interlocutor  able  to 
answer the question “what is called thinking?” (in a sense of  “what calls for thinking?” 
viz., what  summons,  demands or  directs human beings to think),32 it is precisely here that 
Chomsky  places  the  heart  of  his  biolinguistic  project:  for  the  latter,  the  answer  to  
Heidegger’s question should be sought for, and will be found in, the realms of  genetics  
and the evolutionary biology of  the human brain. For Chomsky, the faculty of  language 
is a contingent emergence of  a ‘genetically endowed’ capacity, tout court.  
An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of  discrete in'nity, 
rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes 
objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, 
the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is 
a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system 
of  hierarchically  structured  expressions.  The  simplest  account  of  the  “Great  Leap 
Forward” in the evolution of  humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by 
some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge, at once laying a core part of  the 
basis  for  what  is  found  at  that  dramatic  moment  of  human  evolution:  at  least  in 
principle; to connect the dots is far from a trivial problem. There are speculations about 
29 Heidegger,  Basic Writings p. 396.
30 ‘Science in itself does not think’ (ibid. p. 373).
31 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of  Rationalist Thought , 3rd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 78.
32 Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp. 385-86.
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the evolution of  language that postulate a far more complex process: 'rst some mutation 
that permits two-unit expressions, perhaps yielding selectional advantage by reducing 
memory load for lexical items; then further mutations to permit larger ones; and 'nally 
the Great Leap that yields Merge.33
Merge, paradox, truth: set-theory ontology and structural linguistics
Chomsky’s Minimalist Program (MP) then functions on the basis of a single linguistic 
operation: Merge. Described by Berwick and Chomsky as ‘the simplest possible mode of 
recursive generation’,34 Merge takes two already existing syntactic elements X and Y and 
combines them in an unordered pair  {X,  Y} to form a new syntactic  object. It  is  a 
thought-operation which, being recursive, can be iterated inde'nitely: ‘Merge, iterated 
without bound, yields an in'nity of hierarchically constructed expressions. If these can 
be interpreted by conceptual systems, the operation provides an internal language of 
thought.’35
This internal ‘language of thought’––both the trigger and the symptomatic signal 
of the event of humanisation––is, in Chomsky et al.’s biolinguistic perspective, carrying 
two crucial notions: (1) language-thought, in its iterative operation, presents the cogitant 
subject with something like the vertigo of an actual in6nite (2) being recursive and hence self-
referential, it impregnates the situation with the hazard of paradox.
The main point to underline here is that Chomsky’s MP––which, I will note here 
in  passing,  its  minimalism  is  not  at  complete  odds  with  Badiou’s  subtractiveness––
33 Noam Chomsky, ‘Biolinguistics and the Human Capacity’,  Language and Mind, 3rd edn (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005) pp. 173-85 (pp. 183-4).
34 Robert  C.  Berwick  &  Noam  Chomsky,  ‘The  Biolinguistic  Program:  The  Current  State  of  its 
Development’,  The Biolinguistic  Enterprise:  New Perspectives  on the Evolution and Nature of the Human Language  




though not equivalent to set theory, is clearly shaped by set-theoretical notions: ‘in its 
simplest  terms,  the  Merge  operation  is  just  set  formation’.36 Indeed,  in  an 
exempli'cation which could only be described as the linguistic operation of  the axiom 
of  power-set and pairing, Berwick and Chomsky write that ‘[g]iven a syntactic object X 
(either a word-like atom or something that is itself  a product of  Merge) and another 
syntactic object Y, Merge forms a new, hierarchically structured object as the set {X, Y} 
[…]. For example, given read and books, Merge combines these into {read, books}’37  all of 
which would provide the syntactic structure for the verb phrase (VP) “read books”. 
Merge then, is the basic operation within Chomsky’s MP, and, as noted above, is akin to 
something like an internal, cogitant set-formation.  Most signi'cantly though, is the fact 
that Merge has  the property  of  recursion,  meaning that  it  can apply itself  to its  own 
output.  It  can  merge elements that  are themselves formed by Merge (formally,  in set 
theory the  operation of  sub-set  formation,  axiomatically  legitimised by the  powerset 
axiom). It is this recursive property of Merge that will have provided language with its 
unique cognitive trait. 
It is with Merge that the murmur of noise-inside begins. Its  recursive property is  that 
which  endows  language  with  the  capacity  to  condition,  by  itself,  the  process  of 
humanisation.
Recursion
36 Robert C. Berwick & Noam Chomsky,  Why Only Us: Language and Evolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press,  2016)  p.  10;  c.f.  ‘Merge  builds  hierarchically  structured  expressions  as  sets’  (p.  119);  ‘the 
representations in the original formulations of transformational grammar, were set-theoretic, not graph-
theoretic: trees are simply a pedagogical aid. Recall that the Basic Property also constructs sets’ (Why Only  
Us, p. 135); see also: Noam Chomsky,  The Minimalist Program: 20th Anniversary Edition (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2015), pp. 207-08; Bolhuis et al., ‘How Could Language Have Evolved?’, pp. 1-2 and Berwick 
& Chomsky, ‘The Biolinguistic Program’, pp. 19-41.
37 Berwick & Chomsky, Why Only Us, p. 10.
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Chomsky’s Universal Grammar (UG) rests on the hypothesis of an innate, structurally 
pre-wired faculty of language (FL) unique to the human species. In an article published 
in 2002, Chomsky and his collaborators introduced a distinction, whereby ‘faculty of 
language (FL) now distinguished between FL in the broad sense (FLB) and FL in the 
narrow sense (FLN).’38 Signi'cantly, though, if FLB includes the sensory-motor system, 
the conceptual-intentional system, and all the computational mechanisms for recursion, 
FLN  is  subtractively  identi'ed  solely  with  recursion.  Furthermore,  and  crucially, 
recursion becomes the distinctive identi'er of the human singularity: ‘[w]e hypothesize 
that  FLN  only  includes  recursion  and  is  the  only  uniquely  human  component  of  the  faculty  of  
language’.39 Moreover, Chomsky et al.  further argue that ‘FLN may have evolved for 
reasons other than language, hence comparative studies might look for evidence of such 
computations  outside  of  the  domain  of  communication  (for  example,  number, 
navigation, and social relations).’40
Nature, it seems, even for the ultra-empiricist Chomsky, has played no part in the event. 
And it is precisely at this point where Badiou’s mathematical ontology might begin to 
resonate. 
There  is  neither  Nature  nor  communication––however,  there  is  in  place  the 
capability of  both Merge (i.e.  set  formation) and  recurrence (i.e.  paradox).  How can this 
thought-process be formalised? In true Badiouian manner, we have to start with nothing.
The absolutely initial point that assures the chain of ordinals of its being is the empty set 
, decided axiomatically as secularised form, or number-form, of Nothingness. This 
38 Marc D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky & W. Tecumseh Fitch, ‘The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who 




form is nothing other than the situation-name of being qua being, the suture of every  
situation-being, and of every language, to their latent being. The empty set being an 
ordinal,  and therefore a natural multiple,  we might say:  the point of being of every 
situation is natural. Materialism is founded upon this statement.41
In other words, the empty set,  a set of nothing, exists––nothingness  is: this is 
crucial,  as it presents us with the ontological schema of something like the inaugural 
situation of thought (viz., humanisation): we start with nothing. But if  exists, then, by 
the power-set axiom, the singleton of , written { }, necessarily follows (i.e. the subset 
which includes : or, the singleton of the void, an ontological 'gure for the One); but then, 
continuing the  recursive  operation,  thought  generates  { ,  { }} (ontologically,  the 
ordinal number 2) and so on, ad in6nitum: in other words, Chomsky’s recursion in full 
operation.
What is more, in Badiou, the principle of recurrence does not only operate the counting 
of the succession of ordinals (which is no more than the counting of Nature): for Badiou, 
recursion is the motor of what he terms ‘trans'nite induction’, the crucial operation that 
enables thought to access the in'nite. 
10.13. Reasoning by recurrence combines one veri'cation and the demonstration of 
one implication. Once in possession of these two moments, the structure proper to the 
ordinals authorises the universal conclusion.
10.16.  Reasoning  by  recurrence  is  a  proof-procedure  for  universal  statements 
concerning ordinals. It allows us to conclude. But there is a more important usage of 
recurrence, or of trans'nite induction, one which allows us to  attain the concept. This is 
inductive de6nition.42 
41 Alain Badiou, Number and Numbers, trans. by Robin Mackay (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 83.
42 Badiou, Number and Numbers, p. 89.
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Therefore,  trans'nite  induction  is  a  proof-mechanism that  (tress)passes  from 
level to level (starting with the void, then ordinal numbers, then trans'nite numbers, 
etc...) thus allowing access to the in'nite, whilst concurrently never having to de'ne the 
All.
Thus we will  have at our disposal not  just  a single  concept  ,  but  an in'nite and 
in'nitely  rami'ed  family  of  concepts,  from  ,  explicitly  de'ned,  up  to  the  more 
considerable ordinal indexations , passing through ,  ,  , etc. We will then 
be able to say that concept , as unique concept, is de6ned by trans6nite induction, in the 
following sense: for a given x,  will be true if and only if there exists an ordinal W 
such that x possesses the property at level W. We would have the following equivalence: 
 <—> “there exists a W such that  (x)”.
So  the  inductive  mastery  of  the  concept  passes  by  way  of  its  ordinal 
rami'cation, and by way of the equivalence between “the concept   holds for x” and 
“the concept  holds for x at level W of that concept”. This equivalence avoids all mentioning  
of the All. It tests the property  not “in general”, but on one level, thus freeing it from 
paradoxes of inconsistency.43
And, furthermore, as Miller explains, this inductive recurrence results in a self-reHective 
cogitation which, sutured to an initial lack (the starting nothingness, symbolised by 0), 
begins its metonymic movement inside the subject-to-be. 
Certainly, if the 1 of n + 1 is nothing other than the counting of the zero, the function of 
addition of the sign + is superfatory [superfétatoire], and we must restore to the horizontal 
representation of the engendering its  verticality:  the 1 is to be taken as the primary 
43 Badiou, Number and Numbers, p. 90.
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symbol  of  the emergence  of  lack in the  'eld  of  truth,  and the sign + indicates  the 
crossing,  the  transgression through which the  0  lack  comes to  be  represented  as  1, 
producing, through this difference of  n to  n'  which you have seen to be an effect of 
meaning, the name of a number’. […] [I]f the series of numbers, metonymy of the zero, 
begins with its metaphor, if the 0 member of the series as number is only the standing-
in-place suturing the absence  (of  the absolute zero)  which moves  beneath the  chain 
according to the alternation of a representation and an exclusion––then what is there to 
stop us from seeing in the restored relation of the zero to the series of numbers the most 
elementary articulation of the subject's relation to the signifying chain?’44
Undecidability, declaration and the pathologies of language
We could say that all of  the above presents us, not with an event, but with an evental site. 
Or, to be more precise, with an arch-evental site. The subject––never given––has not yet 
emerged. There is, however, a mere possibility. Recursion brings with it the possibility 
of  paradox, and paradox brings  with it  undecidability:  undecidability is  triggered by a 
supplementation, by the +1 brought by an unpredictable event.  And in order for a 
subject to emerge as a consequence of said event, a decision is required: ‘a truth’s 'rst step 
is to wager on this supplement.’45 
What all of  this is implying is that the recursive operation of  Merge (as we just 
saw, none other than the operation, within structural linguistics, of  the power-set axiom), 
needs  to  be  interrupted:  ‘in  order  for  the  process  of  a  truth  to  begin,  something  must 
happen’.46 
44 Jacques-Alain  Miller,  ‘Suture  (Elements  of  the  Logic  of  the  Signi'er)’,  trans.  by  Jacqueline  Rose 
<http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/cpa1.3.miller.translation.pdf>[accss. 10 Oct. 2012]; 'rst published as 
‘La Suture (Éléments de la logique du signi'ant)’, Cahiers pour l’Analyse 1.3 (January 1966), pp. 37-49.
45 Badiou, TW p. 112.
46 Badiou, TW p. 111.
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Merge prescribes a  structure: in Chomskyan linguistics, syntax (communication) 
derives  from  the  hardwired  structure  of  FL,  operated  by  Merge.  And  for  Badiou, 
structure implies place and repetition: that ‘something’ that needs to happen in order for 
the process of a truth to begin (in order for a subject to emerge from this structure), is no 
more  than  an  interruption of  the  repetition  dictated  by  structure:  ‘a  truth  interrupts 
repetition’.47
And one might speculate that the 'rst, inaugural arch-site of  such possible truth(s), the 
'rst proper, paradoxical, interruption of  Merge, can only be opened and operated  in 
and  by a  subjective,  self-reHective  utterance.  In  fact  this  inaugural  af'rmation  is 
unabashedly  named  by  Agamben  as  ‘the  event  of  language’.48 For  Agamben,  such 
event––which indexes nothing less than the (philosophical)  inauguration of  being and 
ousia––can only take place within the sphere of  what Benveniste calls the ‘utterance’ 
[l’énonciation], which, as we saw earlier, is every speech act which con'gures the I as the  
subject of  enunciation.49 Linguistics, in Agamben’s view, de'nes this dimension merely ‘as 
the putting into action of  language and the conversion of  langue into parole.’ On the other 
hand, throughout the history of  Western philosophy––from Aristotle, through Aquinas 
to Heidegger––‘[t]hat which is always already demonstrated in every act of  speaking, 
[…]  that  which  is  always  already  indicated  in  speech  without  being  named,  is,  for 
philosophy, being.’ For Agamben, the history of  metaphysics, ‘coincides with the taking 
place of  language’: metaphysics, therefore, is an ‘experience of  language [that] in every 
speech act, grasps the disclosure of  that dimension, and in all speech, experiences above 
47 Badiou, TW p. 112.
48 Agamben and Badiou’s notions of “event” are, of course, unalike: in strictly Badiouian terms, one 
cannot  speak  of  “the  event  of  language”.  And  so  to  repeat  once  again:  in  the  Badiouian/Freirean 
framework postulated here, language functions as the condition-of-conditions of the generic subject-of-
subjects produced by the always un'nished process of humanisation, the philosophical name of which is  
education.
49 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, p. 225.
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all  the “marvel” that language exists.’  And, most crucially,  Agamben unambiguously 
points towards language’s self-referencing capacity as conditioning the production of  a 
(transcendental) subject:  
[o]nly  because  language  permits  a  reference  to  its  own  instance  through  shifters,  
something like  being  and the  world  are  open to  speculation.  The transcendence  of 
being  and  of  the  world––which  medieval  logic  grasped  under  the  rubric  of  the 
transcendentia  and which Heidegger identi'es as the fundamental structure of  being-in-
the-world––is the transcendence of  the event of  language with respect to that which, in 
this  event,  is  said and signi'ed;  and the shifters,  which indicate the pure  instance  of 
discourse, constitute (as Kant understood perfectly, attributing transcendental status to 
the I) the originary linguistic structure of  transcendence.50
If  such  emphasis  on  transcendence  does  not  sit  very  comfortably  within  a 
Badiouian  con'guration––this  is  one  of  many  bifurcation  points  in  Badiou  and 
Agamben’s  philosophies––the  notion  of  language  as  a  self-transcendent  act  of 
interruption, does. Indeed, insofar as it belongs (i.e. it is immanent) to the evental site 
wherein humanisation-as-interruption happens, language must already carry within it the 
seed of  such interruption. This seed is,  itself,  language’s immanent symptom:  shifters, 
metaphor,  self-reHection, recursion, paradox––all  somewhat pathological traits  of  the 
always incomplete attempt to make an out-of-joint sense of  what is none other than the 
left-over noise of  an ontological void, which, carried out of  ontology, now murmurs in 
50 Giorgio Agamben,  Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. by Karen E. Pinkus with Michael 
Hardt (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), pp. 25-6. As for the essential notion of  
‘shifters’, Lacan writes that ‘Roman Jakobson borrows this term from Jespersen to designate those words 
in the code that take on meaning only from the coordinates (attribution, date, and place of emission) of 
the message. According to Pierce's classi'cation, they are “index-symbols.” Personal pronouns are the best 
example:  the  dif'culties  involved  in  their  acquisition  and  their  functional  de'ciencies  illustrate  the 
problematic  generated  by these  signi'ers  in the subject.’  Jacques Lacan,  Ecrits,  p.  485 n.1;   see  also 
Roman Jakobson,  Selected Writings II: Word and Language, (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), ‘Shifters, Verbal 
Categories, and the Russian Verb’, pp. 130-47.
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the temporal, relational dialectic of entropy and negentropy produced in the workplace 
(or, rather, in the worktime) of the humanisation process.
6.2. Paleoanthropological Humanism
The paleoanthropological condition
As for the above mentioned “paleoanthropological evidence” supporting the claim that 
the anthropogenic event is more historical than biological, this is betokened here mostly 
by the seminal work of  Ian Tattersall which, together with the momentous archeological 
discoveries by Christopher Henshilwood in South Africa during the early 90s (and the 
subsequent  publication of  the  'ndings  in  collaboration with Francesco d’Errico  and 
others), comprise what can be described as the key “paleoanthropological conditioning” 
of  my argument. 
Tattersall is ‘[o]ne of  the leading scientists studying human evolution’,51 in Chomsky’s 
opinion (and with whom he has recently collaborated on a number of  papers on the 
evolution of  language).52 His latest research has shown that the emergence of  symbolic 
thought, around 80 thousand years ago (kya), was neither a direct consequence of  the 
biological changes happening in anatomically modern humans around 200 kya (larger 
brain, descended larynx and so on), nor were these mutations “adaptations” modulated 
by some linear evolution of  language. On the contrary, every genetic modi'cation that 
enabled the invention of  language, had already been in place for thousands of  years 
51 Noam Chomsky,  What Kind of Creatures Are We?, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) p. 3. 
This text is the transcript of the “Dewey Lectures” delivered by Chomsky at Columbia University in the 
Fall of 2013, originally published in The Journal of Philosophy, CX:12 (Dec. 2013), pp. 645-700.
52 See, for example, Bolhuis et al., ‘How Could Language Have Evolved?’.
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before the appearance of  symbolic thought, marking the distinction between anatomically  
modern  humans (amh)  and  behavioral  modern  humans (bhm).  The  appearance of  symbolic 
thought––riding on the invention of  language––with respect to the capacity for thought––
a result of  genetic exaptations––had a delay of  around 120 thousand years.53   
The  change  over  of  Homo  sapiens from  a  nonsymbolic,  nonlinguistic  species  to  a 
symbolic,  linguistic one, is  the most mind-boggling cognitive transformation that has 
ever happened to any organism. […] It is conceivable that the functionally important 
role of  language as an interior conduit to thought was paramount from the beginning. 
But language as a means of  communication would most easily and rapidly have spread 
through a population that possessed the necessary biology––and ultimately beyond that  
small  or  original  population,  throughout  a  biologically  predisposed  species  whose 
newfound intellect soon allowed it to take over the world.54
The evidence
There are three paleoanthropological facts that need to be considered. 
(1) humans  who  looked  exactly  like  us  (i.e.  anatomically  modern  humans)  were 
53 Give or take a few thousand years––negligible in evolutionary times––Kate Wong’s datings do not 
seem to  contradict  Tattersall’s:  ‘Humans  who looked like  us  had  evolved  by  195,000  years  ago,  as  
evidenced by Homo sapiens fossils from the site of Omo Kibish in Ethiopia. But received archaeological  
wisdom holds that humans did not begin behaving like us until nearly 150,000 years later. That notion  
stems largely from cultural remains uncovered in Europe, where art, ritual, technological advances and 
other indications of modern thinking Howered spectacularly and suddenly after about 40,000 years ago, 
around  the  time  that  anatomically  modern  humans  started  colonizing  Europe’.  Kate  Wong,  ‘The 
Morning of the Human Mind’,  Scienti6c American, Special Edition: Becoming Human: Evolution and the Rise of  
Intelligence 16:2 (2006), pp. 74-83 (p. 78). It must be added that in this article Wong presents alternative 
theories which question the ‘archeological received wisdom’ of a delay between the biological and the 
cognitive mutations in human evolution.
54 Ian Tattersall, Masters of the Planet: the search for our human origins, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
pp. 220-21. This delay is indexed in paleoanthropology as the Middle Paleolithic (or Middle Stone Age when 
referring to African archeology): from the appearance of  the earliest Homo Sapiens (including archaic  
humans, 300 kya) until the earliest evidence of  behavioural modernity, around 30-40 kya, marking the 
start of  the Upper Paleolithic (termed Late Stone Age in African prehistory).
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present already in Levant around 100 kya;
(2) a new wave of  behavioral modern humans arrived arrived in Levant around 45 
kya (the so called Cro-Magnons);
(3) such  a  new  wave  coincides  with  (a)  the  swift  disappearance  of  the  native 
Neanderthals  (who  had  shared  the  habitat  for  around  60  ky)  and (b)  the 
appearance of  the 'rst symbolic objects.
Neanderthals––indigenous from Europe and the Middle East––had evolved around 200 
kya. What this means is that they managed to share the environment with non-symbolic, 
anatomically  modern  humans  for  al  least  60  ky.  The  arrival  of  behavioral  modern 
humans (coinciding with the appearance of  the 'rst symbolic objects in Europe and 
Levant), also marks the beginning of  the swift decline and eventual extinction of  our 
Neanderthal cousins. Something must have happened. 
In the Levant we 'nd evidence for anatomically modern people at almost 100 kyr ago, 
and Neanderthal remains at a mere 40 kyr ago.  Homo neanderthalensis and  Homo sapiens 
thus shared this  region in some way for at  least 60 kyr.  […] It is  surely signi'cant, 
though, that the last recorded Neanderthal occurrence in this region comes only a few 
millennia  after  the  appearance  of  an  “Upper  Paleolithic”  stoneworking  technology 
similar  to  (although  distinct  from)  that  of  the  earliest  Homo  sapiens  who  invaded 
Europe at about 40 kyr ago.55
The new arrivals,  the Cro-Magnons,  ‘in not much more than 10 millennia,  entirely 
eliminated the Neanderthals from the vast area they had inhabited’.56 The swift wipeout 
of  the Neanderthal  population, coinciding with the appearance of  symbolic  objects, 
indicates that ‘it was almost certainly the adoption of  symbolic cognitive processes that 




gave our kind the 'nal––and, for the Neanderthals, fatal––edge.’57 
But what is the connection between symbolic thought and this ‘fatal edge’ that 
the Cro-Magnons gained over their non-symbolic fellow hominids? Although the answer 
might remain in the speculative terrain, everything points what I have been calling all  
along the event of  humanisation: the invention of  language: ‘if  there is one single aspect of 
human mental function that is more closely tied up with symbolic processes than any 
other,  it  is  surely  our  use  of  language.’58 Tattersall  thus  summarises  the  possible 
succession of  eventualities:
humans who looked exactly like us behaved,  as far as can be told, pretty much like 
Neanderthals, for upward of 50 kyr. These humans had brains that were externally like 
our own, but that evidently did not function in the way that the Cro-Magnons’ did in 
later  times.  What  happened?  Did the  earliest  anatomically  modern and the  earliest 
behaviorally  modern  humans  represent  separate  but  skeletally  identical  species,  the 
latter eventually replacing the former? […] 
The only evident (and as we've seen, in terms of evolutionary mechanisms far 
from unusual) alternative is that the potential for the unique human capacity was born 
with our species Homo sapiens as a byproduct of some other change, and that it lay 
fallow, as it were, until unleashed by a cultural (rather than biological) stimulus. This 
capacity,  once  declenched,  would  then  have  spread  quite  easily  by  cultural  contact 
among populations that already possessed the latent ability to acquire it. 
What might that releasing stimulus have been? Like many others, I am almost 
sure that it was the invention of language.59
The African site
57 Ian Tattersall ‘How We Came to be Human’, Scienti6c American, Special Edition: Becoming Human: Evolution  
and Rise of Intelligence, 16:2 (2006), pp 66-73 (p. 68).
58  Ibid. p. 71.
59 Tattersall, The Origin Of The Human Capacity, p. 24. 
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If  for some time it was thought that prehistoric objects found in Europe, dating from 40-
30 kya (the prime example of  which is the ivory Lion-man of  the Hohlenstein-Stadel  
cave in Germany), constituted the oldest evidence of  something like symbolic-artistic 
activity  in  early  human  population,  recent  archeological  discoveries  in  Africa,  in 
particular the paradigm-shifting 'ndings of  Christopher S. Henshilwood at the Blombos 
cave near Cape Town have slightly changed the picture. 
The 'ndings at Blombos, including engraved ochre, bone and ochre processing 
kits,  marine  shell  beads,  and  re'ned  bone  and  stone  tools,  comprise  ‘the  oldest 
unequivocal evidence of  personal adornment to date and proof  that our ancestors were 
thinking like us far earlier than is widely accepted.’60 
What  this  evidence would be  implying is  that  the  symbolic  turn might  have 
happened earlier than some (Tattersall included)  might have thought. However, if  the 
length of  the delay between the genetic mutation in the human brain and the invention 
of  language has  been somewhat  extended by a few tens of  thousands of  years,  the 
Blombos evidence still supports the argument that there was, indeed, such a delay. Most 
importantly, however, it still points to a non-biological, and hence historical site for the 
emergence of  language. Reporting the 'ndings of  their excavations, Henshilwood and 
his collaborators con'rm that
[g]enetic and fossil evidence suggests that humans were anatomically near modern in 
Africa before 100 kya. Key questions are whether anatomical and behavioral modernity 
developed in tandem and what  criteria archaeologists should use to identify modern 
behavior. For the latter, there is agreement on one criterion—archaeological evidence of 
abstract or depictional images indicates modern human behavior. The Blombos Cave 
engravings are intentional images. In the light of  this evidence, it seems that, at least in 
60 Wong, ‘The Morning of the Human Mind’,  p. 76.
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southern Africa, Homo sapiens was behaviorally modern about 77,000 years ago.61
The uncontroversial facts remain: anatomically modern humans evolved more than 100 
kya (in fact, most estimates date it between 200 and 300 kya), the earliest evidence of  
symbolic thought is from around 80 kya. Something (other than a biological mutation) 
must have happened during that interval. 
The noise of  DNA
Chomsky, however, stubbornly faithful to his diehard empiricism might seem to insist 
that the event should still placed in the domain of  biology: it was a genetic mutation 
which rewired the human brain:
[i]t is commonly assumed that whatever the human intellectual capacity is, the faculty of 
language is essential to it. Many scientists agree with paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall, 
who writes that he is “almost sure that it was the invention of  language” that was the  
“sudden and emergent” event that was the “releasing stimulus” for the appearance of 
the  human  capacity  in  the  evolutionary  record––the  “great  leap  forward”  as  Jared 
Diamond called it, the result of  some genetic event that rewired the brain, allowing for 
the origin of  human language with the rich syntax that provides a multitude of  modes 
of  expression of  thought, a prerequisite for social development and the sharp changes of 
behavior that are revealed in the archaeological record, also generally assumed to be the 
trigger for the rapid trek from Africa, where otherwise modern humans had apparently 
been present for hundreds of  thousands of  years.  The view is similar to that of  the 
Cartesians, but stronger: they regarded normal use of  language as the clearest empirical 
61 Christopher  S.  Henshilwood,  et  al.,  ‘Emergence  of  Modern Human Behavior:  Middle  Stone  Age 
Engravings from South Africa’, Science  295, pp.1278-80 (2002), DOI: 10.1126/science.1067575; see also 
Christopher Henshilwood & Francesco d’Errico (eds), Homo symbolicus: The dawn of language, imagination and  
spirituality (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011).
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evidence that another creature has a mind like ours, but not the criterial evidence for 
mind and the origin of  the human capacity.62
In spite of  this––and pace Chomsky himself––as Madarasz asserts, ‘genetic mutation’ is 
still a notion abstract enough for it to qualify as a proper event in the Badiouian sense.63 
I  will  add  to  Madarasz’s  insightful  perspective  the  fact  that,  in  any  case,  noise and 
information  entropy are  all  ideas  that  have been associated  with  evolution  and genetic 
mutation for quite some time. As James Stone points out, 
the ability to separate signal from noise is fundamental to the Darwin–Wallace theory of 
evolution by natural selection. Evolution works by selecting the individuals best suited to 
a  particular  environment  so  that,  over  many  generations,  information  about  the 
environment  gradually  accumulates  within  the  gene pool.  Thus,  natural  selection is 
essentially a means by which information about the environment is incorporated into 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). And it seems likely that the rate at which information is  
incorporated into DNA is accelerated by an age-old biological mystery, sex.64
Moreover,  commenting  on  the  pioneering  work  of  bio-physicist  Lila  Gatlin, 
Jeremy Campbell writes that ‘[s]he proceeds on the assumption that when the symbols 
of  DNA are translated into the substance of  proteins, communication takes place. This 
is more than just another metaphor. Gatlin is using the word in the sense intended by 
Claude Shannon in his 1948 papers on the mathematics of  communication.’65 Yet, what 
is even more remarkable, is that in her classic 1970 paper, Gatlin starts off  from a purely 
biological domain and sets out, not only to apply the concept of  entropy in the 'eld of 
genetics,  but  to  ‘extend  the  entropy  concept  primarily  through  the  apparatus  of 
62 Chomsky, ‘Biolinguistics and the Human Capacity’, p. 176.
63 Madarasz, ‘O “sujeito cientí'co”’, p 482.
64 Stone, Information Theory, p. 3.
65 Campbell, Grammatical Man, p. 112.
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information  theory,  but  I  shall  extend  this  also.  Shannon  gave  the  most  general 
de'nition of  entropy to date and I shall extend the concept of  Shannon.’66 This is yet 
another  striking  case  proving  Malaspina’s  point:  noise  not  only  crosses  over 
epistemological boundaries: the actual crossing will have inexorably modi6ed the territories at either  
side of  the border.
Furthermore,  even  if  this  is  the  case––i.e.  that  there  was  indeed  a  genetic  event 
somewhere––the case for a non-biological event still stands. As Tattersall explains, the 
speed at which language spread is typical of  an emergent phenomenon (i.e. entropic, 
irreversible and noisy).
The  only  possible  explanation  for  this  accelerated  leap  is  the  fact  that  once 
language emerges, it is itself  emergent, recursive and noisy
Language, transmission, evental site
Tattersall indeed points at something like a proto-educational situation. There must have 
had been in operation something like a  cultural transmission that would account for the 
rapid  spread  of  the  new  symbolic  hominids––something  which  could  not  have 
happened purely via natural selection. Bearing in mind that ‘natural selection is not a 
creative force and can propel nothing into existence by itself  [and hence] it can only 
capitalize on what is already there,’67 Tattersall then reasons that 
if at some point, say around 70 to 60 kyr ago, a cultural innovation occurred in one 
human population or another that activated a potential for symbolic cognitive processes 
that had resided in the human brain all along, we can readily explain the rapid spread 
66 Lila L. Gatlin, ‘Evolutionary indices’, Proceedings of the Sixth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and  
Probability,  Volume  5:  Darwinian,  Neo-Darwinian,  and  non-Darwinian  Evolution  (Berkeley,  CA:  University  of 
California Press, 1972), pp. 277-96 (pp. 277-78).
67 Tattersall, The Origin Of The Human Capacity, p. 71.
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of symbolic behaviors by a simple mechanism of cultural diffusion.68
This transmission is one which has to be of  necessity  self-inclusive, insofar as it 
transmits  itself  through  its  own  operation––in  other  words,  language  transmits  the 
capacity for language per se (which, once again, although hard-wired is not a product of 
natural selection, and hence requires a cultural, rather than genetic, transmission) together  
with all the linguistic, informational, cognitive complexity that language is capable of 
carrying. 
All in all, we 'nd ourselves, once again, in the sphere of  Benveniste’s  énonciation, that 
‘utterance’ which is, in effect, ‘this putting into action of  the langue by an individual act 
of  utilisation.’69 The utterance is the minimal datum of  subjective assertion, and this is 
due  in  no  small  part  to  its  paradoxical,  pathological,  self-reHexivity––as  Agamben 
further explains, 
[t]he  sphere  of  the  utterance  thus  includes  that  which,  in  every  speech  act,  refers 
exclusively to its taking place, to its instance, independently and prior to what is said and 
meant in it. Pronouns and the other indicators of  the utterance, before they designate 
real objects, indicate precisely that language takes place. In this way, still prior to the world 
of  meanings, they permit the reference to the very event of  language, the only context in 
which something can only be signi'ed.70
However, if  Agamben takes here a somewhat vitalist turn,71 it is  at this same 
junction  where  one  might  assert  that,  in  fact,  what  Benveniste’s  ‘individual  act  of 
utilisation’ ultimately articulates is nothing other than what Jean-Claude Milner calls the 
68 Ibid. p. 70.
69 ‘L’énonciation est cette mise en fonctionnement de la langue par un acte individuel d’utilisation .’ Émile Benveniste, 
Problèmes de linguistique générale II (Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1974) p. 80.
70 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 25
71 See, for example, Lorenzo Chiesa & Frank Ruda, ‘The Event of Language As Force of Life’, Angelaki 
16:3 (2010), pp.163-180, DOI: 10.1080/0969725X.2011.621233
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‘blind functioning’ of  the  letter,72 an operation which structurally guarantees the pure 
universality of  the transmission of  language: as Milner puts it, it is through ‘this blind 
character, and by it alone, [that] integral transmission is assured.’73
By presenting itself  within the situation it presents, and thereby opening itself  up for a 
perennial self-critique immanent in its own functioning, the transmission of  Language is 
indeed the archetypical critico-pedagogical site.
Curiosity (reprise)
 
One must agree with Tattersall then, that ‘[t]he change over of  Homo sapiens from a 
nonsymbolic,  nonlinguistic  species  to  a  symbolic,  linguistic  one,  is  the  most  mind-
boggling cognitive transformation that has ever happened to any organism.’74
However,  and  to  go  back  now to  speaking in  Badiouian  terms:  what  actually 
happened?
Granted, if  we are considering humanisation as an event, we have to accept its 
randomness, its chance occurrence. The conditioning by language merely happened, 
and there might be no sense, then, in asking the follow-up question: how did it happen? 
Leaving the question at that, however, will inevitably bring back  “the problem of the 
transcendental”. And, as it should be clear by now, an event for Badiou is  immanent to 
the situation for which it happens (the notion of ‘transcendental’ in Badiou has a very 
72 ‘Perhaps “letters” versus “life” is the ultimate forced choice confronting contemporary philosophical 
materialism’ (Clemens, ‘Letters as Condition of Conditions’, pp. 87-8).
73 Jean-Claude Milner, Introduction à une science du language (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 22, quoted in Clemens, 
‘Letters as the Condition of Conditions’, p. 100 n. 21.
74 Tattersall, Masters of the Planet, p. 220
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speci'c sense, related to the logic of appearance of a body in a world).75 
Slavoj Žižek, for his part, for whom ‘the key philosophical problem today is this: is  
the transcendental dimension the ultimate horizon of our thinking?’ enjoys inverting the 
question regarding the origin of language: not “what is nature for language” (i.e. can we 
grasp nature, including the origin of language, through language?), but “what is language 
for nature?” (i.e. ‘how does its emergence affect nature’).76 
Lévi-Strauss’  position––a  ‘transcendentalism  without  a  transcendental  subject’, 
echoed here and there by Lacan––is that ‘one cannot think the genesis of the symbolic 
order.’ The self-referential, recursive essence of language makes it as if ‘nothing of  the 
symbolic order was here, until all of  it, all of  a sudden, was always already here.’77 So even 
a  structural  analysis  must  allow  for  at  least  one  rogue,  zero-signi'er  (to  which, 
thereupon, the whole signifying 'eld is sutured). As Lévi-Strauss himself  puts it, ‘[t]o be 
viable, an investigation completely focused on structures begins by bowing to the power 
and inanity of  the event.’78 In Lévi-Strauss this empty signi'er takes the name mana: ‘the 
mode of  appearance of  this supplementary signi'er which stands for meaning as such’, 
Žižek  adds,  ‘is  non-sense.’79 We  are  not  far,  then,  from  the  subtractive  knot 
void/noise/letter/language.
For Agamben, however, still faithful to his notion of  the ‘oath’, there is in this 
‘cognitivist’  picture a lack of  ethico-political implications––an idea which, one might 
guess, would not encounter Freire’s disapproval (more so if  we keep in mind the strong 
75 ‘The concept of “transcendental” is  without doubt the most important operational concept in the  
whole of the Greater Logic, or theory of appearing. It designates the constitutive capacity of every world  
to assign to what abides there, in that world, variable intensities of identity vis-à-vis what also abides there. 
In short,  ‘transcendental’  designates that a world,  in which pure multiplicities appear in the guise of 
objects, is a network of identities and differences that concern the elements of what appears’ (LW, p. 596).
76 Slavoj Žižek,  Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London & New York: 
Verso, 2014), p. 98.
77 Ibid.
78 ‘Pour être  viable,  une recherche tout entière  tendue vers les structures  commence par s’incliner devant la puissance et  
l’inanité de l’événement.’ Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mythologiques 2: Du miel aux cendres (Paris: Plon, 2009), pp. 1291-
2, epub.
79 Žižek, Absolute Recoil, p. 100.
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resonance  between  Agamben’s  ‘oath’  and  Freire’s  strongly  political  notion  of  ‘true 
word’). Agamben’s criticism is that
in Lévi-Strauss, the event of  anthropogenesis is seen solely in its gnoseological aspect, as 
if, in the becoming human of  man, there were not necessarily and above all ethical (and,  
perhaps, also political) implications at issue. What I would like to suggest here is that  
when […] language appeared in man, the problem it created cannot have been solely, as 
according to the hypothesis of  Levi-Strauss, the cognitive aspect of  the inadequation of 
signi'er  and signi'ed that  constitutes  the limit  of  human knowledge.  For the  living 
human being who found himself  speaking, what must have been just as—perhaps more
—decisive is the problem of  the ef'cacy and truthfulness of  his word, that is, of  what 
can guarantee  the original  connection between names and things,  and between the 
subject who has become a speaker—and, thus capable of  asserting and promising—and 
his actions. With a tenacious prejudice perhaps connected to their profession, scientists 
have always considered anthropogenesis  to be a problem of  an exclusively cognitive 
order,  as if  the becoming human of  man were solely a question of  intelligence and 
brain size and not also one of  ethos, as if  intelligence and language did not also and 
above all pose problems of  an ethical and political order, as if  Homo sapiens was not also, 
and of  course precisely for that reason, a Homo iustus.80
As  we  already  know,  for  Agamben  there  is  little  point  in  localising  a  non-
subtantialisable  ‘arché’,  it  being  but  ‘a  'eld  of  historical  currents  stretched  between 
anthropogenesis and the present’81, which means that humanisation and the invention of 
language itself  is ‘something that is necessarily presupposed as having happened but that 
cannot be hypostatized into an event in a chronology’. 
However, for Agamben it is also true that the arché––this big-bang of  humanisation––is, 
80 Agamben, The Sacrament of Language, p. 68.
81 Ibid p. 11.
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simultaneously,  ‘a  force  working  in  history’  and  that  its  background  radiation  ‘can 
eventually render historical phenomena intelligible.’82 With that in mind, and in order to 
move forward with the argument, I will open it up to yet another degree of  archeological 
conditioning:  on  the  question  of  “how  language  might  have  began”,  I  will  accept 
Tattersall’s own speculation on this matter. In spite of himself  admitting that ‘[e]xactly 
how this fateful novelty may have been invented is a separate question, upon which it is  
beyond my expertise to speculate’, Tattersall does confess a favourite conjecture amongst 
many possibilities: viz., ‘that an initial form of language may have been invented not by 
adults but by children.’ 
Given the fact that the brain is not a static structure like a rubber ball but is rather a 
dynamic entity that reorganizes itself during development (and indeed, given the right 
stimuli, throughout life), it is not implausible that a rudimentary precursor of language 
as it is familiar today initially arose in a group of children, in the context of play. Such 
prelanguage  might  have  involved  words—  sounds—  strung  together  with  additive 
meaning. It is hard to imagine that once this invention had been made, society as a 
whole would not have eventually adopted it.83
Tattersall’s  conjecture about language as the invention of  playing children, seems to 
point to an intriguing site, wherein curiosity and play might have overlapped in order for 
language  and  humanisation  to  happen,  a  paradoxical  site  which  integrates  both 
randomness and creativity.  
Children’s curiosity 
82 Ibid (my emphasis).
83 Tattersall ‘How We Came to be Human’, p. 72 (my emphasis); c.f. ‘Indeed, I am greatly entertained  
by the notion that the 'rst language was the invention of children, who are typically much more receptive 
to new ideas than adults are. They always have their own methods of doing things, and they communicate 
in ways that sometimes deliberately mystify their parents’ (Masters of the Planet, p. 221).
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Jean  Piaget  had  already  observed  that  curiosity  is  an  integral  element  of  a  child’s 
cognitive development. For Piaget this curiosity is triggered by some unfamiliarity, by 
something uncertain and surprising––as  indeed we saw both in Plato and Aristotle’s 
θαυμάζω as much as in Bloch’s Realstaunen: ‘one observes that the subject looks neither at 
what is too familiar, because he is in a way surfeited with it, nor at what is too new 
because this does not correspond to anything in his schemata.’84  
Two  crucial  aspects,  however,  emerge  from  Piaget’s  cognitive-developmental 
approach. Firstly, that children’s curiosity requires something that is neither ‘too new’ 
nor ‘too familiar’, in other words, something lying in the band between pure noise and 
absolute redundancy. Secondly, this Piagetian approach is still pointing towards an anxiety, 
to something like an internal order emerging from an internal disorder: indeed, as Jamie 
Jirout and David Klahr explain, ‘Piaget viewed curiosity as a part  of  the process of 
assimilation,  resulting  from  cognitive  disequilibrium’.  Such  internal  unbalance  is 
produced by the fact that ‘children are curious from birth, with developing cognitive 
schemas leading to new opportunities for surprising experiences that are discrepant from 
what a child believes’.85 In other words, children are already experimenting with the 
shifting  of  epistemological  borders:  they  are  already  operating  in  Malaspina’s 
epistemological noise.
Furthermore,  if  curiosity  is,  for  Piaget,  the  child’s  ‘urge  to  explain  the 
unexpected’86 ––which, translated to Badiouian terms, would mean that curiosity is what 
84 Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, trans.  by Margaret Cook (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1952) p 68. Freire’s mentions of Piaget are surprisingly scarce: see Letters to Cristina, p. 
12,  Paulo Freire’s  Intellectual  Roots,  p.  205, and Paulo Freire,  Pedagogia  da Esperança:  Um Reencontro Com a  
Pedagogia do Oprimido, 23rd edn (Rio de Janeiro & São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2016), p. 34; for connections 
between Piaget and Freire, see Maria Elvira Martins, ‘Aproximações conceituais entre as teorias de Jean 
Piaget e Paulo Freire: senhores de seu tempo’, IX Encontro da Pós-Graduação em Psicologia: modos de produção do  
conhecimento: desa6os das subjetividades, 2011), pp. 1227-1248.
85 Jamie Jirout & David Klahr, ‘Children’s scienti'c curiosity: In search of an operational de'nition of an 
elusive concept’, Developmental Review 32 (2012), pp. 125–160 (p. 128).
86 Susan Engel, ‘Children’s Need to Know: Curiosity in Schools’, Harvard Educational Review 81:4 (Winter 
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drives the infant’s attempt to explain what is, in every respect, for them an event––then, 
children’s curiosity can be considered as nothing less than  an experimental playground for  
subjective truth procedures.
Finally,  and  resonating  with  Tattersall’s  above  conjecture––viz.,  that  language  and 
symbolic  thought  emerged  from  children’s  play––Piaget  underlines  that  the  child’s 
investigation of  the uncertainties of  the surrounding world and of  ‘the basic laws of 
nature’,  is  operated through ‘the  simplest  form of  symbolic  play’,  utilising everyday 
objects as much as their own body.87
6.3. Play and Critique of Play
If  something  like  a  “theory  of  play”  can  be  traced  back  to  Aristotelian  notions  of 
κάθαρσις88, all the way through Friedrich Schiller89 up to Johan Huizinga’s relation (or, as 
we shall shortly see, non-relation) of  play with human nature, it was Roger Caillois who 
'rst  attempted  a  ‘systematic  classi'cation  of  games’.90 In  his  Man,  Play  and  Games, 
published in 1955, Caillois proposes ‘[a]fter examining different possibilities’,
2011), pp. 625-45 (p. 626).
87 Jean Piaget,  The Psychology of Intelligence, trans. by Malcolm Piercy & D. E. Berlyne (London & New 
York: Routledge Classics, 2001), p. 117. See also Engel, ‘Children’s Need to Know’, p. 637.
88 See Aristotle, Poetics 1449b.
89 ‘Man only plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only completely a man  
when he plays.’ See letters XIV and XV of the Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, Friedrich Schiller 
The  Aesthetical  Essays,  (The  Project  Gutenberg)<https://www.gutenberg.org/'les/6798/6798-h/6798-
h.htm#link2H_4_0018>[accss. 4 Oct 2019].
90 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games (1958), trans. by Meyer Barash, (Urbana & Chicago, IL: University 
Of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 12. Like Freire, like Serres, Caillois belongs in a set of idiosyncratic thinkers for 
whom eclecticism seems to be less a method than a mode of thought. Murray Gell-Mann writes that 
‘some of us seem to belong to another category [other than Apollonian and Dionysian thinkers]:  the 
“Odysseans,” who combine the two predilections in their quest for connections among ideas’ (Gell-Mann, 
The Quark  and  the  Jaguar,  p.  xiii).  Considering  that  Odysseus,  according  to some,  was  Hermes’  great-
grandchild (Apollodorus 1.9), one could equally speak of Hermetic thinkers.
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a  division  into  four  main  rubrics,  depending  upon  whether,  in  the  games  under 
consideration, the role of  competition, chance, simulation, or vertigo is dominant. I call 
these agôn,  alea,  mimicry, and ilinx, respectively. All four indeed belong to the domain of 
play. One plays football, billiards, or chess (agôn); roulette or a lottery (alea); pirate, Nero, 
or Hamlet (mimicry); or one produces in oneself, by a rapid whirling or falling movement, 
a state of  dizziness and disorder (ilinx).91
Competition (agôn), ritual (mimicry), vertigo (ilinix) and chance (alea): such are in 
Caillois  classi'cation  the  four  'gures  in  which  human  games  manifest  themselves. 
Caillois’ theory of  play builds on the earlier work of  Dutch historian Johan Huizinga.92 
Somehow contradicting  Schiller’s  above statement,  Huizinga writes  in  his  inHuential 
Homo Ludens, that 
[p]lay  is  older  than  culture,  for  culture,  however  inadequately  de'ned,  always 
presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them their  
playing.  We  can  safely  assert,  even,  that  human civilization  has  added  no  essential 
feature to the general idea of  play. Animals play just like men.93 
What Huizinga suggests here then is that play, in itself, cannot de'ne anything 
like a human nature, nor a notion of  culture. Much to the contrary, the implication seems 
to be, as Sandino Núñez observes, that 
the properly human, or social  (culture,  civilization)  is  therefore established by a certain 
capacity to stop playing, to establish an antagonism between play and something which 
is not play and which is also “superior” to play: a  reality transcendent to play and that 
91 Caillois, Man, Play and Games, p. 12.
92 Caillois, though, was not entirely uncritical of Huiznga: see Man, Play and Games, pp. 1-2.
93 Johan  Huizinga,  Homo  Ludens:  A  Study  of  the  Play-Element  in  Culture (London,  Boston  and Henley: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p1. Huizinga was one of the key developers of cultural history, a discipline 
pioneered by Jacob Burckhardt during the mid eighteenth-century; the Annales school in France, of which 
Lucien Febvre was a prominent leader, became the other main player in the 'eld: as it happens, Febvre is  
a key reference in Freire’s writing.
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allows to speak and to think play. That reality is logos, language.94 
In  this  sense,   humanisation,  language,  culture  (viz.,  education in  the  Freirean 
sense) is not driven by play, but by the sublation of  play.
One can sense a jarring discord noisily  emerging here:  (1)  curiosity,  as  in  Freire  (and 
indeed, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Piaget, Bloch), is  an essential drive, or symptom, of 
humanisation; (2) concurrently,  language is the singular emergence de'ning humanisation; 
(3) furthermore, this curiosity/language singularity emerges as a result of  children’s play (as 
Tattersall and Piaget argue); (4) play, however, is deemed ‘anterior to culture’ (Huizinga) 
and hence not equivalent to logos and language, (5) therefore, play must be sublated in order for a 
properly humanising subjectivity to obtain (Núñez). 
So,  paradoxically,  we  have  that  (a)  play  conditions  the  emergence  of 
humanisation  and  language,  and (b)  play  needs  to  be  transcended  in  order  for 
humanisation and language to emerge. 
At this point, it might be worth noting that, conceptually speaking, there is no 
harm in encountering such a paradox. On the contrary, considering that, as I have been 
arguing  all  along,  paradox––or  rather,  the  epistemological  and  internal  noise  it 
produces––is the symptom of  every evental rupture, its murmuring might very well be 
signalling the proximity of  a truth lurking nearby. 
Having  said  that,  if  the  paradox/noise/anxiety  dispositif is  integral  to  the 
methodology proposed here, inconsistency is certainly not. So in order that the former 
does not decay into the latter, the concept of  play, as it stands, will require some further 
examination. 
94 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora p. 70 (original italics).
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Pedagogy of  play?
As  mentioned  earlier,95 Tyson  Lewis  and  Daniel  Cho  point  to  today’s  key  politico-
pedagogical imperative (the defence of  critical pedagogy against the neoliberal takeover 
of  education) and, along not dissimilar lines as the ones I am attempting here, invoke 
something like a Badiouian-Freirean educational theory as a possible site of  resistance. 
In doing so they problematise a postmodern notion of  “play in education” as a bland, 
‘Haccid’ response to our current predicament:
[i]f  we assume Badiou and Freire’s de'nition of  education, it is clear that education 
within its current one-dimensional, standardized form is not education at all but rather  
the  foreclosure  of  education  since  it  is  denied  its  most  radical  and  revolutionary 
dimension. Thus the central problematic facing both Freire and Badiou becomes clear.  
First, for Badiou, if  education is, indeed, organizing knowledge for a breakthrough of 
truth, then it is already engaged in the project of  truth—what then is the passage from a 
technocratic, administered “education” (like we have today in the US) to education as a 
project  of  truth?  Second,  for  Freire,  if  education  is  a  space  where  students  are 
subjectivized by a transformative praxis, then that transformative space must already be 
internal  to  education itself—where  then is  the  necessary  break within  the  prevalent 
“objectivity” of  contemporary schooling practices through which such transformation 
could  effectively  take  place?  Is  the  only  path  left  for  education  to  be  that  of 
standardization?  
Lewis and Cho argue that a common response to this question, coming more 
from neoliberal models of  education than from properly critical pedagogy, is what they 
call ‘pedagogy of  play’:
[o]ne  possible  response  to  this  question  is  constructivism,  or  what  we  will  call  a 
95 See chapter 1, section 1.2.
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pedagogy of  play. Here educational theorists encourage students to construct their own 
meaning(s)  from  existing  curricula  and/or  their  experiences  with  the  world.   Such 
theories of  creative play seem to always deny the ideological mediations that structure 
the very frame of  these playfully creative acts.  Furthermore,  such encouragement of 
playful creation of  meaning denies—if  not explicitly, then, at the very lest, implicitly—
the existence of  Truth. Is such a stance not similar to that Haccid form of  postmodern 
relativism and solipsism? Is the ludic postmodern pedagogy of  play and affect the only 
other viable alternative to the standardization movement?96
This critique of  play seems to be in complete accordance with Núñez’s analysis about 
what  could  be  interpreted  as  an  appropriation  of  the  praxis  of  play by  contemporary 
capitalism, and something which might very well  be  both cause and symptom of  the 
current educational and cultural crisis. For Núñez, ‘posmocapitalist culture [la cultural  
posmocapitalista]  compulsively  oscillates  between  life,  or  pure  experience  as  an 
unsublimated, extreme liberation of  social energies, and the pure disciplinary order of 
rituals and simulacra.’97 In Núñez’s analysis, the poles of  this oscillation can be identi'ed 
with, on the one hand, the ‘games of  vertigo’ (Caillois’  ilinix), which Núñez associates 
with ‘pure experience’, or ‘that-which-does-not-die’ [lo-que-no-muere] and, on the other 
hand, ‘games of  costume and challenge’ (respectively, Caillois’ mimicry and agôn), which 
are linked to a notion of  ‘pure order’, or ‘that-which-does-not-live’ [lo-que-no-vive].
Núñez’s diagnosis of  the bipolar condition of  contemporary culture contains not 
a few overtones resonating with Badiou’s own verdict about the status of  a ‘democratic 
materialism’,  wherein  the  pure  circulation  of  bodies  and  languages  obliterates  any 
emergence of  truth.98 If, for Badiou, a truth emerges as that which disturbs, or punctures 
96 Cho & Lewis, ‘Education and Event’, p. 3.
97 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora, p. 70.
98 For  Badiou,  contemporaneity  de'nes  a  logic  of  appearances  that  can  be  reduced  to  one  valid 
statement:  there are only bodies and languages––to which Badiou supplements:  except that there are truths, thus 
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a  hole  in  a  status  quo  trapped  between  the  oppressive  Law  of  the  state  and  the 
horizontal  circulation  of  opinion  and  identities,  in  Núñez’s  version,  ‘sense  and 
language’––which are here indices of  Truth––‘happen (may happen) in between the 
that-which-does-not-die of  pure experience (the partial object-without-metaphor) and 
the already-dead of  obsessive structure and norm.’99  
Sense/language  is,  for  Núñez,  a  ‘miraculous  instant’,  a  Heeting  appearance, 
interim, provisional and inter-medial ‘in-between the psychotic and the obsessive: in-
between that which does not die  and that which does not live. In-between the harassment of 
voices and the threat of  the Word.’ The association, then, becomes clear: on one side, a 
schizophrenic circulation of  opinion, communication, bodies and identities: ‘the voices, 
the hallucinated fascination of  partial objects […] evidence that sense arrived too late’, 
and simultaneously, on the other, a pusillanimous deference to the state and to empirical 
scientism: ‘the Word, the vacuous obedience to bureaucratic order, evidence that sense 
arrived too early’––a situation I would describe as the production of  a sick temporality. In 
Badiou’s  account, there  are  bodies  and  languages  with  the  exception  of  truths:  in 
Núñez’s  version,  Truth  (viz.,  language and  sense)  is  the  delicate,  Heeting  Hickering  of 
something slightly out of  temporal joint: 
[l]anguage can never plainly compose the balanced 'gure of  a just in time, because such 
an imbalance and such a delay are precisely what casts sense towards Platonic  dianoia 
and Aufhebung: should there be de'nitive and plain sense, there would be no language. 
That unbalance is language.100 
One  can  fully  get  behind  this  argument.  Núñez’s  connection  between  the  current 
sublating  the  particularist  duality  of  a  hegemonic  ‘democratic  materialism’  into  a  universalist  
emancipatory ‘materialist dialectics’ (see LW, ‘Preface’, pp. 1-40).
99 Núñez, La Vieja Hembra Engañadora p. 66.
100 Ibid. p. 67.
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‘postmocapitalist’ state of  affairs and Caillois’ typology of  play seems accurate enough, 
and  the  notion  of  language  as  an  unbalance,  as  a  ‘miraculous  instant’  of  sense,  is 
completely consistent with what I am proposing here: language-as-subject-constructing 
is, indeed, always already incomplete, never absolute––something like a delicate noise in  
search of  some sense.
Nonetheless, there remains unanswered in Núñez’s account a begged question: 
we are not told if  there actually is any alternative 'gure of  play other than those games 
oscillating between the psychosis  of  vertigo and the obsession of  rules and mimicry. 
What seems to be missing in this account is a 'gure of  play which could be used to 
describe, or model, a truth-seeking, subject-constructing process, one in which sense and 
language  could  actually  happen.  In  other  words,  a  play  able  to  produce  sense  in  the 
unbalance  of  a  delicate  language  quivering  in-between  the  too-lateness  of  voices 
(Badiou’s  ‘bodies  and languages’)  and the  too-earliness  of  the  Word (in  Badiou,  the 
disastrous ‘absolutisation’ of  the power of  Truth). In short, a play expressing a  healthy 
temporality: after all, that is what we are after in the dialogue prescribed by an education 
by truths.
And so, to repeat the question: could there be a notion of  play that would describe, or 't, 
such emancipatory, subject-constructing, critico-pedagogical philosophical outlook? The 
answer, in fact, might be implied by a conspicuous omission in Nuñez’s application of 
Caillois’ categories––which, to be fair, is intended as a critique of  contemporaneity, rather 
than an apologia of  play. Granted, the bipolarity of  our postmocapitalist condition can be 
described in terms of  vertigo on one side, and simulation/competition on the other: any 
attentive reader, however, will note that in Núñez’s narrative, Caillois’ fourth category is 
distinctively lacking: missing in-between the pure vitalism of  ilinix and the dead letter of 
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mimicry and agôn, the pure chance of  alea is nowhere to be seen.
From  this  omission  we  can  then  conclude,  by  default,  that  in  our  current 
posmocapitalist  order  what  is  lacking is a  temporality  of  pure  chance.  Unsurprisingly,  it 
would seem that,  within the  democratic  materialist  order  of  the  state,  noise––proper  
noise––needs to be foreclosed. Except, that is, for the imperial noise of  the state itself: the 
statistics  of  economic rituals,  control  of  information and power,  a crooked game of 
loaded dice which only a few privileged ‘princes’ get to set the rules of.  
Statistics, or, the state’s sacred rigged game
Clearly,  from the  point  of  view  of  the  state,  the  uncertainty  of  alea,  needs  to  be, 
somehow, controlled: the fact that this is (obviously) an oxymoron, renders this control (or 
rather, the illusion of  this control) even more powerful (and hence, as Jean-Pierre Dupuy 
has shown, something touching on the sacred).101 
In Malaspina’s incisive analysis, the notion of  statistics points to the disjunction 
between, on one side, power as control of  information and, on the other, the emergence 
of  the new. ‘Uncertainty falls on the side of  noise and excess together with inaccuracy, 
illegitimacy  and  illegality’;  the  new  is  merely  ‘news’:  the  state  makes  sure  that 
‘information  must  be  understood  as  facts  and  data  that  serve  the  consolidation  of  
knowledge  and  law  and  order,  hence  consolidating  established  power  through 
established knowledge, by reducing uncertainty, disorder and subversion’102––all which 
could  't,  pace  Malaspina  herself,  Badiou's  own  picture  of  the  state’s  knowledge 
foreclosing the illegal truth of  an event.
A culture, and its education, modelled on the uncertainty of  chance and of  what 
101 Dupuy, The Mark of the Sacred, pp. 1-19.
102 Malaspina, EN p. 134.
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Badiou calls the ‘random enquires’ of  the subjects of  truth, is foreclosed. Noise acquires 
its vulgar meaning ‘as improper and immoral behaviour’. For Malaspina, it is key to 
understand how did these ‘negative connotations’ end up becoming  ‘the opposite of 
knowledge’.103
It is worth looking for the answer to this question in the institutions of  knowledge, where 
the  activity  that  produces  information,  i.e.  investigation,  study  or  instruction,  is  
consolidated under the authority to exclude uncertainty, and to expel noisy individuals  
and all those unreceptive to the communication or reception of  accurate facts or data.104
 A proper understanding of  the relation between information and noise requires 
an understanding of  the threshold between them, which, in the end, is understanding 
the relation between ‘established knowledge and power’. The name of  the attempt by 
the state to control the borders of  this uncertainty is statistics.
In  its  historical  origin,  the  relation between knowledge  and  power  is  thus  not  only 
explicit, but fundamental and moreover foundational, since statistics 'rst designated the 
“science of  the state”, and was institutionalized as such during the seventeenth century 
by  Hermann  Conrig  (1606–1681)  who  called  it  the:  “nomenclature  of  knowledges 
necessary  to  the  Prince”.  […] What  we  call  statistics  today  thus  emerges  from this 
history  of  state  administration,  from  the  correlation  it  establishes  between  the 
knowledge and power.105 
For Malaspina, the symptomatic contradiction between Shannon and Wiener’s 
de'nitions of  information  (entropy or “freedom of  choice” in the former, negation of 
entropy or “negentropy”, in the latter), ‘is not the question of  a mere point of  view, but a 
problem deeply rooted in our need for prediction and control, but also of  discovery of 
103 Here ’knowledge’, of course, is not meant in the Badiouian sense, i.e. as contraposed to ‘truth’.
104 Malaspina, EN p. 135.
105 Malaspina, EN p. 136; for Conrig’s quote, see Alain Desrosieres, ‘Statistique’,  Dictionnaire d’histoire et  
philosohie des sciences, 4th edn (Paris: PUF, 2004), pp. 1008-24 (quoted in Malaspina, ibid).
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novelty’. This dialectic between, on one side, the predictability of  knowledge and the 
security of  redundancy, and, on the other, the need to accommodate the irruption of  the 
new is, in Malaspina’s analysis, akin to the opposition between subjective pure reason 
(what  I  refer  to  as  an  ethics  of  the  axiomatic)  and  objective  empiricism:  according  to 
Malaspina,  this  conHict  manifests  itself  in  the  statisticians’  rejection  of  the  a  priori  
implied  in  probability  calculus,  which  to  them ‘appears  too  “subjective”’,  and  who 
require the ‘a posteriori grounding [of] reliable information’ provided by statistical data.106 
‘For two centuries’ Malaspina continues, 
the emerging discipline of  modern statistics is thus caught between on the one hand the 
“subjectivism” of  the calculus of  probability,  which provides an  a priori “measure of 
uncertainty”, and on the other hand the certainty provided a posteriori by the statistical 
frequency of  events.107 
And precisely a probabilistic logic is what needs to be posited to supplement 
Badiou’s  Greater  Logic of  appearance:  viz.,  a  logic  of  knowing,  constructed  on  the 
unadulterated, subjective chance of  probability rather than the a posteriori positivism of 
statistics. As Badiou himself  asserts, ‘no genuine political sequence is representable in 
the universe of  numbers and statistics’.108 
So if  statistics is the only game of  chance in town, this does not necessarily imply that  
Caillois’  alea is truly operational––in fact, the opposite is the case. Chance might very 
well name the element of  play that an evental site for language and critical education 
requires: the healthy anxiety that comes with freedom of  choice, the creative making sense 
out of  nonsense and metaphor––such would be the lesson of  a dice throw that does not 
106 EN, p. 137.
107 Ibid.
108 Badiou, M p. 7.
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abolish chance. However, when alea is subsumed by statistics, the result seems to be that 
we are left pathologically oscillating between, on one pole, the psychotic vertigo of  ilinix, 
wherein  absolute  uncertainty  effaces  every  possible  truth,  on  the  other  pole,  the 
obsessive absolutism of  ritual  mimicry and  agôn,  wherein any arbitrary Rule becomes 
immovable. 
Admittedly,  the  subject-process  involved in  an education  by  truths,  does  require  the 
disciplining  of  rules  as  much  as  the  performance  of  ritual:  it  is  not  a  matter  of 
foreclosing either of  them.  However, it seems that what is needed is a healthy disturbance 
dithering  the  pure  oscillation  between  those  two  poles  in  order  for  it  not  to  become 
pathological: such noise can only be provided by the randomness of  chance. 
Noise will have rendered the oscillation into a movement, a Brownian motion, a 
random trajectory: and such trajectory is none other than that drawn by a subjective truth 
procedure, chaperoned by education.
A world’s play
For Kostas Axelos, play is not restricted to humanity’s play in and with the world, but to a 
notion of  ‘world’s play “itself ”’, or more precisely, ‘world as play, the unfurling of  play in 
which man’s play and world's play encounter each other perhaps to become one. Man is 
a player par excellence, but he is also constantly thwarted.’109 Axelos  not  only  associates 
play with language,  ‘as  a  combinatory system, as  play  between signs  and rules’:  for 
Axelos, play is conditioned in a similar manner as philosophy is for Badiou: there is 
today not only the ‘varied play of  “love”’,  but also the fact  that ‘poetry and art are 
becoming more and more explicitly play’––all of  which, together with ‘the somewhat 
109 Kostas Axelos, ‘Play as the System of Systems’, SubStance 8:4:25 (1979), pp. 20-24 (p. 22).
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empirical play of  world politics [and] the play of  technē, fed by the play of  the sciences’  
comprise what Axelos calls the ‘world’s play’, a systemic, universal play which, by tying 
‘man to world’,  institutes  a  ‘system of  systems [l’ensemble  des  ensembles].’110  To put  it 
differently: play, for Axelos, is the relational subject par excellence. 
Most  importantly,  however,  is  the  fact  that  play  becomes  the  connector,  the 
transmitter  between  humanity  and  the  world:  ‘man,  transitional  being,  being  of 
transition. It is among men that the play of  question and answer between man and the 
world  takes  place.  For  these  two  zones  [ensembles]  tend  to  become  one  [ensemble  
d’ensembles]’. 
Play it seems, is not only hermetic: it is a theophany of  Hermes himself.
Furthermore, if  one of  the Freirean key injunctions is to ‘read the world’111, for Axelos 
this same reading, though necessary, is not suf'cient: 
What is our role as readers and parties to play, as parties to diverse forms of  play? Our 
task consists in knowing how to read in a given instance of  world’s play every other type 
of  play, and, principally, the play of  the world. But we must not only read, we must play, 
turning the rules upside down when necessary, experimenting beyond the subject-object 
dichotomy  with  a  plurality  of  perspectives  on  each  problem.  It  is  a  question  of  
matching, with serenity and sadness, to world's play the unspeakable, the unnameable, 
the unplayable without hurriedly forcing it into little systems which would exhaust it  
with their reductionist, unilateral, imperialistic methods. We must hold ourselves ready 
for  play  which  summons  us,  play  of  language,  thought,  work,  struggle,  love,  and 
death.112
110 Ibid.
111 See Paulo Freire,  ‘Reading the World and Reading the Word: An Interview with Paulo Freire’,  
Language Arts 62:1 (1985), pp. 15–21.
112 Axelos, ‘Play as the System of Systems’, p. 24.
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If, as I have argued, the ‘reading the world’ implies for Freire an epistemological 
curiosity––which  seems  implausible  without  an  element  of  play––in  Axelos  the 
injunction is explicit:  one must play.  However––and more importantly––for Axelos one 
must do so under two conditions: (1) one must play ‘turning the rules upside down when 
necessary’, (thus resisting the absolutism of  the Word, implied in mimicry and agôn, and 
its  obsessive  eagerness  for  sense)  and,  simultaneously  (2)  not  forcing  what  is  not-yet 
consistent  into  ‘little  systems’,  have  the  courage  to  accept  it  as  ‘unnameable’  with 
‘serenity  and  sadness’  (thus  sublating  the  psychosis  of  ilinix and  always-already-late 
arrival of  sense, into something like a courageous acedia).113  
In short, play teaches us how to let noise be noise.
Deleuze’s divine game
On the other hand, Deleuze’s ‘divine game’, (which he opposes to the ‘human game’, 
not hiding an intended distancing from Axelos’ immanently humanist play), is the site 
where ‘Ideas come from’.114 
If  Axelos’s dice are thrown in the world, Deleuze’s ‘are thrown against the sky’; 
whilst Axelos’ transmission happens between ‘man and the world’, Deleuze’s play seems 
purely internal: ‘[i]t is a game on two tables’, played in the ‘fracture or hinge […] of 
empty time, the Aion through which pass the throws of  the dice. On one side, nothing 
but an I fractured by that empty form. On the other, nothing but a passive self  always  
dissolved in that empty form’.115
113 Commenting on Lucretius’ poem, Badiou writes that ‘the bare truth, prior to the occupation of its 
place, appears essentially sad. For most people, the place of philosophy, the place of the proving of the  
true is, as seen from afar, melancholic’ (C p. 47); see also In6nite Thought, p. 106.
114 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 282.
115 Ibid. p. 284. 
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Deleuze’s divine game is one that excludes nothing, that does not abolish chance, 
that produces a healthy temporality.
Be that as it may, Badiou is still scathingly critical of  Deleuze’s notion of  chance.116 Let 
us remind ourselves that, as Brassier explains, a Badiouian truth procedure ‘is random 
or aleatory.’
Chance provides  the  aleatory  substance of  subjectivation because the subject  of  the 
truth procedure forces the generic extension through a series of entirely random choices; 
distinguishing  x from  y without  recourse  to  a  principle  or  concept  by  which  to 
differentiate x from y.117
If,  for Brassier, ‘Badiou is curiously reliant on a suspiciously commonsense or 
intuitive notion of  “chance” or ‘randomness”’, on the other hand,  
Turing showed how any deductive procedure could be de'ned in terms of  recursive 
functions, algorithmically generated, and therefore automated as a computable function. 
And  this  automation  of  computable  functions  is  entirely  compatible  with  the 
straightforwardly intuitive characterization of  “chance” Badiou seems to invoke in his 
account of  the deductive process that constitutes truth.118
As we shall see in the next chapter, it is precisely this Probabilistic logic which not only 
might re'ne what Brassier calls Badiou’s ‘suspiciously commonsense’ notion of  chance, 
but might allow for a stronger conceptualisation of  relationality.119
116 See Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, chapter 6, ‘Eternal Return and Chance’, pp. 67-77.
117 Ray Brassier, ‘Nihil Unbound: Remarks on Subtractive Ontology and Thinking Capitalism’,  Think  
Again: Alain Badiou and the Future Of Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London & New York: Continuum, 
2004), pp 50-58 (p. 54).
118 Ibid. p. 55.
119 Ibid.
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7. Cadence: Humanisation, Noise, Relation, Education
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” – that is all1
7.0. Intro: Relationality and the Production of Time
Badiou’s subtractive non-relationality
An attentive reader might have noticed that Peter Hallward persists, time and again like 
an olympian gadHy, in exacting from Badiou an answer to the question of  relationality––
more speci'cally, Hallward’s ‘friendly demands’ continually aim for what he (correctly) 
perceives as a lack of  relationality in Badiou’s ontology.2
From the  outset,  Badiou banishes  from ontology precisely  this  general  “feel  for  the 
world” as no more than an invitation to sensual and ideological confusion. The question 
is  whether  the  resulting  clarity  can  ever  adequately  move  beyond  its  operational 
abstraction.3
For Hallward there is in the lack of  relationality, not only in Badiou but in all of 
French contemporary thought––including, yes, Deleuze’s––something like a symptom 
that  needs to be addressed.4 And it  is  indeed a necessity,  inasmuch as  it  pertains to 
Hallward’s  unshakable  political  subjectivity.  If  it  is  true  that  ‘[t]oday’s  French 
1 John Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’,  The Oxford Book of English Verse, ed by Arthur Thomas Quiller-
Couch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1912) pp. 729-30.
2 See Alain Badiou, ‘Afterword: Some Replies to a Demanding Friend’, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the  
Future Of Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward (London & New York: Continuum,  2004), pp. 232-237.
3 Hallward, Badiou, p. 106.
4 According to Hallward, the otherwise very diverse work of thinkers such as Bergson, Lacan, Badiou,  
Deleuze, Henry or Rosset all present this common trait: non-relationality; see Peter Hallward, ‘The One 
or The Other: French philosophy today’, Angelaki, 8:2 (August 2003) pp. 1-32.
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philosophers  have  developed  a  conception  of  singular  or  non-relational  thought  as 
varied and ingenious as any in the history of  philosophy’, in Hallward’s view, however, 
‘[t]he task of  tomorrow’s generation of  thinkers may be to develop an equally resilient 
relational alternative.’5 
Without any pretence of  being up to such an important task, the concluding paragraphs 
of  this thesis will not aim to 'nalise an answer to these issues, but rather to allow them to 
resonate with the themes developed thus far.
The hinge between subtraction and relationality
One  of  the  key  corollaries  that  noise-as-the-temporalisation-of-the-void provides  is  a 
perspective  from  where  to  think  the  issue  of  relationality,  without  betraying  the 
subtractive, non-relational origin of the void. 
In order to gain such perspective, however, one must take a route that leads––
yet  again––towards  a  head-on  engagement  with  paradox.  The  incoming  issue  here 
would be that, apropos “relation”, the pair void/noise carries a loud discordant polarity: 
we are hit simultaneously by (a)  absolute non-relationality on the side of the void, and (b) 
pure relationality on the side of noise. 
And, once again, rather than resisting such paradox, the technique will be to 
absorb its force and use it to our advantage.
With respect to the void, it  is  an incontrovertible fact that,  as Hallward observes, its  
emptiness proscribes it from containing anything at all––including, of  course, relations. 
Moreover, it is this lack of  relation which in fact makes the void ontologically empty: for 
5 Peter Hallward, ‘The One or The Other’, p. 23.
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Hallward, non-relationality precedes or over-determines, subtraction itself.  
The void is not so much veri'ably “empty” as demonstrably impervious to or devoid of 
relations. Universally included in its every part, the void of  a situation is bordered, or 
“edged,” by a place that is impervious to the relational mechanisms devised by its state
—and  thus  impervious  to  relationality  tout  court,  since  the  elements  of  a  situation, 
subtracted from the  mechanisms  of  the  state,  exist  independently  of  interelemental 
relations,  as  a  purely  disordered  collection  of  singularities.  In  short,  the  void  is  
nonrelational and without place; it is nothing yet is included in all things; it is located 
nowhere yet scattered everywhere.6
And the foreclosure  of  relation that comes with subtraction is,  for Hallward, 
clearly a problem: granted, one must subtract oneself  from this world (from things as they  
are), and af'rm that there will always be the possibility of  something else––without, for all 
that, completely sacri'cing every notion of  relationality. If  ‘it is certainly essential that 
philosophy do something other than merely react (or resign itself) to the world’ the fact 
remains that ‘[w]e will never change tomorrow’s world, however, on the basis of  a non-
relation’.7
Meanwhile,  and  by  harsh  contrast,  we  have  Hainge’s  inherently  (neo)  Deleuzian 
position––one which most sound-studies scholars would agree with––maintaining that 
noise is, in itself, pure relationality. Indeed, not only is noise ‘the mark of  an ontology 
which is necessarily relational’, for Hainge, it is ‘through noise’ that
we are able to intuit the serial relations that link the heterogenetic modes through which 
everything comes to be in an ontology that does not believe in 'xed identities, beings 
and transcendent essence, but only difference, becomings and relations. If  noise inhabits 
6 Hallward, Badiou, p. 273.
7 Hallward, ‘The One or The Other’, p. 23.
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everything  because  everything  is  in  actuality  formed out  of  noise,  then  what  noise 
ultimately points us to is the relational ontology according to which the world comes to 
pass...8 
Such  a  position,  as  noted  earlier,  merely  Hattens  ontology  in  a  Spinozist-
Deleuzian gesture that conceives ‘the world and everything in it as expressive, arising out 
of  the  movement  or  force  of  differentiation  through  which  all  expresses  itself  in 
existence.’9
Alternatively, what I am proposing here is that relation comes about the moment that 
the  (non-relational)  void  is  forced  into  movement,  not  by  some  sort  of  creative, 
immanent force of  life, but by a metanoic spike which transforms the voided animal into 
a subject. Rather than as an expression of  some given, immanent creativity, noise and 
relation come about as the consequence of  an event. It is in the course of  the subtractive 
trajectory of  a truth that the void becomes an indiscernible noisy murmur, as the animal 
converts  to subject in their af'rmation and investigation of  the consequences of  the 
event. Therefore, relation is not ontologically given, it emerges from these post-evental 
investigations, these enquiries which are necessarily praxial, inter-subjective, dialogical 
and noisy. It is none other than this movement what Badiou refers to as the production of  
time––and it is here, I claim, wherefrom the free energy available for educational work is 
to be extracted.
Relation begins with noise and relation requires some subject at the edge of  the void––
which means: some time-producing work at the threshold of  noise. As we saw in the 
previous chapters, the name of  this irreversible temporality, of  this entropy produced by 
8 Hainge, Noise Matters, p. 14.
9 Ibid.
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(some will say “against”) the negentropic investigation of  a truth, fuelled by curiosity and 
anxiety, is education.10
From the inside to the outside
Furthermore, and now looking at the issue of  relationality from a Freirean perspective, 
this  schizductive,  hermetic  noise––which  in  Freire  takes  yet  another  name,  viz.,  
‘epistemological  curiosity’––performs  a  further  crossing,  this  time  from  the  inside  to  the  
outside,  closing  the  loop  of  alterity  and effectively  (re)producing  relationality.  And in 
Freire it all starts, of  course, with consciousness––however,
[c]onsciousness is a starting point. It is by becoming conscious of  an object that I can 
account  for  it.  Yielding  to  my  curiosity,  the  object  is  known  by  me.  My  curiosity, 
however, before the world, which is “not-I,” perceives the object without reaching an 
understanding of  its reason for being. This curiosity, if  it undergoes a transformation 
process, becomes what I call epistemological curiosity and may perceive not only an 
object but also the relationships among objects, allowing me to realize their reasons for 
being.11 
As  Adriano  Nogueira  explains,  this  relational  loop  activated  by  curiosity  is 
related  to  the  ‘poietic spirit’  [espíritu  poyético] that  Freire  attaches  to  the  pedagogical 
process. It is ‘through the work of  curiosity that objectives appear, laid bare within their 
10  If it seems that the notion of relation appears here subtracted from Nature, de'cient in all of the 
ethological aspects that it evidently should also carry, that is indeed the case. For better or worse I am  
bracketing relation as a purely subjective, humanising (scienti'c, political, artistic and erotic) capability.  
Nonetheless,  I  still  hope  that  the  notion  remains,  if  not  consistent,  at  least  minimally  resonant  with 
Hallward’s de'nition: ‘[b]y “relation” I mean a process that operates terms, in such a way as to condition 
or inHect (but not fully to generate) the individuality of each term. A relation is only a relation in this sense  
if its terms retain some limited autonomy with respect to each other. A relation is only a relation if it is  
between terms that can be meaningfully discerned, even if the means of this discernment proceed at the 
very limit of indiscernment’; see Peter Hallward,  Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation 
(London: Verso, 2006), p. 153.
11 Freire, Letters to Cristina, p. 182 (translation modi'ed).
300
fabric of  interactions.’ For Nogueira, Freirean epistemology ‘is a way of  facing curiosity, 
a way of  dealing with the corporeality of  epistemology [un modo de tratar la corporalidad de  
la epistemología]’. Combining subjectivity, dialogue and corporeality, Freire develops such 
curious, epistemological objectivity, which allows him to ‘come out of  himself, into the 
world.  Relating,  weaving,  proposing threads  of  intelligibility.  Searching for the  raison 
d’être of  objects and phenomena.’12
All of  which brings us back to Bloch’s  Realstaunen,  the ‘astonishment’ or ‘amazement’, 
which, as we saw in chapter 2, can be correlated with Freire’s ‘curiosity’. Most crucially 
though, just like in Freire, for Bloch this notion implies a movement outwards, from the 
inside  of  the  subject,  reaching  towards  the  world  outside.  As  Jameson  points  out 
‘[a]stonishment is therefore for Bloch […] one of  the most concrete possible modes of 
our being-in-the-world, the correlative, on the subjective side, of  an objective disposition 
of  the world itself.’13
Astonishment, which is at the heart of  a humanising, creative urge, provides a 
second term in the subjective dialectic, wherein the cogito begins in a too-closeness of  
complete darkness. 
Just as the darkness of  the lived instant represents one pole of  conscious anticipation 
and of  the anticipatory disposition of  the world as well, so also material astonishment 
[Realstaunen] […] constitutes the other. […] [Astonishment] is the very source or origin 
of  the world itself, ever at work and ever hidden away within the darkness of  the lived 
instant.14  
Just as in Freire, this dialectic that passes from the darkness of  the lived moment 
12 Adriano S. Nogueira, ‘Prefacio’,  Cartas a Cristina: ReIexiones sobre mi vida y mi trabajo, trans. by Stella 
Mastrángelo & Claudio Tavares Mastrángelo, 3rd edn (México, DF: Siglo XXI, 2008), p. 13.
13 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 122.
14 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, pp 353-354 (quoted in Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 122).
301
(Badiou’s  ‘voided  animal’)  to  astonishment/curiosity  (or,  again,  Badiou/Beckett’s 
‘imperative of  saying’)  indexes  an internal  temporality––a both anxious  and creative 
noise-inside. But, most importantly, astonishment, its impulse for creative shaping, is, for 
Bloch, what leads the subject’s movement from the inside back to the outside, from the I 
to the We:
[b]ut exactly here, totally inside, nothing can happen just by itself. The impulse, as it  
collects and appears on a higher level, must be unsel'sh and communal. It must transfer 
into commonality, moving outward from here to understand what is urgent, brightening. 
The egoistic I remains imprisoned within itself, but for the spark in us, once we bring 
ourselves to it, the purer, higher life will certainly become urgent and bright.15 
And, clearly, this We is none other than Bloch’s name for relation.
Noise as (subtractive) resistance
Noise  in  this  sense,  might  be  the  ‘means  of  production’  of  education.  As  for  the 
usefulness (or otherwise)  of  this  notion of  noise:  my contention is  that,  today,  noise 
constitutes the only bastion strong enough to resist the onslaught of  late capitalism. And 
this is simply because noise, from the capitalist-market's point of  view, has no use value 
whatsoever: the production of  noise is immanently subversive, inasmuch as it produces 
innen- and um-subjects that are completely indigestible to capitalism. This indigestibility 
represents the subtractive face of  noise (on the side of  an ontology woven on the void);  
but noise, being educational, is also immanently relational (on the side of  the subjective 
production of  a new logic). 
15 Ernst Bloch,  The Spirit of Utopia (1964), trans. by Anthony A. Nassar. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 203-04.
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Noise remains subversive, less by its destructive potential, than by managing to remain 
altogether ontologically subtractive and logically relational.
7.1. From Being to Appearing: Relation and the Activation of Temporality
The appearance of relation
Ultimately,  however,  Badiou  might  have  eventually  answered  Hallward’s  concerns. 
After all, in Badiou’s system the mathematical non-relational ontology of Being and Event 
is supplemented with the inherently relational onto-logy (i.e., the logic of appearing) of its 
companion text, Logics of Worlds. This development happens by way of Badiou’s coming 
to terms with ‘Set Theory’s rival theory regarding mathematical foundations: category 
theory’.16 As Tzuchien Tho explains,
[i]f the rallying call of [Badiou’s two volume Being and Event] project is the equation 
“mathematics = ontology” then we might schematically align one sort of mathematics 
with each of the volumes. Pertaining to the 'rst volume, set theory, or more precisely 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC), is the mathematics relating 
to ontology with respect to being-as-such. On the other hand, for the second, LW, it is  
category theory that will provide the theory of beings, or the theory of appearance.17
Badiou  here  steps  out  of  the  realm of  being  into  the  phenomenal  world  of  
appearing: something like a phenomenology, albeit one with a very Badiouian twist: an 
onto-logy, a logic of appearing (the term ‘logic’, too, will have for Badiou a very speci'c 
meaning). ‘Category theory formalises the abstract structures of set theory by means of 
16 Badiou, BO p. x.
17 Tzuchien Tho, ‘Category Theory’, Dictionary, pp. 40-7 (pp. 40-1).
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graphs (i.e. nodes (or objects) and arrows (or morphisms): it is a theory of functions––
which is  to  say,  a  theory of  relations).’18 In  other  words:  whereas  Badiou’s  ontology is 
unabashedly non-relational (‘the only relation is belonging’), his  phenomenological logic of  
appearance is intended as relational.
Hallward’s reckoning, however, is that this phenomenological current seems to 
carry Badiou adrift towards Spinozist-Deleuzian waters––which would be something of 
an alien territory.
We might say that the shifting of  Badiou’s  attention from the being of being to the 
appearing of being already implies a shift in priorities that brings him closer to Deleuze 
than ever before: from now on, the ultimate reference to ontological inconsistency or 
“chaos”  will  always  be  mediated  by  the  exploration  of  precise  ontic  strata  or 
“complexity,” in roughly the sense made current by complexity theory.19
Without  completely  disagreeing  on  this,  it  might  nevertheless  be  possible  to 
retune Hallward’s assertion by positing that (1) Badiou’s ‘ontological inconsistency’ is 
related to noise, rather than to chaos (and noise and chaos are not the same thing); and (2) 
we would be on safer (Badiouian) grounds by exploring information theory, rather than (the 
slightly too vitalist) complexity theory.
Transitivity, reexivity, symmetry, anti-symmetry: order ⊨ time
The key formal distinction between being and the logic appearing (or onto-logy) is here 
operated by the notion of  orderliness. In Badiou, the distinction between ontology and 
onto-logy hinges in the difference between ordered and unordered sets. 
Most crucially though, as we saw, it is precisely in the passage from being to 
18 Badiou, BO p. 163.
19 Hallward, Badiou p. 298.
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appearing that ‘relation’ emerges within Badiou’s system. What is more, Badiou even 
explicitly formalises the notion: relation is an ordering obeying three dispositions, viz., 
reHexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry.
A relation between elements of a set A is an order-relation, written ≤, if it obeys the 
following three axiomatic dispositions:
a. ReHexivity: x ≤ x.
b. Transitivity: [(x ≤ y) and (y ≤ z)] → (x ≤ z)].
c. Antisymmetry: [(x ≤ y) and (y ≤ x)] → (x = y)].
Antisymmetry is what distinguishes order from equivalence, and what allows us truly to 
enter the domain of the relation between non- substitutable singularities.20
Therefore,  time––which is  homeomorphic  with entropy,  i.e.  with  order  itself––cannot 
belong in the unordered, isentropic domain of ontology. It is only in the ordered world  
of appearance that an entropic temporality emerges, and therefore where the (ontological)  
void transduces as (physico-phenomenological) noise.
Causal sets, or, the ontology of entropy
Orderliness,  then,  mobilises  the  frozen  time  of  ontology,  opening  the  possibility  of  
thinking an entropic temporality: the crucial thing is that it can do so within the language of  
set theory. What this means is that, in order to think the temporalising passage of the void 
to noise and entropy, we might not have to enter (yet) the slightly alien territories of  
‘complexity theory’, as Hallward reckons.
Albeit entirely speculative, the notion of a temporality  consistent with set theory, 
could nevertheless  'nd its  scienti'c conditioning in  what  is  known as  the  Causal  Set  
20 Badiou, LW p. 158.
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hypothesis, part of the recent theoretical explorations in search of a theory of quantum 
gravity.
Its main developer and proponent is physicist Rafael Sorkin, who introduced the 
concept in a collaborative paper in 1987, proposing ‘that space-time at the smallest 
scales is in reality a causal set: a locally 'nite set of elements endowed with a partial 
order corresponding to the microscopic relation that de'nes past and future.’21
The mathematical framework which causal sets, or causets, give rise to is what 
Sorkin calls  a ‘dynamics of  sequential growth’, wherein ‘time is  an active process of  
“becoming” that can be identi'ed with the continual birth of new elements of the causal  
set’.22 There is no question of delving into the mathematical intricacies of the theory 
here––however, its generic ‘conceptual simplicity’ as Sorkin himself puts it, provides by 
itself  very  powerful  tools  to  help  us  navigate  our  way  out  of  the  timelessness  of 
subtractive ontology into the temporal, noisy oceans of phenomenological appearing, 
without loosing consistency with our set theoretical grounding:
[a] causet, to be more precise, is a discrete set of elements––the basic spacetime building 
blocks or “elementary events”. But whereas in the continuum, spacetime is described, 
mathematically speaking, by an elaborate web of relationships among the point-events 
carrying  information  about  contiguity,  about  smoothness,  and  about  distances  and 
times,  for the elements  of  a causet  the only relational information we have is  what 
mathematicians call a “partial (or quasi-) order”––for some pairs x, y of elements (not 
for all!) we have the information that x comes before y, or, in other cases, that x comes 
after y. Physically, you should think of this ordering as a microscopic counterpart of the 
macroscopic relation of before and after in time: For some events, we know that they 
take place after certain other events. (The word “causal” comes in because we say that 
21 Luca Bombelli et al., ‘Space-Time as a Causal Set’, Physical Review Letters 59:5 (Aug 1987), pp. 521-24 
(p. 521).
22 Rafael Sorkin, ‘Geometry from order: causal sets’, Einstein Online 2:1007 (2006) <http://www.einstein-
online.info/spotlights/causal_sets@set_language=en.html> [accss. 17 Jun 2019].
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an event is later than another event if the latter could exert a causal inHuence on the 
former).23
As Badiou’s logic of appearance implies, it might have suf'ced to introduce the 
notion of order into the unordered sets of ontology to 'nd ourselves in the worlds of 
appearing.  What  I  am  positing  then,  is  that  orderliness  brings  to  ontology  the 
temporality that it lacked, hence rendering it into a logic of appearing. The structure of 
causets provides a mathematical framework that can keep notions such as entropy and 
irreversibility  still  abstract  enough––still  desutured from a  physis that  would  made it 
unacceptable in a Badiouian framework––to allow for the possibility of  thinking the 
event and the intervention of the subject. 
The void may yet 'nd its most faithful translation to noise within the framework 
of causets.24 And even more importantly: allowing the entry of these notions will have 
made  room  for  constructing  a  solid  foundation  from  where  to  think  the  issue  of 
relationality. 
All  the same, we still  require some sort of  logic determining the appearance of these 
relations. Badiou, as we already know, opts for Category Theory as the mathematical 
inscription for his Greater Logic of Appearance.
Would it be possible, however, to propose an alternative logic, one which could, 
23 Ibid.
24 ‘What  is  remarkable  is  that  this  structure  alone  suf'ces  to  reproduce  (to  a  high  degree  of  
approximation) everything that we mean by the geometry of spacetime’ (Sorkin, ibid); see also Sumati  
Surya, ‘The causal set approach to quantum gravity’, arXiv:1903.11544v1 [gr-qc] (27 Mar 2019), [accss. 
17 Jun 2019]. Moreover, entropy is still  a crucial building block in the search for a uni'ed theory of  
quantum gravity––as David Reid explains, ‘the laws of black hole mechanics are identical to the laws of 
thermodynamics. […] In traditional thermodynamics the concept of entropy is best understood in terms 
of  discrete  quantum states;  not  surprisingly,  attempts  to  better  understand  the  reasons  for  this  area 
identi'cation using classical gravity fail. It is widely expected that only a quantum mechanical approach 
will produce a satisfactory explanation. For this reason, black hole entropy is an important topic for most  
approaches  to  quantum  gravity’  (David  D.  Reid,  ‘Introduction  to  causal  sets:  an  alternate  view  of 
spacetime structure’,  arXiv:gr-qc/9909075v1 (22 Sep. 1999), [accss. 17 Jun. 2019]).
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'rst and foremost, provide a direct line from the ontology of the void to the logic of 
noise? And secondly, is there a logic which could “'x” Badiou’s slightly intuitive notion 
of randomness and chance (as in Brassier’s criticism cited earlier)? 
After all, Badiou himself accepts that, regarding the appearance of being, there is no 
reason why a particular logic should be necessarily unique.25
7.2. Extempore: a Probabilistic Logic of Appearance
Set-theory ontology and a probabilistic logic of appearance
Noise has been posited throughout this essay as the (phenomenological) appearance of the 
(ontological)  void of  being.  However,  and probably more interesting, could it  be that 
noise resides at the hinges between being and appearing? That it is a result of the passage 
from being to appearing?
For a start, noise, as we saw earlier, is liable to abstract formalisation. If Badiou’s 
ontology establishes that the void can be inscribed as a matheme (the mark ∅) noise too, 
can be mathematically (i.e. ontologically) thought within the formalised framework of 
information entropy.
Noise and the void share an important trait: they can only be grasped subtractively. The 
overall  (speculative)  relation  between  set  theory  and  probabilistic  logic  could 
schematically be illustrated thus:
25 See Badiou, BO p. 67.
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set theory <=> probabilistic logic
counting-for-one amounts to the 
operation of  oneness:  it  does  not 
deploy  the being of  the one:  it 
structures  presentation  and 
representation.
the  one  equals  maximum 
certainty,  it  is  an  operator 
which  presents  the  result  of 
choice, structured by chance.
once  an  element  is  counted,  it 
passes on to knowledge
once  there  is  a  result  of  1,  it 
passes on to  information,  on the 
side of the message.
each  and  every  element  is  a 
result of a count-for-one (though 
some  elements’  elements  may 
not).
each  and  every  element 
carries, from an original binary 
(probabilistic)  choice  0/1,  the 
mark  of  a  1  (a  con'rmed 
outcome).
the void is the proper name of 
being; pure inconsistency: ∅
0  names  the  impossible; 
maximum uncertainty: ∞
A notable aspect emerging here is that maximum uncertainty (indexed by the 
void, ∅) can be marked with ∞. Unsurprisingly so, we can perceive that noise emerges 
in the hinges between the void and the in'nite. 
oneness <=>  maximum certainty
knowledge <=> information
count-for-one <=> con'rmed outcome
the void ∅ <=> maximum uncertainty (noise) → ∞
A noisy logic of knowing
The  important  point  to  make  is  that  probabilistic  logic,  which  belongs  to  the 
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mathematical  ontologisation  of  Shannon  et  al.  (in  turn,  principal  condition  of 
Malaspina’s thought) does comply with Badiou’s conditions for a “proper” Logic: ‘[l]et 
logic be what makes the science of appearing an intrinsic dimension of Being. On the other 
hand, let mathematics be the science of Being qua Being.’26
Logic  should  'rst  and  foremost  be  a  mathematical  thought  of  what  a  universe  of 
relations is; or of what a possible situation of Being is, insofar as it is thought in its  
relational coherence;  or of  what  Being-there is,  as  the connected essence of  Being’s 
ineluctable localization.27
For Badiou,  ‘there is no reason why logic, which is the thought of  appearing, 
should be unique. The linkage form of  appearing, which is the manifestation of  the 
“there” of  Being-there,  is  itself  a manifold.’28 In other words,  Badiou allows for the 
possibility that multiple logics articulate the appearance of  beings in a world: it seems 
theoretically  possible,  then,  to  complement  Badiou’s  (Category-based)  Logic  with  a 
Probabilistic Logic without committing any inconsistency.29
However,  would  a  probabilistic  logic  still  remain  a  logic  of  appearing?  (i.e.  tending 
towards a Badiouian  phenomenology)?  It might seem that the inclusion of this element, 
information,  might befoul  the whole project with the stench of  epistemology.  That being 
said––and in order to keep the discourse consistent with Malaspina––I will posit that it  
would be something like a logic of knowing, and hence tending towards a noisy epistemology:
26 Badiou, BO pp. 163-64.
27 Badiou, BO p. 165.
28 Badiou, BO p. 167.
29 Indispensable  bridges  connecting  Category  theory  and  Probability  theory  are  currently  being 
constructed;  see  for  example:  Alex  Simpson,  ‘Probability  Sheaves  and  the  Giry  Monad’ 
<https://coalg.org/mfps-calco2017/calco-papers/calco2017-1.pdf>[accss. 19 Apr 2019];  
Prakash Panangaden, ‘Probabilistic Relations’ 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=E39D8A51591B67D26ADBDFFFDBD05E
0A?doi=10.1.1.52.4840&rep=rep1&type=pdf>[accss. 19 Apr. 2019]; David Mumford, ‘The Dawning of 
the Age of Stochasticity’, Mathematics: Frontiers and Perspectives (proceedings, 2000), pp. 197-218.
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set theory (ontology, being)
 category theory (logic of appearing) information theory (logic of knowing)
As  we  can  gauge  from  the  above  diagram,  this  model  requires  that  we 
supplement set theory (ontology) and category theory (onto-logy) with a mathematical 
probabilistic logic. Considering that this “logic of knowing” will have been conditioned 
by  information  theory,  it  will  have  to  be  the  probabilistic  formalisation  utilised  by 
Shannon et al., viz. statistical mechanics.
The heart of the matter lies here in the hinge between the notions of  impossibility and 
improbability.  Which  is  something  that,  of  course,  pertains  to  the  appearing  of  the 
(impossible,  improbable)  event  and––this is  crucial––to the fact  that the latter’s truth 
depends  on  a  subjective  trajectory  imbued  with  randomness  and  noise––therefore, 
subject to irreversibility and temporality––viz., subject to the laws of thermodynamics. 
And ultimately, the fact that ‘probabilistic notions are needed to make sense of 
statistical mechanics’, is due to the fact that ‘the second law of thermodynamics, which 
in its original formulation says that certain processes are impossible, must, on the kinetic 
theory,  be  replaced  by  a  weaker  formulation  according  to  which  what  the  original 
version deems impossible is merely improbable’ but, most importantly, 
in asking about the status of probabilities in statistical mechanics, the familiar dichotomy 
between  epistemic  probabilities  (credences,  or  degrees  of  belief)  and ontic  (physical)  
probabilities is insuf'cient; the concept of probability that is best suited to the needs of  
statistical mechanics is one that combines epistemic and physical considerations.30
30 Wayne  C.  Myrvold,  ‘Probabilities  in  Statistical  Mechanics’,  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Probability  and  
Philosophy, ed. by Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hájek (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2016) pp. 573-
600, doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.26.
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All of  this points to a divided notion of  probability, viz. an epistemic notion relating to 
the degrees of  belief, and an aleatoric notion which ‘attributes probabilities to events in 
the world, such as the toss of  a coin, which they are thought to possess independently of 
our knowledge or belief ’.31 
So, which notion is in operation in the concept of  noise-as-uncertainty that I am 
proposing here?  Belief  or ontic? My wager is that the notion of  noise-inside alluded to 
earlier (and, as we know, akin to Malaspina’s  ‘mental state of  noise’) somehow delivers 
an Alexandrian blow to the Gordian knot tying determinism, chance and subjectivity.
My  position  in  this  respect,  which––I  want  to  think––harmonises  Badiou’s  and 
Malaspina’s,  does not pretend to enter the highly technical  'elds known as  Statistical  
Relational Learning, the research of  which is focused on Machine Learning and Arti'cial 
Intelligence32––what needs to be maintained is the stress on the  noisy  epistemology: a 
noisy  logic  of  knowing,  stationed  at  the  constantly  trespassed,  perpetually  moving, 
borders of  knowledge. A knowledge (or  information, in Malaspina’s terms) always already 
prone to being noisily punctured by some truth.
7.3. Education, or, the Return of Relation
Noise, or, the rogue object of  relation
31 Ibid.
32 The 'eld of Statistical Relational Learning has been growing since the pioneering work of Lise Getoor,  
Nir  Friedman  and  others,  see  for  example:  Nir  Friedman  et  al.,  ‘Learning  Probabilistic  Relational 
Models’,  Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Arti6cial Intelligence, IJCAI-99  (Stockholm: 
August 1999); Lise Getoor & Ben Taskar (eds.), Introduction to Statistical Relational Learning, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2007); Lise Getoor et al., ‘Probabilistic Relational Models’, ibid. pp. 129-74; Hassan Khosravi 
& Bahareh Bina,  ‘A Survey on Statistical  Relational  Learning’,  Advances  in  Arti6cial  Intelligence,  ed.  by 
Atefeh  Farzindar  & Vlado  Kešelj  (Berlin  & Heidelberg:  Springer-Verlag  2010)  pp.  256-68;  Mathias  
Verbeke, ‘Statistical  Relational Learning of Natural  Language’ (unpublished PhD thesis,  KU Leuven, 
Faculty of Engineering, 2014).
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Noise touches on the artistic (Kane, Cox, Hainge et al.), on the scienti'c (Malaspina), on 
the political (Goodman, Attali),33 and on love (Lacan, Reik, Didier-Weill, Quignard):34 
noise seems to be able to in-'ltrate (or rather inter-'ltrate) through the conditions of 
thought,  exactly  in  the  manner  which  was  required  earlier  on  for  the  Subject  of 
Education: Noise, itself un-de'nable and void, is a blind spot that can only be circled 
around  by  language/thought,  a  primordial  nakedness  which  we  have  conceptually 
wrapped––as excess, as symptom, as differance, as virtuality, as event and so on––and 
that,  precisely  because  of  its  voidness,  passes  through  the  walls  of  all  possible 
subjectivities. 
Noise is the turmoil produced by the passing of  what Levi Bryant calls a ‘rogue 
object.’35 Hence,  relations  are  made  and  remade  in  its  passing.  Noise,  as  this  inter-
subjective movement, becomes the phantasmatic being of  relationality (as Hainge would 
want it to be) through the appearing (or existence) of  its movement. 
 Noise, as the 'rst ever subjective resonance of  the ontological void, is what forces 
the logic of  education: an education by truths, and an education in noise.
Education is noise, education is relation
If  Serres, taking an exact opposite view from Badiou, asserts that ‘[r]elation is creative 
[and] that relation precedes being’36, it is Henri Atlan who pushes relationality closer to 
the idea of  an education in noise that I have been arguing throughout this essay. 
33 See Steve Goodman,  Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2010).
34 See Theodor Reik, 'The Shofar', Ritual: Four Psychoanalytic Studies, trans. by Douglas Bryan (New York: 
Grove Press, 1962) pp. 221-305.
35 Levi Bryant, ‘Rogue Objects’, Larval Subjects (May 2011) 
<https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/05/25/rogue-objects/> [accss. 5 Sept 2018].
36 Michel Serres (interviewed by Peter Hallward), ‘The science of relations: an interview’,  Angelaki 8:2 
(2003), pp. 227-238 (p. 234).
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Thinking of  education ‘as an echo of  the theory of  organisation by redundancy 
and variety’ [l’organisation par redondance et variété], Atlan engages the question of  ‘an ethics 
of  relations between theory and practice’ [une éthique des rapports entre théorie et pratique], 
seen, respectively, as ‘a laxist indifferentiation of  the possible [une indefférenciation laxiste des  
possibles] and rigorous differentiation of  the complexity of  the Real.’37  What this means 
is that
in the in'nitely open place of  nascent theorisations, all possibles are equivalent. They 
can all  be, a priori,  deducible from each other,  constituting an immense tautological 
thought  [une  immense  pensée  tautologique]––unformulated––,  an  initial  redundancy  over 
which the work of  critical formulation, intermediary between theorisation and practice, 
will have produced its (self ?) organising effect.38 
Atlan projects an education which, albeit starting programmatically in the infant, 
gradually allows for the ‘non-directed learning, characteristic of  self-organised systems’ 
to take over. ‘In the order of  thought, non-directed learning is active within intellectual 
and artistic enquiries. It permits the integration, ostensibly paradoxical, of  the radically 
new, thus contributing, amongst adults,  in the creation of  culture’.39 
In  this  manner,  Atlan  separates  the  notion  of  ‘creation’  from  that  of 
‘transmission’.
7.4. Coda
Might  education,  in the sense that I am trying to elaborate here, be the name of  this  
missing element, relation?




In  lieu  of  a  conclusion,  I  will  present  here  a  'nal  conjecture:  if  it  is  true  that,  as 
Hallward asserts, relation has been foreclosed from modern (continental) critical thought 
(of  which both Badiou and Deleuze, of  course are crucial players), could it be so that  
relation returns as the Real voice of  Education?
In the end––and seemingly denying any reason to Hallward’s anxieties––implied in the 
above quotes there seems to be something like a return of  relation in French thought 
after all: on one side, Serres’ positing of  an ontologically-grounded relationality, and on 
the  other  Atlan’s  elaboration  on  a  pedagogical  methodology  of  relations.  Hallward, 
however, is right to be dissatis'ed: insofar as they are lacking a notion of  Subject, Truth 
and  event,  these  positions  remain  (from  a  Badiouian  perspective  at  least)  slightly 
de'cient.
What I argue, then, is that each and every one of  these relational scenarios––
which,  being  relational,  all  imply  a  temporality  of  sorts––will  always  require  the 
supplementation of  an event, of  a subject and of  a truth, if  that relational temporality is ever  
to emerge as such. And it is of  course Badiou who, with regards to this, points in the right 
direction: ‘[s]ince the site is a 'gure of  the instant, since it only appears to disappear, true 
duration can only be that of  consequences’.40 
It is exactly here where an education by truths intervenes: education is precisely the  
caring of  this post-evental duration; or better still: education is the tending of  the time produced by the  
subjective investigation of  the consequences of  the event.
Such duration, produced by the random, truth-gathering process of  the subject 
opens  up  the  temporal  interval  wherein  education  emerges.  Being  immanently 
dialogical, education insures that the truth process remains praxial and relational. Noise 
is both the result and the environment of  this inter-subjective movement. And insofar as 
40 Badiou, LW p. 369 (my emphasis).
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noise is the movement of  the void (or the void-in-time), the former guarantees that the 
latter still remains as the phantasmatic being of  relationality. 
Education is unlawful
Education is inter-subjective work: it therefore, makes noise. And as long as this noise 
keeps its bias on the void, it will always already be indigestible to the state: it will have 
been  intrinsically  value-less.  Such  lack  of  value  originates  in  its  undecidability:  ‘[t]he 
undecidable  statement  is  properly  valueless,  but  that  is  the  price  that  enables  it  to 
contravene  the  laws  prescribed  by  a  classical  economy.’41 In  other  words,  this 
valuelessness is what provides noise with both its power and its freedom (which is the 
reason why it requires the ethical containment of  unnameability).
All  of  which brings us back to the notion of  unlawfulness and to the theme of  the  
Socratic  corruption  of  the  youth.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Julia  Kristeva’s  ‘abjection’ 
resonates once again, insofar as, in all respects,
[t]he abject is related to perversion. The sense of abjection that I experience is anchored 
in  the  superego.  The  abject  is  perverse  because  it  neither  gives  up  nor  assumes  a 
prohibition, a rule, or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes 
advantage of them, the better to deny them.42
Education, then, functions as the pastoral carer mentioned earlier inasmuch as it 
involves the tending of  this abjection that the subject (or, rather, their superego) will  
inevitably sustain in their continual exposure to the disorder, uncertainty and lawlessness 
of  noise.
41 Badiou, C, p. 114.
42 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 15.
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Education in noise
Education, for it to be a minder of  the subject’s trajectory with regards to a truth, must 
make sure that the murmuring of  noise is constantly turned “on”. In other words: the 
subjects of  an education by truths––not only educators and educands, as prescribed by 
the Freirean canon, but also artistic works (as prescribed by Badiou’s theory of  the artistic 
subject)––will need to venture beyond the borders of  established knowledge and learn 
how to navigate the edge of  the void, dwell at the threshold of  noise and face up to the 
abject uncertainty and anxiety thereof. 
Getting used to the hazard––which is no more than a description of  courage––
and keep going: noise, both inside and outside, must become the natural environment of 
an education by truths. 
Noise is the thread which allows us not only to trespass the epistemological borders of 
individuated 'elds  (education,  science,  politics,  performance),  but  also to  osmotically 
“'ltrate into the subject”, so to speak, traversing in either direction from the outside to 
the inside, from Umwelt to Innenwelt, and back again.
Improvisation as musical education by noise
But how might all of this speculative con'guration actually work out in the practical 
materiality of  the world? Granted, this is a purely theoretical thesis, neither expectant 
nor deserving of any donation of practice––having said that, let us observe something like 
an  abstract  case  study.  Let  us  take,  say,  the  musical  situation  and  perform  our 
shizductive translations therein. 
317
There are, in fact, only two subjects of truth at work here:  composition and improvisation. 
Noise  itself,  as  we  know,  is  un-presentable as  such:  therefore,  its  edge  can  only  be 
approached, on one side by a repetitive reHexion––the formal algebra of composition––
and, on the other side, by an asymptotic approximation––the procedural topology of 
improvisation. Composition and improvisation name, in their dialectical conjunction, 
the foundational operation bestowing material consistency to the aural elements inhabiting 
the  ‘edge  of  the  musical  void’,  i.e.  the threshold  of  noise. This  is  a  set  including only 
elements which minimally determine any pure presentation of consistent sound, elements 
at  the  horizon  of  music––a  musicality  without  musicianship.  The  subjects  of 
composition  and  improvisation,  exclusive  surveyors  of  such  musical  evental  sites, 
(in)form music by plucking sound elements from the threshold of noise, and thereupon 
set  the  stage  for  a musical  event to  happen.  Such is  the  setting of  a  'rst  normative  (or 
prescriptive) stage.43 
Let us now take the particular case of an improvisational situation. An event 
might therein happen (as we know, everything starts with the event). It is here an illegal,  
hazardous appearance of the musical void itself. It appears as noise in a Heeting rupture 
of musicality, and immediately disappears, either in its anomaly, or in its accession to 
the name “music”: an event, as we know, is  dissipative. Being dissipative, (de)formative, 
the event––noise––requires some sort of (in)forming: this has to be done by a retroactive 
act of nomination. Now, if for Badiou, the nomination of the event is always poetical, in 
the case of the musical situation, nomination is articulated in immanence to its aural materiality: it 
is af'rmed within the horizon of the musical poetics available to the musical language of  
the situation.  Naming the event, as far as the subjects of improvisation are concerned, 
43 Which is, I maintain, not inconsistent with Ruda’s af'rmation that ‘there is a philosophical act that 
today has to take the form of the operation of forcing’ (For Badiou, p. 132).
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implies then the material musical articulation of any hazardous crack in musicality. Echoes, 
or traces left by this singularity are presented explicitly in the listening loop of musical 
thoughts circulating within the improvisational situation.44 Education intervenes at this 
point  by  becoming  a  resonant  topology  surrounding  the  subject’s  (neg)entropic 
af'rmation––which, from the point of view of the situation, is, as yet, un-imaginable and 
un-symbolisable:  hailing  from  outside  generic  musicality,  there  is  absolutely  no 
musicianship  (i.e.,  no  knowledge)  for  it.  It  is,  from the  point  of  view  of  the  musical 
establishment (i.e.  from the point  of  view of  the  state),  noise.  This  subjective  act  of 
nomination  involves  an  impossible  inaugural  translation  of  the  ontological void  into 
phenomenological noise. It is the 'rst torsion of (neg)entropy, the turning-on of temporality,  
the start of subjective labour. Education here ampli'es the subject’s a-legal  naming of a 
new (possible) musical  truth, it  bolsters  the declaration of  the musical  existence of  the 
noise-event.  The  nature  of  this  'rst  intervention  is  translational,  schizductive.  Its 
operation, at the borders of ontology and phenomenology, is liminal.
But for a musical truth to appear, the sole material articulation of the resonance of 
an event is not enough: there needs to be a recognition of its implicative nature: how is it 
changing the musical appearance of the situation? What are the musical consequences? 
If we include this noise in this particular musical situation: how does it bring about a new 
musicality, and with it, a new law—what is this new coherence? (Does it imply a  just 
musicianship?).  A  musical  education  by  noise  will  draw  all  possible  consequences 
(potentially in'nite) from such articulation, 'ltering an algebra for the collective thinking 
of a new law which will musically  form the (up to now) formless. Such informing is the 
negentropic work of the musical subject. The nature of this second intervention is logical, 
inasmuch  as  its  trajectory,  though  indiscernible,  implies  that  the  noise-event, 
undecidable  for the situation, has been decided and a new musicality is in place. It is, 
44 Which might, of course, consist of a single performer.
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hence, the production of what I have termed logical noise and it implies  a second stage in 
normativity.
The  third  intervention  requires  education  to  provide  a  consistency,  an 
organisation,  and  an  ethics  of  care45 towards  the  inevitable  anxiety  caused  by  the 
proximity of the real of noise; education signals an ethical trajectory doubly modulated 
by, on one channel a register of courage, which impels the subject to “keep going” (“don't 
give up, fail better, get on with it”) in spite of the paralysing lack of a law and, on the 
other, by a register of  justice, which oversees the construction of a new law, subtracted 
from any terrorising superego: the Truth of the event itself must remain unnameable. 
Education thus takes, along with the subject, full responsibility for the latter’s breaking 
of the law (education is a-legal). 
Improvisation is never musical communication, but the collective construction of 
a musical truth; it is never self-expression, but the subjective subtraction of the ego in 
order  to  let  noise  sing  in  its  universal  musicality.  This  subtraction,  this  ‘negative 
capability’ is precisely what becomes conscientização, in the Freirean sense. 
This brief description––and to connect with what was brieHy mentioned in the Preface 
of his thesis, regarding the practical background radiation present throughout it––whilst 
a purely theoretical account, is nothing less than a true outline of the actual praxial work 
conditioning the Noise of the Oppressed.
To speak again in purely theoretical terms: the event, in its evanescence is dissipative,  
entropic; the subject’s trajectory is work: it thus creates a (neg)entropic temporality and, 
as such, the subject’s labour is form-producing as much as it is noise-producing.
Noise  is,  'rst  of  all,  the  epistemological  shockwaves  of  the  event;  the  event 
45 See Bartlett “Refuse become subject” p. 194.
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triggers  the  subject  to  af'rm it  and  to  therein  start  work  on  the  af'rmation  of  its  
consequences;  negentropic  (form-producing)  noise  is  therein  emitted  by  the  work––
which  is  both  logical  and random––of  the  subject:  education  is  no  more  than  the 
amplifying, resonant chamber of  this logical, (neg)entropic noise. And, to repeat, such 
noise is itself  the Noise of  the Oppressed. 
Closing thoughts
The notion  of  an  ‘education  by truths’  such  as  the  one  elaborated  throughout  this 
thesis––wherein it is translated as an “education in noise”––will have redeemed an idea 
of  relationality  which  seems  to  have  been  sacri'ced  for  the  sake  of  subtraction.  If  
Badiou’s subtractive position eschews every relation at the ontological level (except, that 
is, that of  belonging to a set), by making education and philosophy mutually inclusive, and 
by  temporalising  the  ontological  void  through  its  translation  into  (phenomeno-  and 
epistemo-logical) noise, then such non-relational fault can be repaired. And this I claim 
without  the  need  to  abandon  the  key  subtractive  principle  that  every  truth  is 
incommensurable  with  knowledge.  Simply  put,  an  ‘education by  truths’,  hereby 
translated as an “education in noise”, is the philosophical term for relation.
Education, as long as it is an education in noise, involves the collective production of  a 
present, of  a temporality which is by necessity entropic, non-reversible and therefore 
relational (which is why, if  the void happens to appear in such temporalised situation, it 
will have to do so as noise). 
Granted, the subjects of  truth indeed operate in a trajectory that leads them out 
of  this world––i.e. out of  the world determined by the knowledge and the Law of  the 
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State––and hence one which renders them indifferent to any relation with it: however, 
this same trajectory––which it is education’s sole duty to accompany, contain and resonate  
with––concurrently involves the af'rmation and collective composition of  a new world.
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